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Abstract 
The consumerist lifestyle of modernity has had a detrimental impact on the environment. 
In part, this is supported by the traditional philosophical conceptualisation of subjectivity, 
which privileges human subjects from surrounding objects. Concern over our attitude to 
the environment has been present from the beginning of civilisation and particularly since 
the emergence of the industrial revolution. This thesis traces a genealogy of these 
concerns, from the Romantics, to 20th century philosophers such as Heidegger, through 
the political movements of the 1960-1980s and the recognition of pollution, resource 
depletion and climate change by pan global organisations from the 1980s to the present 
day. The changes in epistemology in the wider context of society have influenced the way 
environmental education has emerged. Philosophy informs the way we understand 
subjectivity, language, pedagogy, curriculum, and our understanding of the environment. 
Education also operates in a political context, and the concepts that inform policies 
permeate educational institutions. 
Heidegger's philosophy engages with the scope of the environmental problem, offers a 
critique of modernity, develops a new conceptualisation of subjectivity and the 
relationship between humanity and Being, and an analysis of the impact modem 
technology has mediating that relationship. Heidegger began to develop his ideas on 
technology during the period between World Wars, in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. 
His philosophy was influenced by the Romantic Volk movement, and the ideas of 
Nietzsche, Spengler and Ainger. The tense political surroundings have influenced his 
thinking, in both constructive and detrimental ways. Heidegger remains one of the most 
influential philosophers to engage with the framework of technological modernity and its 
constraints on human subjectivity, and our way of relating to the earth. He challenges 
traditional ontology and epistemology. He raises the status of poetry from mere lyrical 
wordplay to a means of developing a more authentic relationship between beings and 
Beings. I make a critical analysis of his philosophy, to distinguish the elements that 
remain inherently conservative and nationalistic from those that are immanently helpful 
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in throwing light on the dilemma of modem life, and the escalating problem of 
environmental devastation. 
Heidegger's ideas about how technology enframes our understanding of ourselves and 
our environment informs my investigation of the dominant political discourses circulating 
in local, national and global institutions. The discourse of sustainability has shifted from 
the earlier concerns that stimulated 'environmental education' in the 1970s to a 
Neoliberal paradigm of 'education for sustainability' in the 1990s through to the present. 
Conceptual documents that contribute to policy dialogues, by authors such as Anthony 
Giddens and Simon Upton, are critically analysed through the lens of Heidegger's 
philosophy. Neoliberal policy makers tend to encourage managerialism and 
accountability, advocating a technological and economic method of totalising control 
through cost/ benefit and risk analyses. 
Heidegger's philosophy engages with the parameters of modernity and offers a seminal 
critique of our relationship with the environment. Yet Heidegger is himself a product of 
modernity's terror, and his ideas are polluted by nationalism and the philosophical 
tradition he inherited through his own education. When writing, none of us are able to 
extract ourselves from the constraints of the capitalist mode of organising society and the 
technological enframing of the world. Yet, this thesis is an attempt to better define 'lines 
of escape, ' that emerge from the economic paradigm of total surveillance and control. 
This involves a more constructive understanding of the arts, as a means for retreating 
from the threshold of environmental calamity, and reintroducing the wild into our 
language, our self-understanding, and our interactions with the natural world. 
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I Introduction 
The world is too much with us; late and soon, 
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers: 
Little we see in nature that is ours; 
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon! 
This Sea that bares her bosom to the moon; 
77ze Winds that will be howling at all hours 
And are up-gathered now like sleepingflowers; 
For this, for every thing, we are out of tune; 
It moves us not. 
Wordsworth, Poems, 7 
Heidegger's threshold/ is a precarious stopping point, almost overbalanced, a shriek into 
the proximity of nothingness. The /slash topples over, collapsing the line from the 
enigmatic to the fundament, from the transcendental to the immanent. Heidegger's 
threshold is not followed by a colon. There is no gut logic that projects the title from one 
point to its consecutive double, from a state of art to more practical concerns. The 
threshold poises at a moment of bubbling Brownian movement that at some unknown 
moment will transform from its overheated state and seize upon a point of difference, 
erupting into a new paradigm, from liquid to gas, a metamorphosis from the threshing 
anxiety of modem technological consumerism. The -hold is the anxious suppression of 
transmogrification, a careful conservatism, a historic attempt to cool terrible 
revolutionary tendencies. The -hold attempts to maintain a sustainable context for living 
beings. We hold on to the paradigm we know because the transformation, while retaining 
elements of the past, may be unrecognisable and nonwithstandable for a human future. A 
future of caring. Poised almost at the point of no return, Heidegger's threshold/ resounds. 
What is needed is a cooling down. A contemplative, restive wakefulness to what will 
emerge - is always getting on with emerging - rather than the technological challenging 
forth, the bubbling, busy storage of exponentially 'growing' profiteering, the ever- 
increasingly hyperactive cycle of crash and bum economics which, possibly this time, 
will overheat to the point of tipping us all permanently over the edge. Heidegger's crisis 
discourse, the threshing against the technological enframing of modernity, owes fealty to 
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Catholic dogma and anti-urban Romanticisation of the rural lifestyle and community. He 
owes cataclysmic depth to Nietzsche. Any present-day attempt at entrepreneurial 
cynicism at his critique of modernity just contributes to the furnace. 
Heidegger's call is Romantic - he wills us back to the tune of 'Nature. ' It is a risky 
business, with a politics of terror always constraining thinkers of modernity. Eco-poiesis 
may begin afresh, finding the sublime at the face of nothingness, but it will always need 
adapting. Being needs tampering. When we pause to tamper, dream, and think poetically 
- the nihilist threshold both comes closer, and recedes. 
In the face of the global monolith of technology, terror and capitalist oppression, it is 
difficult to make such subtle argument as put forward by the Romantics and later 
Heidegger. The withdrawal from modernity flounders in the prevailing winds of 
rationality, accounting and technological enframing. We are out of tune. Yet perversely, 
hope comes forth from within the dangers posed by the modem paradigm. After more 
than a century of ossification in the harsh Idealist and Positivist climate that has separated 
the mind from the body and the human subject from all natural objects, philosophy and 
pedagogy are ripe for new conceptualisation. Pollution and global warming transgress 
national boundaries and have transformed into the grounding motif driving policy, 
politics, philosophy and pedagogy, around the planet. Highlighting the environment re- 
engages humanity in the task of caring about the ethics of our interaction with ecology. 
At present however, the prevailing paradigm is globalised capitalism, the normalisation 
of mass consumerism and Neoliberal faith in the market. The relationship between 
environment and humanity can often be found in the technological assumptions about 
world resources. My thesis is a polemic for a type of listening, thinking, and enquiring 
into the existence of the 'nature' of ourselves and our ecological environment in a way 
that lets it all 'shine forth' as Heidegger puts it, in its own terms. It is not so much a 
counter-argument, or an alternative systematic treatise but a preparation for a change in 
attitude. When the world is only understood in terms of rationality and calculation then 
the attitude of enquiry into the 'Being' of things is closed off. This attitude is not a- 
political, nor is it Luddite. It does not reinforce the traditional dualism between culture 
and nature, coming down on the side of the wilderness. It is an ecological recognition that 
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we live with/in the ecological environment. Our pretensions to consumerist grandeur are 
a form of alienation that threatens to cross the threshold of planetary conditions that are 
capable of sustaining life. 
This research is a philosophical investigation into the interaction between the 
environment, technology, and human society. The way technology evokes nature as a 
resource is based on the modem philosophical ramifications of traditional Idealism. The 
emerging crisis in the environment is a direct outcome of these utilitarian modes of 
relating to nature. The problems with the environment can potentially stimulate a change 
in the educational reason dWre, crating a new ambiance, a new dynamic, a totally 
different set of motives, and a different metaphysical basis. The codes and symbols that 
constitute human meaningfulness are commensurable with the morphology of natural 
systems. Vectors of communication rely on code; language, DNA, crystalline 
consistency, molecular structures, and shape; the human body, the tree, the limestone 
rock, the lake, the ocean. The question that Heidegger raises about the nature of Being 
begins the process of renegotiating thinking, knowing, and understanding in a way that 
faces up to the limitations of the current educational premises - Liberal autonomy and 
rationalism, managerialism, economic governmentality. The reformulation of the 
premises of education and culture, constitute in important ways, a deepening of 
Humanism, rather than a revolt against it. I look at Heidegger's analysis of the emerging 
environmental crisis and the roles that metaphysics, technology, and epistemology play in 
the relationship between humanity and our environment. Heidegger reconceptualises 
many of the basic premises of modernity. He formulates a renewal of culture by 
recognising authentic enquiry into Being as the basis of human meaningfulness. 
Along with Nietzsche, Heidegger introduces a substantive shift from the philosophical 
tradition largely influenced up until the end of the 20th century by Descartes and his 
separation of the subject from the object. The dominant Cartesian Idealist tradition made 
the world-as-object rely upon human subjective interpretation for its reality. Heidegger 
had a very thorough working knowledge of Greek philosophy and he used the pre- 
Socratics, combined with Nietzsche's philosophy to counter the separation of subject and 
object. From this standpoint he could reimagine a different way in which humanity is 
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embedded in the world, and at the same time, retain a type of Kantian solipsism that 
recognizes the primary importance of time, Being, and subjective nominalist 
understanding. Heidegger's first and most famous book is titled Being and Time, Nvhich 
places prime importance on both time and ontology as the metaphysical basis of 
humanity. Within the finitude of a singular life time, Heidegger's ontological concept of 
subjectivity, Dasein topples towards the future - 'being-there' - consistently anticipating 
and thinking, as well as empirically and materially utilising equipment in an all-absorbing 
'world. ' 
Heidegger's methodology includes going back to the 'origin' of western philosophy in 
Ancient Greek thinking. I Concern about how human society interacts with our 
environment is as old as 'civilisation' in the first place. At the dawn of democracy in 
Ancient Greece, Epicurus (34 1 BC- 270 BCE) was so concerned about the turn towards 
conspicuous consumption in Athens that he created an alternative community, called the 
'Garden' and promoted a simple happy life of friends, freedom and thought as opposed to 
fame, opulence and power. "Luxurious foods and drinks... in no way produce freedom 
from harm and a healthy condition in the flesh. ,2 400 years later such was the concern 
about advertising and consumerism, that Diogenes, a gentleman in a town called 
Oinoanda in Asia Minor erected a massive limestone wall through the marketplace with 
25,000 words of Epicurus' aphorisms designed to encourage people to consider the true 
source of their happiness; "One must regard wealth beyond what is natural as of no more 
use than water to a container that is full to overflowing. ,3 
Heidegger's fon-nulation of the problem of consumerist alienation from a simple and eco- 
friendly lifestyle is a spiritual quest into how best to enquire about the meaning of Being. 
He evokes Heraclitus and Parmenides as making the most original contribution in their 
dynamic concepts of flux and becoming. 4 Heidegger argues, following Nietzsche, that 
Plato draws the originating beginnings of philosophy to a close by removing the truth of 
'Being' from the immanent world and placing it beyond time and space. Any entity is 
1 Cf Irwin, 1999 and Foucault, 1977a 
2 Epicurus cited in de Botton, 2000: 67 
3 Epicurus cited in de Botton, 2000: 67 
4 Heidegger, 1973a 
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henceforth confined to a mere simulacra of the original, and furthermore human beings 
can only represent this simulacra through the logos of language. Being stiffens into an 
alienated representation of the 'Good, ' and the rational calculation of values becomes the 
highest power. Heidegger proposes instead, a return to the earlier concepts of Heraclitus 
and Parmenides in his discussion of physis and aletheia, the becoming and shining forth 
of Being. Like the Romantics, Heidegger advocates an open attitude of observation and 
release, rather than the technological 'challenging forth' of all things as potential reserve 
for consumption in the marketplace. 5 
Heidegger highlights our use of language to show how technological metaphors along 
themes of calculation, efficiency, resource, storage and accumulation are shaping all 
interactions in human society, both in regards to the environment and to each other. 6 
Education remains caught up with this paradigm of positivist calculations, rational 
deductions, efficient inputs, throughputs and outputs, of which Heidegger is so critical. 
Increasingly, education challenges students to develop their potential resource value as 
human capital. The present overt encouragement both in policy and financial backing for 
courses which promote information technology is a good example of the latest use of 
education as an important site for shaping the population for insertion in the 
technological possibilities of the modem circulation of information and resources. 
Analyses of industrial relations by Marx and Weber have provided important concepts for 
understanding the processes that underlie educational institutional and pedagogical 
arrangements. 7 The hidden curriculum for example, domesticates the occupants of 
schools, both teachers and students, to obey timetabling, a trait very handy for an 
industrial economy which runs most efficiently when teams of workers turn up to the 
factory on time to work on synchronized industrial and information processes. These 
practices rapidly become normalized in support of existing social relations, in this case, 
capitalist production, consumerism and information circulation. 
5 Heidegger, 1977a 
6 Heidegger, 1977a 
7 Marx, 1887 and Weber, 1968 
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Education holds a primary position in the practicalities of epistemology and metaphysics. 
Traditionally education has played a role in the type of independent critical evaluation of 
society that this thesis attempts and in comparison to private sector research (which needs 
to sing the tune of the corporation that is paying for the research, the Rand Corporation 
thinktank for example) university research is cushioned to some (limited and 
diminishing) extent from having to conform to predominant political and economic 
pressures. Furthermore, pedagogical relations reflect the dominant conceptualisations of 
subjectivity, as the inter-relationships within and between communities, and between 
subject and environment. Education is by definition the place to educate the population in 
new ways of thinking about human society, and in particular human society in relation to 
the environment but, at the same time, it tends to confirm the prevailing dominant 
discourses. 
For as long as education has been compulsory and universal, it has been apparent that the 
use of certain resources has been causing both scarcity and pollution. Coal, for example, 
had been creating massive atmospheric pollution for a considerable period by the end of 
the 19th century. Marx had highlighted the concurrent dynamic of alienated work 
relations associated with industrialisation that removes the intimate relation of worker 
with their immediate environment. 
Luke argues that the 1920s and 30s were a major historical juncture because the class 
opposition that Marx had analysed underwent a significant change and managed to 
increase the levels of mass production and mass consumption such that the workers were 
complicit in the entrepreneurial process. 8 The critical theory of the Frankfurt School 
became vocal at this time, as were Heidegger and the grassroots v6lkisch movement. 
Heidegger began writing during and after the First World War in a milieu of German 
thinkers who were resisting the increasing reliance on machinery and harking back to a 
type of Romantic period before Liberal modernity. This intellectual milieu highlighted 
the people or Volk instead of the individual as the primary unit of society. The v61kisch 
movement were trying to invent an alternative to the technological corruption they 
Luke, 2003: 246 
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thought was inherent in modernity. 9 Amongst these thinkers were many, such as Ringer 
and Spengler, who interpreted Nietzsche in a manner that regarded violence as 
fundamental and unavoidable. 10 Hitler's National Socialist party also developed from 
these concerns for a Romantic v61kisch tradition. Conservative aspects of Heidegger's 
thought emerge partly from the influences of v61kischness, partly from the anti-modernity 
of the Catholic Church, and partly from his small town Badisch family background. In 
Heidegger's writing, the conservatism often becomes entangled with conservationism and 
both are entwined in the volatile political situation. 
At the same time, Heidegger has to be one of the most important philosophers for those 
people interested in the environment and developing a more ethical human relationship 
towards it. He analysed many of the problems that face us in a world dominated by 
massive global financial transactions that bear little or no relation to either the location of 
production or local profitability where technology has enabled storage capacity and 
massive, global mobility - physically and financially. The deterritorialisation of global 
finance and production has decoupled responsibility for care of people, places, species, or 
ecosystems from the places from which resources are wrested. 
Heidegger's theory is tinged with a sense of desperation that humankind is trapped in the 
momentum of the history of western metaphysics and is mired in the depths of nihilism. 
In the context of a prewar discourse that romanticised the German Volk, Heidegger 
argued that a return to Heimlichkeit or homeliness along with a new aesthetic might offer 
a way out of the technological enframing of our understanding of Being. " He was not a 
Luddite, however; it was not tools or technologyper se that constituted the problem; 
instead he wants humanity to question the ideas embedded in our grammar and linguistic 
metaphors, and to reconsider their working relation to the world and find an authentic 
way to engage with technology. Following the poet H61derlin, Heidegger considered 
technology 'the danger' and the 'saving power. ' 12 
9 cf. Zimmerman, 1990, Young, 1997, Wolin, 1993, Rockmore, 1992 
l" Spengler, 2002, Jünger, 1993 
11 Heidegger, 1977a 
12 Heidegger, 1996 
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Heidegger was bom in 1889 and died in 1976. During the 1980s people began to catch up 
with Heidegger's concerns about the relationship between humanity and environment. 
From a marginalized issue espoused by green hippies, the environment abruptly shifted to 
the centre of a global crisis. An ever widening list, including global warming, 
atmospheric ozone depletion, large scale forest felling at a non-replaceable rate, soil 
erosion and desertification, water pollution, acid rain, population growth, rubbish 
disposal and so on, has caused widespread dismay and a feeling of hopelessness. 
Suddenly the assumption that humanity is in control of technology as though it was 
merely a tool invented in order to make life 'easy' is being inverted. Human evolution is 
no longer assumed to be better and better but instead is possibly heading towards distopia 
or calamity: the consummately managed 'end of history. ' Heidegger's argument is not for 
some teleological historical direction but rather that technology enframes everything. It 
constitutes the discursive and material reality that dominates human society and narrows 
the scope for the subject positions of people to technically referenced individual 
automatons who are naively convinced of their own agency. Modem technological 
individualism withdraws meaning from other, older, and more often than not, communal 
forms of self-understanding. The determinism invoked by the technological frame is not 
easily averted. It is the discovery of any possible options for overturning the paradigm of 
enframing that concerns both Heidegger and contemporary ethics of environmental 
education. 
The contemporary solution to environmental problems has been embedded in the 
discourse of 'sustainability. ' This takes a variety of forms. At one end of the spectrum it 
involves a re ection of capitalism and a return to the Romanticised past. As such, it has 
been a Luddite response that rejects modem technology as the cause of environmental 
problems. On the other end of the spectrum there is an intensification of capitalism that 
measures and standardizes acceptable levels of pollution, combined with a call for 
efficient industry as an outcome of 'green initiatives. ' Here, technology itself is regarded 
as the means by which environmental problems can be 'fixed. ' From a notion on the 
fringe of politics and radical consciousness, the concept of 'sustainability' now dominates 
global policymaking. Moreover, it is arguable that the enframing of technology has 
already become integral to 'sustainability' in principle and practice. 
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Recently, environmental educators have asked how to encourage in society a sustainable 
frame of mind. 13 This task is almost outdated, as the discourse of sustainability pen-neates 
nearly every institutional policy document, from the global to the local. But the way 
'sustainability' has been interpreted means that predominantly, education maintains the 
status quo. Pedagogical practices, institutional structures, architecture, distinctive 
disciplines and assumptions about the essential mind and the largely ignored body all 
remain intact. The social organisation of human society with its emphasis on 
technological economics and efficiency all remains unchallenged. 
In contrast, I intend to investigate the premises upon which humans relate to the 
environment in order to throw the present mode of social relations into question. In turn 
this highlights some of the assumptions and practices perpetuated by education. The task 
is to reformulate education so that it can meaningfully take up the challenge posed by 
environmental problems. Educational institutions cannot, in isolation, begin to change 
lifestyles and attitudes en masse or bring about a sustainable and hopefully more ethical, 
or as Heidegger would put it, a more 'authentic' relation between humanity and the 
planet. However, education does have a responsibility to draw attention to the 
problematic, at a range of levels and across all disciplines. The fundamental approach put 
forth by philosophers of education may inform the policy makers and curriculum 
development, the assumptions about school architecture and school organisation, not to 
mention the prevailing notions about the nature of subjectivity and pedagogy. The kinds 
of curriculum that could emerge from this critique of the metaphysics that has based 
western culture are yet to be thought through. The changes will happen at many levels, 
and at different time periods. It is not a question of imposing a sudden revolution in 
policies and practices. The shift is piecemeal evolution - this thesis is a step in the 
preparation for a profound cultural shift - not a prescriptive set of answers. Yet as far as 
prescriptive suggestions go, the collapse of what I phrase, the Idealist distinction that 
separates mind from body, individual subject from natural objects, immanent events from 
universal Truths, is necessary to the shift in approach in relationship between humanity 
and environment. Part of what is required is the introduction of the socio-culturally 
13 Stables and Scott, 2003 
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inscribed body into all curriculum topics. At the same time, the sociological particulanty 
of each of our physical identities contributes to the metaphors and 'world' we assume is 
true, and towards which we actively contribute. The collapse of the Idealist separation 
between the individual and the natural environment will challenge existing metaphors 
and discourses that characterises individuals as separate free agents, and the domination 
and utilisation and management of nature. 
The concept of sustainability is one of those key phrases that hold within it a contested 
realm. The ten-n lends itself to very different modes of community organisation and self- 
understanding. The way in which the discourse of sustainability is taken up will project 
support for one or other of these modes of organising society, and condition the 
relationship between human beings and the environment. 
'Sustainability' has made an issue of consumerism, and with it the processes and 
premises of capitalism as the organising motif of human society. Many people have relied 
rather lazily upon the possibility of the 'technological fix' to environmental problems. 
Indeed technology may 'fix' sustainability, but not in order 'heal' the environment; rather 
the fix seeks to make static, retain, position, conserve, regenerate and nourish the 
resource base of capitalism. This is the eschatological trajectory of technological 
enframing. It is the 'end of history' with the calculable technicity of supreme rationality 
and the relegation of Earth to a recyclable, renewable, and ultimately replaceable 
resource. It is no longer an issue of how to convince people to accept and promote 
sustainability, but of whether human control, often in the guise of Liberal rationalism, 
will be able ever again to ascertain a wonder at the enigma of earthliness best promoted 
by the Romantics. Or if the demise of Romanticism in the proliferation of comy paintings 
and films of the last frontier, will only be rediscovered in reproduction in larger scale of 
new frontiers; in our case, new planets, new solar systems to terraform in exchange for 
the 'homely, ' if exhausted, ground of this one. 
Heidegger's theory is not limited to notions such as sustainability, which are too easily 
co-opted by the existing dynamics of capitalism. Instead he focuses on the philosophical 
basis of human 'being. ' He looks at the epistemology, and onto-theo-logy (as he terms it) 
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of humanity, and worldliness, and Being itself. 14 He is engaging with the Idealist tradition 
of solipsist nominalism, both agreeing with it and redefining it in new ways. Idealist 
solipsism is best characterised by Descartes' aphorism cogito ego sum, thinking amounts 
to being, or more traditionally translated as 'I think therefore I am. ' The common 
translation sets logical deduction as the path from thinking to being. Logic and 
measurement both forges a connection between the thinking individual and sets the 
individual apart from natural objects. Idealist solipsism forms one of the founding criteria 
of modernity. Heidegger reformulates Descartes aphorism as cogito sum - thinking 
being. The rational deduction is removed, thinking and being are brought together, 
identifying thinking as being, and being as thinking. 15 
In critical contrast to Idealist solipsism Heidegger's philosophy is a reconfiguring of the 
relationship between entities and the basis of Being. He wishes to create a new Beginning 
that avoids the pitfalls of the metaphysical tradition and its social formation. The failure 
of nationalist Nazi Germany to 'begin' a culture that threw light on the Being of the 
earth, the world, and ourselves, casts doubt on aspects of his project. His theory has 
limitations in philosophic and political terms, but nevertheless he also has important 
comments and criticisms of the existing modes of western modernity. 
Nature definitions 
Heidegger sets up a distinction between Being and existence. Being has significance 
because it is apprehendable to the subject, Dasein. Existence is incomprehensible, outside 
our realm of knowledge, it is the phenomena beyond human capability. Yet Dasein is the 
German alliteration for 'existence. ' Is the ineffable existence the equivalent of Nature? 
Certainly the 'real' has qualities beyond human scope, whether it be the existence of 
nature in a time before or after the human species inhabits the earth, or more akin to 
Kant's thing-in-itself 
Nature has been described in a plethora of ways: the essence, the substance, the matter, 
the form, the manifold, as wilderness beyond human control, as the thing-in-itself 
14 Heidegger, 1969b 
15 Heidegger, 1962, book 11 
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intrinsically alien to human subjective comprehension, and as the conditions of 
possibility, the interwoven ecological network. We bump up against the 'reality' of 
nature, especially when our concepts begin to fail in the face of inconsistencies in the 
evidence that supports a particular way of knowing. 'Environment' has ecological and 
objective connotations. It is physical surroundings, the Umwelt, that stretches from the 
immediate and tangible to fields further away. The environment reaches into distances 
that become abstract fields of national and global relations. It reaches beyond the limits 
of oceans, land, and atmosphere, it is the stratosphere, the solar system, galaxies, the 
Universe. The environment goes beyond the imagination. 
What is Nature? What is environment? Each description of the term carries with it aa 
plethora of competing histories, jostling theoretical frameworks, from the mythical, the 
scientific, the manifold, the rational, manifestations of God's will, the intrinsically real, 
the poetic, the political, the material, the sublime. 
Environmentalism includes desires to get closer to nature, to preserve it, to leave it alone, 
to clean it up, and to pass on stewardship of it to next generations. We alternately feel 
possessive, defensive, protective, harmonious, and alienated towards what we blithely 
call the 'environment, ' having very little sense of what the environment actually is. We 
frequently need to be reminded that the term contains no determining sense of what 
actually does surround us, of what place we find ourselves in, of how we may recognize r 
define it, and especially of how we come to value it. 16 
Nature itself is not one fixed whole, not merely properties of the physical - but shifts, 
evolves, transmutes, alters scope, dimension, flows from matter to waves of light and 
back again. Nature refuses to reside in one simple word, one essence, one interpretation 
or one framework. 
In such an unstable set of relations, it is arguably difficult to 'fix' a pathway for ethical 
values. If humanity is merely one species amongst multitudinous ecological assemblages 
we would not be alone in becoming the victim of our own success, over-populating and 
poisoning our ecological niche. We are part of nature. There is no difference between 
urban, rural or wild environments. Environments are dynamic rather than stable and 
fixed. That being the case, Oerlemans proposes that nature does not give any indication 
16 Oerlemans, 2002: 5-6 
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for ethics. "Indeed the fundamental problem in environmentalist thinking is 
understanding the place of humanity and consciousness in the physical order of things. , 17 
Heidegger, Zimmerman, Oerlemans and others end up arguing that not only are we a part 
of nature, we are apart from nature. The distinctive capability of reflective thinking 
objectifies nature as the other, opening a space for ethics, truth, and change. Oerlemans 
quotes Frederick Ferre, 
Unless we appeal to the uniquely personal capacities of the human species, we have no 
leverage for self-restraint, no basis for an eco-logical ethics. Taking a purely organismic 
view of nature, including the human as literally no more than one more 'plain citizen', 
our species should be allowed to live out its 'destiny' without any more moral censure 
than is applied to other species that trample and consume. " 
The separation of subject from object leaps back again, this time as the raison dtat for 
ethics and thinking. There is a blindness for humanity in being objects amongst objects. 
A blind absorption in the evolutionary task of procreation and adaptation. But rather than 
the traditional Idealist separation of the subject-in-itself from the thing-in-itself, it is 
possible to think of humanity is a subject amongst subjects, building in ethical regard for 
otherness. Subjective otherness offers the possibility for an ethics of the environment. 
The thesis is divided into three sections: "Environmentalism and Education"; 
"Heidegger"; "Globalisation and Liberal Modernity. " The initial section is a genealogy of 
environmental ideas, touching briefly on early anthropocentric attitudes, tarrying on the 
grounding critique of modernity by the Romantics, briefly alluding to early Liberal ideas, 
Utilitarianism, and 'second wave' environmentalism. The topic is extremely broad so a 
conventional literature review would have taken too long for the remit of a three year 
research project. My aim is to examine the different ways of framing the relationship 
between humanity and the environment as it is threshed out in theories of the 
environment, politics, and pedagogy and environmental curriculum in education. To do 
this I have picked up main themes, contradicting currents that have repeated and differed, 
continued and adapted over the centuries. 
17 Oerlemans, 2002: 6 
" Ferr6,61 quoted in Oerlemans, 2002: 7 
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Environm entalisms and Education 
"Romanticism" in chapter two, makes an important contribution to reinventing a new and 
more democratic aptitude of world-view. The concept of 'Nature' shifts from the 
Classical rigour of the God-given ordering of the natural world. The critical reception of 
the Romantics has been a frustrating reversion to the separation of human subject from 
natural object that prevails throughout modernity. Thus, the 'lack' or 'presence' of 
politics in the 'pastoral' accounts of Romantic painting and poetry is read as either a 
reactionary, naYve Luddite denial of economic realities, or alternatively as a subjectivist 
over-representation of Nature as sexual, feudal or revolutionary politics. The difficult 
task for the Romantics has been to bring the body, emotions, mind, economics, culture 
and especially 'Nature' into the 'body politic, ' particularly in the context of Georgian 
repression of explicit dialogue in polite society. Nevertheless, Burke's philosophy on 
"The Sublime and the Beautiful" has persuasively shifted philosophical ideas from the 
narrowly conceived phenomenological rationality of the empiricists (especially Locke), 
and the extreme subjectivism of the Idealists (for example Berkeley). Through 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Turner, and other Romanticists, the emotional comportment of 
embodied ethics and the interaction and communication that arises throughout the 
'kingdom of Nature' carries weight with a very few important philosophers, such as 
Heidegger, across the centuries. 
Chapter three starts to look at the forces that encouraged "Environmentalisms; 
Philosophical and Political Trajectories" to emerge more recently and how they have 
begun to impact on cultural ethics, mores, and education. The chapter is an historical 
literature review of influential ideas on the environment. It attempts to provide a 
philosophical overview of the scope of the environmental problem in terms of the human 
world-view, and the dominant theoretical strands addressing environmental and social 
arrangements. The previous chapter alluded to the Judeo-Christian-Muslim tradition, the 
Romantics, Bentham's Utilitarianism, and this one looks at the rise of environmental 
concerns about toxins, pollution, and the human population explosion in the 1960s and 
1970s. Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson and Gregory Bateson are among some of these 
important environmentalists of the 2 Oth century. Leopold wrote on the 'land ethic, ' which 
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abounds with anecdotes of integrated ecological lives. 19 Carson drew attention to the 
devastation of dioxins in the food 'chain' and contributed to heightening awareness of 
environmental crisis. 20 Bateson has written a very important philosophical treatise on the 
integrations of 'mind and nature. ' 21 He ranges across biology, chemistry, physics, and 
ethno-anthropology in an astute contribution to the field of philosophy of the 
environment. His argument on the 'threshold' of environment change, and the importance 
of difference and repetition to both the phenomenological registration of the environment, 
and the evolutionary process is extraordinary. 
During the same period, debates fuelled by the prevailing paradigm of Idealist solipsism 
about whether nature can be attributed with intrinsic value or not has dominated many 
philosophy of environment schools of thought. One of the most well-known and enduring 
groups from the period is the Deep Ecology movement. 
The apocalyptic argument is that there is equilibrium in nature that must be maintained 
within certain boundaries. Once the 'threshold' has been exceeded, then rapid and 
unpredictable change impacting on multifarious levels of the ecosystem will topple the 
existing 'balance of nature. ' Climate change, for example, is not well understood because 
it has so many factors involved. Some historical geologists regard the present period of 
global warming as simply one of many 'cycles, ' independent of human impact on the 
planet. Others point out that the rapid large-scale release of various pollutants, most 
notablyC02, has changed the chemical make-up of the atmosphere and the oceans. To 
some extent forests and oceans can act as a 'carbon sink' that absorbs the emissions and 
in fact, thrives on the extra availability of elements. But this is within a certain scale or 
normative range, and once the threshold is exceeded, the oceans will warm up, deep 
ocean currents will move as temperate vectors change, ocean habitats will alter, Arctic 
and Antarctic ice caps will melt, and sea levels will rise - dramatically affecting erosion 
and land loss - and weather patterns will radically alter. At roughly the same time, 
atmospheric conditions will also be transforming. Again, thresholds apply. Minor 
emissions of polycarbons are beneficial at low levels in the atmosphere as they reflect 
19 Leopold, 1949 
20 Carson, 1963 
21 Bateson, 1979 
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some radiation frequencies back out of the atmosphere. But the high levels of 
polycarbons that have made the way up to the stratosphere are detrimental to life, because 
at that level they diminish the reflecting capacity of high altitude gases by bonding with 
ozone, creating an 'ozone hole' and letting in radiation frequencies to the lower 
hemispheres; henceC02 is a 'greenhouse gas. ' 
There are two major approaches to climatic change, one is the geologist perspective 
which tracks the major fluctuations in climate, the emergence of life, shifting of tectonic 
plates, volcanoes, asteroids, the introduction, evolution, and disappearance of varieties of 
species over millions of years. The geologists that argue that this period of global 
warming is merely one of the many fluctuations experienced by the planet make the case 
that it may cause wide spread extinction of species but this is commensurate with other 
similar epochs, the most famous example being the sudden extinction of the dinosaurs. 
The other interpretation of contemporary global warming is that it is induced by human 
related technologies, most notably release of carbon dioxide and fluorocarbons, dioxins, 
polymers, and so forth, that have impacted upon the atmosphere, oceans and vegetation in 
ways we are still only beginning to learn about. These two views are not 
incommensurate. The former certainly should not alleviate human attention and care for 
our environment. 'Care' of the environment in this era has been interpreted 
technologically. 
The technological view bisects into two further differing interpretations. The dominant 
view is that humans have agency or control over the technology that they 'invent. ' This 
tends to lead some environmentalists to expect human societies to take responsibility for 
developing ethical mechanisms, most often put forward in terms of critical and 
democratic processes for 'contesting' the utility of particular technological items. The 
other Heideggerian view is that humans are a vector for the emergence and distribution of 
technologies, including plants, animals and minerals, throughout the globe. Thus 
technology itself (and I would include here the 'technology' of the ripe fruit, that the 
plant entices people and other animals to consume, store and distribute thus enhancing 
the reproduction of the tree) creates the conditions to which humanity responds. We are 
the vectors of reproduction for a technological epoch. As such we are not innocent of 
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agency; we can make ethical decisions about the extent and to some degree in what 
direction our energy is poured - in relation to technology. There is no innocence in being 
a vector. But like the carriers of an epidemic disease, there is also little or no choice about 
divesting oneself of it - other than to limit the distribution - through new technologies. 
My argument here is that education has to consider itself as a vector of technological 
transmission as well - and by reviewing its role, become more conscious of its ethical 
responsibilities. 
The Deep Ecology movement has done a lot to popularise environmental concerns and 
provide one of the most important journals of environmentalism, The Trumpeter, Journal 
ofEcosophy. Arne Naess and others have remained embroiled in bitter debates about the 
human relation to nature, and whether nature can be attributed with intrinsic value. Naess 
is selectively influenced by the philosophy of Heidegger. 
Chapter four continues to examine the prevailing Idealist framework and its resistance in 
"Contemporary Pragmatism and Critical Environmentalism. " This chapter is a critical 
evaluation of the related fields of Utilitarianism, Pragmatism, Neoliberal politics and 
economics. In this chapter critique is not merely destructive, I attempt to build 
constructive indicators of what is best abandoned and how to begin to embrace the risk of 
a future with new paradigms and new thinking about the ethics of our relationships with 
each other and the environment. 
Environmental theorists influenced by Utilitarianism and American Pragmatism tend to 
maintain an Idealist nominal distinction between culture and nature that is also fraught 
with axiological problems of measuring and attributing 'value. ' Andrew Light is 
particularly prone to neo-Pragmatist confusion that theory is separate, abstract and 
disposable whereas environmentally friendly practice is urgent and most effective when 
motivated by anthropocentric, economic reasons. 22 
Andrew Feenberg is critical of 'essentialism' and looks to contemporary Pragmatism to 
help promote his democratic theory of 'constructivism. ' 23 Feenberg carefully examines 
22 Light, 1996,2000,2001,2002a, 2002b 
23 Feenberg, 1999, no date, a 
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the debate that has raged for over 30 years between the Malthusian populationist, Paul 
Ehrlich and the sociologist Barry Commoner. Ehrlich argues that over-population of the 
planet is putting too much pressure on the earth's carrying capacity by forcing wilderness 
areas back and growing crops in an unsustainable manner. Commoner regards 
unsustainable resource use and pollution as the result of the inequality of finance and 
resource distribution between rich nations and 'undeveloped' debtor nations. Feenberg 
takes insight from both these authors, and tries to resuscitate a 'democratic' version of 
technology. This accentuates human agency in the design process and ultimately aims to 
produce a technological fix to environmental problems. 
Feenberg is highly disenchanted with Heidegger for being 'essentialist' about the critique 
of technology. Although he is interested in Heidegger's concept of enframing, he does 
not accept that the 'essence' of technology is rationality and efficiency because many 
rational and efficient inventions get lost in the entrepreneurial process. Feenberg hopes 
that a more democratic process may push forward technologies that have been ignored up 
until now. The hydrogen-powered car is a good example of a design that has been 
suppressed, for about 50 years, by the oil industry whose profit seeking motives favoured 
fossil fuels. Chrysler is finally offering a hydrogen fuelled vehicle to the market in 
response to the huge public anxiety about fossil fuel pollution. 
Tim Luke has taken the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School into the globalised era of 
information technology. Critical Theorists from the Frankfurt School illustrated how the 
working class had 'failed' to revolt against capitalist modes of production because they 
became increasingly implicated in mass consumer culture. Environmental 'externalities' 
will have to be paid for eventually, and the upper classes are better able to insulate 
themselves from the impact of pollution and global warming than the poor. Luke 
recognises that environmental problems seriously challenge capitalist modes of social 
organisation and tries to reimagine a better relationship between humanity and the 
planet. 
24 
24 Luke, 2003 
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Guattari's critique of 'Integrated World Capitalism' centres on the economic metaphor 
which has leached any meaning from alternative ways of knowing. 25 He is highly critical 
of the media - and education is culpable here too - for constraining itself to the sound 
bites of the Neoliberal market metaphor, of the 'knowledge economy, ' and for losing 
sight of the desire for any other ways of knowing - reflective, emotional, or the ethical 
relation to the Earth and to other people. 
Chapter five is on "Environmental Education" which emerged in the 1960s in the context 
of consumer optimism, yet at the same time, an increasing awareness of the detrimental 
impact of industrialisation on nature. Environmental theory is cross-disciplinary and 
includes geography and evolution, analytical positivism, utilitarianism, pragmatism, 
critical theory, theories of ecology, economics, and post-structuralism. Of necessity these 
themes are not examined to exhaustion. There is a plethora of scientific expertise in 
specific fields that argue for or against environmental issues, and I have by and large, 
avoided specific issues in order to focus on the larger picture. Likewise, I have followed 
the general outline of the many environmental theories, sometimes paying close attention 
to specific debates in order to build a picture of the main themes of environmental 
education and its general direction in relation to ecology and Liberal economic 
globalisation. 
The prevailing epistemologies influenced pedagogical theory and shaped the literature on 
environmental education. Pedagogy was dominated in the 1960s by Skinner's 
behaviourism and analytic positivism. These theoretical premises served to keep politics 
and social organisation out of environmental education. In the 1970s a broader 
epistemological base, which included geological history, social history, sociology, and 
political science, helped to reconnect environmental education to the implications of 
prevailing social practises 'on' nature. In the I 980s education caught up with the 
environmental concerns of wider society and showed some transformative promise, at 
least in the environmental education literature. By the 1990s Neoliberalism had once 
again imposed a positivist pedagogical methodology that is occluding politics and social 
practises, and is taking over earlier ecological discourses such as 'sustainability. ' The 
25 Guattari, 2000 
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political engagement of environmental education is fading faster than the realisation of its 
promise. Heidegger's increasing popularity may yet serve to shift education to a more 
ethical concern with humanity's relationship with 'Being' and the environment. 
Heidegger 
The second section explores the contributions and limitations of Heidegger's philosophy 
towards developing a more ethical relation for humanity and the environment. Heidegger 
tampers with traditional philosophy and theology, altering the 'ground' of metaphysics, 
ontology, subjectivity, epistemology, and most importantly, highlighting the relationship 
of humanity with the environment, or as he describes it, Being. I look at the political 
context of the terror of the Nazi holocaust and the way it shaped his writing and thinking. 
His most explicit ideas on education were formed in the context of the Nazi policy of 
Gleichschaltung, bringing-into-line. Heidegger's intellectual pathway gleaned ideas from 
traditional philosophy, poetry and pedagogy as well as the radical traditions of German 
thought, which he remixed in his critique of modernity as the technological Gestell, or 
enframing. 
Chapter six "The Romantic Heidegger, Technology, Thinking and Education in the Nazi 
Era" investigates the political and intellectual milieu of Germany, particularly in the 
interwar years and its impact on Heidegger's period as Rector of Freiburg University. 
The 'ideas of 1914' were characterised by the heroic, Romantic and Luddite Volk 
movement which influenced most German thinkers. 
During this period, Heidegger developed his very substantial critique of modernity and 
the enframing of technology. The theory emerged partly from his reading of Nietzsche, 
partly from the Catholic suspicion of modernity, and partly from the Volk movement and 
the technological superheroics put forward by Oswald Spengler and Ernst Ringer. 26 In 
war-like and masculinist language, these two writers developed a comprehensive critical 
analysis of the potential of the technological boom and a consequent critique of its effects 
on society and the planet. Their prescience is remarkable. Heidegger developed some of 
the ideas of both theorists into the concept of Gestell, the enfiraming of technology. 
26 Spengler, 2002, Jünger, 1993 
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Spengler theorised technology as an overarching force that is shaping each subjectivity. 
He argues that the modem interpretation of nature has radically altered from the feudal 
and the tribal. Making a living has changed from working together with the natural 
rhythms of the harvest to 'challenging forth' nature. The fluctuating cadence of the river, 
the oscillating flickering light of the candle, the slow cyclic regeneration of the forest; 
have all been transformed by a technological 'challenge' which channels and constrains 
the natural tempo and demands the storage, enlargement, and redistribution of nature as a 
'resource. ' The wresting of materials and energy has become commodified because 
technology has produced a capacity for storage so that the seasons, the flow and the 
fallow periods no longer radically constrain consumption. Following Spengler, Heidegger 
realised that technology has objectified everything, including humanity, as potential 
resource. 
Ringer took war as the heroic literary/aesthetic metaphor for the 'destiny of the west. ' He 
argues that work is totally at the disposal of the war machine, whether it be sewing, 
sowing or shooting. Even during times of peace, the war machine is at work. Unlike 
feudal Kings, who had to rally together temporary armies in times of war, modernity 
maintains standing armies in reserve during periods of war or peace. The war machine 
poses a constant threat of terror. Ringer called this continuous usurpation of all labour, 
'total mobilisation. ' He took ideas from Nietzsche's book Thus Spake Zarathustra, 27 
(which had been distributed to soldiers in the German Arrny) on the concept of the 
4superman' as the hero who is able to swallow all events, no matter how terrible, and 
commit to the 'will to power' coursing through the body politic. Heidegger took up many 
of Ringer's ideas about the total technical mobilisation of the war machine and standing 
reserve, but criticised his unreflective acceptance of problematic ideas in Nietzsche as 
being too 'biological' and metaphysically essentialist. 
The 'turn' in Heidegger's thinking about equipment and technology emerged in the mid 
1930s during the term of National Socialist rise to power in Gen-nany. The politics of the 
day and the somewhat Romantic discourses that were circulating about technology and 
the Volk influenced Heidegger profoundly. For ten months in 1933 he enthusiastically 
27 Nietzsche, 1982a 
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engaged with the National Socialists seeking a new era that returned to home and hearth 
and rejected the terrors of the technological age. He hoped to make use of National 
Socialist policies to promote education to the centre of political and cultural concerns, 
rejecting the busy superfluous categorisations that preoccupied many discipline areas, 
avoiding the narrow focus on skills and information and resuscitating genuine 
understanding into the meaning of humanity by attending our relationship with Being. By 
the opening months of 1934, he realised that the Nazis were intractable in their racial 
prejudice and their direction of 'total mobilisation, ' which emphasised employable 
'skills' rather than thinking. He gave up the idea of elevating university education as the 
source of intellectual and spiritual leadership for the promised Volk utopia. He spent the 
remaining years of the war giving lectures on Nietzsche and H61derlin, trying to rescue 
their writing from Nazi interpretation. While rejecting biological eugenics outright, he 
would always hold forth on the superiority of the German language as the 'home' of 
original western thinking and the potential source of the examination and extrication of 
human society from the decadence of modemity. Despite his desperate attempt to think 
his way out, Heidegger remains caught up in the terrible nationalistic politics of modem 
Europe. 
It is this recognition of the nihilism that pervades modernity that pre-occupied 
Heidegger's four volume lecture series written during the war years on Nietzsche. 28 In 
chapter seven "Heidegger's Nihilism: Life, Being, Dasein" Nietzsche and Heidegger 
signal the threshold between the traditional approach to philosophy and a paradigm shift 
which abandons the 'other-worldly' in favour of the immanent integrity of this one. In 
slightly different ways, Nietzsche and Heidegger renounce monotheistic and positivist 
ways of viewing ecology because they are nihilist and exploitative. Heidegger and 
Nietzsche each range over the debates about the relative merits of Aristotelian or Platonic 
philosophy as vital sources of modem culture. 
The two of them had quite different ideas about the integration of humanity into the 
environment. Nietzsche argues that the body and mind are one entity. The mind can never 
fully comprehend the chaos of its phenomenological impressions of the environment. 
28 Heidegger, 1982, vol. s I-IV 
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Any attempt is overwhelming, so a large proportion of the chaotic stimuli that the body 
and mind must cope with is suppressed and actively forgotten. From this premise the 
human agent is to a large degree absorbed into her or his surroundings without any overt 
separation. Furthermore, bodies are constantly touching surfaces, shedding skin, inhaling 
and exhaling, eating and excreting; at some level swapping physiological components 
with the environment. The notion that an individual is separate and differentiable from 
ecology is a convenient misapprehension that makes possible the social identity of the 
human genus. Where Heidegger concentrates on the becoming of Being, Nietzsche talks 
about the flux of Life. Nietzsche's term 'life' is not confined to a solipsistic world, 
revealed by human subjectivity. He incorporates organic and anorganic forms (existence, 
including particles, rocks, bacteria, viruses, fluids, solids, gases, chemicals, stars) in a 
continuously changing flow or will, that are reminiscent of the tenuous and changing set 
of relations and existences at work within an eco-system. 
Both philosophers are interested in nihilism and its connection with the western traditions 
of philosophy and modernity. Their different conceptual bases offer subtly different 
explanations of the nature of nihilism. For Nietzsche the Will to Nothingness is an 
idealistic and otherworldly rejection of the inherent value of life we lead in the here and 
now. For Heidegger nihilism is the nothingness of forgetting to care and enquire into 
Being. Heidegger's emphasis on the importance of the subject, Dasein'S world view in 
relation to Being combined with the totalising enframing of technology, paints a dismal 
picture for the value of wild existence outside of the realms of human interference. 
Nietzsche's interest in the chaotic and unknowable nature of the world opens up space for 
alternative possibilities, while acknowledging that in its present phase of nihilism, life is 
devalued to and beyond the threshold of extinction. Life is a precarious and precious 
thing and may disappear before we resurrect the respect and effort required to overcome 
the life-denying principles that dominate today. 
For both theorists, in subtly different ways, bodies in practice are a central concern of 
philosophy and of education. There is a tradition of focusing in education, on either one 
or the other; 'physical education' or something cerebral like English, Maths, History and 
so on. The disciplining of children's bodies into wriggle-free, self-contained, focused 
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individuals has become central to schooling. Refocusing on the cultural integration of 
bodies, minds and surroundings shifts our attention from 'self' -interested individualism 
and opens an entirely new basis for culture-nature. This promises to set up new 
fundamental premises to the ethics, practices and interdisciplinary cooperation in 
education. 
Heidegger asks a question that heads us in a beneficial pathway in terms of attention, 
scope and care, when he asks What is called Being? The question allows us to address 
our relation to the environment across the entire metaphysical and post-metaphysical 
tradition of the history of modem human culture. The next question is what does 
Heidegger mean by'Being; ' 'nothingness, ' 'becoming, ' 'physis, ' 'emerging' (evolving? ), 
or 'aletheia, ' 'appearance, ' 'world-view, ' 'existence. ' And why did he largely ignore 
'Nature, '' earth, '' environment'? Importantly, Heidegger rules out 'representation' via a 
complex argument that traces the history of Being through Heraclitus and Pannenides, to 
the culmination of philosophy in Plato, to the logos of Aristotle which congeals the 
enquiry into statements or representations. 29 This amounts to the stagnant separation of 
individual 'subjects' who are alienated from objects and can only describe events and 
entities using the endless circulation of signs inherent in the logos. Representation as 
logos is the calculation and rational categorisation that emerges from the subject rather 
than in communion with external objects . 
30 This critique challenges the high status of 
scientific positivism, and re-ignites poetry, and especially eco-poiesis as the Quelle or 
wellspring of insight into the genuine relationships binding the environment and 
humanity. 
Chapter eight is titled, "Heidegger's Environment: Equipment and Being. " Heidegger has 
challenged the Cartesian separation of subject from object and the notion of the 
autonomous individual. Heidegger's theory is an early, and highly influential analysis of 
the emerging environmental crisis and the role that technology plays in the relationship 
between humanity and our environment. He followed Nietzsche's critique of the way 
western philosophy has consistently instituted a separation from the solipsist subject, or 
29 Heidegger, 1982, vol. IV 
30 Heidegger, 1973a 
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ýmind' and the external object, or physical environment. This tradition of a harsh division 
between mind and body, or human subject and world has set up conditions for debasing 
the lived environment as a temporary condition that is little appreciated, as opposed to the 
'truer' more 'essential' realm of the mind or soul. The way these dualist oppositions have 
been conceptualised has altered at varying points during the history of philosophy. When 
Platonism and Christianity dominated the field the immanence of earth was conceived as 
counterpoint to an abstract, transcendent, 'Heavenly Ideal, ' outside of time and space, 
perfection and the 'Good' floating somewhere above the clouds. 
Later, positivism took its lead from Aristotle and searched for verifiable truth 
paradoxically situated not in the subject, but in the object. It was a search for minutely 
detailed generic categorisation that could result in generalisations about the essential and 
universal nature of a specific thing or phenomenon. Again, individual cases or events 
never quite qualify because of specific historic anomalies, so it is only across time and 
space that statistical categorisations can be made. Because of circumstantial accidents, 
the essential truth is always at one remove from the reality of any particular incident, 
urging progress to close in on the normalized goal. 
In contrast to the separation and contrast of the dualism, subject/object, or incompetent 
human finitude versus perfect other-worldly Ideal, Heidegger understands the 
relationship between human subjectivity and the lived environment as inseparable 
through the integrally human factor of 'equipmentality. ' 31 Coming from an almost 
anthropological viewpoint that humanity is the tool wielding animal, he argues that 
human agency is completely absorbed in the understanding of our bodies and 
surroundings as equipment. We enter an 'always-already' environment invested with 
signs. Much of this information is so familiar it becomes unnoticed, so that, for example, 
instead of viewing the chair as an alien object of metal and fibre, I automatically register 
it as comfortable and capable of taking my weight if I park my bottom on it. My physical 
demeanour, my activity, social assumptions and thinking are integral and reliant upon the 
chair-as-equipment. None of this is consciously registered, unless there is a problem with 
the equipment; the chair is lumpy or broken. Even in this circumstance, the desk, the 
1 Heidegger, 1962 
25 
carpet, the window, the small, framed view, will remain unconsciously integral to the 
capacity, understanding and predictability of my being-here, and enables the subject to 
promote or project a reliable future; being-(t)here. The surroundings enable thinking, 
action, and decision-making to take place. It is not possible to conceive of a subject 
without surroundings. Heidegger argues that equipment is integral to our 
conceptualisation of our world, and indistinguishable from the utility of our own body, 
hands, legs, chair, floor, window and so on. 
The chapter goes on to outline some aspects of Heidegger's philosophy; the critique of 
biology as the foundation or ground of essential substance, evolution, thinking and social 
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potential . For Heidegger the 'ground' of thinking is Being. Heidegger has reconceived 
the traditional philosophical concept of 'Being' from the stale, static and over-generalised 
version by retrieving the 'original' force of the concept in ancient Greek. He develops the 
termsphysis and aletheia. Physis is variously described as 'nature, ' 'earth, ' 'world, ' 
'Being. ' Heidegger defines physis as the continual dynamic emerging of becoming in 
Being. The word lethe means shrouded or concealed. Lethe is the sheltering of Being and 
a-letheia is the unconcealment of Being through the attention, care and thought of the 
authentic subject, Dasein. Aletheia is very important to Heidegger's metaphysics. The 
'unknowable' is what is present, immanent, yet hidden and concealed in Being's lethe. 
For Heidegger our lack of complete knowledge does not separate us from Being. It is 
simply part of the magnificence that continually arouses enquiry and awe. Heidegger 
argues that any particular historical epoch will be blind to its ownmost essence in terms 
of Being. What is most familiar, and functions most smoothly is also what hides most 
effectively in the lethe. As with equipment, it is only at the crossing of a threshold, either 
when something breaks or fails, that we 'notice' and attend to it, or it is made 'strange' 
by belonging to another epoch (or culture). 
The stranger on the edge of a cultural milieu has more insight into the 'truth' of things 
than someone deeply engrossed in their own normalised way of being. These ideas get Cý, -- 
developed by Derrida 'on the margins' and others. 33 From our stance in the 2 Vt century 
32 Heidegger, 1973a 
33 Derrida, 1982, Cixous 1991 
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then, some elements of 'the essence' of the German cultural milieu in the early half of the 
20th century become clearer than it was for Heidegger at the time. 
Education reproduces the concealment of Being as well as the lighting of the lethe. Many 
cultural practices are transmitted almost subconsciously, in the architecture, the 
institutional structure and hierarchy, the assumptions about sanctions and punishment, the 
prevailing pedagogical practices - these all announce the normative cultural paradigm 
without specifically critically analysing or becoming conscious of the implications of 
normal behaviour, language and equipment. The bulk of educational practices fall into 
the rubric of 'concealment. ' Thinking is bringing Being into the light of Dasein's 
attention. Heidegger wants to activate education as the primary site for re-engaging 
humanity with our central task - asking the question about the meaning of Being. This 
organically, so to speak, arises when something goes wrong with our equipment; then we 
have to think about the original function and the framework the function operated in; thus 
bringing to light the meaning of equipmentality. But education is partly about the 
transmission of culture and partly preparing the way for enlightened thinking, or a critical 
aptitude for making 'autonomous' decisions. From Heidegger's perspective critical 
thinking is another, more abstract example of equipmentality. Thinking only takes 
another step when it addresses the primary aesthetic relationship between the entity and 
Being. 34 
I look more closely at his interpretation of the traditional concerns of philosophy; that of 
the subject and object, or solipsist agent and the 'world, ' which he reinvents in terms of 
Dasein and Being. This takes an Aristotelian slant on the notion of an essence that shows 
up in specific encounters between Dasein, or the subject, and an object or event. As with 
most philosophers since Kant, Heidegger is immensely interested in time and its impact 
on subjectivity. He notes that the subject's finitude defines the manner in which we are 
'thrown' into an already existent environment and confines the possibility for 
understanding the past and present, and for projecting into the future. His notion of Being 
relies upon the comprehension of Dasein, hence to some extent he remains within the 
nominalist tradition of sceptical solipsism. However, for Heidegger, nominalist 
34 Heidegger, 1969b 
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frameworks 'world' for entire communities rather than separate subjects, so his 
nominalism has a group orientation rather than isolated individualism. The world only 
exists insofar as someone is capable of recognizing it. This means he excludes animals 
from the category of Dasein because they are incapable, he argues, of reflecting upon the 
world. They merely exist within their ecosphere as objects among objects without 
thinking about it. 
Of course, in many ways, that is all that humans do within the work-world of equipment. 
We operate unconsciously, taking for granted the already given names and utilities for 
most aspects of our immediate (and not so immediate) surroundings. Thought tends to 
come into play when an item is not operating as it ought to; and we must think about 
why, and how to resurrect it into the order of things. Perhaps the enframing of technology 
has only become obvious since it threatens the very continuation of life. Heidegger sees 
the problem associated with the enframing of technology not simply as pollution, or 
species extinction and so forth, but as the forgetting of the meaning of Being itself. This 
attention and care that Dasein exhibits towards Being is the essence of human 
meaningfulness so forgetting Being is to annihilate the meaning of our existence. We 
become as important in the scheme of things as a rock, or a pasture. 
Education takes its potency from reinvigorating the questions about Being, and 
enculturating future generations. When he was Rector of Freiburg University, Heidegger 
wanted to restructure all the discipline areas along these lines. He despaired of the 
trajectory of science in particular, as merely collating more and more meaningless 
information and forgetting to approach and ask the crucial questions that define our 
humanness and the Being of our environment. 
In chapter nine, "Heidegger's Turn; Unconcealment and Forgetting" I demonstrate how 
for Heidegger technology mediates between our senses and our understanding of the 
environment. The 'enframing of technology' challenges forth a rational interpretation of 
events that calculates and dissects the 'nature of things. ' In contrast to the inaccessible 
object about which we can only surmise and 'represent, ' Heidegger conceives of the 
concept of lethe, or 'concealment. ' He thinks of concealment as the sheltering of Being 
28 
and unconcealment as the showing forth of Being into the light of Dasein's thinking. 
Technology, he argues, is another form of limiting and corrupting the enquiring openness 
of Dasein towards Being. Instead, Daseinforgets to ask the appropriate questions about 
Being. Being is concealed in the rhetoric of calculation and rationalism. Appropriate 
enquiry and care is forgotten because of the alienation of globalised production, 
transnational economics and corporate finances. It is forgotten by the positivist obsession 
with counting and statistics (and with Foucault's reading of Heidegger) surveillance and 
governmentality. 35 It is forgotten in endless assessment and evaluation, and the 'added 
value' of 'skills' and 'qualifications' to our 'human capital. ' 
Heidegger's concept of concealment broadly agrees with the tradition of nominalism. The 
naming of things is arbitrary and can only ever hope to describe limited aspects of the 
item or event. There is no conclusive truth to naming. Categorisation is more about the 
convenience of explaining to other people, developing a metaphoric world that makes 
human society possible. Humans are incapable of the Gods' eye view, so for every epoch 
aspects of Being remain concealed. Heidegger's version does not separate the subject 
from the object as in strict Idealism as Descartes and Berkeley did. Aspects of Being 
show forth, it emerges, erupts, and imposes upon the consciousness of Dasein. At the 
same time as truth about Being shows forth to an open and enquiring Dasein, there are 
always elements that remain in concealment. Humanity is bound by a historical context, 
and this generates a particular openness while occluding other ways of knowing. There is 
never complete transparency. The truth of Being is infinite, whereas a human being has a 
limited lifespan. 
During and after the upheaval of the Second World War, Heidegger developed a more 
suspicious approach to equipment or technology. He was appalled by the pernicious 
development of nuclear bombs and realized that technological developments made 
destroying the entire planet possible for the first time. While equipment integrated 
humanity into the environment, technology governed human agency by defining the 
possible. He called this Gestell, technological enframing. The danger is when the process 
of absorption through technological equipment is so complete that the separation of the 
35 Foucault, 1979 
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solipsist subject from the object is completely annihilated - then agency is also annulled. 
At present the technological frame colours and totalises everything so that all objects, all 
eco-systems and all of humanity is a resource or potential resource in an all-consuming, 
ever-deepening, and non-reflective process. Hence the increasing emphasis in educational 
policy on increasing attributes of 'human capital' rather than critical, reflective thinking. 
Heidegger's long held complaint about modernity and the philosophical traditions of the 
occident is that calculation and rationality closes humanity from an open attitude and 
encourages human beings to forget the question of Being. However during the 1930s 
Heidegger had a 'turn' in his thinking. He realised that the enframing of technology was 
so devastating that Being was only safe if it was forgotten. Technology, he argues, is the 
danger and the saving power. However, if Dasein forgets that we have forgotten Being, 
then Being is lost forever into the nothingness of mere existence. Thus, Heidegger argues 
we are in a very narrowly constrained place. The philosophical and educational 
leadership that he tried during 1933 and 1934 had failed. Heidegger puts all his faith in 
the destiny of Being to re-emerge into a clearing and show up anew. Human agency is so 
taken over by the technological frame that we are no longer capable of directing authentic 
questioning, except to preserve the knowledge that Being once showed forth in a free 
relation and hope that this authentic relation can occur again. 
Yet Heidegger's revelatory 'turn' is that Being is perversely safeguarded while the 
question of Being is forgotten in the enframing of technology. Thus technology is the 
danger which forgets Being, and also the saving power which guards the concealment. 
Nihilism ultimately, is the forgetting of the forgetting of Being, and our greatest 
obligation is to avoid allowing Being to become so forgotten that Being (and humanity) 
descends into the oblivion of non-thought. 
Chapter ten is about "Heideggerian Environmental Education: Bowers and Pedagogy. " 
Heidegger's argument is that the enframing of technology has foregrounded our 
understanding the environment and ourselves in terms of utilisable resource. Chet Bowers 
is an important writer on technology, educational practices and environmental education 
and one of the only educationalists who has taken Heidegger's critique of modernity and 
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technology very seriously and allowed it to inform his approach to information 
technology in the classroom. Bowers has a tendency to be technophobic, nevertheless he 
has some very interesting insights into the effects technology has had on changing 
pedagogical practice. Pedagogy is increasingly modelled as a conduit where the teacher 
technologically 'enables' the active learner to access information through available 
research resources. This is vastly different from the creative model of teaching as a 
creative and largely unpredictable interaction between teachers and students. I try to 
distinguish between the problems generated by modem Liberal rationalism, 
individualism, managerialism, and economic governmentality as opposed to the 
parameters and possibilities of the technology itself. 
Globalisation, Liberalism and Sustainability 
The last section on globalisation and Liberalism is informed by Heidegger's critique of 
the technological enframing of modernity and the rigidification of language into the 
representative calculus and rationalisation of logos. Heidegger calls for a poetic aptitude 
for allowing ecological Being to 'shine forth. ' The earliest forms of Liberalism emerged 
from revolutionary overthrows of a feudal state in favour of the democratic 'general will. ' 
Liberalism wrested the possibility of capitalist accumulation of wealth from the Church 
and feudal overlords in favour of the merchant middle classes. Neoliberalism has 
extended the market metaphor so that it takes over all categorisations, pushing 
technological enframing into enclaves, traditions and relationships that have hitherto 
withstood its rational calculations. Humanity is increasingly individualised and 
commodified, bearing barcodes and identification numbers instead of personalities and 
names, Liberal principles such as 'freedom' are subsumed in the marketisation of 
'choice. ' Both education and the environment has succumbed in large part to 
Neoliberalism's 'paucity of metaphor. ' The notion of sustainability has been emptied of 
its content of care towards the environment and increasingly stands in for 'market 
efficiency. ' This has implications for environment education. Yet the 'market' of 
Neoliberal theory fails to adhere to either rational or divine order. The calculus and 
accountability of everything, including pollution, emissions, landfill, water 
contamination, and so forth into economic management fails to find some magic market 
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'balance. ' According to Neoliberalism the market never 'balances' because it has not 
been allowed free rein. However the equilibrium, even at Pareto optimality, has 
imperfections, demand never equals want, the psychological impact of advertising is 
unacknowledged, full employment is a myth, and so on. Interestingly, despite the 
constant allusion to science and positivism, whenever events demonstrate the flaws in the 
Neoliberal market model, they use the Aristotelian argument of accidental anomaly to 
disallow it as evidence that more complex forces are at work. 
The economic disparity of wealth and consumption between rich ('developed, ' 'First 
World, ' 'western, ' 'colonizer') and poor ('developing, ' 'Third World, ' 'southern, ' 'post- 
colonial') nations plays an important part in the politics and philosophy of the 
environment. So, to a limited extent I look at some efforts aiming at 'development. ' To 
do this justice it would have been good to investigate theories of the environment and 
social practices in various 'Third World' nations. My home in the southern hemisphere is 
thousands of miles from the 'centre' of wealth and first-world civilisation. I am a Pakeha 
New Zealander (of Irish/Scots descent) situated in Scotland. My cultural and biological 
heritage puts me in a strange insider/outsider position. Scotland is the first place I have 
ever lived where, instead of looking fluorescent, I physically look like everyone else. 
That recognition applies to culture too. Yet the recognition is a stranger's appreciation of 
what is taken here as normal. My upbringing was profoundly influenced by 
'biculturalism' and a positive engagement with Maori and Polynesian culture. I am 
acutely aware that the Greek-Judeo-Christian tradition has constituted modernity with 
imperialist undertones and this thesis attempts a critique of the world domination of these 
ideas. In this work I have not overtly used theories from outside the occidental traditions 
to do this. Partly I have not needed to because as a woman and a foreigner I am already 
marginalized enough to have a fresh perspective on the western philosophic tradition, and 
partly because I do not want to romanticise the 'native' ways of relating to nature which 
vary considerably over time and place. Furthermore, many indigenous cultures also 
managed to threaten many local species to extinction. An example from home is the 50 or 
more varieties of Moa in Aotearoa/ New Zealand hunted to extinction in early times by 
Maori burning huge tracts of forest. More recently, Maori have developed the rahui 
system, which places a tapu or metaphysical and physical ban on specific areas where 
32 
species are under threat so that regeneration can occur. The normative paradigm of 
western Liberalism that is failing the environment on such a massive scale today might be 
transformed by examining the rahui (and other mechanisms, theories and world views). 
But this is not something that I have looked at in any detail in the thesis. 
All ideas and practices change in response to environmental events. I am specifically 
interested in the modem Liberal tradition because it is having such a profound impact on 
nearly all parts of the planet. Thus, like Heidegger, my research concentrates on the 
philosophical tradition which has developed the present normative paradigm, the strands 
of philosophical theory that are in circulation in environmental theory, educational theory 
and environmental education. 
Heidegger's philosophy is one of the most acute critiques of the paradigm of modernity; 
technological enframing as the total mobilisation of everything as 'goods, ' 'services, ' and 
potential resource in the rational, economic calculation of the circulation and 'growth' of 
capitalism. Heidegger offers a lens through which to reflect upon contemporary attempts 
to step back away from the threshold of environmental crisis. Concepts such as 
'sustainability' lend themselves to a worldview of calculation, surveillance and 
managerialism that might alleviate immediate problems with pollution and waste but 
exacerbate and deepen the technological enframing of rational calculation and control. 
It is no accident that the emergence of a discourse of crisis about the state of the 
environment has coincided with increasing recognition of the processes of globalisation. 
Chapter eleven, "Global Policy: 'Sustainability' and 'Risk... engages with a cohort of 
related theories, ideas, and organisations associated with globalisation: economic theory, 
various pan-global organisations such as the OECD, UN, World Bank, IMF, global 
treaties, information and policy initiatives such as the Kyoto Protocol, and Agenda 21 
meetings about the environment at Rio de Janeiro and Johannesburg. 
The total mobilisation that Heidegger and Ringer discuss in the 1930s is contributing to a 
new round of empire building in the early 2000s. China, India, OPEC nations, the EU and 
the U. S. A. are all jockeying for position in the changing world stage. At the level of 
global treaties, the controversial Kyoto Protocol on acceptable levels of greenhouse gas 
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emissions was one of the first things to which George W. Bush objected as President of 
the United States. The significance of his lack of co-operation has been one of the major 
concerns amongst governments throughout the rest of the world. In the United States (and 
to a lesser extent Great Britain) there are still prestigious scientists who cast doubt on the 
scientific reliability of environmental damage. George Bush and advisors insist that 
global warming is part of the natural cycle of planetary temperature change. However, a 
team of scientists from different disciplines have analysed nearly all the available data 
and put together the IPCC document called Climate Change published in 2001.36 They 
have carefully differentiated between long-term predictable cycles and anthropocentric 
intervention. They have tried to estimate the threshold at which viable conditions for 
maintaining life as we know it can survive on the planet. Optimistically, there is a leeway 
of some 6 degrees Celsius. The IPCC have also produced a number of models 
extrapolating from known data the probable climate change over the next century. It does 
not make for happy reading. In the United States, the government's Environmental 
Protection Agency produced a report on global warming in 2003. The White House 
insisted on introducing 'vagueness, ambivalence, and prevarication' into a publication put 
out by its own agency on global warming, introducing 'uncertainty where there is none. ' 
The Envirom-nental Protection Agency withdrew the publication. In 2004 the Pentagon 
described climate change as 'a bigger threat than terrorism. ' It remains to be seen 
whether this pressure will encourage Bush to finally ratify the Kyoto agreement or 
introduce any other measures for diminishing pollution in the world's richest consumer 
orientated nation. 
Across the earth, environmental agencies are being set up and many governments are 
taking environmental problems seriously. The OECD spokesman for the environment, 
Simon Upton, is trying to use Neoliberal theories to incorporate environmental factors 
into the global market. 37 He is attempting to set measurements and introduce 
exchangeable 'vouchers' that will bring pollution levels within the theoretical balancing 
rubric of the market's 'Invisible Hand. ' Using the notion of Pareto Optimality, the market 
is thought to adjust to the most efficient exchange rate, taking into account availability, 
36 IPCC, 2001 
37 Upton, 2001 a, 2002a 
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efficiency and price. Upton presumes that permissible levels of carbon monoxide 
emissions will find a price where they strike a balance between 'acceptable' levels of 
environmental pollution and the continued possibility for wealthy individuals (or nations) 
to continue to drive their cars. The United States could buy vouchers from poorer nations 
that either do not produce their world share of greenhouse gas emissions (through 
poverty) and/or have natural resources that counterbalance the problem such as large 
forest 'reserves. ' This effectively makes a situation where the richer countries in the 
world pay poorer countries not to cut down forests in an effort to 'sustain' healthy 
conditions in the atmospheric 'commons. ' 
Giddens coined the term 'Third Way, ' to include social equity issues into the Neoliberal 
transference of the economic metaphor onto all spheres of social organisation. 38 He is one 
of the few Neoliberals to recognise that the finance markets are grossly different from the 
simple 18 th century model first discussed in Adam Smith's seminal work about the 
conflicts between domestic consumption and the European export in the corn trade. 39 
Global financial markets nowadays are 95% arbitrage and 5% actual commodity so the 
direct appeal to market 'balance' is fundamentally corrupted. Giddens tries to incorporate 
environmental concerns into the economic system by arguing that efficient production 
will use fewer resources, energy and labour. He then continues to associate ecology with 
efficiency in all contexts. He advocates a 'risk matrix' that uses an insurance model to 
counter the potential problems of environmental disaster. Giddens puts great faith in 
global governance, 'human capital, ' and the social investment state to sort out the risks 
and costs associated with global warming. 
The final chapter "Limits of Liberalism" looks at the philosophical premises of the 
Enlightenment and how it has played out in Liberal democracy. The chapter shows how 
empire building is integral to Liberal democracy. 
Bliffidorn describes how the contemporary Neoliberal lexicon has taken over words such 
as 'sustainability' and shifted the meanings from egalitarian communitarian concerns to 
the apparently apolitical discourse of market transactions. He argues that Liberalism has 
38 Giddens, 1998 
39 Smith, Adam, 1904 
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always been concerned with security. Yet over time security has shifted from a 
community basis to an issue of privatised individualism. Environmental concerns too, 
have been privatised and are more the responsibility of the consumer than the producer. 
He also describes how the discourse of 'risk' has begun to shift to an entrepreneurial 
awareness of financial opportunity. Bliffidom argues that Neoliberalism empties the older 
concepts of ten'ns such as 'sustainability' of their content, and shifts everything to the 
money-making enterprise. He is very despondent that education can alter the prevailing 
paradigm, or that environmental education is capable of introducing an ethic of care and 
ecological awareness. 
Heidegger's own life history shows how the politics of terror invades attempts to think 
beyond modemity. Yet from out of Heidegger's despair about the technological 
enframing of Being emerged a hope that we can conserve the seeds of a preparation for a 
new beginning; a Romantic openness to communion with the environment, and with each 
other. "Poetically man dwells. " Heidegger's question about the relationship between 
humanity and Being is the start of a more authentic relationship between humanity and 
the environment. His philosophy has some problems, as we shall see, not least because he 
limits himself to philosophy, and does not read texts in many of the disciplines of the 
sciences; biology, geology, astronomy, and so forth. It is important that when we critique 
the rationalist basis of Humanist Idealism we do not abandon the promise of science, 
rationality, and technology in sweeping over generalisation. The morphology and 
consistency of natural items and events, the powerful shape of linguistics and meaning 
are more closely integrated than Heidegger ever realised. His works on the problematic of 
Modernity are an important component of stimulating the conditions for change in culture 
and education. From the Modem tendency to accounting, calculation and rational 
certitude, Heidegger's philosophy raises the openness of questioning. It is a tenuous 
aptitude, a mere 'readiness' for a new beginning. But it potentially initiates a whole 
stochastic process of change, a transformation and another very different threshold for the 
metamorphosis of culture and education into an acknowledgement of our comparative 
relation with other beings and Being, and a prevailing open ethic of care and thinking. 
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2 Romantic Poetics, Solipsism and Environment 
The integrated relationship between nature and humanity evoked by Wordsworth's poetry 
was completely misunderstood by critics such as Hazlitt, who, backed by Cartesian 
philosophy, argued that Wordsworth was attributing normative, conservative human 
behaviour and emotions into the landscape. But in Romantic poetry, something altogether 
different from dualisms, such as the Idealist separation of subject/ object, culture/ nature, 
was taking place. In this chapter I argue that eco-poetry, with its roots in Romanticism, is 
a means to write to a point that transgresses Idealist dualisms. Poetry encourages an 
emergence from our isolated individuality and allows communication, in Heidegger's 
words, to 'shine forth. ' The chapter looks at the philosophy of language, subjectivity, the 
processes of thinking, and the significance of poetry. These form the genealogical 
building blocks for later thinking about an ethics of environmental care. 
As Wordsworth illustrates in "The World is Too Much With Us; Late and Soon", in 
response to the emerging climate of modem emphasis on measurement and rationality, 
The Winds that will be howling at all hours 
And are up-gathered now like sleepingflowers; 
For this, for every thing, we are out of tune; 
It moves us not. 
40 
Romanticism makes an important contribution to reinventing a new and more democratic 
approach to nature and other peoples. The concept of 'Nature' shifts from the Classical 
rigour of the God-given ordering of the natural world to something more enigmatic, 
unknowable, and Sublime. The critical reception of the Romantics has been a frustrating 
reversion to the separation of human subject from natural object that prevails throughout 
modernity. Thus, the 'lack' or 'presence' of politics in the 'pastoral' accounts of 
Romantic painting and poetry is read as two extremes: either a reactionary, nayve Luddite 
denial of economic realities, or alternatively as a subjectivist over-representation of 
Nature as sexual, feudal or revolutionary politics. The difficult task for the Romantics has 
40 Wordsworth, 1806, in Bartleby, 2004 
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been to bring the body, emotions, mind, economics, culture and especially 'Nature' into 
the 'body politic, ' particularly in the context of Georgian repression of explicit dialogue 
in polite society. Nevertheless, Burke's philosophy in "The Sublime and the Beautiful" 
had persuasively shifted philosophical ideas from the narrowly conceived 
phenomenological rationality of the empiricists, and the extreme subjectivism of the 
Idealists. Through Wordsworth, Coleridge, Turner, and other Romanticists, the emotional 
comportment of embodied ethics and the interaction and communication that arises 
throughout the 'kingdom of Nature' has credence. Unfortunately, that integration of 
organic and anorganic life has missed its mark with most intervening philosophers across 
the centuries. 
In the face of the global monolith of technology, terror and capitalist oppression, it is 
difficult to make such subtle argument as put forward by the Romantics and later 
Heidegger. The withdrawal of eco-social relations from the paradigm of modernity 
flounders in the prevailing winds of rationality, accounting and technological enframing. 
We are out of tune. Yet perversely, hope comes forth from within the dangers posed by 
modernity. After centuries of ossification in a harsh Idealist and positivist climate, 
philosophy is ripe for new conceptualisation. Pollution and global warming transgress 
national boundaries and have transformed into the grounding motif driving policy, 
politics, and philosophy around the planet. Highlighting the environment re-engages 
humanity in the task of caring about the ethics of our interaction with ecology. At present 
however, the prevailing paradigm is globalised capitalism, the non-nalisation of mass 
consumerism and Neoliberal faith in the market. The relationship between environment 
and humanity can often be found in the technological assumptions about world resources. 
This chapter is a polemic for a type of listening, thinking, and enquiring into the 'nature' 
of ourselves and our ecological environment in a way that lets it all 'shine forth' as 
Heidegger puts it, in its own terms. It is not so much a counter-argument, or an 
alternative systematic treatise but a preparation for a change in attitude. When the world 
is only understood in terms of rationality and calculation then the attitude of enquiry into 
the 'Being' of things is closed off. This attitude is not a-political, nor is it Luddite. It does 
not reinforce the traditional dualism between culture and nature, coming down on the side 
of the wilderness. It is an ecological recognition that we live with/in the ecological 
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environment. Our pretensions to consumerist grandeur are a form of alienation that 
threatens to cross the threshold of planetary conditions that are capable of sustaining life. 
Idealism, Irony, Tragedy 
Individual, subjectivist solipsism is probably best characterised by Descartes. He 
promoted a type of asceticism and proposed that his own mind was the only thing he, 
himself, could truly be sure of. Everything else was a nominal interpretation of 
sensations. Objects might impinge upon his body, creating an imprint on the retina, 
bruises on the body, roughening the fingertips, exploding sound against the eardrum, or 
linger on the tastebuds; but these sensations meant nothing without the mind's capacity to 
name and understand them. Even the mind had to be held with some suspicion, because it 
was known to do weird things. Sometimes, without overt sensory stimulation, the mind 
dreamed, or it created mad and uncharacteristic images, identities, and ideas, or it was 
deceived (possibly by the devil). So it is important not to allow the mind just any kind of 
fertility; only a limited type of rational deduction can ascertain anything with certainty. 
The objects 'out there' cannot be taken for granted. The nominalist fallacy separates all 
imminent events from certitude. It may be that we have got it wrong, and what looks 
small and close is actually large and far away. Or the furry thing we assumed fell within 
the Category of 'cat' was actually a rather sleek and smallish 'dog. ' Objects are alien. 
The only thing of which we can be certain, according to Descartes, is the rational 
deduction of the mind to illuminate the categorical unfolding of God's true plan. 
To come up with the notion that rational deduction is the only ground for certainty and 
truth introduced a groundswell of new ideas, the exploration of scientism, measurement 
and calculation, a lot of which is in its own way, fascinating. Descartes' rationality 
centred on the individual's mind, and made all other objects, including other people, 
unknowable with any certainty. Having built on the ideas of his predecessors, including 
Ockham's concept of the razor, that the most simplest, rational explanation prevail, 
Descartes initiated the beginnings of a new paradigm of modernity; free individualism 
and rationality attached to an ontology of progressive order. The solipsist individual is 
held apart, yet rational calculations can ascertain the aggregates of behaviour and predict 
the underlying logic and plan of the world. 
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A good example of the shift from universalising Ideals of the Classical Age to the 
Romantic pluralism of knowledge can be found in the forms of tragedy. The Greek 
premise for tragedy was a comment on the unavoidable lack of knowledge that sets in 
motion a tragic pathway. If Oedipus had known it was his father Laius, he would not 
have killed him, thus avoiding the entire tragic story. In Greek times, as Oedipus realises 
the entire truth of the situation he blinds himself. Ironically blindness signifies aletheia, 
the truth coming to light. In the Classical age the hint for resolution lies with the 
omnipotent knowledge of God's (and the audience's) eye view. But tragedy in the 
Romantic period takes a different turn. There are no possible answers to the tragic 
episode. The production of the problematic pathway is sociological rather than 
ontological. Berlin's example is the play, "Danton's Death" by the German Romantic, 
Btichner, where Robespierre puts the revolutionary Danton to death during the Terror. 
There are no right or wrong answers to the tragedy. Bflchner is resolutely socio-political 
in his writing. The play is engaged with immanent realities, not Absolute knowledge. 
Danton made errors but did not deserve to have his head sliced off, yet Robespierre was 
correct in doling out justice. History knows that having made speeches advocating the 
justice of Terror, that the Assembly put Robespierre himself to death by the guillotine. 
The audience has no better solution for there is no solution. As Berlin puts it, "It is due 
not to error, but to some kind of conflict of an unavoidable kind, of loose elements 
wandering about the earth, of values which cannot be reconciled. ), 41 Immanent struggle is 
unavoidable and always political. The Romantics produced a sociological pluralism - 
which might account for the broad spectrum of political and philosophical beliefs 
advocated under the 'Romantic' banner. The processes of nature are unpredictable, 
unknowable, and despite its often tragic consequences, struggle is the creative stuff of life 
itself. From this position of immanence and inevitable socio-political partiality results a 
deepening of Humanism, which at the same time, is sceptical of the Idealism embedded 
in Liberalism without rejecting the ethical tendencies towards, for example, equality. 
Romantic Art for art's sake was a deliberate naivete; it was opposed to utilitarianism and 
economic materialism, "art as an instrument of social salvation. " In the 1980s critics, 
'Berlin, 1999: 13 
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influenced I would suggest by Hazlitt, argued that Wordsworth's nature poetry 'evaded' 
(Maýorie Levinson) or 'denied' (Alan Liu) or 'displaced' (Raymond Williams and David 
Simpson) political issues by folding the 'sublime area of his own subjectivity' onto the 
natural realm. 42 Having expounded wondrously on Wordsworth's 'philosophical pastoral' 
poems, Hazlitt wrote in 1825 that "The power of his mind preys on itself 543 
Wordsworth's poetics, as we shall see, were not as a-political or as solipsist in the Idealist 
sense as either Hazlitt or some of the historical revisionists of the 1980s assumed. 
Irony emerged as a politics of being during the early Romantic era. Before that, all those 
devout Crusaders, whether Christian, Muslim, or something else, had a depth of belief 
and utter lack of meta-reflection that seems unreal to us now, steeped as we are in the 
democratic recognition (if not acceptance) of otherness. Irony enabled a promiscuity of 
faith, a live and let live mentality, and an irreverent j ouissance at the dedicated fidelity of 
others. In the bedrock of democracy lies the ability for a light-hearted regard, a perceptive 
alleviation of the tendency to judgemental dogma, a respectful recognition of the allure of 
the alien and different and an ability to take in apparent contradictions, paradox, and 
playfulness. 
Yet this rapidly descended into voyeurism of the exotic, sensual Orientalism, nature 
tourism. And voyeurism leaves the Liberal individual intact, as the solipsist centre, 
regarding everything 'else' as objectively distant from the subject. In contrast poetics in 
general reaches out, breaching that individualised rational solipsism, as language, meter, 
rhythm and environment, share and interact 'by nature. ' 
The Romantics were writing in the context of Newton's Copernican revolution, that the 
earth is not the centre of the universe. Square rigged colonial ships were making 
exploratory voyages, mapping, charting, collecting, and drawing previously unknown 
seas and terrain. In Europe in the later half of the 1700s, Linnaeus and Erasmus Darwin 
were inventing a new taxonomy of animals, and so prepared the conceptual basis for the 
theory of evolution. Scientific and colonial examination took off across the entire globe 
with fervour during the Romantic era and persists to this day. Precise descriptive 
42 Fosso, 2001 
43 Hazlitt, 1998: 114 
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anatomical drawings of individuals, species, and genera were collected. Beetles and 
butterflies were pinned alive to presentation boards. It was noted that some animals, 
notably the Dodo, were becoming extinct. This paradigm of surveillance, calculation and 
rationalised categorisation deepens with the entrenchment of modernity. 
The Sublime and the Beautiful 
Edmund Burke wrote a treatise called A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our 
44 Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, (original, 1757) . Burke's philosophy built upon the 
British Empiricists, who, despite the nominalist fallacy, had even more faith that 
rationally deducible categorisation could derive from empirical evidence than Descartes. 
Burke also took empirical sensations as evidence of the integration rather than the 
separation of human bodies, thoughts and emotions with the physically surrounding 
environment. 
The 'Beautiful' challenges Idealist and empiricist rational individualism without 
throwing out solipsism altogether. Rather than the individualised, immediate, sensory 
feeling that runs along a scale between physical pleasure and pain, Burke suggests that it 
is love or 'society' that is most significant and the scale runs between emotional delight 
and indifference or disappointment. Positive society is linked to an emotional life of 
sympathy, imitation, and ambition. Love has a scale of emotional responses ranging from 
the ambivalence of possible loss, to the affection and tenderness proffered to the 
'Beautiful. ' The attachment of love or fondness - the "variety of intricacy of relation" of 
the Beautiful includes affection within humanity and towards other animals. 
In contrast to the focus on the other in the Beautiful, the Sublime is intrinsically 
conceived as solitude. Solitude is assumed to arise at the beginning of life and its 
inevitable ending. So the terror of the sublime is tied to birth and death, danger and self- 
preservation. Its grandeur evokes the human capacity for spellbound awe before the 
veracity of natural immensity and magnificence and is egalitarian in its allegiance. Burke 
wrote, "The passion caused by the great and sublime in nature... is Astonishment; and 
astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some 
44 Burke, 1987 
43 
degree of horror. In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot 
entertain any other. , 45 This awe was ambiguously tied to some form of monotheist God, 
as a signifier of the complex immensity of the Creation of Nature. The Sublime 
transcends the particular political or religious crusades of various sects and loyalties. 
Wordsworth, Coleridge and Southey, Kant, and the German Romantics, might not have 
agreed with Burke's ecclesiastical manifesto, but were all influenced by Burke's 
physiological concepts of the Sublime and the Beautiful. Nature is both awesome and 
sublime in its mountainous, stormy, grandeur and its detailed ordinariness, of wafting 
daffodils or meandering becks. The Romantics were open to a physical, emotional, and 
intellectual response to nature that they attempt to put into words. There is no refusal of 
nature as an object, or alienation of nature as an individualised solipsist and nominalist 
6 representation' of the mind. Burke's physiological concepts of the Beautiful and 
Sublime enable a metaphysic of direct apprehension, of intuitive and passionate 
enthusiasm, that does not rely on universal knowledge, or perfect form. It is the direct 
experience that has not been alienated by technological rational deduction or mechanistic 
economics. 
Burke's system of the Sublime and the Beautiful draws on two forms of subjectivity; the 
individual's terrible regard for their inevitable death, the Sublime; and the social 
relationships, or emotional bonds that range from pleasure of Beauty to indifference. 
Both the Sublime and the Beautiful are governed by the passions, producing 
physiological 'tightening' or 'loosening' of the fibres in the body. Burke's philosophy 
emphasises that in life, there is 'society' or social interconnections between all things, 
and all events, not just human beings. 
Romantic eco-politics 
Romantic aesthetics arose concurrently with the industrial revolution. As now, the 
consumerist benefits of industrialisation, struggle with themes of resistance to the ways in 
which modernity, science, and technology changes the modes of life, behaviour and 
45Burke, 2004, orig. 1757: 58 
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expectations, the meanings and truths and capacities of Europe's many societies and 
cultures. In 'The Tables Turned' from the Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth famously wrote, 
One impulse from a vernal wood 
May teach you more of man, 
Of moral evil and of good, 
Than all the sages can. 
Sweet is the love which Nature brings; 
Our meddling intellect 
Misshapes the beauteous forms of things - 
We murder to dissect. 46 
Elements of Romanticism infuse all subsequent effective counter-arguments to the 
pervading characterisation of modernity as categorisation and economics. Romantic ideas 
keep reappearing in later critiques of modernity, such as Heidegger and many of the 20th 
century environmentalists. In this passage from 'The Tables Turned' Wordsworth 
criticises the scientific 'meddling' that dissects and interrogates things while becoming 
increasingly ignorant of the beauty that, as Heidegger later puts it, 'shines forth. ' The 
Romantic version of nature has itself been criticised for its apolitical, subjectivist, 
emotional, and culturally conservative ethos and because they appear to attribute 
'intrinsic value' to the natural world. 'Nature' is no one thing to any group of thinkers. 
Nature throughout the western tradition is as heavily interpreted as the 'subject' and if 
possible, even more alienated. 
The subjectivism or 'sublime egoism' suggested by Hazlitt and the historical revisionists 
created an ambience that replaced any 'figuring of the real. ' Miall argues that 
Wordsworth idealises his view of 'Nature' in "Tintern Abbey" by cutting out of his 
description the industrial activity of the iron furnaces, the railway tracks or the "beggars 
lurking in the ruins. " Peters agrees that the pastoral image of Romanticism "developed 
through a series of associations - intuition over rationality, feelings over beliefs, with a 
sense of mysticism and oneness with Nature; as though it was possible to overcome the 
alienation and reification that had emerged with capitalism, industrialisation and 
, 47 urbanisation . Peters cites Miall, who argues that 
"Nature can never be known directly" 
46 Wordsworth, 1798, lines 21-28, collected in Bartleby, 2004 
47 Peters and Irwin, 2000: 2 
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so that "Wordsworth is deceiving himself (and his readers) in claiming that here he felt a 
spirit that rolls through everything. , 48 
The charge of pastoral a-politicism then resurrects subjectivist Idealism where the 
separation of the subject from the object makes all concepts into nominal representations 
that emerge from the subjects' intentions, ideas, and language. The Romantics are 
assumed to be subjectivist, like the predominant positivist model of late modernity. 
Jonathan Bate's book Romantic Ecology: Wordsworth and the Environmental Tradition 
(199 1) challenged the easy dismissal of nature as having ever been non-political. Bate 
wrote that Wordsworth had a kind of 'green politics. '49 I would argue that Wordsworth, 
Coleridge, Southey, Bums, and others were concerned with urbanisation and 
industrialism, with the new technologies that tracked through the landscape, like the train, 
and the enclosure of farmable land along with the clearances of the Highlands that were a 
direct result of the industrialisation of agriculture. Their poetics does not outright reject 
change or technology, but it highlights the shifts in way of life, in ethics, and in 
philosophical relations. 
In his later book, The Song of the Earth, (2000) Bate's argument is informed by 
Heidegger's resurrection of the Greek eco-poiesis which is a kind of ecological green 
poetics, that makes the most of 'eco' as 'home, or 'dwelling place. ' This call to 
'homeliness' is one of the more problematic elements of Heidegger's philosophy, as it 
reverberates with nationalism and Nazi politics. In the article we wrote for The 
Trumpeter, Journal ofEcosophy, Michael Peters criticises Bate for idealising Romantic 
ecopoetics at the expense of ecopolitics. 50 Fulford argues that Bate's argument for a 
Romantic 'green politics' is not the full story. During the 18 th and I 9th centuries, nature 
and particularly agricultural industrialisation and the privatisation of land ownership was 
a fundamentally political issue. Land was undergoing rapid transformation as the 
Commons were enclosed and the King's ability to gift estates in return for owed fealty 
was becoming undermined. In Scotland the infamous 'land clearances' were underway as 
48 Miall, 2000 cited in Peters and Irwin 2002: 3 
4913ate, 1991: 1-35 referred to in Fulford 2001 
50 Peters and Irwin, 2002: 4 
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sheep made more profit for landowners than crofters, and in Cumbria many unemployed 
labourers were hired to enclose land with dry stone walls. Land ownership was also the 
criteria for political franchise and membership of Parliament, and justified the 
disempowerment of the peasants and women. Romantic poetics engaged with all of these 
things through iconographic metaphor, often of mountains or trees or other natural 
phenomena. In 'Discourse of the Wanderer and an Evening Visit to the Lake' 
Wordsworth is congnizant of the problems of both modem industrialism - making of 
nature and humanity a resource, or cog in the big machine - and the deprivations of 
earlier pastoral ways of life; 
When, heretofore, I placed before your sight 
A Little-one, subjected to the arts 
Of modem ingenuity, and made 
The senseless member of a vast machine, 
Serving as doth a spindle or a wheel; 
Think not, that, pitying him, I could forget 
The rustic Boy, who walks the fields, untaught; 
The slave of ignorance, and oft of want, 
And miserable hunger. " 
Wordsworth's poem The Excursion, which has largely been dismissed by critics for its 
unwieldy tangents, has the Sage make an impassioned plea for kindliness, equality, 
universal State education, and emigration to solve problems of over-population. 
An erstwhile friend of the Lake District poets, the critic Hazlitt described Wordsworth in 
1825 as "bold, violent, Jabonical. " Fulford's rejection of the 1980s historical revisionism 
agrees with Hazlett's 19 th century political reading of Wordsworth's landscapes. In "The 
Prelude, " Hazlett praises Wordsworth for a Republican "mountain liberty. " Hazlett's 
description reveals how the mountains create "an impressive discipline of fear, " and a 
"ministry of fear" as referring to the British government's oppressive leadership under 
Prime Minister, Henry Addington. 
Paulin (2004) illustrates the relationship between landscape and politics with lines from 
"Tintern Abbey, " 
The tall rock, 
The mountain, and the deep and 
gloomy wood. 
51 Wordsworth 1814, book IX, lines 156-164 in Bartleby, 2004 
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The mountain in French, I remembered, is 'la montagne', and that was the name given to 
the sloping benches in the French National Assembly, where Robespierre and his fellow 
Jacobins sat. Wordsworth is here remembering the Jacobins, and he uses the 'tall rock' 
not just to describe the slightly sinister cliff face he can see above the River Wye, but as a figure that associates with the Tarpeian Rock, where traitors were thrown to their deaths 
in ancient Rome. But it also has a contemporary reference for Wordsworth: it signifies 
the guillotine on which, some scholars argue, he saw a French politician he knew - Gorsas - executed. He doesn't simply describe landscape - he projects contemporary 
events and ideas into it. " 
The political challenge to the monarchy recurs in science, painting, novels and poetry. In 
paintings by John Constable and George Stubbs the 'pastoral' is not so much nostalgic, as 
we might interpret it today, as radically egalitarian. In Constable, the landscape is no 
longer a picturesque setting, as it had been during the Renaissance, but has taken over the 
entire painting, diminishing the workaday figures to integrate them into the working rural 
scenes. Stubbs keeps the larger than life portraiture of earlier formal painting, but 
foregrounds animals, especially the extremely important horse, so that the character and 
beauty of the animal is just as paramount as the human personalities associated with it. 
It should not go unremarked that the Romantic revolutionary impulse of heroic pluralism 
and the new aesthetics coincided with the revolutionary impulse of industrialisation and 
egalitarian Liberal political organisation. Although the Romantics' reliance on aesthetics, 
the Sublime and the Beautiful, and their insistence on 'art for arts sake' has been 
criticised during the early 1980s for its middleclass naivety and essentialism, there is an 
intuitive and almost intangible aspect of the Romantic respect for nature that has created 
a powerful countervailing force to the positivist and Idealist separation of subject from 
object. More recently, historians of the Romantics have established that nature was very 
political in the predominantly rural based economies of the 18 th century, and that the 
apparently politically naive poetry of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Keats (for example) 
were commentaries on the lifestyle, the sexual politics, and the political policies of the 
Pitt government and the eruption in France, of the Terror. 
18"' Century Science 
Many sea faring nations have been exploring the planet for several thousand years. The 
Polynesian people have spread out from South East Asia into all the thousands of islands 
52 Paulin, 2004: 6 
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in the Pacific, across east to the Americas and west to Madagascar. Europe had long held 
relations with other exotic nations, the spice trade with China, for example, that meant 
some people knew of new lands over the oceans. But something different was happening 
during the epoch of European exploration and colonisation beginning in the 16 th century 
with Spain and Portugal's arrival in South America. These expeditions included artists 
and scientists, who recorded everything they saw, from first impressions of the 'natives' 
to picturesque images of beautiful panoramas, gentle bays, sublime mountains, startlingly 
different plants and animals. The success of these early voyages knocked over the fable 
that the earth was flat, and with it the notion that humanity (in the image of God) was at 
the centre of the universe. These depictions and collections of new data had a profound 
impact on those philosophers, scientists, writers, poets and painters that remained at 
home. 
Science also portrayed a startling similarity between the drives and weakness of other 
species and beings, in a similar way to assumptions about human motivation and 
behaviour. In science, it was not the rural economy that forged interdependence of human 
beings with agricultural landscapes and animals that was present in the Romantic 
integration of 'subjects' and 'objects. ' In the later half of the 1700s, both Linnaeus and 
Erasmus Darwin had written a new taxonomy of animal species that made it clear that 
humanity had rather more similarities to other forms of life than peculiarities. Fosso 
describes the systematic integration in the work of Darwin, who, 
resituated homo sapiens as one animal among many similar, interconnected 
species. Hence, in the preface to his epidemiological taxonomy, Zoonomia 
(1794), Darwin could argue that, although the "Creator of all things has infinitely 
diversified the works of his hands, " he has also "stamped a certain similitude on 
the features of nature, that demonstrate to us, that the whole is onefamily of one 
parent. 53 
Linnaeus was an important biologist from Sweden who was the first to name humans 
homo sapiens (wise animals) and was criticised for associating both chimpanzees and 
human beings as 'cave dwellers. ' However he insisted his method of naming (which was 
based on the dualism of the sexes) was not evolutionary but merely catalogued God's 
53 Fosso 2001: 3 
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order of things. Erasmus Darwin greatly admired Linnaeus and was criticised in a similar 
manner for sexualising all relations in the animal, insect, and botanical worlds. In the 
Temple ofNature Darwin wrote, 
Hence on green leaves the sexual Pleasures dwell, 
And Loves and Beauties crowd the blossom's bell; 
The wakeful Anther in his silken bed 
O'er the pleas'd Stigma bows his waxen head; 
With meeting lips, and mingling smiles, they sup 
Ambrosial dew-drops from the nectar'd cup; 
Or buoy'd in air the plumy Lover springs, 
And seeks his panting bride on Hymen-wings. 54 
Nichols describes Erasmus Darwin's work as ascribing "wilfulness, intention, and 
pleasure" and probably suffering to the lives of other organic and even anorganic things. 
Erasmus Darwin was criticised by his own contemporaries for sexualising nature. The 
historical revisionists charged all the Romantics, for imposing human qualities, feelings 
and moral codes on the 'behaviour' of animals and plants. Nowadays plants are assumed 
to just grow, not behave. It is certainly the case in his text, "Economy of Vegetation, " that 
Erasmus Darwin described plant reproduction in the language of sexual passion (rather 
than ecological competition), and he noted through empirical observation the tendencies 
of plants to favour cross pollination with non-family members, although Darwin's 
recording describes this as 'extramarital' rather than avoiding incest. 
The vegetable passion of love is agreeably seen in the flower of the pamassia, in 
which the males alternately approach and recede from the female; and in the 
flower of nigella, or devil in the bush, in which the tall females bend down to 
their dwarf husbands. But I was this morning surprised to observe... the manifest 
adultery of several females of the plant Collinsonia, who had bent themselves 
into contact with the males of other flowers of the same plant in their vicinity, 
neglectful of their own. " 
Most interesting is that none of the criticism, whether 250 years ago, or in the last 20 
years, has either questioned the empirical methodology or raised astonishment at Erasmus 
Darwin's title; the 'Economy of Vegetation. " In the 1980s the scholarship on the 
Romantic period has resuscitated legitimacy for Romantic art because they symbolically 
54 Darwin, E. vol. 11: 263-70 quoted in Nichols, 2001 a: 3 
55 Darwin, E. vol. IV: 121 n. quoted in Nichols, 2001 a: 3 
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made issue of the political and economic relevance of rural life, just as Erasmus Darwin's 
vegetation is accounted for through economics (albeit in that era, a 'home' economics). 
The legitimacy of economics has gradually increased its stronghold on our relation with 
nature. Erasmus Darwin's grandson Charles gathered many ideas for 'competition' in 
4 survival of the fittest' from the economics in Adam Smith's Wealth ofNations (1776). 
The Romantics had been spurned for granting joy to dancing daffodils until their work 
was seen once more in economic terms. 
The Ecological Whole 
In Zoonomia, Erasmus Darwin describes "Vegetable Animation, " "The fibres of the 
vegetable world, as well as those of the animal, are excitable into a variety of motions by 
irritations of external objects. This appears particularly in the mimosa or sensitive plant, 
,, 56 whose leaves contract on the slightest injury. There was a great deal of excitement 
about plants such as the Mimosa and Venus Flytrap, that were being discovered in the late 
18 th century by colonial explorers across the planet. They obviously exhibit a form of 
empirical responsiveness very similar to the sensory information that supplies human 
subjects with the raw data for naming, categorising and making meaningful. 
The debate in theology and philosophy about the merits of individual solipsist 
nominalism - or as the Idealist critic Hazlitt describes it, 'subjectivism' were seen to 
contradict the monist thesis that interested many of the Romantics that all life is 
interrelated, an ecological unity, where humanity combines physically and intellectually 
with the flux of matter. As Goethe described it in his essay, "the Experiment as Mediator 
between Subject and Object 95 
Nothing happens in living Nature that does not bear some relation to the whole. 
The empirical evidence may seem quite isolated, we may view our experiments 
as mere isolated facts, but this is not to say that they are, in fact, isolated. The 
question is: how can we find the connection between these phenomena, these 
events. 57 
In the same text Goethe writes, 
56 Darwin, E. vol. 1: 73, cited in Nichols, 2001 a 
57 Goethe, 1792: 80 cited in Nichols, 2001b: 9 
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Basic characteristics of an individual organism: to divide, to unite, to merge into 
the universal, to abide in the particular, to transform itself, to define itself, and, as living things tend to appear under a thousand conditions, to arise and vanish, to 
solidify and melt, to freeze and flow, to expand and contract... Genesis and decay, creation and destruction, birth and death, joy and pain, all are interwoven 
with equal effect and weight; thus even the most isolated event always presents 
itself as an image and metaphor for the most universal. " 
In the Temple of Nature, Erasmus Darwin makes a similar case for the integrated, 
evolving cohesion of all things, empirically, emotionally, and in language. 
With ceaseless change, how restless atoms pass, 
From life to life, a transMigrating mass; 
How the same organs, which to day compose 
The poisonous henbane, or the fragrant rose, 
May, with to morrow's sun, new forms compile, 
Frown in the Hero, in the Beauty smile. 
Whence drew the enlighten'd Sage, the moral plan, 
Man should ever be the friend of man; 
Should eye with tenderness all living forins, 
His brother-emmets, and his sister-worms. 59 
In contrast to this new philosophy of integration, rationality, and emotion, the important 
contemporary critic, Hazlitt denounces Locke's empiricism because the mind is a passive 
empty vessel, responding to phenomenological stimuli (sounds, sight, smell etc. ) without 
an active principle beyond reaction. Idealist subjectivism takes the polar opposite 
approach, presuming interpretation designates truth, and that Nature slides in there as a 
secondary aside. Hazlitt's critique emerges from the Idealist tradition, that emphasises the 
role of each individual's transcendental mind - abstracted from the body - and the 
deduction of universal truth and contrasts with the immanent interconnectedness that the 
Romantics emphasised. Hazlitt obscures the integration of humanity in the environmental 
niche by bringing to the fore the 'power of the mind. ' Wordsworth's mind, he writes, 
44preys on itself. It is as if there were nothing but himself and the universe. , 60 
Wordsworth does not abandon solipsism but he regards the mind and body together in an 
emotional comportment that is embedded in the eco-socio-politic environment. Contrast 
5' Goethe 1792: 52 cited in Nichols, 2001b: 9 
59 Darwin, E. vol. IV: 419-28, cited in Nichols, 2001 a: 27 
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the rational individualised subjectivist Idealism with Wordsworth's ideas of the 
intellectual and emotional relation arising in communion with Nature in The Prelude. 
,,. in all things 
I saw one life, and felt that it was j oy. 
61 
Subjectivism is not left out of Wordsworth's poetry but rather he criticises in The 
Excursion, the alienated individualism and a rationality that "examined, pondered, 
searched / Probed, vexed, and criticised - to be prized / No more than as a mirror that 
reflect / To proud self-love her own intelligence? , 62 Wordsworth's solitary rambles 
amongst mountains or daffodils were not merely about 'sublime egoism. ' Wordsworth's 
subject is integrated in Nature, whereas the rationalist paradigm of science places 
narcissist Man as the master and centre of the universe. Throughout his oeuvre, as this 
example from The Excursion illustrates, he struck a mode of apprehension both empirical 
and nominal that seeks to integrate ontology and epistemology rather than separate the 
two. 
There is an active principle alive in all things; 
In all things, in all natures, in the flowers 
And in the trees, in every pebbly stone 
That paves the brooks, the stationary rocks, 
The moving water and the invisible air. 
All beings have their properties which spread 
Beyond themselves, a power by which they make 
Some other being conscious of their life" 
Wordsworth attributes a mutual communication which is far more than Locke's empirical 
sensory perception of pleasure or pain. Burke shared a climate of opinion about the 
emotional response to Beauty and the terror of Sublime infinity. In The Prelude 
Wordsworth writes, "From Nature and her overflowing soul /I had received so much that 
all my thoughts / Were steeped in feeling. , 64 It takes an integrated view of human bodies, 
61 Wordsworth, book 11,429-30 in Bartleby, 2004 
62 Wordsworth, 1814, book IV, 11,972-4,987-8 cited in Hazlitt, 1998: 116 
63 Wordsworth, 1814, book IX in Bartleby, 2004 
64 Wordsworth, 1805, book 11,396-399 in Bartleby, 2004 
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thought, rationality, and emotional attention being taken up by the active principle, 
properties, powers andjouissance of everything; living or being. "To unorganic natures I 
transferred / My own enjoyments, or, the power of truth / Coming in revelation, 1 
,, 65 conversed / With things that really are. 
My focus on Wordsworth has not been because he exclusively enunciates the elegiac type 
of Romantic nature poetry that forms the basis of eco-poetics - he is one of many of the 
period who experiment with these ideas. But he is a very good example of what Onno 
Oerlemans calls the 'material sublime. ' "These poems pose questions about the origins of 
thought, and of how thought may spring from, and be connected to, physical objects. 566 
Very detailed descriptions of natural entities: flowers, trees, lichen, stone, mountains, 
combine and separate, recombine and dissolve the physical surroundings and the origins 
of thought, the transient spark of life and the continuity of geological evolution, the 
human and the environmental. Oerlemans notes that in the Lyrical Ballads "The Thom, " 
which is emblematic of the body and consciousness of Martha's dead child, is both "at 
once dead and alive, permanent and impermanent, organic and inorganic - an 
extraordinary mixing of categories that perhaps has as its primary tension the opposition 
of stasis and dissolution. , 67 At the same time, the poem is ironically conscious of the 
'excitable' and 'garrulous' narrator of the poem. Wordsworth manages to integrate the 
human subjects in the physical surroundings through emotive verse and intimate 
description of the landscape and yet hold up the descriptive interpretation for its 
inevitable subjective personality and bias. The words merge and emerge from the 
material evidence, and at the same time are held apart as conditioned by the pre-existing 
history, personality and predilections of the narrator, the author, and the reader. All of 
whom bring with them criteria for evaluating the 'truth' or meaningfulness of the story. 
The 'ecological whole' ties in humanity, as another species, but the linguistic circulation 
of signs and meaning are on a subtly different plane, and Wordsworth manages to 
juxtapose them in a manner that holds them together and yet keeps them apart. 
Oerlemans writes, 
65 Wordsworth, 1805, book 11,390-394, in Bartleby, 2004 
66 Oerlemans, 2002: 44 
67 Oerlemans, 2002: 45 
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Yet it is probably impossible finally to avoid the charge that such claims are not 
4romantic' in the pejorative sense, that subjectivity is being projected onto the somatic 
realm in the process of attempting to find meaning in the natural world. Meaning is a 
product of consciousness, even if consciousness is a product of complex, chaotic 
processes. The universe and its systems would still exist even if there were no self- 
conscious entities to perceive them. 68 
The inevitability of language and cultural interpretation stamped onto the descriptors of 
nature leads Liu to claim "There is no nature. , 69 Oerlemans makes clear that Liu is not 
making a 'quasi-idealist epistemological claim' that innate cognitive limitations 
combined with universal categories define our perception of nature. Rather, cultural and 
ideological history impinges on our definitions. Language is never pure in its description 
of a virginal object. Both object and name embrace contested realms, histories of 
struggle, pressures, sedimentations and growth. Oerlemans writes that nature always 
"begins as concept, that the pure materiality of otherness of nature passes first thought he 
screen of culture and consciousness, even if these forces are ultimately products of 
,, 70 physical, determinate processes. 
The ontology of nature and humanity is broken up by the factors of interpretation and 
perception. Even though we are one species amongst others, Oerlemans quotes Robert 
Pogue Harrison, "this in itself does not prove that humanity is ontologically continuous 
with the order of nature. , 71 Harrison takes the Kantian argument - tools of perception and 
representation always get in the way of unmediated perception. Kroeber responded that 
the Romantics knew Kant and regarded social constructs and human consciousness as a 
result of natural processes. But Oerlemans disagrees with Kroeber's relegation of the 
Kantian a priori to 'critical banality. ' Oerlemans argues that although we can accept 
ourselves as part of the ecological whole, 
we nevertheless experience consciousness and selfhood as distinct. Thus any desire we 
may also feel for a reunion, for knowing our connection with the world, must be to some 
degree suspect ... it is the fundamental paradox that lies at the heart of environmentalist 
thinking, and forms its central conjunction with RomanticiSM. 72 
68 Oerlemans, 2002: 10 
69Liu, 104fn. In Oerlemans, 2002: 11 
70 Oerlemans, 2002: 11 
71 Harrison, 200 quoted in Oerlemans, 2002: 11 
72 Oerlemans, 2002: 11 
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Having said that, Kant's concept of the parameters and conditions of human subjectivity 
do not necessarily lend themselves to the Categories he describes in the Critique OfPure 
Reason. Wordsworth wrote in one of his essays, "in nature everything is distinct yet 
nothing defined into absolute independent singleneSS,, 73 Wildness in language as much as 
landscape resists the stagnant categorisation and ideology. Oerlemans argues that the 
particularity of place, in "Tintern Abbey" for example, stands against the "dangerous 
universalising of the French revolution. , 74 
Instead of abstracted universal categories, the Romantics look to the particularity of 
nature. Particular materiality stands in for objective foundations. But Oerlemans warns us 
that far from being born 'naturalists' the poetic impulse for elegy needs to be learned, 
our predominant reaction to the external realm is as petty Platonists, searching for 
essences, tendencies, characteristic qualities, single meanings, totalising systems of order. 
It is difficult even to want to see the natural environment 'as it is. ' We are easily bored by 
objects that withhold their meanings, or seem inimical to human being. We characterize 
entire regions as wastelands when they threaten a sense of our own centrality. 
75 
Oerlemans advocates striving to perceive the distinctness of nature; it is the thing-in- 
itself, uncategorisable, even as we attempt to acknowledge how the natural environment 
shapes our own physical existence. 
Rather than breeding familiarity, or creating an illusion of knowledge, it brings us to the 
limits of what we know. We can construct an idea of nature, make a useful order, but 
know too that there is a fundamental order that eludes us. Nor is it a vision of a process, a 
dialectics or dialogics continually promising completion. It is, rather, part of the onginary 
moment of romanticism, a way in which its writers stand against the Platonism that they 
very often proceed towards nonetheless. It is a resistant step ... 
76 
At the one time then, the environmentalist stance tends towards the particularity of 
landscape which attempts to transgress the subjectivist alienation with a poetics of elegy, 
but at the same time understands its own subjective limitations and the cultural 
embeddedness of language. It is a juxtaposition of subject and object that both integrates 
them and holds them apart, "a desire for an unmediated access to the material realm, a 
,, 77 
desire that is moderated but not erased by the inevitable failure to achieve this access . 
73 Wordsworth 1815 quoted in Oerlemans, 2002: 14 
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Language is the medium of consciousness, and thus poetry offers no final escape from 
the self or consciousness; nor can it make the material transparent. However, lyric is a 
key form of the exploration of the otherness of the material or the ground of being, 
precisely because it can allow for the ostensive moment, which I have been calling an 
openness to the material. It is ... crucially a form of incompleteness, of multiple 
suggestiveness, and perhaps necessary obscurity. In its 'green' mode, it can reveal not 
just the lacunae with language, which can allow consciousness to see its own activities as 
other, but also those of the physical world we find ourselves in. In other words, the 
extraordinary self-consciousness of lyric language reveals the discontinuity, or wildness, 
of the physical world. It disturbs the illusion that consciousness is somehow pervasive 
and continuous with what is perceived, and so reveals the physical in relief as the 
fundamental ground that cannot be reached. " 
In the intervening centuries, positivist ideas inspired by the rationality of empiricism and 
the nominalist categorisation of Descartes and, later, Kant have dominated the world 
view that shapes humanity's assumptions about our relation with the environment. 
Heidegger has called upon the philosophy embedded in Romantic poetry and aesthetics. 
It is the Romantics that popularised the shift in human status and began the egalitarian 
and plural codes of mutual recognition rather than polemical separation of subject from 
object, nature from culture that characterises Idealism. The Romantics mark another 
beginning that enables a break from Greek and Judeo-Christian ontology and introduces a 
new element of awe and wonder at the natural world, a new aesthetic as a paradigm to 
counter the gradual absorption of society and environment into the technological, 
industrial, commercial era of modernity. They attempt to break through the threshold 
dividing the categorisations of 'subject' from 'object' that had been manufactured by 
Idealism. Romanticism is characterised by its confusing, contradictory impulses of 
aesthetic heroism, rural primitivism, eccentricity, a certain rejoicing in life and passion, 
the Beautiful, and also the extreme terror of death, the infinite, and the Sublime. Despite 
this conglomeration of disparate elements, Romanticism contributes an important 
countervailing voice to the economic rationality, the managerial individualism and the 
mastery over Nature that has dominated modernity since its roots in the Classical Age. 
78 Oerlemans, 2002: 21-22 
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Heidegger and eco-poetics 
Like the Romantic ecological whole, Heidegger also assumes there to be a certain 
ordering that underlies all things. It is not chaos, mayhem or disarray, but an undisclosed 
ontological arrangement that produces the entities that shine forth from concealment. 
During the 18 th century, Edmund Burke had developed a philosophy of the Sublime and 
the Beautiful, which permeated life beyond the merely human. The Copernican 
Revolution had shifted humanity from our central position on a finite and flat earth, as the 
image of God, at the peak of the Great Chain of Being. Scholars like Goethe and Erasmus 
Darwin took Ancient Greek ideas about the inter-related flow of atoms, a holistic 
metaphor for the universe, and posited the connections as passions and intellect in all 
aspects of Being, from the pairing of swans, to the attraction of magnetism. Yet at the 
same moment in history, as Wordsworth complained, the integration of all things was 
being disaggregated into minutely classified fields of expertise under scientific 
positivism. Now the prevailing understandings of ecological systems ignore emotion and 
intellect in favour of the economics of ecology, for example, sustainability as 
technological enframing. Heidegger argues that technological enframing encourages the 
measurement and calculation of all things to fit, as a potential resource, inside the 
consumerist paradigm. There are objects, categories, movements, power relations, but no 
feeling, and no thinking. 
Mastery and control over nature is commensurate with the Idealist and positivist 
emphasis on categorisation. But the privileging of rationality and measurement has been 
aimed at humanity itself, as much as to the natural realm. Human beings have become 
objects amongst objects, enframed as much by the technological Gestell, as Heidegger 
puts it, as any other potential resource. Heidegger asks how it is possible to stand in front 
of a tree in bloom without reducing it to a contributing factor in the machinery of 
consumption. When we perceive everything rationally there is no alternative but to 
understand both ourselves and the tree within the technological horizon as a consumable 
resource. Intrinsic nature is ineffable in rationalist terms. It remains aloof. 
Nominal categorisations constrain the circulation of meanings to a particular forrn of 
rationality and ideology. Romantic poetics entices new meanings, emotional 
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comportments and wild transgressions of the social order to emerge as the limits of 
language nudge up against the particularity of natural events. Heidegger does not deny 
the solipsism of subjective perception and interpretation, any more than do the 
Romantics. The circulation of signs in the linguistic system presents a forbidding 
limitation to reaching into the truth of the realms of nature that are physiologically 
separate from 'culture' and 'personhood. ' Bakhtin develops the attitude of 'play' in the 
relationship between name and object. Heidegger's hermeneutics tends towards the 
unveiling of Being through the ontological difference between the underlying Being and 
the particularity of beings. Like the Romantics, they both attempt to resist stagnant 
ideology, while recognising that any particular epoch, any language community, has its 
own pre-existing history that constrains the ability to comprehend outside a socio-cultural 
worldview. How do we open up to the wild unknowableness that nature presents? With a 
focus on the material sublime as the foundation for possibility, and with the enquiring 
attitude that is a prerequisite for thinking. The Idealist rupture between subject and object 
proves ultimately unhealable. And it is the space between that emerges as the most 
productive for escaping the limits of technological enframing and total mobilisation in the 
consumerist epoch of late modernity. 
It is possible then, that eco-poetry will conceive of new terminologies that exceed and 
resist the overarching Neoliberal metaphor that relegates everything to the marketplace. 
The genealogy of Romantic ideas adds emphasis to the body and emotions, the Beautiful 
and the Sublime, in the construction of metaphors and the philosophy of language and 
these ideas emerge in Heidegger. In Erlduterung zu H61derfins'Dichtung, 79he evokes 
the "body of language" rather than the "content of thought. " 
The crucial element of Romanticism for Heidegger's philosophy is the interface between 
language, meaning and empirical environment. When Heidegger asks us to contemplate 
treeness, the first thing to emerge is the physical and sensory connection, the windy 
whispers of leaves and branches, the smell of loam and bark, the living, residing, 
becoming of both tree and human. There is very little in this initial meeting about 
language, rational calculus, or even philosophy. Thinking has a pre-event, a 
79 Heidegger, 1996d: 153 
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consciousness of the interwoven ecological consistency of assemblages - tree, air, soil, 
human - meeting, interspersing, resisting each other. It is not a matter of the tree being a 
product of the rational human imagination. In the meeting, at first, the Idealist fallacy and 
the process of categorisation has not get anything to catch hold upon. 
The second event is the separation of subject from object, such that conscious thought 
begins to take place. As Oerlemans puts it, this is the crucial interaction that Romantic 
eco-poetry brings to light. 
Knowing that consciousness is itself a construct of natural forces, or even an 
epiphenomenona of it, does not enable us to overcome the experiential discontinuity that 
exists between self and the world, consciousness and matter. Although we can know 
much about the natural world, and can trace our cultural and biological roots to natural 
objects and processes, we nevertheless experience consciousness and self-hood as 
distinct. 80 
The Romantic aesthetic engagement with nature challenged the formal and aristocratic 
conventions of content, meter, style and language. It was based on new philosophical 
ideas that contravened traditional subjectivist Idealism and contemporary empiricism. 
Along with the new science, new style and new philosophical ideas, was a new 
egalitarian approach to the environment and to the beliefs of other people. These 
controversial ideas have continued to rage ever since, in a plethora of misunderstandings 
and philosophical misunderstandings in the huge volume of Romantic criticism. 
The Romantic change in attitude to the environment emerged in response to growing 
urbanisation and the severe environmental impact of the industrial revolution. Elements 
of Romanticism infuse all subsequent effective counter-arguments to the pervading 
characterisation of modernity as economics. The environmental, the natural, the earthly 
erupts into our language and thinking, and we inhabit our skins in a way Descartes would 
never dare dream. 
80 Oerlemans, 2002: 11 
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Environmentalism: Philosophical and Political Trajectories 
The Romantics set a precedent for second wave environmentalists in the 1970s by 
challenging anthropocentricism. Dogmatic belief that humanity is morally superior to 
other beings is now open to question. The possibility of rational explanations for the 
assigning of intrinsic value to nature began to be explored. 81 In contrast, environmental 
protection can be argued instrumentally from the anthropocentric perspective in terms of 
sustaining human well-being, now and in the future. The ongoing debate for many 
generations has been centred on the separation of 'culture' from 'nature. ' Jonathan Bate 
explains the prevailing modem premise. 
Modem culture is the opposite of nature. We make ourselves modem by setting ourselves 
against nature. We make 'nature' separate and unknowable by setting culture against it. 
We cannot ever "return to nature" in the manner of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's noble 
savage. But nature returns to us. As a green reading of Freud might have it, the repressed 
returns in the form of flood, famine and pollution. Nature returns in the sublime and the 
beautiful. This, then, is the troubling paradox: the greening of culture is both a 
contradiction in ternis and a necessity for our very survival on the planet. " 
The dualism between culture and nature still tends to dominate contemporary 
environmental debate, often in the form of raging controversy over whether nature has 
'intrinsic' value or not. This chapter is an historic literature review of the major ideas and 
many of the authors in the environmental canon. It looks at the relationship between 
philosophical concepts and political and social organisation, and the resulting impact on 
the way we understand our relationship with the natural environment. 
Traditional anthropocentric arguments about animals or nature usually involve a 
deontological approach to morality. Humans have a duty (driven by either a logic of 
extended self-interest, paternalism or justice) to approach other humans ethically. The 
issue is to what extent should the parameters be extended: to sentient beings (animals); to 
all living beings (fish, reptiles, insects, plants, amoeba); or an-organic life (earth, air, 
water, fire). From the traditional anthropocentric point of view these debates have been 
" Brennan and Lo, 2002: 2 
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justified in instrumental human tenns. In the text, 'Duties to Animals and Spirits' from 
the Lecture on Ethics, Kant argues that cruelty to animals might desensitise the person 
possibly resulting in cruelty towards humans and therefore cruelty to animals is a bad 
83 
thing. The animal fails to really qualify as intrinsically due kindness and respect. 
Arguments on animal rights often fall into the deontological rubric and centre on 
I intelligence' as a marker of an entity that deserves respect (see below). 
Utilitarianism is particularly influential in western Liberal democratic societies. Wide 
ranging instrumentalism and utility defines the dominating philosophy of twentieth 
century Utilitarianism. The logic of Utilitarianism is most commonly associated with 
Jeremy Bentham and James and John Stuart Mill. Jeremy Bentham set up two premises 
that have become crucial to democracy; 'Everybody to count for one, and nobody for 
more than one' and 'The greatest good of the greatest number. ' 'Good' is judged 
according to the scale of pleasure, or pain it affords. Motives of actions are not as 
important as the consequences of them. Likewise, individual beliefs or behaviours are not 
as important as the aggregate number of mass individuals into a democratic decision. The 
term 'utilitarian' refers to judging an event according to its usefulness at affording 
pleasure to the greatest number of people. 
Bentham argued for expanding the franchise of 'the good' to whom the 'rights' of moral 
duty is owed. 'Rights' are conceived in Liberal-capitalist terms (amidst the controversy 
of slavery) of the responsibility and ownership over one's own body. Rather than 
evaluating intelligence as the marker for a beings 'rights' Bentham argued along 
Utilitarian spectrum of happiness versus suffering: 
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which 
never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French 
have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being 
should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come 
to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination 
of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the 
same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, 
or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison 
a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, 
83 Kant, synopsis in Brennan and Lo, 2002: 2 
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or even a month old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question 
is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer? 84 
In John Stuart Mill's hands, Utilitarianism became increasingly concerned with 
individual rights and the extent and limits of liberty. He wrote a book on The Subjection 
of Women (1869) arguing for an extension of franchise and property rights to women. In 
his other important text On Liberty, (1859) he wrote, "the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of 
,, 85 their number, is self-protection. This negative freedom is fundamental to Liberal and 
Neoliberal political norms and underlies the justice system in most democratic nations. 
Although the conventional politics of today in no way extends the concept of 'rights' to 
animals, as Jeremy Bentham advocated in the 1780s. 
Mainstream Utilitarianism has always fallen far short of Bentham's Ideal. Even 
expanding the franchise of the Utilitarian project to include animals (and instantly 
questions of where to draw the line arise) does nothing to preclude the reduction of all 
factors to utility and rational calculation of an aggregate 'good. ' Utilitarianism has a 
pragmatic focus on practical conditions rather than the emphasis on the abstract in the 
many guises of Idealism. It is pragmatic in that 'good' is the mathematical result that 
collates the highest number of each member's spectrum of happiness versus suffering. If 
the population that counts is limited to humanity, then of course, widely available, cheap, 
consumable 'goods' enhance greater numbers of people's happiness. But if 'happiness' 
must be attributed to anorganic environments, to entire eco-systems, then the evaluation 
system must be quite different. Whenever we take a concrete example, oil is the most 
well known, then the 'happiness' of the immediate vicinity from whence the oil is 
pumped is compromised, the risks of long distance transportation are unhappy ones, the 
rubbish that accumulates as a result of distribution is unfortunate, and while consumers 
(and I am one of them) have their expectations met, the knock on 'externalities' of 
consumption also have profound and unhappy consequences. Carbon monoxide exhaust 
is unhappily producing acid rain, that in turn erodes stone, cliffs, buildings and sculpture. 
The acid rain poisons trees and groundwater, and it creates the 'Greenhouse effect' that 
84 Bentham cited in Singer, 1986: 221 85 Mill, 1999 
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allows radiation into the atmosphere but at high altitudes the gas reacts like a mirror and 
refracts the light back towards earth instead of allowing it to harmlessly escape into 
space. Gradually this heats the planet, which in turn melts the ice caps and expands the 
oceans so sea levels rise, in turn changing the sea currents, wind and weather patterns. 
This creates its own challenges; extending deserts, exacerbating storms and damage, 
drowning and eroding low lying land, and so on! Utilitarianism, by habit if not design, 
tends to 'count' the happiness of the greatest good in narrowly prescribed terms and 
specifically confined places - at most people in 'the West, ' more regularly, people in the 
U. S. A. 
'Good' in Utilitarian terms does not attempt to reach towards a Platonic Ideal, or an 
Aristotelian essence, let alone a position of intrinsic respect. Instead the calculus of 
'good' is most suited to a positivist framework and financial statements of profit and loss. 
In human terms, the aggregate calculation is suited to democratic social organisation 
which works on similar principles. So Utilitarianism remains one of the grounding 
principles of ethics in many environmental policy initiatives. 
Recent American Pragmatists (who are thoroughly immersed in Utilitarianism) such as 
Norton, 86 Light 87 and Feenberg 88 take a 'prudent' or cynical view when they argue 
against intrinsic value for nature. They argue that rather than radicalising and alienating 
the environmental lobby as idealistic anti-consumerist, left wing, 'greenies, ' the 
anthropocentric side of the dualism culture/ nature produces more workable policy 
outcomes that pragmatically involves local community interests. 
2e Century Environmentalism 
It was not until the period of industrialisation that the significance of nature arose with 
any clamour. And it was the intensification of technology that set the industrial revolution 
in motion. Karl Marx famously initiated early analysis of the 'alienation' of humankind 
from nature, arguing that it was encouraged by the industrialised efficiency of 
technological modes of production. Unfortunately, Marx remained caught up in the 
86 Norton, 1996 
87 Light, 1996 
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industrialised technological frame that he had begun to critique by reiterating the older 
legacy of human superiority to nature. 
In the 1930s Ringer, Spengler and Heidegger were writing in Germany about the violent 
cultural changes that were being brought about by technology. Heidegger in particular 
has become a very influential source of philosophical thinking on the environment and 
technology. Far from asking questions that calculate the efficiency and utility that might 
best bring about maximum happiness for human beings, Heidegger's central theme was 
to frame a crucial question; "What is the question of Being? " This has importantly set the 
stage for later meaningful enquiries into the scope and relationship between humanity and 
the environment. Heidegger's theory of Being situates humans as integrated into their 
surroundings, predominantly unconsciously. As the tool-wielding-animal, humans extend 
them'selves' to the chair, the table, the pen and so on. Through culture, habitus, and the 
intimate bounds with our surroundings, human subjectivity is submerged in objects. What 
makes human beings of any particular importance in relation to Being is our potential to 
truly care and question in an effort to understand the essence of Being. However, 
Heidegger remains anthropocentric because his definition of the subject, Dasein has to 
have the capability of discourse - which, perhaps inevitably, is construed in human terms. 
According to Heidegger, this capacity to care and think, rather than a calculation of 
intelligence, the 'good, ' happiness, or the consumerist ethic of technological efficiency is 
the key to constructive change. 
Heidegger's position towards animals remains problematic because he specifically 
excludes them from the concept of Dasein. Heidegger does not even deign to comment 
on anorganic life, or plants, lizards, fish etc. His reason for excluding animals (but not all 
other intellectual beings e. g. gods) from Dasein is on account of their 'paucity of world 
view. ' The solipsist argument is on the one hand upheld; the animals' world-view is 
uninteresting, but on the other hand undennined; the animals do not extract themselves 
from the eco-systern and reflect on either themselves or their surroundings. They are 
incapable of creating the subject/object split. That juxtaposition of the subject against 
object produces thought and a world 'view. ' 
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Heidegger mounts a sophisticated critique of industrialised modernity that reduces 
everything, human and environment, to the impersonal utility of a resource. He associates 
the terrible efficiency of the Nazi Death camps with the efficiency of environmental 
devastation: neither are accidents of history, they are both integral to the modem project. 
His critique is based on the concept that we modems haveforgotten the question of 
Being. To achieve a change in culture from the consumerist ethic, Heidegger suggested a 
somewhat Luddite return to 'home and hearth. ' Where community and place are 
resurrected in importance and environmental responsibility is more visible as 
consumption directly affects the surrounding landscape. His complex view engages in a 
desperate struggle with technology as at once the 'danger' and also the 'saving power. ' 
He calls for a more spiritual deism that might hark back, as Nietzsche did, to Greek pagan 
nature cults, 'only the gods can save us. ' 
Heidegger's ideas have their limitations, but he indicated the initial scope of the question 
that needs to be asked. While spelling out what he though the question was, he showed us 
that historic epoch, finitude, culture, ecology, technology, world-view, the production of 
meaning and the capacity for thinking were all at stake. 
During the same time period, the early part of the 20 th century in the United States, John 
Muir started one of the earliest and strongest conservation advocacy groups, the 'Sierra 
Club' to appreciate and protect all that is 'natural, wild and free' in the Rocky 
Mountains. 89 As well as writing Romantic, nature books and articles, Muir fought for the 
establishment of the Yosmite National Park. The Sierra Club has proceeded to bring 
environmental debate into jurisprudence. 
Aldo Leopold wrote A Sand County Almanac (1949) in the United States in what has 
become a founding text for environmental conservation throughout the world. Leopold's 
concept of the 'land ethic' emphasises the entire eco-system rather than individual 
species. The land ethic situates humanity within the landscape, placing responsibility for 
89 Brennan and Lo, 2002: 4 
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the ethical sphere in the biotic community, "That land is a community is the basic 
concept of ecology, but that land is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethics. "90 
It is a century now since Darwin gave us the first glimpse of the origin of species. We 
know now what was unknown to all the preceding caravan of generations: that men are 
only fellow-voyagers with other creatures in the odyssey of evolution. This new 
knowledge should have given us, by this time, a sense of kinship with other fellow- 
creatures; a wish to live and let live; a sense of wonder over the magnitude and duration 
of the biotic enterprise. " 
Leopold's writing is intimate with wilderness and shows his familiarity with the 
mountains and wildlife in the ranges where he lives in America. "Nature study" as he 
puts it, "constitutes the first embryonic groping of the mass-mind toward perception. The 
outstanding characteristic of perception is that it entails no consumption and dilution of 
any resource. , 92 Perception is the only genuine creativity. Leopold recognises that 
knowledge is not confined by the same limits to growth that constrains economics. 
Like Wordsworth, Leopold recognises that 'getting back to nature' is generating the 
urban dwellers recreational tourist industry. "Like ions shot from the sun, the week- 
enders radiate from every town, generating heat and friction as they go. 93 The tourist 
industry damages the wilderness in a variety of ways. Foot traffic and litter is the most 
obvious and the antidote to the dilution and damage has been an increase in the 
husbandry of wilderness 'parks. ' But while Leopold is not exactly complimentary about 
the motives of the huntin', fishin', shootin' crowd, he is also not averse to trapping some 
species, wearing pelts or generally intervening as a part of wildlife. Park management 
though, is the taming of wilderness areas for human recreational use, which he regards as 
devastating. "It would be hard to calculate the mutual injuries by and between mammals 
deprived of their natural predators, and ranges stripped of their natural food plants . 
Leopold tends to refrain from polemic, but this remark clarifies his planetary perspective. 
90 Leopold, 1949: vii-ix 
91 Leopold, 1949: 109 
92 Leopold, 1949: 173 
93 Leopold, 1949: 165 
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67 
LT_ 
humo sapiens putters no more under his own vine and fig tree; he has poured 1 is gas into hi 
tank the stored motivity of countless creatures aspiring through the ages to wiggle their 
way to pastures new. Ant-like he swarms the continents. 9' 
Brennan and Lo contend that Leopold fails to turn the land ethic into a systematic theory. 
Indeed, various authors and conservation groups have taken up Leopold's ecological 
principles and turned them to a variety of ends. Norton swears Leopold was a Pragmatist, 
Katz rejects that thesis, Routley attributes the land ethic to non-anthropocentric ends, in 
contrast, Holmes Rolston III uses it to argue for a species orientated deontology. 96 
Leopold refrained from turning ecological integration into a fixed systematic framework 
promoting instead an attitude. The integration of human society and the subject into the 
ecosystem synthesizes anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric perspectives. 
"Artificialized management has, in effect, bought fishing at the expense of another and 
perhaps higher recreation; it has paid dividends to one citizen out of capital stock 
,, 97 belonging to all. The polarisation of environmental ethics is unnecessary; communities 
can care for their locale and sustain their livelihoods without reducing the environment to 
Utilitarian or economic ends. 
By the 1960s the affects of the industrial revolution were beginning to show up in 
popular consciousness. Lifestyle changes, technology and a rapidly increasing global 
population provoked a reaction in all fields of life. In disparate discipline areas across the 
sciences and the humanities profound changes were being told. While taking elements 
from Romanticism, philosophy of the environment takes a scientific turn. 
The feeling of crisis made its way into popular books such as Rachel Carson's Silent 
Spring (1963) which details evidence of how pesticides DDT, aldrin and deildrin spreads 
and concentrates through the entire food network. She argues that short-term economic 
measures to maximise food crops simultaneously impact on the environment and public 
health. Science and economics are political. 
The historian, Lynn White Jr. published an essay in 1967 on the historical background of 
the environmental crisis, which, like Nietzsche, she attributes to mainstream Christianity. 
95 Leopold, 1949: 166 
96 Brennan and Lo, 2002: 4 97 Leopold, 1949: 170 
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Christianity has encouraged exploitative attitudes through positioning humans in a 
superior status over the rest of life. White argues that there are occasional minority views, 
such as St Francis who meliorate the dominant trend to a limited extent but on the whole 
Christian 'arrogance' is largely responsible for the ecological crisis. 
In 1968 NASA published the first photographs of Earth and the image of the fragile 
swirly blue ball floating in space had a profound affect on the collective consciousness of 
humanity. That year Paul Ehrlich published The Population Bomb arguing that the 
population had exceeded the planet's ability to remain sustainable long-term. Since then, 
Ehrlich's prolific 'solutions' have proven very controversial and I look at these 
arguments in some detail below. Particularly critical of Ehrlich's propositions for 
population control is Barry Commoner. Commoner argues that Ehrlich's politics are 
racist and he is too pessimistic about technology. Commoner's sociological 
environmentalism demands that the divide between poor and wealthy countries need to 
be addressed if environmentalism is to have a real chance. 
In 1972 a team from MIT lead by Donatella and Dennis Meadows wrote the authoritative 
Limits to Growth which argues for a basic change in values and a new model for 
economics, not unlike the economist E. F. Schumacher's Small is Beautiful (1973). The 
aim of both books is to recognise the finitude of environmental factors (such as oil) and 
that it is necessary to 'tread lightly on the earth. ' They argue for economic 'balance' 
rather than ever expanding 'growth. ' 
The scientist, James Lovelock, took the notion of the fragile ball along with ancient ideas 
of 'mother earth' and turned the planet into a spiritual entity or living being he called 
Gaia. Cloaked in science, the Gaia hypothesis describes the planet as itself a living 
organism. He argues that the planet exhibits most of the same characteristics of a living 
being; it has a finite life span, and this can be shortened by disease and poison or 
pollution. It defers to the Greek goddess of the Earth, Gaia, and Romanticism, in 
suggesting a spiritual and scientific understanding of Nature as one living system 'in 
balance. ' Lovelock suggests that if humanity does not make the earth too 'sick' then, like 
other living organisms, she will recover equilibrium or health. Most recently, Lovelock 
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has become a spokesperson for the Nuclear power industry. Although Lovelock's theory 
has been criticised for its scientific merit, it remains an example of non-anthropocentric 
environmentalism and has influenced a great many people to shift their attitudes towards 
the planet. 
Also in 1972 anthropocentric versus non-anthropocentric arguments surfaced in legal 
debate. Christopher Stone argued that trees and natural objects should have the same 
legal status as corporations. At the time, Disney Corporation had applied to develop a 
resort high in the Mineral King Valley with a highway through the Sequoia National 
Park. The Sierra club argued that the national park ought to have the status of a 'legal 
person', which allows compensation and discourages the risk of injury. Joel Feinberg 
(1974) countered that only entities with 'interests' can be represented in court, and 
therefore also in morality. 
As Brennan and Lo note, Feinberg's assessment of interests as the applicable criteria also 
pertains to the animal rights movements put forward most vocally in the 1970s through to 
the present by Peter Singer 98 and the novelist J. M. Coetzee. 99 
Singer argues for animal rights, through an expansion of the democratic franchise to 
include animals instead of drawing the line at different types of human being. He uses 
Jeremy Bentham's argument that it is not rationality or language that should be the 
markers or boundaries on rights, but the capacity to suffer. Thus, a stone does not require 
'rights' but a mouse does. He is also adamant that eating meat violates animal rights, as 
does vivisection and intensive industrial fanning. In a similar vein, Regan is a non- 
anthropocentric individualist. Thus animals enter the Liberal paradigm of 'rights' in the 
same way as human individuals. 100 
One of Coetzee's novels is about a retired academic who embarrasses her son by giving 
lectures on animal communication, ecology and vegetarianism. It is a commentary on 
9' Singer 1986 and referred to in Brennan and Lo, 2002 
99 Coetzee, 2003 
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ethics and the difficulties of changing the normative cultural paradigm of conservative 
capital accumulation. 
As noted at the beginning of the chapter, in 1974, John Passmore was writing along lines 
similar to Lynn White's thesis that the church is predominantly despotic towards nature. 
However, being sceptical that a radically new ethic could take a hold in society, Passmore 
proposes that the themes of 'stewardship' and 'perfectors of God's creation' might 
meliorate the dominant tradition that had in the past, legitimised destructive practices. 101 
Gregory Bateson 
The year before he died Gregory Bateson published one of the most important books on 
environmental philosophy yet to be released, Mind and Nature; A Necessary Unity, 
(1979). The word limit of the thesis prevents spending more time on Bateson's ideas, and 
the way in which philosophers such as Deleuze and Guattari have taken him up in more 
recent years. Gregory Bateson's thesis is that vectors of communication are the keystone 
for connecting and enabling the two great stochastic processes of change - the individual 
process of assimilation and learning, and the species process of evolution and 
transformation. Bateson argues that there is a profound relation between growth (or 
epigenesis), communication, and evolutionary change. What is essential in all these 
relations is the connection between code and morphology. The communication of code 
and shape permeates and connects individuals, species, ecosystems, fields and strata, 
stratosphere, solar systems, universes. 
Education is central to the transmission of code: the communication between individuals, 
society and ecological systems. Sadly, Bateson is despondent that education is doing 
anything more than reproducing old patterns. Education is in a key position to enhance 
communication, learning and evolutionary change for individuals and societies. Across 
time education encourages the absorption of cultural patterns and learning by individuals 
and the adaptation and evolution of the species in relation to the environment. 
lo' Brennan and Lo, 2002: 5 
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Bateson makes a convincing argument that draws an analogy between language and existence as 
two examples of similar phenomenon. The notion that language is a distilled and rarefied 
speciality that occurs in privileged, intelligent, and rational animals (such as humanity) and is 
attributed to objects via 'representations' is instead seen as patterns of repetition and difference, 
readiness and stochastic change. Code suffuses objects. All shape is an expression of code within 
a particular historical, environmental context. The growth of the individual to maturation 
depends on the grammar of genetics, and the limitations of surrounding context. This is a circular 
arrangement where context circumscribes growth and brings into being the already- existent 
regulations of the formula. The code formulates the possibilities for epigenesis or growth - it is 
the pattern of growth. The individuals grow up and contribute to their community and 
environmental context, reinforcing and modifying the parameters of the code. This cycle of 
repetition and difference contrasts with Enlightenment ideas of linear progress. Bateson places 
emphasis on grammar as the vector which reaches into all morphology and all language, 
growth and differentiation must be controlled by communication. The shapes of animals 
and plants are transforms of messages. Language is itself a form of comi-nunication. The 
structure of the input must somehow be reflected as structure in output. Anatomy must 
contain an analogue of grammar because all anatomy is a transform of message material, 
which must be contextually shaped. And finally contextual shaping is only another term 
for grammar. "' 
Instead of conceiving of the human mind as the highpoint of evolution, 'in the image of 
God, ' Bateson postulates the mind as both operating through and resulting from 
processes of stochastic change. The mind is a combination of random events being 
actively selected and transferred. Epistemology is not logical but paradoxical. The 
initiation of a minute random change that makes a qualitative difference could trigger an 
epistemological shift, a dynamic evolution in genetic code, a semi-permanent evolution 
in shape and meaning. 
A state of readiness serves to create the conditions that selects a new mode or initiates a 
new set of regulations. Conditions of readiness create appropriate circumstances for 
change but cannot control the particular moment and quality whereby the new logical 
type is triggered. "Readiness can serve to select components of the random which thereby 
become new information. But always a supply of random appearances must be available 
102 Bateson, 1979: 17 
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from which new information can be made. " 103 Readiness is the 'overheating' of the 
thresh-hold, that which seeks with a kind of desperation for an abrupt metamorphosis of 
the entire context. The thresh-hold of readiness shapes up the general potential for change 
in the manifold of possibility. From these circumstances, the cycle of ordering, 
evolutionary change, growth and maturation, and learning, can be separated into two 
stochastic fields; epigenesis (or embryology), and evolution and learning. The production 
of order is always a tenuous and temporary condition. Order endures longer only in the 
difference in tempo between one sequence and another that-does-not-endure-as-long. 
Bateson cautions, 
pattern and/ or information are all too easily eaten up by the random. The messages and 
guidelines for order exist only, as it were, in sand or are written on the surface of waters. 
Almost any disturbance, even mere Brownian movement, will destroy them. Information 
can be forgotten or blurred. The code books can be lost. 104 
While retaining the nominal separation between the solipsist worlds of things and 
subjects, Bateson is exploring the vectors of communication between these worlds and 
the limitations of perception which maintains their separation. Instead of being afraid of 
the nominal gap as isolating and reifying human individuals into animal rationalis, 
difference is the means of apprehension and connection. Distinguishing difference is not 
a matter of alienating one view of reality from another, but the means of registering and 
incorporating the new into the tautological mapping of world view. 
Not only does Bateson completely reconceptualise the importance of difference for 
thinking, but he argues that a failure to register difference can be catastrophic. 
It is a nontrivial matter that we are almost always unaware of trends in our changes of 
state. There is a quasi -scientific fable that if you can get a frog to sit quietly in a saucepan 
of cold water, and if you then raise the temperature of the water very slowly and 
smoothly so that there is no moment marked to be the moment at which the frog should 
jump, he will neverjump. He will get boiled. Is the human species changing its own 
environment with slowly increasing pollution and rotting its mind with slowly 
deteriorating religion and education in such a saucepan ? 105 
103 Bateson, 1979: 47 
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It is no great leap to apply the metaphor of the frog gradually boiling to the increase in 
climate temperature, gradually creating a condition of readiness for a transformation from 
the existing set of conditions to something extremely different. These alliterations are 
examples of Brownian movement, where the overheating, in this case of human 
population and pollution pressures continues to build, over-reaching the thresh-hold of 
viability until a moment of difference is actually registered (the avalanche effect), and 
suddenly monumental and irreversible change occurs. 
Biological stochastic change is the active process of selection of random change being 
transferred and repeated. Again, it involves the recognition of difference and the 
transformation of code. Both the environment and the mind work on a combination of 
similar principles of digital and analogic process. For change to take place, the new 
description of code must impose in a way that fits the demands of the existing coherence 
of both organism and ecological surroundings. It is a double requirement, a double 
description, a double specification: "The possibilities for change are twice 
fractionated. " 106 Phylogenetic and biological conservatism must agree with 
environmental suitability for adaptation and change. 
We face, then, two great stochastic systems that are partly in interaction and partly 
isolated from each other. One system is within the individual and is called learning; the 
other is immanent in heredity and in populations and is called evolution. One is a matter 
of the single life-time; the other is a matter of multiple generations of many individuals... 
The unity of the combined system is necessary. 107 
Communication, growth, change, all adhere to the mind's ability to impose the dynamics 
of code; repetition and difference, the moire phenomenon where new patterns of 
emphasis emerge from the abduction of new codes on existing modes of consistency. 
These ways of knowing are about pattern not accounting. That is to say, pattern is 
theories of predictability and consistency, it traverses wildly disparate fields, and it is not 
the financial accountability of govemmentality. 
The vectors of communicating code enable the two great stochastic processes of change - 
the individual process of assimilation and learning, and the species process of evolution 
106 Bateson, 1979: 144 
107 Bateson, 1979: 149 
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and transformation. For stochastic change to take place, a certain 'readiness' is required, 
an overheating that seizes upon a point of difference to make the metamorphosis from 
one sphere of consistency to another. Difference is not an insurmountable barrier between 
the solipsist subject and the external world, but a crucial element of the ability for one 
organism to 'know, ' to think, to speak, to change and to exist. Difference is Being. 
Difference is immanent to being. 
Eco-feminism 
Eco-feminism constitutes another important vein of environmentalism because it directly 
links culture, power and environmental devastation. In 1974 Sheila Collins wrote that 
male dominated patriarchy was supported by sexism, racism, class exploitation, and 
ecological destruction. There is a wide range of feminist positions on the ways patriarchy 
impacts on culture and ecology. In the late 1980s Ynestra King argues that nature has 
long been associated with women and both are inferiorised as 'other' to the rational 
centre of male dominated culture. Val Plumwood cites women and ecology as examples 
of the oppressive structure of colonisation where the dominant party uses 'conceptual and 
rhetorical devices' to position themselves as privileged over others. 'Rape' applies to the 
destruction and plunder of nature as well as to women. 108 Subjugation may take a variety 
of forms, but these oppressions mutually reinforce each other. Male centred culture 
makes use of linguistic oppositions which hierarchically positions logo-centric, 
individually orientated, male and anthropocentric characteristics over other forms of 
social and ecological relationships. Feminism problematises these dualist assumptions, 
such as mind/ body, culture/ nature, reason/ emotion, human/ non-human, subject/ object 
for falsely privileging one aspect and ascribing lack or inferiority to the other. 
Nature, women and emotions have traditionally been subjugated to culture, man, and 
rationality. The renowned Idealist philosopher, Francis Bacon thought of science as a 
means of consolidating man's dominion over nature. Hutchings writes of Bacon's text 
Novum Organum, "Enlightenment rhetoric that described scientific inquiry-which 
10' Plumwood referred to by Hutching, 2001: 3 
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Bacon believed would restore humanity to its originary position of 'empire' over 
nature-as a 'penetration' of nature's c womb. "' 109 
Eco-feminists have often reversed the dualist hierarchy and claimed a privileged, if 
problematic, feminine insight into the realms of emotion and nature. Inadvertently, this 
leaves the dualism intact and fails to challenge men, culture, and rationality to take any 
responsibility for environmental and cultural alienation. 
Mary Midgley takes in the feminist critique in her discussion of the relationship between 
humanity and environment. Midgley has been writing for decades and the book that best 
engages with environmentalism is called The Ethical Primate; Humans, Freedom and 
Morality, (1994). As Nietzsche 110 , White 
III 
, and Passmorel 
12 have cogently argued, 
Christianity reinforced the assumption of a special, central position by marking out Man 
as the only being in His image. Midgley writes that secular philosophy might have been 
sceptical about the existence of God, but they accepted the mythological position of 
Man's supremacy nevertheless. She makes use of feminist theory, astronomy, biology, 
and geology to disrupt the self-centred, anthropocentric perspective preserved in Idealism 
without abandoning the most interesting aspects of nominal solipsism. 
There is a distinct sense in which subject-centred solipsism is undeniably experienced by 
each of us. As subjects we experience the manifold impressions of the environment 
through a self-centred 'I. ' To pause a moment longer, those subjective impressions make 
no 6 sense 5 unless the understandings that we share with our language community are 
applied to them. So the isolated individualism of the 'self-centred' subject is rapidly 
overcome by the importance of the environment - as instigator of the original 
impressions, and the community, as bearers of shared frames of understanding. 
Unfortunately the dominant discourse circulating in our shared understanding of the 
world is the 'individual, rational, utility maximiser ' which exaggerates the importance of 
the solipsist centre and reduces the ecological imbrication of the individual with their 
surroundings to an irrelevant consideration. Kant wrote 'As the single being upon earth 
109 Bacon, referred to in Hutchings, 2001: 3 
"0 Nietzsche, The Antichrist, Beyond Good and Evil, The Genealogy ofMorals, and The Will to Power 
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that possesses understanding (man) is certainly titular lord of nature and, supposing we 
regard nature as a teleological system, he is born to be its ultimate end. " 13 Midgley 
comments on the easy shift from solipsist 'centre' to hierarchical 'titular lord. ' 
Paradoxically, the metaphoric assumption is both undermined and manages to persevere 
in science and governmentality. A better understanding of astronomy unden-nines man as 
the centre of the universe. No longer are the sun, planets and universe thought to be 
revolving around the earth. Instead the universe is far more immense than it is possible to 
conceptualise, and the earth is a mere speck of sand amongst a long wide beach. 
Evolutionary biology reveals Homo Sapiens as another example of the general shape of 
primates, rather than a reflection of the personhood of God. Xenophanes had a good 
point, Midgley writes, when he surmised that if horses and cattle had gods they would 
have the shape of horses and cattle. Man made God in his own image. Geography 
discloses that instead of the firm 'ground' philosophy has traditionally referred to, 
tectonic plates are in fact, constantly moving and changing the shape of the earth. 
On the other hand, some scientists hold a belief that the telos of history has arrived at its 
ultimate destination with the human animal. This overblown view seems to owe 
something to Berkeley's Idealism - if the tree falls and no-one sees it - did it fall? The 
scientific answer is that until humans 'see' it, probably via scientific residues or 
'evidence, ' it has no significance, thus no 'reality. ' Furthermore, as humanity 
progressively understands and codifies the universe (through technology such as 
computers and telescopes) we will reach an comega' point of total conscious 
understanding and becomes godlike. Science has no god in the background, positioning 
man as mere stewards. "Man replaces god as creator, not just of the earth but of 
everything. " 114 Midgley calls this extreme form of self-centredness 'anthropolatory. ' 
This extreme is distinct from the milder and more common anthropocentric ism which is 
"Simple human chauvinism, narrowness of sympathy comparable to national or race or 
113 Kant, 1928: 93-94 cited in Midgley, 1994: 104 
114 Midgley, 1994: 109 
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gender chauvinism. " 115 She ascribes the exclusion of animals from ethical regard as the 
equivalent of the I 9th and 20th century civil rights battles, where 'pugnacious' 
exclusiveness was reinforced by dualistic metaphors. Midgley's philosophy is well 
thought out, but she does not fully engage with the implications for politics, world 
governance or the processes of economic capitalism. 
Deep Ecology 
Another influential group to emerge during the late 1970s is the 'Deep Ecology' 
movement. The Norwegian Arne Naess distinguished deep ecology In his early work 
from the 'shallow ecology movement' which is the 'fight against pollution and resource 
depletion' in the interests of the 'health and affluence of people in developed countries. ' 
In contrast 'deep ecology' attempts to formulate principles that will encourage 
'biospheric egalitarianism' which places intrinsic value on all living things regardless of 
their utility for human beings. He conceptualises ecology, including humans, as a 
6relational total field image' and organisms are like 'knots' in the biospheres net. Naess 
espouses a reverential, ascetic attitude towards nature that was partly influenced by the 
philosophy of Spinoza and Heidegger, and came partly from a mountain climbing 
expedition in the Himalayas where he was hugely impressed with the Sherpa sacred 
devotion to their mountains. As part of the model for achieving this ascetic 
reverentialism, Naess conceives of an enlarged Self that "extends beyond the boundaries 
of my skin. " 116 Naess follows in the footsteps of the Romantics and Heidegger by trying 
to conceptualise the relationship between humanity and nature as interdependent. The 
enlarged boundaries of the Self result in the ego 'identifying' with nature. 
One of two early journals to publish on the environment and education; Environmental 
Ethics began in 1979 and the e-journal, The Trumpeter, Journal o Ecosophy began in ýf 
1983. Deep Ecology gained momentum during the Thatcher and Reagan era of voracious 
capitalism and resistance by major corporations towards any responsibility for the 
environment. As Tim Luke puts it in his perceptive and critical analysis "Humans and 
Nature: Tensions and Interdependence" (2004); "The immobilisation of reform 
115 Midgley, 1994: 111 
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environmentalism in the Reagan years, coupled with a reckless disregard for the 
environment in too many corporate initiatives during the boorntimes of the 1980s" 117 
contributed to the widespread audience for Deep Ecology's message of ascetic self- 
sacrifice, treading lightly on the planet, and the spiritual nature-Romanticism of various 
ethnic cultures from around the world. 
Nicky Duenkel and Bob Henderson outline the pseudo- spiritual, anthroposophic, 
peacenik, eco-friendliness of Deep Ecology. 
Perspectives within include eco-theatre, a naturalists' view, activism, classroom teaching, 
travel guiding, personal lifestyle issues, community initiatives and philosophical inquiry. 
It is certain that all writers approach education experientially with a strong focus on 
being, experimentation and creativity. There is much happening/ evolving in the name, 
and in the framing inspiration, of the deep ecology movement in education for all ages. 
The key players in creating educational programs, lifestyle change, recreational offerings, 
however, are more than likely working as the innovators themselves, forging their own 
ideas into practice. "' 
Deep Ecology maintain the faith that prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s that educational 
sites are an important tool for influencing society at large through transformational ideas 
and structures, and egalitarian opportunities for meritocracy that, despite capitalist class 
hierarchies, will redistribute national income more evenly throughout society. They battle 
with changing the educational system from within; "The hidden curriculum to avoid 
fundamental change towards increased social justice and eco-centric practice is 
strong. " 
119 
Their attempt to change school culture is grounded in a sense of the local and a 
Heideggerian concept of care. Part of the inheritance from Heidegger is the emphasis on 
place; "Ecosophy literally means the wisdom of the household place. It implies the 
wisdom to dwell harmoniously and non- destructively in a place. " 120 Ecosophy is 
reminiscent of the Romantic household economy that emphasised the animals and rural 
landscape that defined family economic life in the 18 th and I gth century at the advent of 
the Industrial revolution. 
117 Luke 2004: 90 
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Later, in the1980s Deep Ecologies' 'biospheric egalitarianism' transforined into the 
weaker declaration that human and non-human life have intrinsic value. Naess and Fox 
tried to separate out 'Ecosophy T' which specifically theorized the Self in relation to 
ecology from 'Deep Ecology' which attempted to advocate an overarching political 
allegiance based on commonly agreed ecological 'platforms' which could provide 
commonalities for divergent environmental groups to convene, agree, and work together. 
Deep Ecology has four levels of discourse; ultimate premises, platform principles, 
policies and practical actions. Emphasis was placed on the secondary platform of 
principles developed by Naess and George Sessions because it is a level where broad 
general agreement can be reached as opposed to the first or ultimate level which has too 
diverse a range of worldviews or religions to be pragmatically informative. Thus, Deep 
Ecology can claim to be both aiming for a pragmatically "total or COMPREHENSIVE 
VIEW" and remain relatively independent of the deepest or 'ultimate premise' of 
worldview which is regarded as a problem because it is diverse and non-consensual. 
The first of the (second level) Platform principle is the inherent value of Life on Earth 
"independent of usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes. " Natural 
diversity is posed in terms of the liberal notion of 'rights' which humans ought to respect, 
not reducing them "EXCEPT TO SATISFY vital human needs" Furthermore, 
"nonhuman life requires a decrease" in human population. Policy changes to implement 
these necessary platforms involve "basic economic, technological and ideological 
structures. " "THE IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE IS MAINLY THAT OF APPRECIATING 
life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an 
increasingly higher standard of living. " 121 
Warwick Fox is the author of an informative text titled "The Meanings of 'Deep 
Ecology. " 122 Ecophilosophy offers a critique of the 'modem world view' that has been 
characterised as assuming a narrow-minded anthropocentricism, a teleology of improving 
technology and with it, a material history that comprehends the earth as a potentially 
consumable resource. The Critical Theorist, Luke, agreeing with deep Ecologies concerns 
12 ' Naess and Sessions. 3-4, capitals and italics in the original 122 Fox, 1990 
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about modernity, describes societies' mechanistic view of nature; "(Nature is no more 
than a vast machine that can be studied, mastered, and then administered). " 123 Fox 
attempts to pose a radically non-anthropocentric perspective "or, more positively, an 
ecocentric approach to ecology/ living-in-the-world. " 124 'Deep' is opposed to 'shallow' 
environmentalism because the aims are not surface, social tinkering but to question the 
normative and prescriptive premises of modernity. 125 
In contrast to the inference of its name though, Deep Ecology avoids 'first principles' 
because they are divisive and the urgency of environmental damage does not allow time 
for quibbling over religious or philosophical bases. Fox argues that both anthropocentric 
and ecocentric views can derive from fundamentals such as 'Obey God! ' and 'Further the 
ends of evolution! ' and therefore the realm of fundamental philosophy is untenable and 
not worthwhile. To some extent Deep Ecology is able to encompass the spectrum of eco- 
to anthro-pocentric values, "It fails to distinguish ecocentric views ... 
from 
anthropocentric views. " 126 
Naess developed Ecosophy T as a theory of Self-realisation that is inspired by Gandhi 
and Spinoza that expands the sense of self as widely as possible to 'this-worldly. ' The 
aim of this 'gestalt ontology' is for an expansive, compassionate sense of self rather than 
a narrow, atomistic and egoistic sense of self. Fox argues that Deep Ecology is different 
from Ecosophy T because the latter is not primarily interested in the notion that the 
environment has intrinsic value. Rather Ecosophy T is concerned with a "certain state of 
being, specifically, the this-worldly realisation of as expansive a sense of self as 
possible. " 127 They argue that this avoids moral imperatives and the dangers of 
environmental axiology associated with anthropocentricism. 
But despite the best efforts of Fox and Naess, the moral imperative shows its hoary face 
by ostracizing behaviour they define as undesirable with adjectives such as 'abnormal, ' 
'neurosis, ' and 'sick. ' While Naess is clearly trying to put Heideggerian ideas about 
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'care, ' 'Being, ' 'home, ' and the 'local' into more digestible form for a wider audience, he 
falls into pitfalls that Heidegger himself manages to avoid. 
Care flows naturally if the 'self is widened and deepened so that protection of free 
Nature is felt and conceived as protection of ourselves ... just as we do not need morals 
to make us breathe ... (so) if your 'self in the wide sense embraces another being, you 
need no moral exhortation to show care ... you care for yourself without feeling any 
moral pressure to do it - provided you have not succumbed to a neurosis of some kind, 
developing self-destructive tendencies, or hating yourself. "' 
This notion of the self, while wide, is still self-interested. For Naess compassion and care 
are only achievable by expanding the concept of self to embrace and identij'y with as 
much as possible because to care for something completely alien and other to oneself is 
outside their conceptual framework. Of course this is a critique of Naess and Fox's 
unstated grounding assumptions - that realm which both have deemed out-of-bounds 
because of the diversity of people's belief systems and the contestable interpretations and 
results of any given fundamental theory. 
During the 1980s there were a plethora of publications making use of scientific and 
sociological evidence that environmental resources were depleting at alarming rates, that 
pollutants were having widespread effects in unimagined contexts, like the upper 
atmosphere, and that the bio-feedback of the ecological system was in danger of warping 
so far out of kilter that the entire structure may collapse. Naess regards 'apocalyptic 
pessimism' as dernotivating as the entire society is subdued by a kind of catatonic shock. 
So he advocates ecological optimism, or 'sustainability' as a political device to enhance 
fundamental change for future generations. Naess tries to distinguish ecological 
sustainability from economic sustainability. Ecological sustainability "ensures full 
richness ('abundance') and diversity of life forms on Earth (to the extent humans can 
ensure it). "129Economic sustainability focuses on ambiguous words like 'development. ' 
The development concept is tied to 'growth' of GNP rather than as Naess puts it, life 
quality. 
128 Naess, 1987: 39-40, in Fox: 1990,3 
129 Naess, 1992: 1 
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Pluralism or Relativism 
Naess seeks cooperation between the traditional activist movements of Peace and Social 
Justice. This pick W mix encourages a type of pluralism by carefully avoiding religious, 
philosophical or ethnic world views or ethical motivations. Politics is divided into Green, 
Red and Blue axes. Naess claims a little of each for deep ecosophy: blue, an "aversion to 
bureaucracy, emphasis on personal enterprise and initiative, and a reluctance to take 
certain green utopias too seriously"; red, "the fight on the side of the underdog; green, 
ecological sustainability" and ethnic pluralism as recouping a type of anthroposophic, 
revisionist 'New Age' spiritualism. 
He has a rather confused approach to business and entrepreneurial endeavour. 
Surprisingly, Naess caters for conspicuous consumption but at the same time advocates 
no political support for greed or social injustice. Arne Naess envisages a utopian future 
which still has room in it for his brother's lucrative job in the oil industry, or at least 
something with as much status and wealth. He is vague about the exact contours of 
conspicuous consumption but thinks that the most green utopias are too dreary to spark 
the interest of more than a few modest artists and mild naturalists. Capitalist society 
might have faults but it is wild and sexy! "We shall need enthusiasts of the extravagant, 
the luxuriant, the big. But they must not dominate. " 
On the face of it, this nod in the direction of capitalist grandeur fails to maintain any 
consistency with his earlier statement in the same rambling article, "The deep ecology 
theorists are servants rather than masters. " 130 But unconsciously I believe Naess has 
accepted the shift in the meaning of the discourse of 'service. ' Service within late modem 
capitalism has taken different connotations from the class distinctions of feudal times. 
Now 'servants' are the 'masters' - discovering what consumers 'need' and ascertaining 
how to 'provide' the services which meets these needs and at the same time taking a slice 
of the action in profit. In the capitalist marketplace, through devices like focus groups, 
market indicators, and advertising, as well as a metaphysical faith in the balance of Pareto 
optimality 'servants' are the new masters. The nod that Naess makes in the direction of 
130 Naess, 1992: 3 
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social justice is totally unexplored in any other terins. He just gets to be a nice guy with 
his entrepreneurial brother as well as his left wing friends. 
Andrew Light thinks that contemporary Pragmatism can correct Deep Ecologies' 
inconsistencies. "Pragmatism can help solve the difficulty in determining the correct 
interpretation of deep ecology. " 131 The Pragmatist view on 'correctitude' as we will see 
below, is based on a strongly held conviction on the anthropocentric economic value of 
society and nature as well as pluralist rather than relativist political and ethnic interests. 
Both Pragmatists and Deep Ecologists regard theory, or debate over world view or the 
independent intrinsic nature of Nature as a waste of time in the face of urgently required 
ecological action. 
Debate about the legitimacy and status of the political interests and world views of a 
plethora of groups has been the last haunting cries of the universal expansion of 
democratic 'rights. ' The Black Civil Rights movement, feminism, the men's movement, 
indigenous rights and animal rights have all been contested within the modem democratic 
framework. The debates on the legitimacy of pluralism versus relativism have political 
and material consequences. As the 'minimal State' rolls back, freeing up erstwhile 
commonly held 'resources' such as state forests, parks, the foreshore, fish, or public 
utilities like rail, buses, electricity, water, gas, radio, television, or infra-red frequencies, 
private interest groups are being given the opportunity to claim ownership on the basis of 
indigenous or minority ownership rights, as well as corporate capitalist 'efficiency. ' 
Representation 
In 1997 Arnie Naess wrote a piece in the Journal ofEcosophy called "Heidegger, 
Postmodern Theory and Deep Ecology" in reply to Zimmerman's comments on him in 
Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity (1994). Ironically for a 
self-avowed Heideggerian, Naess complains that Zimmerman "painstakingly discusses 
all ... (at the level of) ultimate premises" which Naess argues produces 
incompatible 
views and lack of consensus. Along with the anti-intellectualism, anti -po ststructurali sm 
13 1 Light and Katz, 1996: 13 
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and some confusion over the interpretation of Zimmennan, Naess has genuine concern in 
this dialogue with Derrida's reduction of all 'centrisms' to language. 
The first confusion between Zimmerman and Naess is over the terrn 'construct. ' 
Construction or deconstruction is where Naess takes issue with Derrida, and he obviously 
thinks Zimmerman is far too influenced by 'postmodem' deconstruction. Zimmerman's 
explanation of Naess is that, like early Heidegger, he does away with the subject-object 
distinction and with it primary qualities, essence, substance, or even 'things. ' 
Zimmerman writes, "Things are useful constructs for dealing with constantly changing, 
internally related phenomena, which constitute 'experience. "' 132 Naess objects to this 
interpretation of his ideas because" 'Constructs' reminds me too much of postmodemism 
and suggests an activity on the part of us humans which is too pretentious. We do not 
construct things. We construct concepts of things - that is remarkable enough for me. " 
Zimmerman is fully cognizant of this argument and puts it to use, not least in the phrase 
quoted. But Zimmerman's point is that the ultimate identification of all nature with the 
Self of gestalt ontology incorporates every 'thing' into the human framework, rather than 
leaving it to its own, 'other' extrinsic existence. 
Naess's maladroit article tries to justify his concept of 'gestalt ontology' combined with 
Heidegger's notion of the truth of Being 'shining forth, ' both of which, importantly, 
annihilate the separation of subject from object. 
Naess takes Zimmerman's argument that gestalt ontology amounts to totalising 
anthropocentricism and has a critical discussion about Derrida's insistence that every- 
thing, in this case 'ecosystem' and 'nature' is a 'social phenomenon. ' 133 It is a starkly 
simplified interpretation of Derrida's complex philosophy that fails to take account of 
'differance' and therefore fails to understand the temporal relation between meaning and 
the 'otherness' of 'reality. ' Naess objects to Derrida's aphorism that 'reality is a text' or 
'Everything is a text. ' Derrida appears to revert to the subjectivist Idealism that 
Heidegger had earlier rejected (see chapter 5 section on epistemology versus ontology). 
132 Zimmen-nan, 1994: 123, in Naess, 1997: 2 
133 Zimmerman 1994: 138, Naess, 1997: 3 
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Contradicting his earlier collapse of the distinction between subject and object on the face 
of it at least, Naess abruptly introduces a traditionally Idealist theme: that "there is an 
eternal ignoramus" between humanity and nature as thing-in-itself - making it logically 
impossible for all 'things' to be consumed by the naming force of textual circulation. 
Jonathan Bate acknowledges the limitations of representation too. 
If everything is predetermined by ideology, there can be no unmediated access to nature. 
Equally, if all artworks and cultural analyses are refracted through the prism of language 
and other signifying codes, then we can only ever know our representations of nature, not 
the thing itself .. 
Cultural representations of nature are always mediated. It does not follow 
that nature somehow does not exi st. 134 
Heidegger is highly critical of Descartes separation of the subject from the object and 
shows how it constitutes the premise for the modem individual. And the total annihilation 
of any distinction does prove to be a problem in Heidegger's philosophy. But in his later 
work, he recognises that failing to have a 'subject of knowledge' or regarding us all as 
'objects amongst objects' is to regard everything as 'standing reserve. ' It is impossible to 
'know' nature without reflection and at the same time, we are always confined by our 
preconceptions. Deconstruction is one means of pushing beyond preconceptions and 
reconnecting (at the first level) with the undisclosed 'Being' of the event, shining forth 
from 'concealment. ' These great questions about the relationship between humans, 
thinking, and Being have been thought - traditionally - through the prism of 
representation, logic, and language. Heidegger's question of 'what is called thinking? ' or 
'what is calling up thinking? ' hints about a new pathway. What Heidegger calls the 
pathway to thinking is also the pathway to a new mode of relating to nature that holds the 
hope of exceeding the technological enframing of capitalism without abandoning the 
peculiar qualities of humanity that has the potential for authentic care. Naess and Deep 
Ecology contribute to the consideration of that pathway. 
Recently Ae Journal ofEcosophy, Yhe Trumpeter has taken a more diverse and rigorous 
tone. The environmental educationalists from Bath, Andrew Stables and William Scott 
were the guest editors of a recent edition in 2002, that gathered together some of the best 
philosophers in environmental education in Britain. Influences from this publication are 
134 Bate, 2001: 26 
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scattered through my thesis, although the bulk of them are in the chapter on 
Environmental Education. The section written by Michael Peters on "Earthsongs: 
Ecopoetics, Heidegger and Dwelling" is referred to earlier in the chapter on the 
Romantics. Peters criticises the Romantic aversion to industrial reality while referring to 
an a-political pastoralism that was even then becoming obsolete. Like Heidegger, the 
Romantics 'dwell' in reference to a Luddite past. The Romantic eco-poeisis evoked by 
Bate needs to take account of political and technological culture in a struggle for 'green' 
politics. My part of that paper is reproduced with some alterations in chapter eight on 
"Heidegger's Environment: Equipment and Being. " The chapter written by William Scott 
and Andrew Stables themselves tends towards the pragmatic, a position that is closely 
examined in the next chapter. Richard Smith and John Foster's contributions are post- 
structural critiques of the status quo in education and the environment. Michael Bonnett 
and John Foster are Heideggerian. The journal has endured many debates in philosophy 
of the environment over the last 30 years, and the recent turn reflects the Neoliberal turn 
in politics and our conception of ourselves. Bliffidorn's paper is included in the final 
chapter on Neoliberalism 'Societies of Control. ' Heidegger's analysis is becoming more 
bracing than ever, and his influence is becoming more overtly the stage on which 
capitalist thought rages against the eco-poetic. 
There are several incommensurate themes running through the environmental canon. One 
emerges from the tradition of Idealist philosophy that tends to elevate humanity over the 
natural ecosystem, setting up the dualisms between culture and nature, subject and object, 
and privileging an iiber-rationality that tends to measure, dissect, calculate and 
categorise. The second is inspired by Romantic eco-poetics, and it recognises the intrinsic 
worth and otherness of nature, both recognising the interconnections of humanity in the 
assemblages of ecological systems, and the peculiar property (not necessarily limited to 
humanity alone) of thinking, caring, and forging ethics. These two main ideas impact on 
our interpretations of ourselves, our modes of social and political organisation, our 
approach towards technology, and the environment. They permeate contemporary 
theories on the environment. 
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4 Contemporary Pragmatism and Critical Environmentalism 
In the last 35 years, two strands of ideas have dominated popular philosophy of the 
environment. The one is Pragmatic and the other emerges from Critical Theory. Using 
the Heideggerian lens I want to trace the genealogy of ideas that informs each philosophy 
and evaluate the way they are being argued more recently. Both have different 
implications for modes of social organisation, attitudes and ethics towards the 
environment. 
Both Pragmatism and Critical Theory are peculiarly well suited to both education and 
theory of the environment because they are practical. Dewey, for example, world 
renowned as a Pragmatic philosopher of education, mounted his critique on the traditions 
of Idealism and analytic philosophy because it abstracted the mind and rational thought 
and separated it from lived, recognisable experiences of ecological events. Pragmatism is 
profoundly influenced by Darwin's Origin of the Species (1859) and takes an ecological 
view of human beings as a species, who alter their ecological niche, and in turn adapt to 
the shifting conditions of nature. There is no dualism between human culture and nature, 
or the individual subject and natural objects. Both reciprocally structure the other in 
ongoing exchanges and ever evolving ontological and epistemological shifts. It is this 
emphasis on practice, on inquiry, on happenings, events, problematics and ecosystems 
that is present in both Pragmatism and Heidegger, and that challenges the traditional 
separation of human thought and epistemology from the 'real. ' There are no obvious 
direct links between Heidegger and German philosophy and the early Pragmatists in 
America (although I believe Hume informs both strands of philosophy). They both draw 
on the Romantic and empirical sciences that emphasise humanity as a species amongst 
many, and our integral relation with the natural environment. This interaction between 
humanity and environment sets up an important critique of philosophical Idealism that is 
present in both Continental and Pragmatist philosophy. 
Liberal and Utilitarian thought influences both Pragmatism and Critical Theory (at early 
and later stages). Contemporary Pragmatists and most Critical Theorists assume 
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themselves to take the normative position. Because the USA is still the largest economy 
in the world and creates by far the most pollution, their attitudes towards the environment 
are both particularly important and particularly poor. In this chapter I look closely at 
several environmental theorists that adhere to Pragmatism and Critical Theory to try and 
establish where there is promise and where there is dogmatic conservatism entrenched in 
contemporary environmental care. 
Andrew Light is emblematic of conservatist Neopragmatism, with heavy emphasis on 
maintaining the American way of life as the standard norm, whilst addressing 
environmental sustainability. Light regards Heidegger's thought as wasting precious time 
in the urgency of finding solutions for environmental catastrophe. Andrew Feenberg 
crosses between Pragmatism, Critical Theory, Constructivism, and some awareness of 
Heidegger's philosophy concerning technology. Feenberg's close examination of the 
Ehrlich/ Commoner debate is an important example of the practical political and 
economic consequences of environmental philosophy. Tim Luke takes a Critical Theory 
approach that has less invested in preserving the American way of life. His neoMarxist 
critique of modem capitalism allows a fresh and creative examination of the 
environmental crisis that is deeply ethical and unafraid to imagine new ways of 
organising human society. 
Contemporary American Pragmatism 
In the prologue of their book Environmental Pragmatism, Light and Katz make 
extraordinary claims against theorising about the environment - for example that "The 
ideas within environmental ethics are, apparently, inert - like Hume's Treatise, they fall 
deadborn form the press. " From the perspective of Environmental Pragmatism they 
"argue that theoretical debates are hindering the ability of the environmental movement 
to forge agreement on basic policy imperatives. " 135 
The common sense assumptions of contemporary Pragmatist emerge from a very explicit 
group of Classical Grand Masters; Pierce, Royce, James, Mead, Dewey, and a less 
explicit set of theoretical influences, most notably Hegel, materialism and Liberal 
13 5 Light and Katz, 1996: 7 
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Utilitarianism. Unlike their predecessors (who were more like Hume than their later 
name-sakes), contemporary Pragmatists make a stark distinction that separates practice 
from theory, and they valorise one side of other dualisms such as anthropocentricism over 
non-anthropocentricism, instrumentality over intrinsic value, and culture over nature. 
Light and Katz' book sets out to examine the connection between classical philosophical 
Pragmatism and environmental issues; address the perceived gap between environmental 
theorists and policy analysts, activists, and the public; theorise a normative basis that will 
provide the ground for the convergence of activists on policy choices; and win theoretical 
and meta-theoretical arguments about moral pluralism as opposed to poststructuralist 
4relativism' in 'normative' environmental theory. 
Light and Katz complain that there is a 'political correctness' about the debates between 
individualism/holism, anthropocentricism/ non-anthropocentricism, instrumental/ 
intrinsic value, and pluralism/ monism. The politically correct view results, they argue, in 
a unified theoretical field that bears no relationship and thus has no practical effects on 
policy. "Thus methodological dogmatism may account for the failure of environment 
ethics in the realm of practical affairs. " 136 
Despite the emphasis on the practical, the book itself offers little advice that would affect 
policy. This is explained by Anthony Weston, who has a Hegelian telos that regards the 
'birth' of Environmental Pragmatism as a discipline (in 1996) as too 'immature' to have 
discovered its ultimate, progressive form. Pluralism is at the immature beginning stages 
but gradually a Pragmatic approach will forge some sort of focal point for environmental 
practices. Weston writes, 
Originary stages are the worst possible times at which to demand that we all speak with 
one voice. Once a set of values is culturally consolidated, it may well be possible, 
perhaps even necessary, to reduce them to some kind of consistency. But environmental 
values are unlikely to be in such a position for a very long time. The necessary period of 
ferment, cultural experimentation, and thus multi-vocality is only beginning. "' 
136 Light and Katz, 1996: 7 
137 Weston edited by Light and Katz, 1996 
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Likewise, in their contribution to the volume, Rosenthal and Buchholz state "When the 
goal of the new evolution of value is undetermined, it would be a serious mistake to 
attempt to force a theoretical consistency in environmental philosophy. " 138 Confusing, I 
imagine, postmodernity with poststructuralism, they go on to wam that pluralism could 
easily be confused with a lack of a standard for truth in postmodernism. Moral pluralism 
"sounds dangerously close to the abject relativism of deconstructive postmodernism. And 
this relativism is something that we may agree ought to be avoided during periods of 
crisis. " 139 In contrast to the poststructuralist suspicion of metanarratives (with its debt to 
the philosophical tradition of the nominalist fallacy and particularly Hume), pluralism 
incorporates different theoretical stances, for example, "Peter Singer's criterion of 
sentience and Paul Taylor's criterion of respect for all teleological centres of life" that 
can be subsumed into a coherent "single moral enterprise. " Light and Katz argue that 
Pragmatism is a "radical correction of modemity. "140 Juxtaposed against postmodern 
relativism, they require "a workable, robust and critical environmental philosophy, (that) 
at best may provide the foundations or guidelines for the types of theory development 
needed at this stage in the growth of environmental philosophy. " 141 Their concern about 
the relativist problems of Postmodernism is because such theorising delays the urgent 
action that helping the environment requires. 
In her contribution to the volume, "Pragmatism and Environmental Thought, " Kelly 
Parker describes the theoretical underpinnings of the classical Pragmatists, Pierce, Royce, 
Jamesl Mead, and Dewey. She argues that the classical Pragmatists were critical of 
traditional western metaphysics and epistemology because humans, along with other 
organisms, are embedded in a particular location, so knowledge and value are a result of 
interactions within the worldview of that particular place. Like Hume, (and later 
Nietzsche) they argue that there are no indubitable givens as foundations for 
knowledge. 142 
138 Rosenthal and Buchholz edited by Light and Katz, 1996: 10 
139 Rosenthal and Buchholz edited by Light and Katz, 1996: 4 
140 Light and Katz, 1996 
141 Light and Katz, 1996: 10, my italics 
142 Parker edited by Light and Katz eds. 1996: 22 
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According to Parker, James' theory of epistemology is that belief succeeds in making 
sense of the world if it is not contradicted by experience (in which case new beliefs need 
to be developed). However, the carefully construed rendition of the Old Masters falls to 
mention some less palatable ideas put forth by them. Mary Midgley notes that far from 
being environmentally friendly, William James also makes an argument f6jr taking 
human aggression and subverting it by directing it against nature, "The Moral Equivalent 
of War. " 143 
For Pierce, the theory of epistemology was that the meanings of ideas derive from the 
subsequent effects on thought and experience. Parker explains, "We have no indubitable 
beliefs; only a stock of importantly undoubted ones. " Concepts are not immutable but 
comparatively stable and sufficiently clear to make good sense of experience. Experience 
though, can demonstrate that our concepts are too vague or just wrong. With uncanny 
resemblance to Hume, and writing during the same period as Nietzsche, Pierce contends 
that epistemology is always contingent; "if we forget that our understanding is fallible, 
the philosophical quest for wisdom may devolve into a pathological crusade for absolute 
certainty. " 144 Nobody in the book draws attention to the influence of evolution on 
Pragmatism, but this is what unites the North American philosophers with the Scottish 
Empiricists and the Continental philosophers. In classical Pragmatism there is a "matrix 
of conceptual constructs, both tacit and theoretical, that bring order to raw experience" 
from the 'stuff of chaotic, unassimilated raw experience. "The world we live in is 
surrounded by the fringe of the unknown, an ineffable but insistent existential reality that 
is larger than ourselves and our settled knowledge. , 145 Pierce keeps coming back to the 
limits of human knowledge, drawing attention to the necessary conditions and limitations 
of human understanding and also to the phenomenological experiences and culturally 
located roots of epistemology. The earth always exceeds the 'world as known. ' Both 
Nietzsche, and the early Pragmatists owe a profound theoretical debt to Hume's critique 
of causality. So perhaps theory is not stillborn after all. 
143 Midgley, 1994: 105 
144 Parker edited by Light and Katz, 1996: 22 
145 Parker edited by Light and Katz, 1996: 23 
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For Pierce, mind is a part of the world. It is an ever-shifting universe of complex 
relationships that occupies a primordially continuous field of experience. It is an 
uncertain, doubtful, indeten-ninate situation that is reconstructed to make sense, to 
become intelligible. This transforms both the knowing subject and the known object. 
Pragmatism's theoretical roots confirm pluralism, indeterminacy, chance, change, 
development, novelty, structures and relations, reality, beings, and radical empiricism. 
Parker describes 'Subjectivist' experiences in radical terms that dissolve the separation of 
the subject from the object, "experience as such is just another name for the manifestation 
of what is. What is is the ongoing series of transactions between organism and their 
environments. " 
146 
Pragmatic axiology seeks to enquire into what it is that people actually need and desire. 
They do not place value on the utilitarian pleasure - pain axis. The emphasis is on desire 
and growth as a creative or aesthetic richness of experience rather than the material 
47 'growth' such as measuring well being through per capita Gross Domestic Product. ' 
My reading of the roots of classic Pragmatism is that it is an evolutionary theory of 
interaction with environmental conditions; noting the problematics, inquiring into 
necessary adaptions, challenging the species and the circumstances to be rethought and 
introducing a new dynamic to the exchange. 148 
When Parker diverges from the close examination of the nineteenth century Masters and 
resumes the contemporary pragmatic position, she resorts to anthropocentric self-interest. 
The instrumental mastery of nature is not desirable because if everything is completely 
settled and predictable then there is no change, or novelty so humans can no longer grow 
in experience. She never makes this critique of the 'end of history' to dispute 
contemporary Pragmatic faith in teleological change. Parker is in favour of sustainability 
for the utilitarian reasons that through diverse ecological environment, a diversity of 
experiences and knowledge is promoted for human beings. 
146 Parker edited by Light and Katz, 1996: 29 147 Parker edited by Light and Katz, 1996: 27 148 Dewey, 1916 
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Classical Pragmatism is so radically empirical that it is critical of absolutes or dualisms. 
"The world of experience deals harshly with absolute distinctions. ýi 149 This ought to 
dissolve dualist generalisations that privilege one pole of an oppositional pair, 
understanding them instead as integral aspects along a spectrum, but of the same 
phenomena. The metaphor of the spectrum (and better again, the rhizome) dissolves the 
dualist distinctions by not privileging either side of the divide; object or subject, nature or 
culture, man or woman, and so on. 
In contemporary hands there is an interesting shift from empiricism towards Idealist 
subjectivism. While contemporary Pragmatism remains critical of the concept of the 
objective environment as separate from humanity, it goes on to privilege the 'subjective' 
interpretation of the environment and fails to acknowledge that nature always exceeds the 
human 'world' such that epistemology is always simply beliefs that are contingent upon 
our natural experiences. For contemporary Pragmatists the privileging of the human side 
of the culture versus nature dualism results in the statement that there are no non- 
anthropocentric or intrinsic values. Pragmatic theory derives axiology from the 
immediate socially empirical context and actively engages in existing political, social, 
and presumably environmental issues. At the turn of the I 91h century, Pragmatism was 
radically engaged developing a dynamic theoretical framework that caste off subjectivist 
Idealism. Now these contemporary environmentalists, who should be in a position to take 
the most challenging, forward thinking, and creative aspects of Pragmatism are instead 
allowing these ideas to coagulate and stiffen into a protective regard for the status quo. 
The rejection of dualisms and the interconnection of environmental and subjective 
experiences is designated a one sided anthropocentric outlook. Pluralism is reduced to a 
4single moral enterprise' and the fragile unknowability of the manifold world is simply 
occluded. Contemporary Pragmatists pride themselves on their active engagement with 
social issues and fail to see that their engrossment with the short term is at the peril of the 
environment and humanity in the long term. 
Sandra Rosenthal and Rogene Buchholz also regard Pragmatism as the "radical 
correction of modernity" however they seem to cope with the sceptical divide of 
149 Light and Katz eds. 1996: 23 
94 
nominalism slightly better than their co-authors. Their critique is that the modem 
scientific view objectifies nature and separates humanity from the natural world. Science 
is better understood as creative human activity, rather than the excavator of the essence of 
things. These are important ideas for confronting the belief that technology and science 
can sort out environmental problems (should they be so employed). Rosenthal and 
Buchholz emphasize a relational context, or organic unity, such that the individual is 
embedded in the locality. Biological creatures are continuous with nature, so there is no 
need for dualisms such as anthropocentricism/biocentrism, individual/holism, intrinsic/ 
instrumental and so on. They explain the rational and conscious organisation of 
experience to produce future value as a basis of Pragmatic ethics. Rationality and 
consciousness gets underlined here, to produce a 'correctness' of world view that only 
Pragmatism can provide. 150 
Ari Santas writing on G. H. Mead's Cosmology, theorises a continuum of existence that 
connects all entities, especially all living beings. While failing to carry the implications 
through to the Idealist and capitalist politics of his cohort, he again states that there is no 
physical distinction of the individual from the environment. Individuals are defined by 
interactions with their surroundings. 
151 
Larry Hickman continues the theme by writing with Dewey in mind. Hickman argues that 
nature is not independent from humanity, either as a self-contained machine, or a self- 
directed being (Lovelock's Gaia). Nature is a human construct, he argues. It is a cultural 
artefact: 'Nature as Culture. ' For nature to remain purely nature is a matter of raw 
experience. Nature's immediate value is posited in retrospect. Nature as culture 
constructs cultural artefacts and connects experiences into a coherent verified whole. 
This, Hickman argues, is valuable as guides to future human experiences. 152 
By emphasizing subjective solipsism and the nominalist gap at the expense of the 
empirical integration of everything, contemporary Pragmatism has leaned towards the 
rationality and dogmatic thrust for absolute Truth promoted by anglo-Analytic 
150 Rosenthal and Buchholz edited by Light and Katz, 1996 
"' Santas edited by Light and Katz, 1996 152 Hickman edited by Light and Katz, 1996 
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philosophy. This book unden-nines everything 'radical' in 1 9th century Pragmatism and 
unnecessarily stiffens the separation of theory from practice. The result is a confirmation 
of the capitalist way of life in the United States, and a very narrow conception of 
attending to the relationship between human beings and the environment. 
In an article published in Metaphilosophy titled "Contemporary Environmental Ethics: 
From Metaethics to Public Philosophy" (2002), Andrew Light writes an important and up 
to date survey of the field of environmental ethics. 153 He has developed an analysis of 
different theoretical views which predominantly slot into two main camps; the first and 
apparently dominant is the 'non-anthropocentric' theorists who also tend to place 
inherent, 'intrinsic' or 'non-Utilitarian' value on the environment. The second is the more 
traditional type of philosophy that remains anthropocentric and approaches the 
environment in a humanist manner, which tends towards the Utilitarian. 
The latter anthropocentric position emphasizes the solipsist problematic of epistemology; 
that humans inevitably understand the world (and 'nature') through human eyes. An alien 
construction of meaning (whether it be the perspective of a tree, rabbit or Martian) can to 
some extent be sympathised with - but never inalienably comprehended. Light solves this 
problem with a kindly, 'weak' anthropocentric viewpoint that seeks to preserve nature 
rather than develop nature as a resource. 154 
Light argues that the antagonism towards anthropocentricism is so pervasive in 
environmental ethics it has become dogma. His complaint is that theories about the 
environment based on non-anthropocentric values (or non-Utilitarian values) are mere 
'intramural' word-play. They do not ground the actions of most environmental activists. 
Instead, using the example of the Amazon Rainforest, Light notes that the 
environmentalist Chico Mendes was motivated to protect the Rainforest because it was 
the livelihood of his entire community. Light looks to American Pragmatism to sort out 
the theory versus practice debate. The many different theoretical approaches in 
environmental ethics, whether they be anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric, all seem 
to end up in a practical 'convergence' which tends towards protecting or creating 
153 Light, 2002a 
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ecological habitats. So, even the animal rights theorists such as Singer, will prudently 
advise the humane hunting of exogenous rabbits, for example, for the larger good of the 
Australian Outback. 
While I sympathise with the desire for urgent and practical action, I do not think it is a 
matter of postponing environmental care while we have a think. It is naive and even 
dangerous to relegate the myriad debates about Utilitarian versus intrinsic value, or 
anthropocentric versus non-anthropocentric, or individualist versus community aims, and 
even monad versus pluralist beliefs, to a 'convergent' interest in environmental 
protection. Clearly not all political views are interested in environmental protection. 
Some interest groups claim to be environmentally motivated, such as big business 
including 'sustainability' in their mission statements and advertising without any genuine 
attempt to alter capitalist practices in a far-reaching way. Conflicting strategies produce 
divergent politics that play out in the practices of activists, politicians, citizens and 
schoolteachers. Theoretical premises affect the organising paradigms, self-understanding 
and the actions of societies, communities, and individuals. In a global world, 
anthropocentric capitalism dominates the 'view' that the media, advertising, education, 
work ethic, consumerism and so forth, take on the environment. As Heidegger cogently 
argues, everything is enframed and understood as potential resource. So thinking our way 
out of these conundrums is vitally important, both short and long term, for realigning the 
relationship that humanity as a whole has with the earth in all its aspects. Diverging ideas 
about how the relationship between humanity and the earth can be best cared for is a 
constructive way forward (and impossible to annihilate) because different contexts 
generate different relationships. Thought is like biodiversity; difference shelters 
contingent possibilities for unexpected problems, monoculture fails when confronted with 
new disease, or new weather conditions, new predators, new conditions of possibility. 
'Pragmatic' resignation to western prejudice avoids the hard 'development' questions 
about uneven global wealth distribution, skewed global economic and environmental 
policy. Avoiding theory results in ignoring the absorption of old Liberal and more recent 
environmental terms, such as 'choice, ' Ireedom, ' 'equality, ' 'sustainability' into the 
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Neoliberal lexicon and its resultant policy initiatives that are being implemented in 
nations around the planet. Ignoring theory is to ignore what is actually going on. 
Andrew Light attributes his Pragmatism to Richard Rorty's ability to separate private/ 
public practice that seeks to privatise disputes and display public tolerance. Light argues 
this will result in "workable and democratic political theory, " but also as a regulative 
ideal "emanating from practice ... guiding the construction of political and normative 
theories"' 55 
Strangely enough, the major gap in the surveys of Brennan and Lo, and Light from the 
environmentalist canon are the outright evolutionists, Dewey at the turn of the century 
and Gregory Bateson, who argued in the 1970s that the basic unit of anthropocentric 
calculus should not be the individual, nor even the species, but the family-and-ecological- 
niche. Dewey, along with Heidegger and Bateson, all occlude the traditional 
philosophical separation between human-subject and earth-object while retaining a 
nominal space for reflective thinking. Their arrangement recognizes contingent ethical 
demands, as in the Mendes Amazon Rainforest and the Australian Outback examples, 
without falling into the either/or polarisation between anthropocentricism and non- 
anthropocentricism that Light is suggesting dominates the field. 
If the environmentalist project is to generate action, then a genuine epistemological shift 
amongst the global population is required. The piecemeal pockets of revegetation, nature 
'enhancement, ' isolated national parks, sustainable management, urban recycling and so 
on may only contribute very limited environmental 'good' and preserve narrow 
ecological niches, but at the same time, they contribute ideas towards a paradigm shift 
that normalises concern for ecology rather than the present atomised alienation of 
humanity from our surroundings. 
Light is intrigued by the need to 'convince people' to pursue environmental ends. 
Unfortunately this is the only element of interest in his essay, "The Case for a Practical 
Pluralism" which is a superficial skate over what is for him, familiar terrain. He does 
little to explain the various fonns of pluralism apparently advocated by the authors he 
155 Light, 2002a: II 
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surveys. He blithely avoids any engagement with "cleconstructive poststructuralist 
diffýrance " 156 by naming and shaming it as moral relativism. 
Relativism entails abandoning the view that there are some moral stances better than 
others that could guide our ethical claims about how we should treat nature. If we admit 
relativism then, one could argue, we would give up on attempts to form a moral response 
to the cultural justifications put forward to defend the abuse or destruction of other 
animals, species or ecosystems. Relativism entails that ethics is relative to different 
cultural traditions. 157 
Light maintains a North American faith in the 'normative force' of American cultural 
superiority. This criticism of relativism neglects the emphasis on critique, where 
evaluation based on mutual respect for differing view points can still come to an ethical 
decision - but quite possibly not a consensus. Misgivings aside, it is effectively the 
educational project that engages him. Light sees 'convincing people' as central to the 
protection of the environment. But he underestimates the potential for human society to 
change. Light's pluralism is based on a despondent view that the American status quo is 
insurmountable: "when possible we should work within the traditional moral 
psychologies and ethical theories that most people already have and direct them, where 
we can, at the same environmental ends. " 158 
This social conservatism is combined with a very modem sense of urgency - an urgency 
to avert impending doom immediately. "Given the environmental crisis we face, how 
could we afford the sorts of delays seemingly implicit in such talk of 'cultural 
experiments , ?,, I 59This feeling of crisis dominated popular psychology of environmental 
books in the late 1980s. Books like James Lovelock's Gaia Hypothesis, Schumacher's 
Small is Beautiful and many others gave voice to the widespread misgivings of the Cold 
War's nuclear proliferation, together with growing but largely disbelieved body of 
evidence about global warming. At the same time, the realisation that fossil fuels might 
become exhausted, Ehrlich's exponential population estimates, and mounting numbers of 
species extinctions and habitat destruction contributes to the discourse of crisis. 
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By now the majority of people, in every nation have become somewhat familiar with the 
discourse of environmental crisis. I think Light underestimates the significance of this 
familiarity. The general acceptance that there is a massive, global, environmental 
problem is providing the conditions for a 'sea change' in the ways humanity interacts 
with the earth. If we are merely pragmatic and remain with the traditional common sense 
ideas then we will not be 'urgently' helping environmental protection and enhancement 
to take place. We will be inhibiting the potential for a dramatic and irreversible change, 
an epistemological shift, for which the world is increasingly ready. A good example of 
the way common-sense (Liberal-capitalist) views sidetrack this growing concern for the 
environment is the debate on 'sustainability. ' Sustainability is meaningful to people on 
opposite poles of the environmental spectrum. It is in use by those arguing for the 
protection of 'pure' Romantic nature, and especially those concerned with endangered 
species and ecosystems. It has also been take up with gusto more recently by 
Neoliberalism and corporations to promote more 'efficient' management of resources in 
the effort to squeeze more 'growth' out of the market economy. 
The 'sustainability' argument emerges from a Malthusian analysis of the basic needs for 
a healthy life combined with estimations of the finite carrying capacity of the planet. 
Oftentimes this is set forth in Darwinian terms of competition (an idea Darwin owes to 
Adam Smith), and increasingly these ideas have been married to economic ways of 
understanding human society and nature. 
A very important contemporary critic of theoretical and political concepts of the 
environment and society is Andrew Feenberg. Feenberg takes a position informed by 
Pragmatism, Critical theory, and what he describes as the 'essentialism' of Heidegger, 
Borgman and Ellul, and Constructivism. He has written a very insightful analysis of the 
controversy between Ehrlich and Commoner that began in the 1970s. Ehrlich relies on a 
Malthusian analysis of population pressures and basic needs. Commoner is more 
politically orientated and notes the implications of the Malthusian argument on specific 
places and peoples. Feenberg's analysis produces some interesting positions on 
technology and its implications for the relationship between the environment and 
humanity. 
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The Population Argument 
A major influence on contemporary environmental philosophy has been Malthus, who in 
his Essay on the Principle ofPopulation (1798), wrote about the over-production of 
infants in many species, requiring predation or disaster from the environment to maintain 
a 'balance' of population in relation to available resources. He wrote of a hierarchy of 
personal 'needs' and related these to environmental conditions: the availability of food, 
shelter, clothing, followed by the need for companionship, and so forth. This has led to an 
early analysis of the thresholds of population pressure on ecosystems. Malthus was 
interested in primary needs, and the capacity of the earth to provide them. He wrote on 
population increase, civilisation and the limitations of natural resources. This emphasis 
on statistics, biological and environmental detenninism has influenced many discipline 
areas. The ideas of Malthus have become an early blueprint for statistical analysis as a 
tool for projecting probable trends, global governance, and the development of social and 
environmental policy. 
Population pressure began to be regarded as a greater threat than wars, pestilence, famine 
or flood, fire and earthquake. Age old disasters were turned around in the new 
governmentality of population statistics, into a mechanism for constraining a run away 
plague of human expansion. Feenberg lists a raft of these Malthusian publications from 
the early 1970s; Donella Meadows Club of Rome study, The Limits to Growth (1972), 
The Ecologist's document Blueprintfor Survival (1974) and Robert Heilbroner's Inquiry 
into the Human Prospect all of which predict a cycle of growth and crash both in 
population and economic terms which eventually escalates to complete conflagration. 
The apocalyptic message has even been tied to radical governmental population controls, 
and the tolerance or outright advocacy for the devastation caused by famine and diseases 
such as AIDS. 
Most famously, Paul Ehrlich, professor of Population Studies at Stanford University 
wrote a book in 1968 about the population explosion, The Population Bomb, How to be a 
survivor (1971). His argument has become familiar to many environmentalists, "the 
causal chain of deterioration is easily followed to its source. Too many cars, too many 
factories, too much pesticide, ... too 
little water, too much carbon dioxide - all can be 
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traced easily to too many people. " 160 Ehrlich's campaign for zero population growth 
resulted in ambiguous politics - no-growth economics, the Chinese population policy, 
counter- cultural anti-consumerism, opposition to Mexican immigration and high minority 
birth-rates. He wrote, "Basically, then, there are only two kinds of solutions to the 
population problem. One is a 'birth rate solution' in which we find ways to lower the 
birth rate. The other is a death rate solution, ' in which ways to raise the death rate-war, 
famine, pestilence-find us. " 161 
Feenberg traces the political implications of Ehrlich's environmental argument on the 
political, economic and population conditions that exist between 'first' and 'third' world 
nations. Ehrlich summarised and agreed with an earlier book called Famine - 1975! 
162 
which proposes that western food aid to the 'third world' ought to be based on a 'triage' 
approach. Those third world nations with enough food should be left to fend for 
themselves, those on the borderline would be given maximum aid presumably resulting 
ultimately in permanent self sustaining capability. And, 
Finally, there is the last tragic category - those countries that are so far behind in the 
population-food game that there is no hope that our food aid will see them through to 
self-sufficiency. The Paddocks say that India is probably in this category. If it is, then 
under the triage system, she should receive no more food... In my opinion, there is no 
rational choice except to adopt some form of the Paddocks' strategy as far as food 
distribution is concerned. 163 
At this point Ehrlich is prepared to be 'brutal and heartless, ' in his own words, 
Coercion? Perhaps, but coercion in a good cause. I am sometimes astounded at the 
attitudes of Americans who are horrified at the prospect of our government insisting on 
population control as the price of food aid. All too often the very same people are fully in 
support of applying military force against those who disagree with our form of 
government or our foreign policy. We must be relentless in pushing for population 
control around the world. 164 
And Feenberg notes a similar set of ideas in Garret Hardin a couple of years later, 
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How can we help a foreign country to escape overpopulation? Clearly the worst thing we 
can do is send food. The child who is saved today becomes a breeder tomorrow. We send 
food out of compassion, but if we desired to increase the misery in an overpopulated 
nation, could we find a more effective way of doing so? Atomic bombs would be 
kinder. "' 
Hardin finishes by favouring the white population; "Fortunate minorities must act as the 
trustees of a civilisation that is threatened by uninformed good intentions. "' 66 
Ehrlich believed that in developing countries "the stork passed the plow" in 1958, so 
conly' 500,000,000 people per year, in a ten year 'die-back' was required to return to a 
balance of population and resources. Feenberg writes that Ehrlich was aiming to 
influence "moral, financial and especially coercive legal incentives, applied on an 
international scale by the US or a world government. " 167 
Many black people in the U. S. A. rejected Zero Population Growth as the "movement of 
prosperous, well educated whites anxious to shift the ecological burden to poor blacks. " 
Ehrlich tried to redress this with a 'babytax' and wrote, "The best way to avoid any hint 
of genocide is to control the population of the dominant group. " 168 But he never 
succeeded in avoiding racist associations. The approach resulted in highly controversial 
'law & order' policies of birth control and black sterilisation. 
By 1971 Ehrlich backtracks from such a hardline position on food aid and black 
sterilisation and published How To Be a Survivor. In this text, he suggests a massive Aid 
programme for the Third World, saying, "The population problem cannot be 'solved' by 
withholding medical services or food and letting people die of disease or starvation. " 169 
Force might still be required but now Ehrlich modified the role of the United States in 
favour of a world government, which could enforce what Hardin called "mutual coercion, 
mutually agreed upon. " 
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The population bomb resonated with similar arguments then circulating about atomic 
weapons, that a world government, or failing that, western powers such as the U. S. A., 
France and Britain could maintain control over 'rogue' states by owning and threatening 
with nuclear capabilities, paradoxically enforcing a world 'peace. ' Feenberg notes "The 
kind of world government which would use force to impose demographic controls would 
be a government of the developing countries by the developed ones. 171 
Feenberg regards Ehrlich's earlier books as failing in his "earlier alarmist predictions" 
and despite his modified politics these early errors over the limits of food and resources 
get carried through to Ehrlich's later writing "he writes as though The Population Bomb 
had been confirmed on the whole by events. "' 72 However, although Ehrlich's specific 
speculations on the production and distribution of food and resources may have been 
inaccurate, it is even more inaccurate to imply that humanity is increasingly able to 
sustainably manage resources. Feenberg criticises Ehrlich for having a stagnant 
assumption that technology will remain in its 1970s state; reliant upon massive 
consumption of petroleum, releasing vast quantities of greenhouse gases, pouring 
thousands of kilograms of nitrate fertilizer onto the soil, and so forth. However, Feenberg 
relies too heavily on the potential of technology to become increasingly environmentally 
friendly, thus 'saving the day. ' Alarm bells about 'improved' technology like Monsanto's 
high yield, barren seed and genetically modified organisms are largely ignored by 
national policy makers. In this case technological 'improvement' has meant that 
crosspollination of old seed types has made vast tracts land contaminated with 
nonreproductive seed and so millions of poor Indian families, whether or not they 'chose' 
to buy and use genetically modified, high yield seed, are forced to buy next years seed - 
from Monsanto. Nor has Feenberg allowed for the toll of decades of soil loss that mass 
food production has encouraged. The fact is, that it is already too late for many species, 
and according to UN Indicators and the World Watch Reports the planet is exhibiting 
many indications that it is not able to 'carry' the human population with its technological 
lifestyle at 1990 levels let alone its present levels of consumption and pollution. 
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Feenberg rallies powerful arguments to legitimately criticise Ehrlich's political 
'solutions. ' However, the threshold thesis of overpopulation is not without validity 
Feenberg prefers the approach taken by Barry Commoner, the Director of the Centre for 
the Biology of Natural Systems at Queens College. Commoner is actively politically 
engaged, for example he ran for President of the United States as the candidate for the 
Citizen's Party in 1980. He was recently involved with the National Toxics campaign. 
Commoner's approach to environmentalism is through socialist engagement with 
inequitable social relations and the effects of that on human habitat. His writing is 
polemical against populationists. Optimistically, he puts emphasis on the regeneration 
and unpredictability of change, especially technical change. He writes, "environmental 
degradation is not simply the outcome of some general expansive process, growth of 
population, or demand for goods, but of certain very specific changes in the ways goods 
are produced which are themselves governed by powerful economic and political 
considerations. " 174 
Of primary importance is the economic and political north/south divide; richer nations 
concerned with running out of resources, who advocate economic and population 
controls, and poorer nations hoping to gain from economic growth so emphasise not 
growth per se, but its unintended consequences; pollution and health hazards. Feenberg 
explains Ehrlich's position very well; "Fundamentalist environmentalism emphasizes 
control of growth because it can conceive of no change in the industrial order that would 
render it ecologically compatible. Technological determinism thus leads straight to a 
Malthusian position for which environmental and economic values must be traded off 
against each other. " 175 Instead, Commoner (and Feenberg following him) believes in a 
radical technical transformation that will reconcile economics and environment. 
'Demographic transition' occurs when the society is capable of providing stable 
sustenance, education and health care such that large numbers of children are no longer 
required to increase the chances of surviving infancy and supporting parents in their old 
age. The wealthier developed nations have long since slowed their rates of reproduction. 
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Commoner argues in 1971 that the 'answer' to burgeoning global population is to pour 
aid into developing nations and redress the inequitable disparity between rich and poor 
nations. 
Furthermore, Commoner notes that between 1946 - 1966 the population of the US 
increased by 42%, pollution rates during the same period went from 200 to 2000 % 
increase. ' 76 Of population, affluence, and technological pollution, Commoner argues that 
it is the last that is the disproportionate culprit in environmental degradation. "Productive 
technologies with intense impacts on the environment have displaced less destructive 
ones, " including escalating pesticide and fertilizer use, larger cars, synthetic fibres instead 
of cotton and wool, and detergents replacing soap. 177 From this Feenberg declares that it 
is "Thus not biological and technological determinism, but economics (that) lies at the 
root of the environmental crisis. " 178 
Commoner requires a transformed technology to come to terms with "the inescapable 
demands of the ecosystem. " 179 According to Commoner, "most of the nation's resources 
for capital investment would need to be engaged in the task of ecological reconstruction 
for at least a generation. " 180 
For many years Commoner argued that a democratic and socialist economic system could 
address the problems of the environment. But, Feenberg writes, the fall of the communist 
bloc in Russia has meliorated his views somewhat and in 1990 he published a text that 
acknowledged to a limited extent the useful mechanism of a market for "facilitating the 
flow of goods from producer to consumer; but it becomes a social evil when it is allowed 
to govern the technology of production. " 181 
Feenberg's analysis of the debate between Ehrlich and Commoner is that Ehrlich fixes 
technology as a static given and therefore "ends up by treating nature as a social 
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obj ect. 11182 Finding biology easier to adjust, Ehrlich's 'solution' is reproduction politics, 
birth control or sterilisation administered either by individuals or the state. "Social 
control over personal acts" as Commoner criticises. By contrast, Commoner assumes that 
technology is changeable and that the locus of the environmental problem is in the 
organisation of society. This might require, for example, increased public transport to cut 
C02 emissions instead of decreasing the population that requires cars. 
Ehrlich responded to Commoner's criticism in a fierce debate about population pressures 
on the threshold or natural limits to resource exhaustion which results in diminishing 
returns. Diminishing returns then require greater pollutant practises, like increased 
fertilizer on marginal land, to continue use. Commoner replied that increased fertilizer on 
marginalized land in the U. S. A. was a result of national policies to keep some land out of 
production, rather than an exhaustion of possible resources. The threshold of diminishing 
returns was a result of policies designed to maintain capitalist value through scarcity 
rather than the limits of the land itself. Whether or not we attribute environmental 
degradation to capitalist modes of production and unfair ownership or over-population, 
environmentalists today would not deny that depletion of natural 'resources' is occurring, 
take fish stocks for example, and that the theory of thresholds and the pollutant affect of 
diminishing returns is an important one. 
Ehrlich's proposals on population control have been criticised for being insufficiently 
cognizant of the very real political implications on policy and lives; population measures 
either require draconian state measures such as China's one birth per family policy and 
the State sterilisation of particular disadvantaged groups, or it is voluntary and 
individualistic. Neither extreme aims to alter the structures of civil society or alter the 
dynamics of capitalism. It is worth noting though, that many of the debates about genetic 
engineering and interventionist fertility treatments are also perceived to be 'apolitical' 
even if they are not amoral. The main thesis of Feenberg's book is that technology is 
politically contested at early points of the design process, and often gets transformed due 
to public debate and intervention. The controversy between Ehrlich and Commoner 
indicates that notions of democratic contestation do not necessarily arrive at one final 
182 Feenberg, 1999: 59 
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'result' and that the technology itself conditions society as much as society chooses 
technological avenues. 
Ehrlich's emphasis on individual responsibility for 'treading lightly on the earth' and 
living 'below' ones' means was a threat to the consumerist ethic of capitalism. But 
Feenberg notes that some corporations quickly found avenues for exploiting the new 
green ethic by accentuating the individual's responsibility and playing down the role of 
companies. For example American Can Company promoted an anti-littering campaign 
'Keep America Beautiful' where, somewhat cynically, "Hundreds of millions of dollars 
of free advertising space were devoted to diverting environmental pressures away from 
business and toward individual action. " 183 
Commoner's proposal is that environmentalism should be a 'progressive' movement in 
the Marxist or Critical Theory tradition. Economically, pollution is an 'externality' that in 
its early stages, production can ignore. Both labour and capital can allow the problem to 
be absorbed unnoticed. "But in fact pollution represents a debt to nature that must be 
repaid. Later when the environmental bill is paid, it is met by labour more than by capital; 
the buffer is suddenly removed and conflict between these two economic sectors is 
revealed in full force. " 184 In human terms, those with capital can offload the negative 
impact of pollution by buying a nice house in the suburbs, and filling it with bottled 
water, air-conditioning, and imported healthy organic food. The poorer in the community 
have to bear the physical affects of toxicity and pollution. Furthermore, some ecological 
niches: whole valleys, plains, rivers, forests, even skylines are rearranged and are 
unacceptable habitats for millions of species. 
Unfortunately Feenberg argues, although this paints a reasonably accurate picture of 
capitalism's disinterest in pollution problems, it has not resulted in an alliance between 
Trade Unions and Environmentalists in the way that Commoner hoped. Feenberg has 
good reasons for the failure of the labour movement to cohere with environmentalism. 
Older technologies like glass and paper containers instead of plastic are much better for 
the environment, but they are also much more labour intensive to produce. Feenberg 
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draws attention to the benefits of increased welfare and leisure time (and commodities) 
that workers amass by also excluding pollution as an externality. It is unlikely then, that 
Commoner's argument for the limits of automation will be considered a viable option by 
the working classes. Strictly Utilitarian arguments fail to motivate people to change. 
Feenberg argues that cultural change needs to be included in the progressive analysis, 
taking a leaf from Ehrlich's book about individual decisions not to over-consume, to 
encourage recycling and so forth. These small scale, end-use modifications may do little 
to alter the impact of pollution on the environment, in the scale of things, however they 
do introduce an important vehicle for people to consider the consequences of 
consumerism, and thus begin to inform cultural change. 
This is no merely verbal point: where a clean and healthful environment is considered not 
as an exogenous dumping ground but as a component of individual well-being, different 
environmental practices would be followed spontaneously by the individuals in their 
pursuit of welfare and would not have to be imposed on them by 'market incentives, ' or 
by political or moral coercion in opposition to their own perceived interests. 185 
Feenberg thinks that Ehrlich and the other 'pessimists' have it wrong because they 
redress the environmental threshold with individualistic spiritualism rather than 
constructive technological and social change. If contemporary standards of wealth and 
current technology are the best the human race can hope for, then all adjustments to 
environmental constraints appear as economic regression. But far from identifying the 
natural limits of the 'world system, ' this position really only establishes the limits of a 
given type of capitalist economic and technical culture, which it defends against 
environmental obsolescence with the promise of spiritual compensations. 186 
Feenberg diagnoses another problem with the pessimistic threshold theory. It places 
ultimate reliance on end-use alterations to consumption patterns that tend to blame the 
individual consumer without addressing corporate advertising or high pollution 
production processes. 
The crux of Feenberg's argument is that "since technology is routinely adapted to 
changing social and economic conditions, there is no reason of principle why it should 
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not be redesigned to conform to the requirements of such a culture" which values clean 
air and healthy surroundings. 187 Thus, Feenberg remains within the progressive humanist 
tradition that believes that humanity is in control of its own destiny. Technology may 
have caused environmental problems, but in the right hands, and with the right direction 
for new innovations, we, the agents of change, can fix it. He is very sensitive to the 
polarity between G8 nations and 'developing nations. ' He believes that the present 
precarious environmental conditions, 
intensifies the very horrors and upward struggles that threaten survival and yet promise 
also a precious spark of light to those hitherto excluded from the benefits for technical 
advance. Insensitivity to this ambiguity leads to a politics of despair that would freeze the 
current relations of force in the world- and with them the injustices they sustain-as a 
condition for solving the problem of survival. "' 
Commoner brought attention to the lower birth rates of richer countries, which tends to 
suggest that wealthy consumerism needs to be universalised throughout India, China, 
Asia, South America and the Eastern bloc, to bring birth-rates in the 'Third World' down 
too. I would argue that it is not an increase in consumer goods that has promoted the 
reduction in birth-rates, but an increased confidence in reduced child mortality rates (we 
can predict that most of our offspring will reach maturity) and the social provision of 
security (Malthus' food, clothing, housing, medicine) in old age. It is the predictability of 
basic needs being met that has meant that parents do not need to produce great numbers 
of children to guarantee care and wellbeing in their old age. 
What also needs to be brought back into focus is Schumacher's argument (1973) that 
small is beautiful. In an updated version, Luke writes, 
The technological myths of modem production assert that the new industrial state 
produces abundance for all at little or no cost to anyone through technical innovation. 
Much of this 'technical innovation, ' however, actually can be tied to reorganizing world 
trade to benefit capital -controlling regions as well as overriding the ecological balance of 
Nature, to produce what appears to be an unlimited or inexhaustible supply of material 
goods and services. Thus, the demands of markets force contemporary farms and 
factories to overdraw on finite renewable stocks of natural resources available not to the 
present and, in effect, borrow against the future by using the yet unborn generations' 
potential frugal use of resources for truly profligate consumption. 189 
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Luke's analysis of earth's finite carrying capacity is firmly tied to the present conditions 
and the underlying assumptions that contribute to the acceptability of flagrant 
consumerism. Feenberg's analyses of the political implications of Ehrlich's population 
predictions are also an excellent illustration of the material affects that ideas have. Ideas 
are practical in their impact, often in ways that are unforeseen by the initial discussants. 
Thus, Feenberg excellent analysis of the socio-politico impact and performativity of ideas 
provides the foil to his occasional anti-intellectual tendency that, like other Pragmatists, 
separates and privileges environmental practice over environmental theory. This position 
seems ignorant of praxis or Nietzsche and Heidegger's bringing together of practice and 
theory by rejecting the 'otherworldly' in Idealism. 
rt cal Theory of Technology 
The Frankfurt School, of Marcuse, Adomo, Habermas, Horkheimer have contributed a 
great deal to Feenberg's analysis. Critical Theory informs his 'Constructivist approach. ' 
In Critical Theory of Technology (199 1), Feenberg makes a case for three approaches to 
technology: the instrumental, the substantive, and his own development: the Pragmatic/ 
Constructivist approach. The instrumental is the traditional notion that technology is 
humanity wielding tools or instruments. Heidegger's significance, along with Ellul and 
Borgman is the 'substantive' theory of technology. The substantive argument is that 
technology is the essence of modernity, or its inverse, that modernity enlightens us to 
technology's essence: rationality and efficiency. Thirdly is Feenberg's critical, or 
constructivist approach to technology which seeks to revitalise critical democracy in the 
ethics of technology. 
The instrumental approach to technology is the commonly held belief that technology 
amounts to neutral 'tools' which humanity wields. Modem technology is simply a more 
sophisticated version of the stone adze, or the ancient fishing hook. Technology is 
assumed to be politically neutral, rational and universally applicable. It promotes a 
sensible and efficient ease of living. There are minor limitations brought to bear on the 
rational and efficient use of technology. Occasionally on an issue by issue basis, 
decisions must be made about moral tradeoffs about environmental, ethical or religious 
goals versus efficient technological resource use. Although a 'price' must be paid, under 
III 
the instrumental model "the technical sphere can be limited by non-technical values, but 
not transformed by them. " 190 This model of technology bears a close relation to 
traditional economics, both of which assume that the human sphere intersects with the 
environmental, rather than technology, economics and all human social organisation 
residing entirely within the environment. The simplicity of the instrumental approach 
should not serve to underestimate its implications as the normative basis of research in 
the sciences and the social sciences. 
The substantive theory put forward by Heidegger argues that technology is the frame 
through which the entire world is being transformed into 'standing reserve. ' Feenberg has 
a complex approach to Heidegger. Feenberg characterises Heidegger's philosophy of the 
'essence' of technology as 'efficiency' and 'rationality. ' He captures Heidegger astutely; 
"Heidegger asserts that the technical restructuring of modem societies is rooted in a 
nihilistic will to power, a degradation of man and Being to the level of mere objects. "191 
Perhaps because of the ambivalent reception of Heidegger, or perhaps because of 
Heidegger's rather awkward and arrogant style, Feenberg has quite an antagonistic 
interpretation of the field's most authoritative figure. Feenberg both engages with 
Heidegger, and tries to better him on rather spurious grounds. Feenberg groups together 
such disparate authors as Ellul, Borgman, Heidegger and Habermas because they are all 
6 representatives of essentialism. ' 
Essentialism holds that technology reduces everything to functions and raw materials. 
Goal orientated technological practices replace practices which embody a human 
meaning. Efficiency sweeps away all other norms and determines an autonomous process 
of technological development ... rational though it may 
be, technology engulfs its creators, 
threatening both spiritual and material survival. "' 
Feenberg regards this characterisation of technology as reductionist and too general and 
that it fails to engage with its positive and creative implications. 
Like the Neopragmatist environmentalists, Feenberg is highly cognizant of the urgency of 
the environmental crisis. But like the Neopragmatists, Feenberg rejects 'relativist' truth in 
190 Feenberg, 1991: 6 
191 Feenberg, 1991: 7 
192 Feenberg, 1999: vin 
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favour of 'pluralism. ' The problem with post- structurali st relativism, he quips, is they 
quibble over the relative importance of sushi or hamburgers. Theories are irrelevant. "The 
anti -technocratic significance" of arguments about epistemological relativism are 
"obvious but of little practical value. " 
Practical questions of technology are not decided on epistemological grounds. Whatever 
the ultimate status of scientific-technical knowledge, it is what we usefor truth in making 
policy. We need far more specific arguments against technocracy than can play at that 
level. '9' 
He takes a kind of fiberpragmatism that makes use of Pierce's critique of truth and 
therefore over-rides all efforts at philosophical analysis. 
According to substantivism, modernity is also an epistemological event that discloses the 
hidden secret of the essence of technology. And what was hidden? Rationality itself, the 
pure drive for efficiency, for increasing control and calculability. This process unfolds 
autonomously once technology is released from the restraints that surround it in 
premodern societies. 194 
Essentialist progress moves towards distopia and 'advances' to total control. Feenberg is 
critical of the eschatology bound up in 'essence. ' Spiritualism seeks solace in theological 
redemption rather than immanent practicalities. 
In his article on "The end of History" Feenberg makes the point so well articulated by 
Francis Fukuyama, that the ultimate end of the consumer society is the total, rational and 
efficient control over all comers of the globe. Struggle between peoples, ways of life and 
ideas, will cease in the service of the self-engrossed fashionable replacements of last 
years' consumer products. Karl Mannheim (the editor of Heidegger's book An 
Introduction to Metaphysics) wrote, 
It is possible, therefore, that in the future, in a world in which there is never anything 
new, in which all is finished and each moment is a repetition of the past, there can exist a 
condition in which thought will be utterly devoid of all ideological and utopian elements. 
But the complete elimination of reality-transcending elements from our world 
would ... 
bring about a static state of affairs in which man himself becomes no more than 
a thing ... 
Thus, after a long tortuous, but heroic development, just at the highest stage of 
awareness, when history is ceasing to be blind fate, and is becoming more and more 
193 Feenberg, 1999: 13-14 
194 Feenberg, 1999: 3 
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man's own creation, with the relinquishment of utopias, man would lose his will to shape history and therewith his ability to understandit. '9' 
As Heidegger puts it, we will become objects amongst objects, incapable of reflection 
and thought, but endlessly repeating the cycle of consumerism as both beings in the 
environment and human beings are merely potential resource, waiting for insertion into 
the consumption machine. Feenberg has a 'solution' to the total control society. He 
argues that micropolitics is a viable antidote to technocracy. 196 In his essay Technology 
and Freedom he argues that existing elites channel rather than control the advantages of 
technology. 197 Fiddling with the design process introduces democratic agonism into the 
'total control society' and somehow, this solves the problem. 
Design is only controversial while it is in flux. Resolved conflicts over technology are 
quickly forgotten. Their outcomes, a welter of taken-for-granted technical and legal 
standards, are embodied in a stable code, and form the background against which 
economic actors manipulate the unstable portions of the environment in the pursuit of 
efficiency. The code itself is not normally varied in real world economic calculations, and 
as further advance occurs on the basis of it, movement backward no longer seems 
technically feasible. "' 
Drawing attention to the design process is similar to Foucault's genealogical 
methodology. Stripping back normalized codes of practise that seem to have produced its 
ultimate end in the present day's utility exposes the battles, chances and contingent 
decisions that contributed to the normalisation of the artefacts. 1 99 The meaning attributed 
to the 'evolution' of a particular technological practice is often imposed, after the fact, on 
history by the social groups that benefit from the present days norms. Prevailing 
(govemmentality' can be shown as instituting behaviours that conspire to protect some 
social groups while occluding and excluding others. 
Micropolitics engages at the level of end-use aims for design and this will at times affect 
and consider environmental concerns. However it falls far short of addressing the 
consumerist ethic, or the uneven distribution of technological goods, know-how and 
lifestyle benefits. Nor does it ask questions on a larger scale about the way in which 
'9' Mannheim cited in Feenberg, no date, b: 5 196 Feenberg, 1999: 5 
197 Feenberg, 1995: 8 
'9' Feenberg, 1999: 96-97 
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technology enframes the field of possibility so that some relationships and ways of 
knowing are no longer possible and other new ways are created. 
Feenberg has an astute understanding of politics and does not regard market choice as a 
democratic tool - 
there are rather narrow limits to what can be done by isolated individuals on the market. 
To call such a system consumer 'sovereignty' is a pathetic exaggeration of the actual 
power consumers wield in advanced capitalist societies. Even with the help of state 
regulation they usually cannot break through the imposing fagade of fiscal power and 200 technical resources of modem corporations. 
Finally, in true Hegelian style, Feenberg finds a synthesis between the 'substantive' 
theory of technology and the 'instrumental' theory, as both approaches present 
technology as destiny; a destiny that through democratic choices we may actively pursue 
or delimit. Feenberg argues, "the conquest of nature is not a metaphysical event, but 
begins in social domination. The remedy is therefore not to be found in spiritual renewal 
but in a democratic advance. , 201 
Feenberg has faith that 'all this debate' will have a positive and democratic effect on 
technological devices, introducing them to the public sphere from the hidden realm of 
private corporate design. "The technological world we will inhabit in the years to come 
will be a product of public activity to a great extent. " Feenberg is so enthusiastic that 
technology will open new possibilities in ways of living with the environment, that he 
even describes nuclear power as potentially 'safe. 202 Technology as a discipline is 
apolitical in that it 'forgets' that various devices have been modified by public pressure 
from their originally conceived utility, to a wide variety of unforeseen new meanings and 
use factors. He writes, "Technical disciplines are constituted around devices conceived as 
essentially functional, and therefore as essentially orientated toward efficiency. In the 
pursuit of efficiency, technical disciplines systematically abstract from social aspects of 
their own activities. , 
203 
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Feenberg goes on to conflate his own analysis of the existing technological disciplines 
that are essentially interested in efficiency (and I would add, modem capitalism) with 
Heidegger (along with Ellul and Borgmann) and their use of the term 'essential. ' "The 
only difference is that essentialism deplores the social consequences of technology the 
technical disciplines ignore. " 
Andrew Light agrees with Feenberg in a review essay called "Questioning Technology. " 
Light agrees with the explanation of the emergence of specific technologies being 
contingent upon the interests of the players. Chance rather than efficiency dominates 
which particular technology will dominate and be developed and utilised and which will 
disappear into obscurity. The myriad possibilities that open up at the beginning of 
technical inventions tend to congeal into defined use values along dominant pathways, 
and other avenues ossify and disappear. 204 
Feenberg is excited about the democratic possibilities of technological intervention. In his 
essay "Technology and Freedom" he enthuses that at its beginning in the 1960s the 
French Minitel computer network was transformed from simple coded data sharing 
hardware. Users hacked in and introduced communication applications and converted it 
into a sophisticated system that could cope with public communication. 205 1 would argue 
that this is not so much an example of democratic intervention but rather wild resistant 
intrusion; anarchy, unauthorised intervention. Because it is high status, it is acceptable 
crime. 
Feenberg argues that Heidegger (and Ellul, Haberinas and Borgman) define the 'essence' 
of technology as rationality and efficiency. 206 Given Heidegger's essay 'Letter on 
Humanism' where many of the critical ideas about humanism and modernity that are now 
commonly circulating in the social sciences derive, this blithe combination of Heidegger 
with what amounts to unreflective corporate technological discussion is too quick and 
rather ill-conceived. It has become commonplace to set up a sociological or constructivist 
critique of 'essentialism' in association with Christian dogma, and the popular analytic 
204 Light, 1999: 10-12 
205 Feenberg, 1995: 9 
206 Feenberg, 1999: viii 
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interpretation of essential truth as universal foundation and fixed 'core. ' However 
Heidegger is familiar with this argument, indeed, to a large extent he initiated and 
propounded it. So Feenberg's characterisation is from the outset simplistic. His 
description of Heidegger as essentialist entirely ignores Heidegger's complex 
interpretation of the term 'essence. ' In Heidegger wesen holds a complicated and 
dynamic position that owes to both 'being' (esse in Latin is the infinitive form of sum, or 
'being') and epistemology. 
Heidegger's theory about the essence of technology is far more totalising than Feenberg 
is suggesting. The essence of technology is not merely rationality and efficiency - they 
are the instruments for transforming every thing and every one into 'standing reserve' or 
4potential resource. ' The limited space for the agency to confine or pursue technology via 
democratic rationality is an illusory freedom which merely promulgates the technological 
world view. The entire world, including our thinking, is created by technology. There is 
no 'outside' of the technological frame. It is only through technology that perhaps we 
may also discover the source of its 'saving power. ' And of course, for Heidegger, this 
means taking a new stance, and imagining afresh the basic philosophical question: the 
relationship between Dasein and Being. Far from a simple decision to confine or pursue 
technology, Heidegger denies that there is any such possibility for such agency to take 
place. We were 'always-already' born into a technological universe. The technological 
universe shapes our lived environment as well as our thought- constructs. The machine 
breaking of the Luddites at the end of the 1700s, or the opting-out of the Arts and Crafts 
era in the late 1900s, or the hippies during the 1960s and 1970s are all reactions to the 
prevailing technological era. As such Luddite thinking remains thoroughly engaged with 
the realm of technology by purposefully resisting its use. No-one can reverse awareness. 
Once one 'knows, ' forgetting is a conscious and partial sublimation of that knowledge. 
But forgetting is concealment, not obliteration into nothingness. 
Feenberg devotes repeated attention to Heidegger's text The Question Concerning 
Technology in many of his articles and books, which demonstrate his recognition of the 
importance of Heidegger's philosophy to environmentalism, and the role of technology in 
modernity. Feenberg seems to misconstrue Heidegger's intention of critical inquiry about 
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the enframing of technology. Feenberg quotes "Everything loses its integrity as part of a 
coherent world and is levelled down to an object of pure Will.,, 207 The concepts of 
universal will, pure will, general will, individual free will are common throughout 
Enlightenment thinking. However, Heidegger associated will with the nihilistic will to 
power which is reminiscent of the Nazi reading of Nietzsche and from which Heidegger 
angrily distanced himself. He spent four years during the Second World War analysing 
Nietzsche and argued that the will was the remnants of metaphysical thinking that meant 
Nietzsche's philosophy belongs to modemity. 208 It is the disintegration between object 
and subject, that earlier in his career he had been at such pains to spell out, that 
Heidegger hints may, in the end, be the final loss of humanity's ability to separate 
ourselves out enough for thought to take place at all. It is precisely because the subject is 
no longer the object of thinking; that all objects are lost in the solipsism of technology 
that thinking is threatened. The completeness of the annihilation of the division between 
subject and object, so hard won from Descartes and positivism, becomes, ironically, the 
source of technology's 'danger. ' Under technological enframing, everything is an object 
for utilisation. 
Feenberg takes Heidegger's critique of modernity and the technological Gestell 
(enframing) without understanding Heidegger's ambivalence about thinking or 'The end 
of Philosophy. ' Heidegger argues that human agency is so caught up by the enframing of 
technology that we have forgotten any other ways of knowing. The human ability to 
genuinely apprehend Being is 'forgotten' and remains in concealment. What Feenberg 
missed was the significance of concealment. Concealment does the same 'work' as Hume 
and Pierces' thesis of unknowability. The emphasis is put on aspects of the environment 
to erupt into human conscious thought - despite the apparent determinism of technology. 
Thinking and change emerge from the united coalition between Dasein (Heidegger's 
term for the subject) and Being; not an Idealist separation of the subject from the object, 
nor the Appearance from the Idea, nor theory from practice. Clearly, Feenberg recognises 
the importance of Heidegger to the enterprise of thinking about the relationship of 
humanity with the environment. He has a book coming out on Heidegger where he has 
207 
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probably engaged more fully with Heidegger's philosophy. Feenberg makes a beginning, 
and in the next section this thesis will look even closer at Heidegger's philosophy to 
better realise his ideas and limitations for philosophy of the environment and philosophy 
of education. 
Feenberg is making a challenge for society to open up and repoliticise discussion about 
technology. Once the particular artefact has become familiar and normal, the social 
tensions about its purpose and the displacement that it causes in society become rapidly 
forgotten. The political and economic consequences of these small scale decisions 
amount to the Neoliberal paradigm of market choice that dominates global policies and 
assumptions today. The Neoliberal paradigm invites particular forms of subjective 
identity that are not inquiring, they are merely consuming. 
Rather than set up a dualism that sets technology versus meaning, Feenberg argues we 
need to "recognise our subordinate position in the technical systems that enrol us, and 
begin to intervene in the design process in the defence of the conditions of a meaningful 
life and a liveable environment. , 209 From this recognition and focus on the subsumed 
political nature of technical design, Feenberg goes on to argue that protest about 
globalised corporations, consumer culture and environmental degradation are 'immature' 
because there are no unifying articulation for identity based protest groups. He seeks a 
ccutopian vision of a redeemed modernity"210 to unify the left, post Marx. Feenberg has 
set upon an interesting path, and is by no means as conservative as Andrew Light, but 
both Americans appear despondent that alternative ways of living a democratic yet 
environmentally ethical way of life can come about. 
Feenberg traces a progressive trajectory in thinking about technology that sinks into the 
mire of the determinism versus agency debate that haunted the Frankfurt School for so 
long. This progression starts with assumptions that technology is neutral and 
instrumental, moved to technological determinism which critically evaluated the essence 
of technology as efficiency and rationality, and finally ends in the social constructivism 
position that tries to re-politicise technology by activating individual agency in the design 
"'9 Feenberg, 1999: xiv 
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process, without however, thoroughly criticizing consumer culture. This last is influenced 
by separating out Marxist arguments for the redistribution of wealth and Third World 
development while ignoring the environmental constraints of material alienation and 
accelerated consumerism. However not all Critical theorists have made this separation. 
Critical Theory and Ecological Consciousness 
In the early 20th century, the Frankfurt School wrote on the failure of Marx's 
revolutionary dialectic to take place. During the rise of capitalist corporatism, the State 
and consumer culture managed to stall the eruption of working class discontent into 
revolutionary overthrow. The State apparatus suppressed many uprisings on the one 
hand, and increasingly on the other, offered a minimal welfare safety net through 
employment measures, minimum wage legislation, increasingly universal education, 
health-care, and modest welfare benefits. Consumable commodities also apparently eased 
the odour of exploitation, providing "soothing reified goods of a very comfortable 
alienation whose domination over independent thinking has made active resistance 
against capitalism even more difficult. 211 
Max Horkheimer and Theadore Adorno wrote a critique of the classical Marxist view of 
nature in 1969. In classical Marxism, workers are alienated from nature because of the 
capitalist mode of production which conceives everything as merely a potential resource 
for exploitation. Indeed, Marx agreed with the capitalist refusal to 'Romantically' deify 
nature. 
Horchheimer and Adorno argue that Marx himself contributes to this alienation through a 
narrow positivist conception of rationality. They critique the teleological assumptions 
that rationalism is an instrument for pursuing power, technological improvement, and 
observable calculation, measurement and control. Combining these rational faculties with 
'Romantic' values of expression, aesthetics, sensuality and morality allows the vulnerable 
'inner nature' of human life take expression and the 'outer nature' to be unleashed from 
capitalist domination. 
21 1 Luke, 2003: 240, Kellner, 1995 
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Tim Luke has written many important articles and books contributing to a 'Critical 
Theory of the Environment. ' Luke notes that Critical Theory is prepared to speak from a 
"standpoint of totality" (which is a characteristic of many philosophies of environment 
but unfashionable in a lot of social theory). The processes of capitalism and "the 
commodity in all its many iterations through the production of society and the 
reproduction of nature remains a central preoccupation for an effective critical theory. , 212 
Traditionally, the presumption has been that nature pre-dates society. This conception of 
nature as primal existence and the object of scientific knowledge, contrasting with society 
as thinking subject was shared by Lukas, 197 1, and Habermas, 1971,1975.213 The 
prevailing positivist assumptions of modernity, from 17 th century Newtonian physics, 
through Popper's 20th century extortions for disciplined methods of observation, 
expenmentation and verification define an empirical nature as 'out there. ' 214 These 
'proofs' of mathematics, physics and engineering provide the foundation for 'modernity's 
technological proficiency. ' 
215 
Marcuse, Adorno, and Horkheimer retain Marx's 'philosophy of practise' but would 
leave behind the dualist categorical distinctions 'subject/object, ' 'mindibody, ' 
csociety/nature' as bourgeois alienation. Luke regards these dualist antimonies as a 
crucial discursive means for empowering ... the economic' to sustainably develop 'the 
environmental' or licence 'the social' to regulate 'the environmental. ,, 216 Philosophy of 
practice allows society to become 'second nature' and nature to become a 'second 
society. ' "Nature is always social, the environment is already economy, and ecologies 
also are activated communities of human and nonhuman life. 9217 
Luke outlines the resistance to the positivist predilection for categorizing and alienating 
nature in all its epistemological, ontological and technological guises. 218 The scientific 
and technological advocates sing the praises of increased industrial output, the cures for 
212 Luke, 2003: 239 
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deadly diseases, speed of travel and the distribution of information. Increasingly 
however, the impact on the 'commons' of the noxious, time-consuming, rubbish- 
producing, resource depleting 'externalities' of these processes are being noticed and 
actively resisted. 
Conversely, these movements of resistance to the dominance of scientific-technological 
modes of ever-increasing consumable outputs are themselves resisted because cultural 
pace, economic comfort and political empires are deeply committed to preserving modem 
consumerism. They struggle to let "science continue to amplify its technological 
proficiencies. " 
There has been a shift in the legitimating discourse of late modernity from discerning the 
inherent rationality or epistemological essence of nature to an operational achievement 
and technical -economic performance. 
219 But as Luke writes, even the apparently a- 
political nonnalisation of market rationality and technical improvement is at threat when, 
instances of technical-economic perforinances, like Auschwitz, Bhopal or Chernobyl, 
shake scientific technology's legitimacy, and a reflexive realisation that anthropogenic 
changes in the Earth's climate, soils, atmosphere, waters, and biomass make any 
incorrigible epistemic certainty about the planet's autogenic activities very difficult, if not 
impossible, to maintain. "O 
Globalisation and the Information Age 
Further to the 'compromise' initiated by Keynesian type welfare states and the 
proliferation of consumer goods, globalisation has changed the nature of industrial 
capitalism, societies and environments. A massive increase in transport and information 
flows has allowed the globalisation and deregulation of corporations on such a scale that 
traditional categorisations have collapsed. Such fixed conceptual definitions that served 
in the I 9th century as national boundaries or the currency gold standard, or even state 
responsibility for domestic security, economy and welfare have eroded into the shifting 
sands of the globalised market. The 'externalities' that technic al-industriali sation 
produces - pollution, resource depletion, alienation, are all inextricably tied to the local 
219 Idhe, 1990, Luke, 2003: 241 
220 Luke, 2003: 241 
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and the trans-national organisation of corporate administration further removes people in 
control from industrial responsibility. 
By developing new informational modes of production, which are designed and managed 
by decentralized networks of professional-technical workers from a web of large complex 
techno-bureaucratic firms and small flexible corporate alliances, local and global capital 
are reconstructing the economic and political conditions of social reproduction as the 
ultimate guarantor of humanity's 'sustainable development' and 'environmental 
securlty. 221 
Globalisation of production relies on incredibly cheap freight transport, which allows 
manufacturing to move to nations where labour is cheapest and tax reduction Is largest. 
Thus sweatshops in China, Malaysia and parts of Polynesia create the labour intensive 
elements of manufacturing in textiles, electronic, automotive and so on. These disparate 
parts from all over the planet may be collected and assembled in a location close to their 
markets: in Britain, Europe, America and other wealthy nations. The transnational 
location and large scale mobility of manufacturing displaces responsibility for the 
preservation of primary resources, the maintenance of pristine conditions in the 
manufacturing locality, or the maintenance of fair working conditions and national 
welfare, education and health provision. 
Since the late 1970s, saturation of goods and services has left entrepreneurial capitalists 
in a bind. The Neoliberal ideology that has saturated governments and pan-global 
organisations like the World Bank have proven to be the perfect vehicle for private 
capitalism to expand into the sure money-making areas of fundamentally necessary 
realms such as energy, transport, and tele-communication provision (if not 
infrastructure). The Neoliberal belief in the 'minimal state' is based on the assumption 
that State Owned Enterprises (SOE) have expanded because of 'provider capture' where 
employees expand their empires in order to safeguard their jobs. Neoliberalism also 
assumes that self-interest includes laziness and that SOEs are full of people who, having 
life-time job security would operate in semi-retirement which somehow, the corporate 
model of administration would limit, thereby making gains on efficiency. On the grounds 
of efficiency and free enterprise it was advisable to minimise the State by privatisation. 
22 1 Luke, 2003: 242-243 
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However, if the assets held by the State were sold at genuine market prices, the State 
would effectively, remain as 'large' as before. On the stock exchange assets or money 
both contribute to the estimation of the financial value of a corporation, or in this case, a 
corporate State. Thus, to decrease the size of the State, the public assets must be sold at a 
loss. This has resulted in massive energy, telecommunications, water, transport, health 
and education sites and institutions being sold for scandalously low prices that have 
fantastically enriched a handful of already exceptionally wealthy gentlemen. 
The Neoliberal theory advocating the privatisation of SOEs is supposed to improve the 
economy through a combination of improved efficiency, Pareto optimality, the 'Invisible 
Hand, ' and the trickle down effect. The market balance of Pareto optimality is where a 
certain number of inefficient or unsustainable producers might go bankrupt, until the 
product has scarcity value and the prices increase producing viable conditions for 
increased production. The effects of price fixing between providers counteracts Pareto 
optimality and must be regulated by the State, which still has a role in protective 
legislation and the judiciary. The Invisible Hand is a divinely inspired metaphor of the 
miraculous way that the competitive forces of the market drives down prices to the level 
that producers and consumers can bear, creating market 'balance. ' The 'trickle down' 
effect is the increased spending power of those wealthy individuals who newly own and 
make a profit out of institutions that had previously been 'locked up' by the State. The 
trickle down effect is assumed to improve the circulation of money through the market by 
stimulating the economy. 222 
As opposed to the post-war period where consumer demand was immense for consumer 
goods, since the 1980s the markets in developed nations are largely saturated. 
Manufacturing has dropped in Great Britain from around 75% of GDP in the post-war era 
to less than 20% now. Some new regions have broken open to increased consumerism - 
most notably Asia. Many under-developed nations have either gone bankrupt trying to 
keep up (Argentina, Brazil) or simply been unable to participate in globalised consumer 
culture (most of Africa). Luke's analysis is that there is a tripartite arrangement of 
capitalism; 'producer choices to organize adding value, ' the contribution of labour, and 
222 Devine, 2005 
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consumer decisions (technologies of the self). In developed nations consumption patterns 
have moved from absorption with goods to an emphasis on service, transport and 
information. 
Having expanded dramatically into the fundamentals of the energy, water, transport, and 
telecommunications infrastructure of nation states in the 1990s, privatisation is now 
encroaching into communication technologies and the 'knowledge economy. ' Britain's 
experiment with the 'private/public partnership' of school assets being owned and 
maintained by private corporations and rented back by State schools is one good 
example. Rupert Murdoch's expansion and commercialisation of newspapers is another 
example. The invasion of advertising on television, the Internet and mobile telephones 
are another. More profound perhaps is the sheer expansion of access to vast quantities of 
banal infon-nation. 
Luke argues that corporate reality is pervading all aspects of society and nature. 
Neoliberal administration is closely bound to the technological capabilities of information 
technologies. 
Not only can the raw resources of the earth, the manufactured things of social production, 
and the social services of human institutions be submitted to capital's logic of 
reproduction, but even words, codes, memories, sounds, images, and symbols now are 
designed as value-added, fungible products to circulate in mass markets as efficient 
instruments of production, accumulation, reproduction and circulation. "' 
The fine degree of minute calculation, commodification, and surveillance is astonishing. 
Paedophiles in England are being trailed with GPS satellite surveillance systems that can 
identify their position to within three meters. They have to carry a mobile phone with 
them at all times so they are constantly contactable if they stray into tempting areas like 
school playgrounds. Some supermarket items (for example razor blades) have a minute 
chip on them that traces their whereabouts from production line to dissemination. The 
networked 'bits' that make up computer memory are changing the nature of governance 
of peoples, individuals, and things. 
223 Luke, 2003: 243, see also Haraway, 1991 
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The flow of bits over telematic networks is moving many to think about forsaking the 
government of people to embrace the administration of things, which, in turn, ýý, ill 
remediate new modes of control out of bits as a vision for digital governance over people 224 
and things is expressed in many more partial, privatised, and productive practices . 
Along with the intensification of the technological ability to assess, monitor and manage 
the mechanics of bodies, reproductions, organisations, and flows, is an overload of 
information. The disorder of the criminal is a good indicator of how the surplus of 
surveillance overloads the ability of policing systems to sift through an ever-increasing 
abundance of evidence. One street might have thousands of hours of video footage for 
each hour of real time. Luke's argument is that like atomic particles, digital bits are the 
new model for consumerism. 
Recasting the world as bits in order to surpass, but also acquire greater control over, the 
world as atoms, is today's commodification project. Like all previous markets, these 
global informatic exchanges also are devoted to 'systematizing something that is 
resolutely unsystematic, and historicizing something that is resolutely ahistorical. "" 
In contrast to the wholehearted embracement of the digital metaphor of measurement and 
administration, and the globalisation of production through cheap transport, and 
information, a Critical Theory approach to environmentalism begins by "Illustrating how 
the creation, circulation and accumulation of commodities on a mass scale now mutilates 
the ecological order of the planet. , 
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What has been present throughout modernity, is a counter-discourse of eco-friendly 
living that can be intellectually and organisationally set against the dominant paradigm of 
surveillance, economic efficiency and the marketplace. It involves recognition that the 
planet has a limited carrying capacity of biotic production. Eco-friendliness involves 
planning for permanence rather than obsolescence, sustaining biological diversity rather 
than genetically modified monocultures, negotiating regeneration of existing sites of 
industrial damage with current needs and future ecological renewal. It is not, therefore, 
the anarchic absence of planning, foresight, or technology. But there is a different 
emphasis and meaning to the production of culture - and it is not about capitalist 
consumerism, or the objectification of everyone and everything as a potential resource. 
224 Luke 1998 
225 LLike, 2003: 244 
22" Luke, 2003: 244 
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Luke argues that environmental sensitivity frees up eco-political spaces for "non- 
hierarchical social relations, technical simplicity, small scale economics, political 
decentralisation, reasonable science, and cultural vitality. , 227 Ecological and socially 
responsible technology, production and consumption practices are good ideals. Luke 
tends to put technology in the same box as corporate economy and oppose them both to a 
box called culture and nature. But what Luke is advocating with small scale communities 
that are closely affiliated with their inherent possibilities of their local place is a very 
sophisticated integration of people, technology and ecology. If these exclusive categories 
are reintegrated successfully then a radically new social construction of nature will have 
taken place, "making it subject not an object, an agency not an instrumentalist, and an 
equal partner not a dominated resource. , 228 At the same time as it 'frees' nature, 
integration of eco-communities will free millions of people "whose autonomy suffers in 
nature's abusive indenturement to the global market's instrumental rationality.,, 229 
The theme of local, ecologically sustainable communities echoes Heidegger, 
Schumacher, and Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School. It is 
concurrent with Feenberg's ideas and the popularisation of 'think global, act local. ' It 
also brings to mind a Romantic, volklore type of reversal of urbanisation as the most 
meaningful, environmentally and economically viable way of organising societies. To put 
all this in practice, Luke and also Feenberg advocate a careful examination of the 
relationship between technology and cultural practices. 
Environmental changes, then, should be realized by reimagining how technologies create 
particular conventional cultural understandings in commercialised acts and artefacts, 
produce specific exchange-driven power effects, and generate peculiar social practices 
through commodifi. cation. "0 
This is a very Heideggerian view of the problem, and the way forward. It is shared by a 
variety of contemporary commentators of modem culture, some more and some less 
aware of Heidegger's philosophy. Feenberg regards the political contestation of the 
227 Luke, 2003: 247 
228 Luke, 2003: 248 
229 Luke, 2003: 248 
230 Luke, 2003: 249 
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outcomes of technology as crucial to the democratic processes of westem societal 
organisation. 
Guattari 
Felix Guattari is a psychiatrist, best known for his books with co-author Gilles Deleuze 
on philosophy and late modernity. He engages with the massive increase in 
communication and the commodification of knowledge in the 'knowledge economy' of 
late modernity. He criticises the media (and the argument also adheres to education) in 
his book Three Ecologies (2001) for participating in the Neoliberal frame by making the 
language and metaphors available for self-understanding impoverished and mediocre. In 
contrast, a concept of ecology that incorporates the psyche, the social, and physical 
produces understandings which can enrich and transform our relationship with the planet 
and our sense of ourselves. 
In an argument that clearly owes considerably to Heidegger's concept of technological 
enframing, Guattari, along with others such as Noam Chomsky charges the media with 
being largely responsible for confining the available metaphors for self-knowing to a 
limited range closely affiliated with 'Integrated World Capitalism. ' This is partly a result 
of the increasingly global ownership of newspapers and telecommunication channels by 
corporations such as Rupert Murdoch's media empire with an associated 'dumbing 
down' to a normative common denominator that sells easily and reinforces the status quo. 
But even independent or educational communication technologies tend to adhere to the 
dominant discursive paradigms instigated and perpetuated by globalisation. Guattari 
argues that 'Integrated World Capitalism' is implicated in all organisations that produce 
signs, metaphors, or syntax: the media, advertising, opinion polls and education. 
Neoliberal, or at best Liberal concepts and principles dominate policies across the globe. 
These concepts rest on an anthropocentric set of values: individualism, equality, liberty, 
fraternity, rights, justice, choice, and freedom of speech, the free market and so forth. The 
surrounding ecology is invisible in these metaphors. When the environment does impose 
on human affairs, it is transformed by the totalising capitalist account of potential 
cresource5 or the economic reductionism of 'externality. ' 
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The increasing deterioration of human relations with the socius, the psyche and 'nature', 
is due not only to environmental and objective pollution but is also the result of a certain 
incomprehension and fatalistic passivity towards these issues as a whole, among both 
individuals and governments. 231 
Guattari's primary concern in The Three Ecologies is with the 'paucity' of metaphor and 
understanding that is creeping through every aspect of the human SoCiUS. 232 This is, I 
think, somewhat similar to Heidegger when he speaks of an 'impoverished world' 
(although Heidegger speaks of animals in contrast to humanity). It is a paucity of view, 
self-image and interaction both between individuals, cultures, and between humanity and 
the environment or 'world'. The paucity is not strictly speaking a 'devaluation' or under- 
estimation of the importance of people and nature but a reductionism in available spaces 
for knowledge and interaction. The paucity results from positivist, structuralist, 
globalised, and commodified forms of knowledge order that drives social regimes along 
conformist and restrictive lines of legitimacy; 'efficiency, ' 'rationality, ' and 'success'. 
Guattari writes that the media "verges on a strategic infantilisation of opinion and a 
destructive neutralisation of democracy. , 233 By failing to connect together the three 
domains of the psyche, the socius and the environment, institutions amplify the existing 
silence which disables people from perceiving and relating as co-habitors. Instead, 
regions of silence are expanding. "It is not only the species that are becoming extinct but 
also the words, phrases, and gestures of human solidarity. , 234 
This habit of drawing hard distinctions between the three domains the social, the psychic 
and the physical emerges from a long philosophical tradition. Solipsism relies on the 
disaggregated subject starkly separated from the object, which 'he' then 're-presents' in 
language or art. The earth, as has been famously argued with many nuances and flavours, 
is reliant upon the world view of the subject. 
Ecology sets up a fundamentally different approach to human existence. Whether 
individual, family or community - all humanity operates in conjunction with our 
23 1 Guattan, 2001: 41 
232 Guattaii, 2001: 50 
233 Guattan, 2001: 41 
234 Guattari, 2001: 44 
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surroundings. Life still activates through a subjective 'singularity' but this channel is not 
individuated in the same way that Theology or the Enlightenment presumes. The primary 
unit becomes the ecological niche instead of the isolated human being. This simple 
principle challenges the entire Liberal capitalistic enterprise. The 'rational individual 
utility maximiser' becomes situated, interconnected and responsible! 
The poststructuralist metaphor for the underlying governing principles of the universe - if 
we can put it that way at all - is a question of scale: amplification, diminishment, 
repetitions, lines, planes, oscillations, and also disruptions, edges, doublings, folds, 
excesses. As Deleuze and Guattari put it in A Thousand Plateaus, 235 it is territory and a 
rhizome. The ecological niche becomes the supporting metaphor for philosophy. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy resonates with an interest in language, but one that 
supersedes structural linguistics. The concept of the intensities and flows exceed any 
systematic approach to language and meaning. Guattari suggests, 
While the logic of discursive sets endeavours to completely delimit its objects, the logic 
of intensities, or eco-logic, is concerned only with the movement and intensity of 
evolutive processes. Process, which I oppose here to system or to structure, strives to 
capture existence in the very act of its constitution, definition and deterritorialization. 
This process of 'fixing-into-being' relates only to expressive subsets that have broken out 
of their totalizing frame and have begun to work on their own account, overcorrung their 
referential sets and manifesting themselves as their own existential indices, processual 
lines of flight. 236 
Instead of psychologising the individual or contextualizing each one as the primary unit 
of an aggregated society, Guattari has theorized an integration of the psychic, the social, 
and the physical into a 'cartography' with trajectories which map simultaneously on all 
three fields. Not 'seamless' linear progress but a three dimensional fusion that sometimes 
coheres and at others interrupts. A 'territory' that follows the flow of repetitive 
coagulations in which it is possible to spontaneously recognise the points of rupture - 
where a chain of events or signifiers suddenly amounts to something altogether different, 
and sets off a new flow, of unknown consequences or direction. Guattari writes of 
... Deleuze and Guattari, 1999 236 Guattan, 2001: 44 
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subjectivity as 'mental ecology'; "It is a logic of intensities, of auto-referential existential 
assemblages engaging in irreversible durations. , 
237 
Imaginative disruptions to the normal discursive regimes are an important source of 
possibilities for extricating ourselves from the belittling non-nalisation of global 
capitalism. Technical advance has been refashioning our sense of the possible so vastly 
that norms of conventionality no longer revolt at notions of flight, galactic travel, atomic 
shattering and dispersal, the sending and recapturing of images and sound over thousands 
of miles in a millisecond, instantaneous, multifarious global communication, and so on. 
Yet all these things defy the logic of 'common sense' held through the ages, and enter the 
realm traditionally occupied by magic. 
Unfortunately, just at the point when anything really has become possible, Integrated 
World Capitalism has recolonised subjectivities with an insidious normalisation. 
Globalised Capitalism accepts the magic of technology that presses open the bounds of 
the imagination but reintroduces a new set of limits on what is admissible in regimes of 
knowledge. Physical boundaries are no longer the edge of society's norms. Instead it is 
our collective imagination that has become the limiting factor. It has become a matter of 
impressing a narrow range of discursive options - the Neoliberal rational individual 
utility maximiser, for example, to colonise the psyche of populations across national 
boundaries, at all levels of class and culture, in every societal institution; family, 
education, media, health, vocation, entertainment. 
The economic paradigm has initiated a range of global agencies that perceive their role as 
managing the diverse range of human cultures and radically different environmental 
circumstances according to the same set of financial stratagems. Neoliberal precepts have 
dominated global policy making institutions such as the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, World Trade Organisation, United Nations, and so forth. Financial 
incentives to 'develop' nation states are tied to national policy directives on completely 
separate issues, such as devolving and privatising education. In the name of the free 
market, consumer rights and the equal playing field, most nations in the world have 
237 Guattari, 2001: 44 
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privatised realms that under the Keynesian settlement were the prerogatives of the stable 
nation and the Welfare State; education, health, welfare, infrastructure, transport, 
communications. Neoliberal rhetoric masks the (new) access privatisation allows for 
capitalist profit making. 
The basic unit of modem individualism alters subtly and importantly when emphasis is 
placed on the niche, or place-and-people as the standard paradigm instead of the 
individual -as-utility-maximi ser. 
The problems with new ecological existentialities are that they feel frightening and 
unspeakable. For most teachers there is a range of responses to Integrated World 
Capitalism, from a belief in modem progress to an inability to verbalise their infon-ned 
and overwhelming fear of cataclysmic devastation that continuing capitalism entails. 
Furthermore, in a society that accentuates economic efficiency and positivist 
accountability, wholehearted environmentalism seems wishy washy, vague, 
unfashionable and unattainable. 
At the heart of all ecological praxes there is an a-signifying rupture, in which the catalysts 
of existential change are close at hand, but lack expressive support from the assemblage 
of enunciation; they therefore remain passive and are in danger of losing their 
consistency. "' 
A philosophy of environmental education involves anxiety, guilt, and pathologies 
associated with leaving behind the known arrangement of societies' relations of 
consumption, production and greed in regard to the surrounding planet. Students seem 
better able to enunciate these fears and hopes perhaps because, as yet, they have less 
'invested' in the current system. 
Guattari and Luke are by no means alone when they advocate outright new way of 
looking at technology and capitalism, in order to re-ignite a more authentic community 
and environmental consciousness. There have been a number of popular books arguing 
against consumer culture in the last couple of years, for example: Naomi Klein, No Logo, 
Eric Schlosser, Fast Food Nation. Michael Moore's films, Roger and Me (1989), 
238 Guattan, 2001: 45 
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Bowlingfor Columbine (2002), and Fahrenheit 9111 (2004), and his book, Stupid ffhite 
Men that rails against North American gun culture, and the consumerist ethic. 
John Gray, in his book Straw Dogs, (2003) argues against his erstwhile Neoliberal 
convictions, that modem information technologies, especially the media, are depressing 
the possibility of reimagining our world outside the calculating rationality of science and 
economics. 239 Noam Chomsky, has a long-held conviction that the media is responsible 
for corrupting the politics and imagination of the general public. 240 George Monbiot 
writes frequent articles about American cultural and political imperialism and the 
technological alienation of the environment. 241 Joseph Stiglitzt, who was on President 
Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors for four years and then three years as Chief 
Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank is so disillusioned with the 
governance that influential organisations imposes on nation states, that he has written a 
very important book on supra-national policy and its problems. 242 These books are 
important for stating the problem. What I am attempting to do in this thesis is begin the 
preparation for a cultural metamorphosis, to generate the point of difference that can 
instigate a new platform, new connections, new rhizomes and pathways into the future. 
In much the same way Leopold refrained from turning ecological integration into a fixed 
systematic framework, the ideas offered here are for an ecological attitude. I set forth a 
new set of metaphors that emerge from eco-philosophy, eco-politics, and eco-poetics, as 
much as from rational calculation, for an ecologically integrated subject and community 
along the metaphoric connections of the rhizome. The integration of human society and 
the subject into the ecosystem synthesizes anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric 
perspectives. The polarisation of environmental ethics into 'Intrinsic' or 'anthropocentric' 
is unnecessary; communities can care for their locale and sustain their livelihoods without 
reducing the environment to utilitarian ends. In these circumstances, ethical principles 
can maintain their influence while being contestable and mutable in different historical 
and political circumstances. 
239 Gray, 2003 and see also Gray, 2002 
240 Chomsky, 1995 
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242 Sfiglitzt, 2003 
133 
The environment defines the conditions within which we must act. At the same time, our 
behaviour shapes and conditions our material surroundings. Theories about the 
environment emerge from the epistemological assumptions and variety of discourses 
circulating in a given socio-historical epoch. The next chapter looks at how the prevailing 
understandings of epistemology and pedagogy have impacted on the newly emerging 
field of environmental education. At the same time, the impact of technological 
industrialism, capitalism, and politics have shaped the ways that are possible to think and 
educate about the environment. 
Addressing the culture of modernity and particularly the way technology is changing the 
human understanding of our planet, ourselves and each other is the role of 
environmentalism. Engaging with politics, economics, policy and culture would seem the 
obvious place for environmental education to begin, but surprisingly at its inception the 
environmental education curriculum attempted to be completely apolitical. Epistemology 
has an impact on material culture, just as it has an impact on education. As the prevailing 
ideas change, so do the approaches to environmental curriculum, policy and pedagogy. 
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5 Environmental Education 
Environmental education materialized as a discipline in the late 1960s, during the Cold 
War, at a time when humans were walking on the moon, viewing the planet from the 
perspective of the solar system for the first time. A conglomeration of ideas, including 
geological time, positivism, scientific environmental data, Skinner's positivist pedagogy 
of behaviourism, and the increasing emphasis on individual children as autonomous 
learners, all contribute to early environmental education. In 1968 student revolts in 
France against early Neoliberal policies transformed the political left's reliance on 
Marxism, most famously transfigured by Foucault's theory of Power/Knowl edge. This 
change in the State settlement from Keynesian Welfarism to increasingly privatised 
contractualism and Neoliberal politics impacted on theories of epistemology and 
education. The connection between environmental pollution, over-population, and 
economic disparity between developed and 'undeveloped' nations dominates 
environmental education from the late 1970s until today. 
Environmental education emerges in a context affected by both the prevailing historical 
pedagogical theory, the dominating policy framework operating globally, and ecological 
interaction with the surrounding environment. Both the Classical Idealist separation of 
the subject from the object and resulting positivism and the critique emerging from 
Romantic eco-poetics play a role in environmental education. This chapter looks at a 
selection of particular texts on environmental education to examine the changing 
prerogatives over time, and give an indication of where the field is at present. It is by no 
means exhaustive, but is intended to sketch the changing concerns and emphases in both 
attitudes to the environment and educational prerogatives. 
The 1960s was an era that was dominated by a positivist basis to epistemology and 
pedagogy. The defining models of pedagogy were based on Piaget's 'stages' of learning 
and development, a behaviour modification model, and one that promotes the 'objective' 
ascertainment of empirical facts. This combines two apparently contradictory impulses in 
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pedagogy; the disciplining of students into normative behaviour and the promotion of the 
'independent' learner who could discover that the 'truth was out there. ' At the same time. 
publications of scientific evidence were becoming prolific in the public arena, and to a 
large extent, they demonstrated that human consumer society was generating 
environmental hazards. In the 1970s and 1980s the response to the strengthening 
environmental movement and the decline in a universal commitment to analytic theory 
were fertile ground for key texts with political clout, for example those published by the 
World Wildlife Foundation, that really have not been bettered since. By the time 
environmental education has begun to be introduced to schools with any sort of 
systematic commitment in the 1990s and 2000s the concept of 'sustainability' had 
entered the lexicon of global agencies, and undertakes a subtle but important Neoliberal 
shift. Environmental education has shifted to 'sustainable education' and began to lose its 
political acumen once more, as it has increasingly been tied to utilitarianism, 
vocationalism, and positivist epistemology. 
Positivism 
An early British text on Environmental Studies, written by D. G. Watts in 1969 gives an 
indication of the concerns that permeated educational theory during the Keynesian 
period. Watts advocates an empirical methodology and appears naively convinced of his 
Liberal prerogatives. This book contrasts starkly with later texts that are better informed 
of the politics of the colonial consequences of globalisation and less well informed on 
classical philosophy. 
Watts advocates a pedagogy based on direct observation. This is a specifically Liberal 
education, designed partly in reaction to the older traditional model of authoritarian, 
didactic pedagogy where the teacher intoned from a podium at the front of the classroom 
and the students, like passive, empty vessels, were 'filled' with knowledge. Watts' argues 
that students should be 'active learners' whose interest is engaged by the local 
environment through activities such as field work. Discussion, debate, questions and 
disagreement would emerge democratically, with the teacher merely guiding students 
around a topic via field questionnaires, and tasks that emphasise estimating, measuring 
and calculating. The 'active learner' still dominates large sections of pedagogical 
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practise. It has been used to demote the teacher's expertise entirely to a mere 'facilitator' 
of pre-ordained curriculum packages that are often designed around precisely these types 
of 'direct observation' projects. The students learn 'methodology' and can collate vast 
quantities of data, without making any critical associations of data or methodology with 
the political or ecological context. This was the kind of busy information gathering that 
Heidegger was so critical of, in German universities in the first half of the 20th century. 
Watts has an extensive chapter on the history of ideas, which traces the roots of Idealism 
to the rivalry between Locke and Berkeley. Locke rejected the Aristotelian tradition of 
defining the mind as growing like a seed, and set up an empiricist concept of the mind 
developing in response to material external input. Berkeley refuted this with harsh 
solipsism; our understanding predetermines our experience of the world. Watts then 
skates over Kant's 'synthesis' of the ideas of Berkeley and Locke and their influence on 
classical Idealism and its development into Hegel's dialectic. Finally, Watts writes that 
Froebel had the right idea when he wrote that God is the 'eternal law' and 'Unity' of 
nature, and the source of all things. Watts associates this with a Hegelian/ Darwinian 
rationality and progress. This scholastic gloss on analytical metaphysics, combined with a 
mishmash of German and British educationalists (whose names rather than ideas are 
mentioned) and a sprinkling of American Pragmatism justifies his notion of 
'environmental studies' as 'direct observation. ' 
Watts prescribes a very narrowly confined definition of 'environment' that is based on 
the neighbourhood. Subsequently this engagement with the local built environment 
dropped out of environmental philosophy for many years. Geographers have recently 
begun exploring local built environments as socio-political ecologies again. But Watts 
specifically excludes politics or social concerns in his emphasis on the neighbourhood 
because he wants to find strictly objective environmental 'data' for students to 'observe. ' 
This obsession with objective methodology remains a dominant trend in the British 
education system. In order to maintain this style of 'objectivity, ' Watts describes the 
wider environment as 'abstract. ' As unavoidably political, he wishes his students to avoid 
the abstract dimensions the wider world. Watts writes, 
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Beyond this neighbourhood environment is the wider world, of which the child will have 
only occasional direct experience. This, though in a different sense from the school, is all 
artificial environment, transmitted and shaped by the agencies of communication. The 
school of course concerns itself with this world, with national issues, world affairs, 
natural resources, high and pop culture; but the educational principles and methods 
relevant to its exploration are very different from those involved in direct observation. "' 
He fails to recognise that positivist methodology of local data can also never be 
apolitical, because the process of measuring and naming imposes a set of normative 
evaluations from the outset. There is no unbiased position. In contrast to the conservatism 
of positivism, I think the transmission of discourses that shape the 'abstract' field on the 
wider environment are the reason that sites of communication like education and the 
media are important. It is the critical evaluation of all discourse, including positivism that 
'enlightens' students to our inevitably political world. And given the popular media often 
avoids asking large problematic questions about international agencies, multinational 
corporations, financial flows, and the vast inequalities of wealth and consumption 
patterns, or questions about environmental damage, the impact of pollution or global 
warming - as another agency of communication, education is left with an increased rather 
than a diminished responsibility to begin engaging with these difficult questions. 
Politics and the Environment 
Watts is, however, one of the few writers on environmental education to specifically 
engage with philosophy. The others seem to fall into two broad camps. Firstly, emerging 
largely from geology and biology, is the mapping of the emergence of life on this 
surprising planet. Then the geologists discuss the relatively recent and dramatic changes 
initiated by industrialisation and the state of affairs as it is now. These books tend to be 
actively encouraging a pedagogy of politicisation, ecology, and environmental care. 
The second category tends toward policy and has been co-opted by the rhetoric of 
'sustainability' and the slippage that assumes this means capitalist 'efficiency. ' Often 
these texts utilise the same sets of key words as the ecologists, but in the 'sustainability' 
discourse the terms are assembled to promote and extend the existing order of things, 
243 Watts, 1969: 4, my italics 
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rather than question at any fundamental level the concepts of utility, resources, or 
distribution. 
Environmental Education; Principles and Practice (1978), edited by Sean Carson, falls 
into the category of a 'geographical' or ecological book. It places life in an evolutionary 
context and draws correlations between the affects of human technology, culture, and 
expansion and climate change, species extinctions and so forth. 
The emergence of environmental education in Britain was informed by a series of 
associations. Carson documents the transfiguration of the National Rural Studies 
Association formed in 1960. It transformed into the National Association for 
Environmental Education in 1972 and became increasingly philosophical and politicised. 
They were importantly influenced by the Club of Rome, Donella Meadows, Blueprintfor 
Survival, 1972 (see below). 
Population, industrialisation, urbanisation, oil crisis, nuclear waste and weapons, 
pollution, desertification, and the shrinking of biodiversity are key issues that Carson 
argues need to be introduced to schools. "These problems will all intensify during the 
lifetime of pupils still at school and will constitute the background to their lives. It is 
urgent, significant and appropriate that (environmental concerns) should form a major 
element of their education. , 
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Ever since the photographs returned from the moon landing, the planet earth has been 
seen as a geographical space capsule. Peter Berry's article, "Planet Earth" argues that the 
geographical time scale has its own form of politics, 
to see the present within the context not only of historic but also of evolutionary, 
geological and cosmological time; to appreciate the long protracted preparation of the 
planet for life; the slow evolution towards man; and the deep roots of present-day social 
and economic problems. 245 
There are critical points in history where paradigm shifts occur -the first living cell, the 
beginning of terrestrial life, the transformation from cold-blooded creatures to mammals, 
244 Carson, 1978: 1-2; 
245Berry edited by Carson, 1978: 55 
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the emergence of humans, and now possibly, the demise of planetary conditions suitable 
for carbon based life. The geological perspective enhanced the urgency of political action 
in education. 
Berry quotes from Education for our Future published by the Conservation Trust (1973) 
that aims its suggestions at curriculum development for teachers. They situate humanity 
in terms of the 'critical nature' of the times, to promote ecological study and field work 
of 'man's present predicament. ' Education could inform students about the three spheres 
(borrowed from Brundtland), population, resources, and environment, and encourage "a 
smooth transition to a sustainable society" along with increased involvement of 
educational institutions with their communities. 246 
Another article in the Carson volume, interesting because it illustrates the problems of 
unmediated scientism, is by Ann Trotman, "Ecology - The Basic Pattern of thinking in 
Environmental Education. " She suggests that scientific method underlines the areas of 
concern but cannot solve the conflicts and ideas associated with them, "it is the 
containing and resolving of these conflicts on the basis of the limitations of which we are 
made aware by the pattern of ecological thought, that is the present concern of 
environmentalists the world over. " Unfortunately she then proceeds to outline curriculum 
suggestions that are constrained to scientific approaches to ecological issues. Trotman 
applies 'natural' containment of animal proliferation that occurs spontaneously for 
example, as possible solutions to the human over-population problem. Clearly even from 
the scientific point of view, different species have vastly different ecological parameters 
and are susceptible to widely disparate conditions that might undermine their potential for 
expansion. In contrast to Trotman, biologists would not assert that the dispersal and 
emigration of Aphid populations bears any resemblance to the nomadic lifestyle of some 
human cultures. 247 This crude scientific approach also lends itself to the critique levelled 
by Feenberg at Ehrlich, that population control tends to encourage inhumane and 
draconian measures mostly aimed at 'third world' communities while preserving the 
status quo in terms of economic disparity between countries. 
246 Conservation Trust 1973 cited in Carson, 43. 247 Trotman edited by Carson 1978: 112 
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Environmental education tends to take an approach that rests heavily on geology, 
biology, human over-population, and industrial resource depletion and pollution. The 
scope of the field means that traditional disciplinary boundaries are often breached (with 
more and sometimes less success) in an attempt to grapple with these complex global, 
ethical, political, economic, technological and scientific issues. 
The highlight of the book is the chapter by Paul Rogers titled "Economic and Social 
Influences. " He discusses the impact of Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring (1963) on 
environmental theory and education. Rachel Carson investigated the impact of accruing 
pesticide residues. Together with Blueprintfor Survival published by The Ecologist 
magazine on resource depletion, the two texts have stimulated a huge expansion in the 
awareness and action about the environment. Rogers argues that this new awareness of 
world environmental trends must be understood in the context of a world economic and 
social system that persists in maintaining, if not exacerbating, huge "disparities in wealth 
and well-being between different sectors of the world community. , 248 
Many environmentalists of education place present day conditions in the context of the 
evolution of the earth . 
249The planet formed between 4 and 5 billion years ago. Life began 
perhaps 3 billion years ago, marine life emerged one billion years ago and over four 
hundred million years ago is evidence of terrestrial life. It is likely that for millions of 
years pre-humanoid types of animals have roamed the planet, wielding tools with 
relatively little detrimental impact on their surrounding ecosystem. Eventually several 
species of primates (Neanderthals and Homo Sapiens) learned how to control and use 
fire. Between four to eight thousand years and some 500 generations ago, agricultural 
technology began to substantially change the landscape. 
The industrial revolution was only eight generations ago, steam engines, carbon fuels, 
motorcars, powered flight, electricity grid, radio, television, nuclear fusion and space 
travel all developed within living memory. The impact on population growth, global 
pollution, deforestation and desertification, climate change, and depletion of minerals, 
biodiversity, and clean air and water are recent and extreme in the scale of planetary 
24' Rogers edited by Carson, 1978: 149 
24913erry, Rogers, Silvertown and Sarre, Greig, Pike, Selby and others 
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change. In 2001 the IPCC published Climate Change which is a very comprehensive 
document that assesses the level of geological fluctuation over the planets history. 250 
They have attempted to calculate how much climate change is part of regular fluctuations 
and how much is due to the interference of human technological pollution. Results are 
modelled for the next 100 years and are very frightening. 
In the 1970s there was poverty in Africa, South America, the Pacific, Asia and South East 
Asia, the Middle East and large areas of the Soviet Bloc. These areas are not merely 
unmodified traditional lifestyles that do not tally up to riches in a modem sense. The 
poverty came about in countries where years of western extraction of materials and often 
people in the form of slavery or indentured labour had decimated the ability of local 
populations to maintain viable lives. Although some of these regions have improved in 
the ensuing 30 years, particularly South East Asia, many remain in the same trap of 
extreme poverty. The complexity of the situation and the distances involved seem to 
alleviate modem nations of any responsibility. But the 'west' should acknowledge their 
parts in the historical causes and the continuing exploitation of the 'third world' which 
includes, 
past slavery and colonial exploitation, not forgetting current incompetence and 
mismanagement. But transcending these in importance is the extent to which the 
countries of the third world have become the suppliers of cheap raw materials to the 
industrialized countries. The latter, primarily producers of manufactured goods, have 
consistently dominated world trade and have helped to ensure that their trading position 
has invariably been maintained at the expense of the less developed countries ... 
(The third 
world has) effectively found themselves in a trade trap, a world economic system which 
has worked to their continued disadvantage and which they have been virtually powerless 
to overcome. 251 
The thesis of Donella Meadow's important text, Limits to Growth (1972) is that 
worldwide disorder is the product of humanity exceeding the earth's 'carrying capacity. ' 
The limits to growth have a political nature. The specific estimates of resource depletion 
and associated predictions of the consequences have proved inaccurate and problematic, 
but the argument of finitude and thresholds to resources continues to carry a lot of 
weight. 
250 IPCC, 2001 
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Interestingly, the discourse of finite resources has had important consequences on the 
global economic markets. A few Third World countries were beginning to realize the 
potential political and economic strength of their position as producers and exporters of 
primary products. The best example is the oil trade. In 1960 Venezuela joined Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
In the 1970s these countries together produced 60 % of the world's oil. In 1973 the 
United States consumption of oil exceeded its own production and it became, like most 
other western industrialised nations, reliant on importing oil from OPEC states. As the 
discourse of finite resources circulated through the modem world OPEC cohesively acted 
to raise the crude price of oil by 400%. 
The effects of the oil shocks of the 1970s still reverberate today. It impacted upon other 
Third World countries as well as wealthier industrialised nations. But Rogers' point is 
that most importantly, 
these price rises and shortages had been engineered by the producing countries many 
years before the expected depletion of known oil reserves. In other words, political 
considerations were more important than the more long-term factors of physical resource 
depletion, even though these provided a powerful stimulus to undertake immediate 
action. "' 
It is hard to grasp how great the impact of the oil crisis was on the circulation of finance 
throughout the globe. From the west, money drained towards OPEC nations, particularly 
Saudi Arabia. It could be argued that the International Stock Exchange really took off in 
response to this event. Saudi Arabia was saturated with consumer products and already 
owned the bulk of the world's most valuable resource, 'black gold. ' The Stock Market 
gave Saudi Arabia the opportunity to buy other income bearing commodities in the forrn 
of shares, while stimulating international financial flows, pulling the world back out of 
the 1970s depression. The New York, London and Tokyo exchanges have remained the 
main conduits of financial flows ever since, buoying up the dollar, the pound, and the 
yen, and with these currencies, their local economies, despite the significant collapse of 
manufacturing in all three nations. 
252 Rogers edited by Carson, 1978: 151 
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During the same period of 1973-1976 other strategic alliances by third world countries 
formed to control the price of copper, bauxite, rubber and other raw materials. OPEC 
avoided becoming another oppressive regime in tenns of third world nations by 
maintaining political alliances and offering foreign aid without the Neoliberal reformative 
strings that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) attach. A new 
strategic bloc called the 'Group of 77' had developed. Their attempts to set up a United 
Nations based Commodities Programme was opposed principally by the major importing 
nations; United States, Britain, West Germany and Japan. 
From the vantage point of 1978, Roger's prescience is remarkable. He thinks that there 
are three possible options; firstly, the First World may succumb to pressures from OPEC 
and other trading blocs and lose comparative affluence. Secondly, the First World may 
overtly use their existing power to control the rest of the world, maintaining and 
exacerbating their colossal consumption patterns. Thirdly, the First World may 
voluntarily reduce consumption patterns and democratise global organisations, making 
the world more equitable and more sustainable. 253 By 2003, it looks as though the Bush's 
destabilisation of 'terrorist nations' (Afghanistan and Iraq, with Syria, Iran and North 
Korea on the hit-list) has successfully averted the first option. The second time war was 
initiated in Iraq has been the U. S. A. and Britain united against UN protocol with open 
resistance from Germany and France. This internal division between the historic English 
Empire and the other major United Nations countries has effectively splintered and 
destabilized one of the other major competing trading blocs; the European Union. 
America has also challenged the development of global government by refusing to be 
accountable to the International Court, and systematically undermining, both politically 
and financially, organisations such as the United Nations. Furthermore, under Bush the 
second, America failed to ratify the Kyoto protocol which attempts to limit and modify 
consumption patterns by recognising and agreeing upon international standards for 
pollution levels. As it stands, the three options recognised by Roger are still grappling 
with each other, but George Bush looks very determined to overtly wrest control over the 
rest of the world. 
253 Rogers edited by Carson, 1978: 153-154 
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Rogers concludes by noting that it is a very difficult task to educate teachers about 
international or intercontinental relations especially when the implications will affect the 
living standards of those concerned. Environmental education, he argues, needs to be 
interdisciplinary and politically engaged. 
J. C. Smith has edited a very good book called Learningfor Living; Environmental 
Education in Scotland that was published in 1985 by the Scottish Environmental 
Education Council. Smith remarks enthusiastically that the 1970s, 
have been marked for many people by an extension of the boundaries within which they 
lead their conscious lives. Many have become more aware of the spread of both their 
influence and their dependence on distant places and peoples, of environmental problems 
which are transnational, and of the national and international agencies which attempt to 
manage the associated complex of resources and relationships ... For all these reasons it has become steadily more important to extend the range of Environmental Education 
outwards to the less familiar and the unfamiliar, so that theses issues can be tackled with 
more understanding by a better informed citizenry. 254 
Education, like the media, is a potent force for infon-ning and mobilising the wider 
population. Television familiarises us with both the beauty of foreign environments and 
the circumstances of urban poverty in other parts of the planet. But partly as a result of 
the nature of the technology, television is in danger of sanitising these episodes, leaving 
significant responsibility of pedagogy to educational institutions. 
Shorn of sounds and smells and the presence of misery which would have made some to 
them intolerable and unforgettable if directly experienced. Instead they are described in 
language which sometimes verges on Orwell's nu-speak. Thus there is a danger that 
people become habituated to them, accepting them and their attendant violence as 
something inevitable in the world outside, regrettable but beyond influence other than 
through the despatch of money or material aid. Education has a responsibility to bring 
home the realities of a global environment and to prepare people for constructive policies 
that may help to prevent disasters. "' 
A decade later, in the Educationfor Sustainability, (1996) Ken Webster also complains 
that teachers tend to reduce the political component of their environmental education, 
which defeats its purpose as a mobilising, transformative subject into a sanitised 'weak' 
topic that reinforces societies' status quo. Environmental education, 
254 Smith, 1985: 48 
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urges teachers to assess the extent to which the curriculum is riddled with 
modernism and schools as institutions filter initiatives5 taking from there what 
they want but generally removing their critical core. Education for weak 
sustainability is more acceptable than education for strong sustainability and 
teachers who seek the latter are advised that there is important work for them to 
do in their everyday interactions with students. "' 
1989 was a prolific year for books on environmental education. Damian Randle wrote 
Teaching Green; A parent'S guide to education for life on Earth. In it he quoted Jonathan 
Porritt Seeing Green along similar political lines to the WWF, "teaching is a subversive 
activity. But teachers and parents alike must find some way of organising themselves if 
holistic education, educationfor life on earth, is to have any significant bearing on the 
future. , 257 
Environment and Society (1990) is an edited collection by Silvertown and Sarre, 
produced as a text book for a university level course. It is a cross-disciplinary approach to 
environmental education, combining "scientific evidence and theory, analysis of social 
processes, knowledge of technical possibilities and awareness of underlying value 
,, 258 positions . The bulk of this book is geological combined with examples of scientific 
accounts of human-generated pollutants (such as Sellafield's Nuclear Reactor and 
associated radiation) and naturally occurring disasters. The term 'environment' is initially 
defined as 'surroundings. ' 
In Malthusian and biological terms Silvertown and Sarre begin with the processes that 
support any species needs for food, water and shelter; "the individual's environment is its 
life support system. " But quickly, and in line with Humanist, Malthusian and Liberal 
paradigms, they position humanity as particularly important. "Clearly, a human being's 
environment is much more extensive that that of an insect or plant, in that the human 
depends on other people for companionship and in that human food and shelter depend 
on a world system of agriculture, industry and trade and on structures built in the past. , 
259 
Any one of these 'clearly' held criteria are subject to challenge; rats occupy precisely the 
same habitats as humanity, and many species require companionship. What is interesting 
256 Webster edited by Huckle andStifling, 1996 257 Porritt cited in Randle, 1989 258 Silvertown and Sarre, 1990: 1 259 Silvertown and Sarre, 1990: 2 
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is their argument takes a particularly modem and technological angle for positioning 
humanity at the top of a reorganised Great Chain of Being. Furthermore, this emphasis on 
the special place of humanity (not as a species, but as a society) goes on to justify or 
enrich the definition of environment 'in human terms' that ends up somewhere close to 
Pragmatic destabilisation of the Cartesian separation of subject from object. This 
movement follows the same pattern, leaving behind individual subjectivism in favour of a 
shared understanding and shared impact on the environment by society as a whole. 
"Because the concept of environment now stresses vital connections between object and 
environment, it is to some extent arbitrary where the boundary is drawn between society 
,, 260 and environment. The editors of this book are the earliest example I have come across 
in environmental education of the trend that dominates the 1990s and 2000s, where the 
relationship between humanity and the environment is defined instrumentally, and the 
separation between subject and object is achieved by objectifying everything. 
For our purposes, the most interesting chapter in Environment and Society is a historical 
genealogy written by Stuart Brown "Humans and their environment: changing attitudes. " 
Brown traces a genealogy of a few well known historical tales as early examples of some 
of the prevailing attitudes and conceptualisations of nature or environment. Noah's Ark is 
an early Jewish tale of humanheld obligations of stewardship and conservation towards 
other animals. It places humanity with a role of responsibility in the event of climatic 
disaster. Genesis opens with the Great Chain of Being which explicitly positions 
humanity with dominion over the other birds and beasts. God's instructions to Adam 
were to "replenish the Earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, 
and over the fowl of the air and over every living thing that moveth upon the Earth. 19261 
Since the writing of the Bible, Christian attitudes to the status and responsibility of 
humanity in relation to Nature have undergone some change. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) 
promoted a Christian Scientific Imperialist attitude towards Nature. The continued 
influence of Bacon's imperialist stance makes it worth quoting from Novum Organum in 
full. 
260 SlIvertown and Sarre, 1990: 2 26 1 Genesis 1: 28 
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it will, perhaps, be as well to distinguish three species and degrees of ambition. First, that 
of men who are anxious to enlarge their own power in their country, which is a vulgar 
and degenerate kind; next, that of men who strive to enlarge the power and empire of their country over mankind, which is more dignified but not less covetous; but if one 
were to endeavour to renew and enlarge the power and empire of mankind in general 
over the universe, such ambition is both more sound and more noble than the other two. Now the empire of man over things is founded on the arts and sciences alone, for nature 
is only to be commanded by obeying her. 262 
Carolyn Merchant (1980) has argued that Bacon's continual reference to nature as female 
was associated with his virulent antagonism to witchcraft and paganism. The extended 
metaphor of nature with femininity has produced a modem earthly misogyny. 
Seventeenth century imperialism was contested by the ideas of the Romantics. The Rime 
of the Ancient Mariner (1798) differs from the Classical because humans and animals are 
placed by Coleridge on an equal footing before God. However humans still have a duty of 
stewardship in Coleridge's Romantic poem. Romanticism emerged during the beginnings 
of industrialisation, urbanisation and the opening up of the countryside by Rail. 
Romanticism also popularised, somewhat ironically, a new past-time - hillwalking and 
tourism. 
In the 1970s environmentalism had emerged through various protest groups such as 
Greenpeace, CND, the World Wildlife Fund, and Friends of the Earth. At the same time 
'establishment environmentalism' saw everything from encyclopaedias, national Green 
politics to the United Nations collating, discussing and producing material on the 
environment. There was still a great deal of debate at this stage about whether there was 
truly a 'crisis' or whether there is 'no sense in being unduly alan-nist' and that piecemeal 
management of localised pollution problems could be solved with a little forethought and 
new technology. 
Brown traces the influence of the earlier varieties of political and philosophical principles 
on the emerging forms of environmentalism; steward, imperialist, Romantic, and 
Utilitarian. Imperialism seems to be as entrenched now as it was in Bacon's time. Often 
writers and policy-makers on the environment limit their views to a superficial 
modification of the existing capitalist consumer paradigm rather than a complete 
262 Bacon, 1620, Book 1, para 129 cited in Brown, edited by Silverton and Sarre, 1990: 242 
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overhaul of a system that is clearly advancing the cause of a select few at the expense of 
the bulk of both humanity and the rest of ecology. 'Sustainability' is a good example of 
colonial imperialism in process, as the four discourses; steward, imperialist, Romantic, 
and Utilitarian, attribute competing meanings to the term. 
Brown argues that stewardship influenced Arne Naess's movement 'Deep Ecology. ' 
Deep Ecology tries to theorise in non-anthropological terms. Brown quotes Naess: 
The ecological field-worker acquires a deep-seated respect, or even veneration, for ways 
and forms of life. He reaches an understanding from within, a kind of understanding that 
others reserve for fellow men and for a narrow section of ways and forms of life. To the 
ecological field-worker, the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and 
obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental 
effects on the life quality of humans themselves. This quality depends in part upon the 
deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership with other forms of 
li fe. 263 
Romanticism clearly echoes here. I argue in the chapter on Deep Ecology that Naess is 
significantly influenced by Heidegger, who is himself influenced by the poetry and 
literature of Goethe and H61derlin. Unfortunately, I do not think that Naess is entirely 
consistent in his attempt to generate a non-anthropological philosophy of the 
environment. This is partly due to his metaphysics of Gestalt - identity and his desire to 
4 pragmatically' compromise with any other type of environmentalism, no matter how 
they conceptualise the relationship between humanity and the earth. There are problems 
that are inherent in Heidegger's work to do with the status of humanity in relation to 
other animals of which Naess is oblivious. 
Utilitarianism still plays a large role in influencing politics in general and arguably, the 
dominant forms of environmentalism. American Pragmatism, the rhetoric on 
sustainability, and Neoliberal policy all adhere to many Utilitarian concepts. Actions are 
acceptable according to Utilitarianism if they accord pleasure to a maximum number of 
sentient beings, most notably humans. At this period in history, Brown's literature review 
ends, and we have to fill in the intervening decade ourselves. Brown delves into the 
Naess cited in Brown, edited by Silverton and Sarre, 1990: 244 
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historical roots of four important discourses that prevail in our attitude towards the 
environment. His methodology is reminiscent of Foucault and Nietzsche's genealogy. 264 
Written at about the same time, Greenprintsfor changing schools edited by Sue Greig, 
Graham Pike, David Selby, (1989), emerges from a three year World Wildlife Fund 
project called 'Global Impact. ' Rather than a geological or historical methodology, their 
methodology introduces a rhizome of interconnectedness as the primary framework. 
Their approach relies on the work of Gregory Bateson, who has also been very influential 
on Deleuze and Guattari. Greig, Pike and Selby argue for the interconnectedness of 
individuals with their immediate surroundings, with their nation and with the relations 
with multitudinous other nations through trade, ideas and ecosystem. In contrast, they 
argue that the dominant worldview is fragmented into segregated realms of expertise. It 
compartmentalises different resources into brackets with little or no relation to other 
segments of the environment, and objectifies the whole lot of it. It also separates out the 
human mind from the rest of nature. Since the 1700s (as better outlined above by Brown) 
a materialist, rationalist, Utilitarian and reductionist paradigm has dominated the 
advanced capitalist countries, and their ideas now dominate the entire globe. 
Greig, Pike and Selby put this modem Idealist set of assumptions at the feet of Rene 
Descartes' idea cogito ergo sum, that because I think, therefore I am. Quoting Gregory 
Bateson, they assess the results of Cartesian dualism as distressingly arrogant and 
exploitative of the environment. "As you arrogate all mind to yourself, you will see the 
world around you as mindless and therefore not entitled to moral and ethical 
consideration. The environment will seem yours to exploit. , 265 
This notion of exploitation is present in the founding texts of Christianity, in the opening 
few pages of Genesis which admonishes Man to take dominion over the birds and beasts. 
Although Greig, Pike and Selby remember that there is an alternative Christian strand of 
stewardship "struggling to be heard. " 
264 
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They argue that Descartes and Newton set up the dualism "that which is not mind is 
machine. " The dualism simplifies and systematises the alienated and objectified 
environment into something that makes rational sense. Otherwise such stringent 
alienation between mind and environment would result in complete unknowableness of 
nature and the mind could make of it no sense nor thought. The mind can understand the 
fragmented parts of the machine through scientific enquiry. 
In their second book from the same WWF project, Earthrights; education as if the planet 
really mattered, (I 989b) Greig, Pike, Selby Networks challenge individuated models of 
leaming. Referring to Hine's paper 'The Basic paradigm of a future sociocultural system' 
in World Issues, they describe community networking as flexible rather than weak and 
disaggregated. It, 
encourages full utilisation of individual and small group innovation whilst minimising the 
results of failure, it promotes maximum penetration of ideas across socio-economic and 
cultural barriers while preserving cultural and sub-cultural diversity, it is flexible enough 
to adapt quickly to changing conditions and it puts a structural premium on egalitarian, 
personalistic skills in contrast to the impersonalistic modes of interaction suited to the 
bureaucratic paradigm. 266 
The rhizome of grass-roots innovation that engages politically without recourse to 
monolithic institutional frameworks is also to be found in Guattari's Three Ecologies, 
released the same year. The rest of the Greig, Pike, and Selby's book is full of detailed 
practical advice for teaching environmental concerns in schools across all disciplines. 
Neoliberal Environmental Education 
The 1990s show the influence of Neoliberalism, a disregard, or disbelief in the human 
influence on ecosystems and climate change, combined with a growing faith that 
increasingly sophisticated and sensitive technology can fix any niggling environmental 
problems. The Neoconservative turn in education is impacting on the way we 
conceptualise and teach about our relationship with the environment. 
A good example is Plimmer, Parkinson and Carlton book, The Environment; A Primary 
Teacher'S Guide, (1996). They approach 'Spaceship Earth' from a biological point of 
266 Hine, V. H., April/May, 1977,19 cited in Greig, Pike, Selby 1989b: 25 
151 
view. There is a detailed and informative explanation of the interconnectedness of 
biology followed by an examination of the potential situation should the human 
population ever reach the 40 billion it has been estimated might occur by the end of this 
century. They have a somewhat inconsistent approach to biotechnology. The 'Green 
Revolution' in the 1970s of modified wheat varieties that took India and South-east Asia 
by storm has been sternly criticised. These types of wheat require much more irrigation 
and very high levels of artificial fertilizer which has had unfortunate effects on 
surrounding waterways. Pollution from run off has poisoned streams, damaged fish and 
duck populations and contaminated the water table. High levels of fertilizer has meant 
that only wealthier land owners could afford to continue to plant high yield crops, and the 
gap between rich and poor within third world nations has been exacerbated. It should be 
added that increased irrigation has resulted in permanent soil loss. As importantly, the 
high-yielding modified varieties of wheat are infertile and next year's seed must be 
bought from the international companies that own the brand (Monsanto) draining money 
from within poor nations out to multinational corporations. 
The writers are far more positive about genetic engineering, although they do not take 
note that the critique of the Green Revolution took 20 years to become public. They 
speak positively of some examples of genetic modification, particularly those that 
produce medicinal cures for human diseases, such as genetically modified sheep whose 
milk secretes the blood clotting Human Factor IX necessary for haemophiliacs. Or the 
production of protein-rich "food material" which is a bacteria harvested from starch and 
oil waste that could theoretically supplement the "tapioca, yams, sago and breadfruit" 
starchy food types. The unwritten assumption behind these 'improvements' is that they 
are aimed at the world's poor. It is not westernised countries that will have to give up fish 
and chips in favour of crispy bacteria. 
For Plimmer, Parkinson and Carlton the environment is a resource base, and conserving it 
is to properly manage one's estate. They make one throw away reference to bio-ethical 
obligations which subsides rapidly into conserving biodiversity so that disease will not be 
able to wipe out whole crops and threaten human populations with starvation, as with the 
potato blights in Ireland during the 1800 and 1900s. The book is full of examples of 
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environmental damage and the effects it has on humanity. Schools are encouraged to 
plant more trees and so forth, to enhance environmental utility value. The environment is 
conceived in terms of a 'sustainable' resource. 
Environmental Education versus Education for Sustainability 
In a recent article, Dirk Postma, "Taking the Future Seriously: On the Inadequacies of the 
Framework of Liberalism for Environmental Education" writes a cutting critique of 
Liberal anthropocentricism because it co-opts the discourse of sustainability to maintain 
the consumerist status quo. He notes that there has been a slide from environmental 
education to education for environmental sustainability. This is largely based on the 
Brundtland report, Our Common Future, which assumes environmental sustainability to 
be a universal moral framework. 267 
Postma argues "We should conceive ourselves as citizens of an intergenerational 
community of justice. " He argues that Rawlsian Liberal ethics cannot cope with future 
obligations; there is no reciprocity, a great deal of ignorance (of the future), and a 
paternalistic attitude. Liberalism has idealised the market metaphor. This was reinforced 
by Hobbes' notion of the contractual state, which safeguards against the brutal nature of 
individuals and anarchy. But procedural contractualism assumes a form of reciprocity - 
safety in return for the curtailment of freedoms. However the market's ever-increasing 
demands on raw resources fails to recognise or have regard for the future. The market 
metaphor of reciprocity has degenerated into public/private consumerism. Postma argues 
that Liberalism gives "rise to a privatisation of moral dilemmas. , 268 
Individualized preferences fail to recognise either the way market structures organise 
their choices, or how these choices impact on the environment. Sustainable development 
is not neutral; it is an economic distribution and anthropocentric lack of moral regard for 
other living things. The market discourse of sustainable development impoverishes 
understanding of environmental morality and politics. We need struggle and debate in 
politics and education to find ecological justice. Objectifying the planet and ourselves in 
267 Postma, 2002: 42-44 
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the reductionist discourse of 'potential resource' stipulated by Neoliberalism falls to 
protect or enhance conditions of life for human ecosystems. When education limits its 
environmental curriculum to Neoliberal ends, the result is to discourage genuine 
communication, critical reflection and thinking, and to accentuate the reduction of all 
educational means and ends to assessable 'skills. ' The struggle over environmental 
education is a good example of the alternatives; on the one hand is the Neoliberal 
4 emptying' of all discourse to the consumerist ethos of the market, on the other is the 
deepening, political examination of environment, technology, aesthetics, and subjectivity 
through methodologies that owe conceptual influence to Heidegger, Bateson, Foucault, 
Deleuze and Guattari. 
Bjorn Lomborg, in his book, The Skeptical Environmentalist (2001), cites evidence that 
the economic measures of wellbeing are improving and that therefore environmental 
problems are a problem of representation rather than fact. On the other hand, Eric 
Neumayer, an environmental economist at the London School of Economics describes 
how Lomborg was captured by Simon and Beckman's optimistic economic theories. 269 
Beckman famously won a bet with the 'pessimist' Ehrlich about the rate of worldwide 
resource depletion in the face of exponential population increases. The arguments of 
Simon and Beckman is that technology, along with the market's Invisible Hand, will alter 
the way resources are used, therefore there is no limit to either human ingenuity, natural 
capital, or economic growth. Lomborg agrees that all environmentalist estimates about 
pollution or resource depletion seem to get 'fixed' technologically, or prove not to be as 
bad a problem as first estimated. But Neumayer notes that even if Lomborg's revised 
figures of environmental problems are accepted, the minor lowering of emissions such as 
C02occludes the real damage that is occurring, no matter what number crunching we 
apply. Furthermore, Lomborg regards the 'environmental crisis' as an exaggerated 
discourse, yet the impact this discourse has had on changing the attitudes and behaviours 
of people, (if not the genuine ecological relationship) is highly significant. 
In his inaugural lecture as Chair of Education at Bath, William Scott notes that there are 
over 300 definitions of 'sustainable development' in relation to social imperatives, "and 
269 Neumayer, 2001: chapter 2 
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disputation continues with rival meanings being used as competing rhetorical currencies 
in a market for which, and whose, worldviews will best save the planet. , 270 His image of 
competing 'currencies' reveals an initial indicator that he has accepted the Neoliberal 
market metaphor pertaining to all things, including world views. 
Scott reinvokes the nominalist separation, arguing that Wordsworth is mistaken to regard 
4nature as teacher; ' "we should remember that what we read in the book of nature, we 
have socially constructed. " Scott's aim for environmental education is 'building capacity' 
to 'live and to learn. ' He makes use of sustainable development, citing the Brundtland 
Report, and many other sources with emphasis on the humanistic ends of sustaining 
environmental 'resource capital. ' Scott designs a Utilitarian hierarchy, reminiscent of 
Marx's analysis of capital, that 'nests human activity' on the base line of 'natural capital: ' 
'built/ human capital' is the next tier, via science and technology; 'human/ social capital' 
next, via political economy and 'well-being' atop that through theology and ethics. 271 
Scott is an environmental optimist; he regards the 'doom and gloom' scenarios of 
impending environmental devastation as exaggerated in order to raise public interest and 
funds. 272 
William Scott and his colleague, Andrew Stables edited a special volume of The Journal 
ofEcosophy, The Trumpeter, (2002) about the role of education in producing a 
sustainable 'frame' of mind in the population. The j oumal draws together many of the 
active philosophical environmental educators in Great Britain at present. 
Scott's contribution is that traditional educational discipline areas focus on a widely 
divergent range of issues to learn about the environment. Atmospheric smog in science, 
"the pathetic fallacy" of ascribing "human emotions and sympathies to nature" in art and 
literature, different cultural world-views about the nature-humanity relationship in social 
sciences, as well as equitable social and environmental justice. Over-arching conceptual 
frameworks may not be helpful. 273 While education may not be instrumental in changing 
270 Scott, 2002b: 10 1 
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cultural conditions, he argues, for democratic reasons the environment should be raised in 
the classroom, so that potential voters can make informed decisions. 
While not particularly well known, William Scott has a lot of influence in environmental 
education as he edits two journals including Environmental Education Research, and is a 
Professor of Education at Bath, who directs one of the only overtly environmental 
education centres in Britain; the Centre for Research in Education and the Environment. 
He also has connections to the North American Association for Environmental 
Education. So when he complains that the environmental curriculum is being 'prescribed' 
for education by many diverse groups including Qualifications and Curriculum Authority 
and the World Wildlife Fund it has rather far reaching implications. Scott describes the 
World Wildlife school resource as 'tendentious and determinist' when they say in 
Lessons for Life, 
We have a responsibility to help young people to understand the reasons for sustainable 
development, and to develop the knowledge, skills and values on which to base their 
future decisions and actions. 274 
Scott's colleague Andrew Stables is in broad agreement. He argues that, 
"environmentalist rhetoric has cleverly combined palaeontological, cultural, and personal 
timeframes to create a sense of imminent disaster. , 275 At least, however, while refusing 
any sympathetic genuine relationship with 'nature' because of the nominalist fallacy, 
Stables is prepared to acknowledge the limitations of our current 'frame' because the 
whole is a lot greater than the part will ever apprehend. 276 The pursuit of the unknowable 
suggests, he argues, that we need to acknowledge "some force, a mind, greater than our 
own, individually, collectively, or historically. " Thus we might understand ourselves, "as 
mechanical agents within a mysteriously purposeful universe: little technicians who have 
often lost sight of our significant insignificance in the greater scheme of things that will 
always, in its entirety, remain closed to US.,, 277 
274 World Wildlife Fund cited in Scott, 2002b: 102 275 Stables, 2002: 53 
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Stables does not recline in his passive technological facilitation for long, his concluding 
remarks refer to Finkielkraut's critique of modem rationality, who, like Hannah Arendt, 
discusses Stalinism and Nazism "as the excesses of a coldly instrumental rationality that 
demonised difference in the pursuit ... of Utopia. , 
278 In the face of answering his own 
question about suitable 'frames' for environmental education, Stables finishes by asking a 
further question, loaded with the calculating market rationality from which he had earlier 
tried to retreat; "What price an education that makes us grateful for life on Earth? ý279 
Stephen Gough is also a member of the 'Bath School. ' He has a better knowledge of the 
sociology of education, noting that requiring education to change the 'frame' of society in 
relation to the environment is quite possibly overestimating the potential for educational 
institutions to establish large scale socio-political or ideological change. "Leaming 
always takes place within a pre-existing context of power relations, rules, expectations, 
historical narratives, and perceptions of group and individual interests, which affect not 
only what learners learn, but what they think it is important to learn and why. , 280 
Environmental education for informed citizenship is a positivist view of educational 
institutions, Gough argues, that perceives the institution as a tool to implement in 
facilitating environmental literacy. He goes on to claim that socially critical theorists 
challenged the positivists with the perceived need for a new paradigm, which Gough 
thinks is also contestable. 28 1 Given the "manifest and numerous uncertainties" in both 
environment and education he argues for an agonistic approach to the environment, that 
recognises that different people and institutions have different cultural paradigms, or 
'world-views' about the relationship between humanity and the environment. 282 
Ultimately Gough takes an entrepreneurial approach to environmental education that 
even amongst the midst of crisis, looks for opportunity in our changing institutions, 
practices, literacies and interaction with our biogeophysical surroundings. 283 
278 Stables, 2002: 56 
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The Ministry of Education in New Zealand has a discussion document for the 
government offering advice on sustainable education, called "Sea Change: Leaming and 
Education for Sustainability" (2004). Chapter three is particularly important as it outlines 
the history of environmental education, and the proposals for a sustainable education 
'futures' outlook. Environmental 'pessimists' are criticised for being old fashioned and 
are linked with 'environmental education. ' Optimists are akin to those in favour of 
'education for sustainability. ' Since the Brundtland report sustainability has been 
widened, they argue, from purely ecological concerns to include economic, cultural, and 
social matters as much as environmental ones. Education is important for raising public 
awareness about consumption and production patterns and the need for change in the face 
of global pollution and climate change. The New Zealand government confirms the 
United Nations goal that 2005-2014 be the Decade for Education for Sustainable 
Development. 284 
The optimistic framework is very future orientated. It includes critical analysis of past 
and present practices to discover more than simple scientific and technological solutions, 
,, 285 but also "their root social, political and economic causes . It is a constructive attempt 
to invent values that can contribute to better ways of living and understanding in the 
future. Education for sustainability lends itself to a transformative education for future 
generations. The scope is not merely cross-disciplinary in terms of curricula, but crosses 
the boundaries of traditional educational institutions. Education for sustainable futures 
aims at the media, the family, businesses, and the workforce, to reach into realms of the 
population that are not involved with formal educational institutions. But the authors 
caution, although the strong aims of education for sustainability aim at engaging the 
population in a democratic restructuring of society, it should not merely be the 
responsibility of individuals to constitute change. 
The document outlines the ways in which the NZ government has been involved and 
committed to many of the global meetings on the environment, including Agenda 21 and 
the UNESCO meetings. Yet despite the commitment for entrenching education for 
284 NZ govt 2004: 37 
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environmental sustainability, there is almost no mention of the environment in either the 
Early childhood strategic plan (2003) or the Tertiary education strategy (2003 ). 286 An 
earlier document called Learning to carefor our environment (1998) sought to involve 
and integrate environmental education in schools across the entire curriculum, tangata 
whenua, businesses, and all sectors of the community. The commitment to evaluating this 
initiative has been abandoned because it belonged to the previous party who was in 
power in the mid 1990s. The short term nature of democracy tends to inhibit these long 
term deep changes that are unpopular because they impact on the immediate lifestyle and 
comfort of the present population. In fact a connection to educating for environment 
sustainability does not even reach across all government strategies let alone all sectors of 
the community. The document surveys exactly what is, and what is not happening in 
reaching into the population to inform and educate for environmental sustainability. 
The document is cognizant of the need for an imaginative generation of 'futures' and 
manages to take up the dominant discourse of sustainability (in contrast to the 'old 
fashioned' environmental education) without adhering to marketised society or rational 
individualism. Written as it is for a Neoliberal government, its critique is low key but 
nevertheless is, if you like, 'post Neoliberal, ' warning that transformation and 
responsibility can not be reduced to the individual or the balance of consumer choices on 
the market. 
Continental Philosophy and Environmental Education 
Not all environmental educationalists in the 2000s are so Utilitarian as the Bath school. 
Richard Smith's article in Scott and Williams volume of The Journal ofEcosophy, The 
Trumpeter, "Sustainable leaming" takes a position informed by post-structuralism. Like I 
have done in this chapter, Smith begins with the pedagogical and shows how this informs 
the types of subjectivity and environment we expect and encourage in education. 
Rousseau's child centred learning forms a Romantic version of the subject au naturel and 
the environment as innocent in its God-given form, but which becomes degenerate and 
286 NZ govt 2004: 53 
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disfigured by society. Another discourse emerges from Plato, whose rigorous 'dialogues' 
prepare the field for rationality over all other ways of knowing. 
The instrumental, techno-rationalism that runs through current educational pedagogy is 
incapable, Smith argues, of framing a lifestyle of genuine sustainability. Managerialism, 
efficiency and performativity that turns human beings into resources has been "deified 
rather than critiqued" by the "school effectiveness movement. , 287 The emphasis on 
assessment and visible performance results in short term, marketable, educational goals 
rather than any commitment to the joys and pleasures of new understanding, creative 
exploration, or the expanding consciousness that results from reading a demanding book. 
The Platonic strand in education has also encouraged the development of the mind as 
separate from the body, which is largely treated with indifference. The architecture, the 
classroom design, the division of disciplines all adds up to the discipline and separation 
of the mind from the body. What is more, he argues, except for a vague nod in the 
direction of consumerism, the purpose of education has become increasingly vague. The 
Dearing Report conceives, for example, education "primarily in instrumental and 
,, 288 economic terms. The phenomenal expansion of the numbers of the population gaining 
degrees was initiated partly, I think, for egalitarian reasons. But lately this has been 
understood as contributing to the 'Knowledge Economy. ' The Dearing report states, 
"looking twenty years ahead, the UK must progress further and faster in the creation of 
such a society to sustain a competitive society. " Of particular interest to an 
environmentalist is the context for the term 'sustain' which has been removed from 
ecology altogether and become a mechanism for economic management. The purpose of 
debate in education has been so completely co-opted by Neoliberal objectives of 
consumerism and the rational calculation of assessment, evaluation, attendance as 
methods of surveillance and governmentality, that debates over the purposes or styles of 
pedagogy have almost died out. Richard Smith protests - 
Instrumentalism, techno-rationalism, short-term thinking, managerialism, a refusal to 
think about what, after all, education isfor, a neglect of, or indifference towards, the 
287 Smith, R., 2002: 141 
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embodied experience of the pupil or learner; not just a failure to nurture in him or her a 
love of the things of this world, but an encouragement to disdain them: how, under these 
circumstance, could we ever foster the frame of mind sympathetic to sustainable 
development? "' 
John Foster is in broad agreement with Richard Smith, and is critical of the prudential, 
economic management model of sustainability. Foster argues that trying to control risk is 
to forfeit evolutionary possibility. Foster proposes that we are "fundamentally sense- 
makers" which puts education at the centre of meaningfulness in regards to society. This 
is not to set up a set of rules by which society should abide. Sense making is not as 
arbitrary as some policy makers and academics have lately been arguing. He states, 
we cannot take any criterion as a guide to sense-making, since the application of any 
criterion in judgement is itself only a matter of making sense. A fortiori we cannot take 
any natural ly-endors ed criterion as a guide. But sense-making cannot be unguided-the 
idea of gratuitous sense-making, sense-making at radical liberty, itself makes no sense. 
Foster's sense making is phenomenological in the manner of Hume and Nietzsche; the 
physical constraints and capabilities of the body produce a certain 'focus, ' a certain 
resolution, or capacity to attend upon things. The a priori of the body is as a sense- 
making organism that will tend towards certain ways of categorising because of our 
physical capacities: not because of some pre-ordained and fixed 'truth. ' 
Specific styles of sense making are 'sedimented' over time, nevertheless, education needs 
to avoid static techno-managerial approaches to pedagogy because it produces a pre- 
ordered attempt at risk management and a narrowly conceived workforce, rather than 
enabling students to have open-ended, responsive lives in a 'learning society. 290 A 
learning society, 
would quickly generate a wider context of social and corporate institutions as learning 
organizations, capable of collective life -intelligent responsiveness to their changing 
economic, cultural, and physical environments, and of exploratory-heuristic planning at 
all levels, with the minimum structural locking-in of inflexible goals and assumptions. 291 
Foster's model is natural evolution, which layers historical sediment together with the 
unexpected pressures of forces that will not yield to any totalising predictability. To press 
289 Smith, R., 2002: 143-4 
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the analogy further, globalised capitalism has been in place long enough to have built up 
intolerable pressure, and the potential for volcanic eruption is high. Human subjectivity 
and society are both more able to flexibly accommodate unexpected change if devotion to 
conserving capitalist modes of production and distribution are seen as merely one 
approach to organising human society, a mode that can be displaced and superseded by 
more flexible attentiveness to all the other factors in our environment. 
Bliffidom's contribution to the journal contextualises the discourse of 'sustainability' in 
various historical periods of the Liberal concern for 'security' and 'freedom. ' 292 1 
examine Bliffidorn's argument in detail in the last chapter. 
In our contribution to The Journal of Ecosophy, The Trumpeter, Michael Peters and I 
wrote that the discourse of sustainability is so all-pervasive that requiring education to 
introduce it as a 'mindframe' is outdated. Having written extensively on Neoliberalism 
elsewhere, we focused on future avenues for social and ecological co-habitation. We 
assumed a Heideggerian stance towards environmental education and began to scrutinise 
both the Romantic roots of 'eco-poiesis' and Heidegger's metaphysics for the lack of 
political engagement and the narrow frame of reference in 'Being' and 'Dasein. ' 293 it 
became clear from conference discussions that the 'Bath School' were outlining the 
prevailing problematic, for 'solutions, ' whereas we were seeking a new basis for an 
attitude to the future that could overcome the prevailing model of modernity. 
James Simon takes a stance informed by Heidegger and Buddhism, drawing attention to 
our 'bodily comportment' that might foster a mode of being that elicits a 
"nontechnological... 'releasement toward things. 55294 Simon draws directly on 
Heidegger's critique of technological enframing, where every 'thing' shows up as 
potential resource, or 'standing reserve. ' Simon explains, "the technological world is a 
world in which things no longer disclose themselves as things, but a world in which they 
have evaporated into a groundless, constantly shifting matrix of instrumental 
292 Bliihdom, 2002 
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,, 295 relations. The calculating rationality of the technological frame produces a telos of 
ever increasing efficiency. Heidegger argues that the change from the 'craft' era to the 
technological frame of modernity is about the forced extraction and storage of energy, 
that ignores the 'natural' tempo of the flows, the rhythms, the growth and ebb of the 
seasons, and instead 'challenges forth' events and entities as potential resource. "The way 
of revealing that rules in modem technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the 
,, 296 unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such . 
This results in an alienation of humankind from the earth. The estrangement is a kind of 
existential 'homelessness, ' the loss of a 'dwelling place' from which to build, and think. 
"Technological man (sic), swept along in the blind currents of fashion, fluid money 
markets and job flexibility, is portrayed as being no longer in touch with the earthiness of 
things ... distracted by mobile phones, televisions, and the Internet, his attention is 
constantly elsewhere. , 
297 
Heidegger's 'solution' to what he describes as rootless homelessness, is to attend 
respectfully to the thing, in itself, rather than as an indifferent cipher or 'placeholder' in 
the production of consumerism. To let objects be (a hammer, a journey, a painting) and 
care about them so that they can show up in their own way, and at their own tempo 
allows things to 'gather world. ' Simon explains this very well; "The idea here is that 
attending to a thing can illuminate a world, a world, that is, understood not as an object 
(planet Earth for instance) but as an arena within which things show up as significant 
things in the first place. , 298 
To drag us away from the empty business of technological enframing, Simon accepts 
uncritically Heidegger's tendency towards homeliness, dwelling, nostalgia and a certain 
Buddhist influence in "letting things be. " Homely dwelling is not so much frame of mind, 
as a bodily comportment, a habitual conditioning to the environment as it 'worlds. ' 
Physical ways of being affect thinking and understanding as much as the other way 
around. Technological man also has an efficient bodily comportment: "He grabs an 
'9' Simon, 2002: 32 
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energy bar on the way to work to stand in for breakfast; he gobbles down his five 
servings of fruit and vegetables to keep healthy. " Simon approves of the nostalgia in 
Heidegger as a means of "coming home... out of the alienating grip of technology. " 
Michael Bonnett 
Michael Bonnett's chapter in Ae Trumpeter advocates flexibility and openness to new 
forms of knowledge, as does Simon and Foster. He puts forward a Heideggerian stance, 
without declaring Heidegger's influence. Bonnett advocates poeisis, or 'genuine, 
receptive openness' to nature. 
A poetic apprehension in which that which is currently withdrawn is allowed to show 
itself, where the inchoate and strange (as central elements of nature as the self-ori I 
are acknowledged and allowed to stand, and we participate in things in their many 
sidedness and intrinsic mystery. 299 
Bonnett's position counters the Idealist subjectivism put forward by William Scott and 
others. "There is a nature, an integrity, recognized as external to our will with which we 
have to find a harmony. , 300 This seems to counter Idealism; we neither author nature, nor 
have the authority to dispose of it. Echoing subjectivism to some degree, Bonnett 
maintains, like Heidegger, that nature only 'shows up' in human cultural practices and 
language. 
Though it cannot matter in the slightest to biophysical nature whether humankind 
survives-some equilibrium will always be established, with or without us-nature only 
has significance in that space which is human consciousness, or its equivalent. 'O' 
Bonnett makes the same move that Heidegger does in the description of Dasein; 
individual solipsism is not adequate to describe the interaction between humanity and the 
environment. Better is a collective description of the earth 'worlding' circulating though 
language and comportment. Yet it is the unique questioning ability of human 
consciousness that raises Nature into the realm of significance. 
The poetic openness to nature, is at the centre of an 'authentic' relationship between 
human beings and the environment (which Heidegger terms Being). Letting things 'be' 
299 Bonnett, 2002: 9 
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involves considerable responsibility, given that nature will simply exist and that it is 
humanity that notices and cares and produces its significance. Attention, care, and an 
adequate aesthetics and language are not an end, but the essential meaningfulness of 
human life. Thus humanity has a duty "truly to safeguard, to preserve, to conserve" as 
this relationship is what provides meaning for nature and for ourselves. That 
responsibility, that Heidegger describes as the authentic Dasein, allowing Being to 'shine 
forth' from concealment (aletheia) and is the motivation forpoeisis rather than the 
rational calculation of all things. 
From this Heideggerian basis, Bonnett asserts that embedded in modem rationality are 
certain aspirations towards nature which aim to: "classify, explain, predict, assess, 
control, possess and exploit it.,, 
302 
In contrast to the exploitation of nature by rationalist positivism, humanity needs to 
develop authenticity. In our present era of alienation, "will require, above all" Bonnett 
stipulates, "a radical re-evaluation and re-positioning of the calculative motives and 
understandings that dominate modem Western consciousness and SoCiety.,, 303 
Otherwise we risk the likelihood of preoccupying pupils with symptoms masquerading as 
causes. (For example, measuring pollutant levels and devising scientific remedies rather 
than addressing the underlying motives and conceptions embedded in social practices 
which give rise to pollution. )1114 
He argues against education being 'procedurally neutral' (or positivist) when so many 
other institutions in society are not. "In a social- economic-political climate that privileges 
consumerism and the free market how pure is the rationality of pupils and other agents in 
local decision-making likely to be? " 
The environmental ethic we seek must be one in which perception and action become apt 
to things themselves. An ethic not of rules but of receptive response, where discernment 
is given priority over definition. 'O' 
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Educationalists such as Bonnett are making important attempts at creating the space for 
reconceptuali sing metaphysics, epistemology, pedagogy and the human relationship with 
the environment. It is no accident that he is so influenced by Heidegger, who initiated the 
scope of the question that informs this ability to stand back and really critically analyse 
the habits, norms and goverrimentality that pervades educational practices. 
Bonnett's monograph titled "Retrieving Nature; Education in a destitute time" in the 
Journal of Philosophy ofEducation (2003) sets out to challenge the normative 
metaphysics that are taken for granted in present day education and reconfigure them in 
more 'authentic' Heideggerian and environmental terins. His argument is very 
reminiscent of my own, that metaphysics structures the way we understand our own 
'humanity' and 'nature' and in turn, the relationship thus built up constitutes the ways we 
organise our educational institutions, policy, the curriculum and approaches to pedagogy. 
He writes, 
Environmental issues can disturb the traditional contours of educational space and 
produce a landscape of a different complexion and ambience whose internal quality 
reverberates to a different set of motives, a different metaphysics. This means that raising 
the question of environmental education is to raise questions about the nature of 
educational learning, knowledge and understanding in ways that will challenge many 
recent and current conceptions of education itself, such as liberal -rati onall st , managerial 
and market orientated. "' 
Both Michael Bonnett and I are engaging with Heidegger as crucial to a reimagining of 
the bases of globalised liberal culture, knowledge, subjectivity and education (although 
Bonnett suggests the 'answers must emerge from the West, whereas unlike both him and 
Heidegger, I am much more eclectic in where 'legitimate' ideas might emerge). We have 
had some contact and three conferences in 2001 and 2002 but emerge from different 
nations and have substantially similar ideas about politics and environmental concerns 
but subtly different approaches to philosophy and education. Bonnett adheres more 
closely to Heidegger whereas my approach is more critical and influenced by the Post- 
structuralist tradition rather than the Analytic. Both of us draw broadly similar arguments 
from Heidegger, including his critique of the rational consumerist paradigm or 
technological enframing that reduces everything to a 'resource. ' We both consider the 
306 Bonnett, 2003: 575, compare to Irwin, R. GBPES 2001: 166. 
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revisiting of philosophy in the face of environmental crisis as necessary (in a 
philosophical and evolutionary sense) for producing deep-seated social, ecological and 
educational changes. Bormett describes this requirement, 
Perhaps most fundamentally, coming to terms with environmental issues ultimately 
requires us to reconsider the nature of things themselves and how they are known, and to 
contemplate some views on this that are different from those that standardly underpin 
education today. 'O' 
Bonnett describes the history of culture and philosophy in the west as not only 'largely 
innocent' of awareness about environmental issues, but "whose central motive was the 
subjugation and exploitation of nature. " From this position of master, both nature and 
community began to be constructed as primarily a resource. 
Thus environmental concern alerts us to the possibility of certain aggressive motives 
holding sway within traditional subject knowledge. It thereby raises fundamental 
educational questions not only about what kinds of knowledge will best illuminate 
environmental problems, but also about the nature of educational knowledge itself - the 
spirit in which it is acquired and how it conditions our outlook. 'O' 
He is very explicit about the dangers associated with "that great paradigm of the 
rationalist project, scientific knowledge. " As Bonnett is at pains to point out, the critique 
of rationalism in Heidegger seriously challenges the dominant educational mores 
operating in traditional curriculum areas. Bonnett argues that we require "more receptive- 
responsive motives towards nature. " 
Similarly, we may seek to reveal and re-appraise the metaphors of nature that different 
kinds of knowledge assume and employ, and to ponder the epistemological foundations 
of a curriculum germane to a genuinely 'organic' conception of reality. '09 
I suggested to Michael Bonnett at Oxford in 2002 that the re-appraisal might be 
understood as a suspicion of metanarratives rather than a renewal of metaphysics. This 
directs attention to the basis of Heidegger's philosophy; the ontological difference 
between Being and beings. The ontological difference is a reworking of Aristotle's 
conceptualisation of the One and the many. Yet Heidegger tries to avert the subsequent 
tendency in the philosophical tradition to interpret the 'One' as a fixed underlying form 
or Idea from which specific examples (the many) deviate. Heidegger's ontology of Being 
3" Bonnett, 2003: 572-573 
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attempts to be more flexible and embracing of change, yet its metaphysical predecessor 
consistently haunts the concept. 
There is increasing interest in the relationship between subjects and the surrounding 
environment because, as Bonnett has pointed out, embedded in Idealist solipsism, is a 
tendency to control and manage nature that clearly is detrimentally impacting on the 
planetary conditions viable for organic life. Idealist solipsism, or 'subjectivism' as 
Heidegger terms it takes seriously the ancient philosophical concept of the nominalist 
fallacy. That is, any name which we attach to an object emerges from the linguistic base 
of the community, and the individual's personal and peculiar understanding of the 
meaning of the term. Taken to extremes, the naming of an object emerges from the 
initiating, enunciating subject rather than the object to which it is nominally attached. In 
the Idealist tradition the subject has become increasingly privileged, and the pathway to 
correctly identifying a particular object has been circumscribed to rational categorisation. 
Heidegger is scathing, not of the nominalist fallacy or solipsism per se, but of the 
rationalist paradigm, the emphasis on calculation, and the attempts at universal categories 
put forth by Descartes and Kant, amongst others. 
Like Bowers, Bonnett is most interested in the critique of individual subjectivism, and the 
associated undermining of rationalism. In the monograph the widest disparity between his 
understanding of the application of Heidegger and its implication for contemporary 
philosophy and theory are about his gloss on 'postmodernity' and in particular Derrida's 
epistemology. For Derrida differance defers to the not-present (in much the same way 
Heidegger's Dasein is not simply being (here) but is directed to the future; being-there. 
Bonnett is most aggrieved by Derrida's concept that there is no 'extra-text, ' which he 
regards as subjectivist in the mode that Heidegger critiqued. 
There is a shift in the focus of relations from the ontological 'difference between' Being 
and beings to the post-ontological 'deferring' of text with context. What is at stake is the 
status of truth, structure, and Being; a competition between a totalising ontology and a 
totalising epistemology and how these two approaches affect the question of an ethics of 
nature, an ecology of relations, and education. 
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'Nature' 
Bonnett spends some time on the definition of 'nature. ' Aristotle defines nature as the 
essence of things. It is also commonsense, that comes as 'second nature. ' At some point 
during modemity nature became understood as a dangerous wilderness that needs to be 
tamed and subjugated. Bonnett asserts that this "modem metaphysics of mastery', 310 4, is 
reflected in both our actions and our ascendant forms of knowledge, such as science and 
technology. , 311 With a few important exceptions, such as Aldo Leopold, many of the 
texts on environmental ethics reside within this rationalist paradigm, which has 
stimulated much debate about whether there is an 'intrinsic nature' that is more than, and 
external to, human understanding and human nature. Bonnett describes the liberal 
rational paradigm as creating the model of nature as a resource to be used rather than a 
reciprocal cohabitation of respectful otherness. Heidegger's definition of nature is that in 
late modemity the environment has become understood as a resource for human 
consumption. To contrast with the narrow definition of nature as a resources, and to 
emphasise its 'intrinsic' status, Bonnett describes nature as the 'self-arising. ' 
(T)he reality of nature as the self-arising exhibits the following: it is epistemologically 
mysterious; it possesses its own integrity as a spatially and temporally continuous whole; 
it is inescapable and everything that occurs within it is unique, cannot be 'replayed'; it 
has intrinsic value. Thus characterised, nature is that dimension of experience that, 
simply, we have to accept and that because of its essential otherness, from which we can 
genuinely learn and be inspired, can save us from an essential stultification... 
Expressions of nature are best understood in ten-ns of a metaphysics of open, infinitely- 
faceted, essentially mysterious things rather than stabilised, heavily categorised, 
intellectually possessed objects - things here also understood in the Heideggerian sense 
of arisings that gather a neighbourhood; through their inscrutable presencing a world of 
significance is opened up. It follows that if we are to know nature so characterised, we 
must learn to develop the receptive/ responsive - that is to say, poetic - attitude that itself 
is a key characteristic of authentic dwelling, a dwelling that is in touch with what 
ultimately sustains it. "' 
Bonnett's reaction to the problematic modem attitude toward nature derives from 
Heidegger's later philosophy, where nature is intrinsically 'self-arising' and humanity's 
openness to nature's mystery and fluid integrity comes from both 'authentic dwelling' 
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and poetic intuition. Bonnett is suggesting a renewal of a more 'authentic' metaphysics 
rather than a 'suspicion of metanarratives. ' 
If all of nature is understood as a resource, then, following the argument of Francis 
Fukuyama to its ultimate conclusion, the endless rational calculation of the most efficient 
utilisation tends towards the 'end of nature. ' All of nature becomes 'the same' in an 
endless repetition of meaningless consumption. Yet Bonnett rejects the endless repetition 
of 'the same' as argued by the end of nature thesis. There is still 'wilderness' of the 
unexpected present in the otherness of natural phenomena. Aletheia, Heidegger's 
ontological concept of truth is the coming to light of 'things' rather than categorised 
objects. Rather than the 'play' with language, with irony, and paradox, poetics in 
Heidegger (and Bonnett) is the unearthing of nature into language. It requires a receptive 
enquiring attitude on the part of the subject, raises the question of poetic authenticity, and 
is best secured through homely 'dwelling. ' He foregrounds the many ways in which 
nature affects us from the flow of natural processes on which our bodily health depends 
to recalcitrant cancers, from moonlight on water and the recycling of the Earth's 
atmosphere by innumerable microflora to earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. We are 
constantly dependent upon, and subject to, natural processes at both micro and macro 
levels. Unlike Heidegger, who does not delve into the intrinsic/ extrinsic argument, 
Bonnett regards nature as the Other, "nature remains always beyond us, " which ethically 
requires respect rather than alienation. Bonnett raises the question of the status of truth, 
and its relation between the subject and the natural 'thing. ' 
Modem subjectivism derives from Descartes and earlier, Plato (amongst many others). 
Any faith in truth comes, according to Descartes, from rational thinking - rather than 
some simple tautological correspondence between an object and our nominal description 
of it. In the nominalist gap between the object and the understanding, arise all sorts of 
possible errors. It could be that the subject misunderstands a bright and yellow flecked 
rock for a genuine valuable metal, rather than crystalline fools gold. Or worse, the 
deception might occur because the subject is not actually experiencing the situation as he 
thought at all - he is dreaming, or mad, or convinced by demons. Descartes insists that 
the only true reckoning of knowledge is through deduction and rational thought. If 
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everybody deduces the rock contains gold then universal truth is ascertained; indeed the 
gold standard has been found. 
Bonnett does not raise the issue, so dear to Heidegger's heart, that modem rationality 
emerged in connection with the harsh separation between subject and object set out by 
Descartes (and others). Instead, Bonnett concentrates on the 'intrinsic nature' debate that 
is so often raised by the environmental ethics canon, from Peter Singer's respect for 
animals, implicitly in Aldo Leopold and explicitly by the contemporary Neo-pragmatists. 
In contrast to the Pragmatists who argue that everything is a subjective interpretation 
Bonnett argues for an intrinsic nature that is 'self-arising. ' He describes nature as, "the 
self-arising whose features furnish fundamental aspects of our metaphysical space, that is 
to say, our reality. , 313 In contemporary terms it marks two subtly different stances - the 
suspicion of metanarratives or a renewal of metaphysics. 
Ontology versus epistemology 
Substantially Bonnett's thesis is similar to mine: a Heideggerian reading of philosophy of 
environment and philosophy of education, reworking the basic premises and 
presumptions of Liberalism and particularly managerial Neoliberalism because it is based 
on a rationalist paradigm that we argue is not only philosophically 'outdated' but 
dangerous because it is embedded in a paradigm of 'mastery' 'over' nature. 
Michael Bonnett raises an interesting point in chapter four of his monograph in the 
Journal ofPhilosophy ofEducation which amounts to the juxtaposition of contradicting 
views about the relationship between ontology and epistemology. Bonnett takes a stance, 
informed by Heideggerian 'onto-theo-logy, ' that there is a 'mystery' in 'intrinsic nature' 
that is retrievable through a poetic approach to the real. Heidegger's terminology is rather 
different to Bonnett's, and I would argue importantly so. Heidegger conceives of the truth 
ontologically as aletheia, which emerges from Being into unconcealment. Bonnett's 
shorthand for aletheia is the 'mystery' (of Being). 'Nature' is rarely referred to in 
Heidegger as directly as in Bonnett. 
313 Bonnett, 2003: 692 
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As I argue in more detail in chapter eight, in early Heidegger 'Nature' is an interpretation 
that comes after the full absorption of humanity in equipmentality. 314 Nature has 
Aristotelian overtones but these are not simply 'essence' (or wesen in German) as has 
been understood by the philosophical tradition. Heidegger argues that essence is a 
degradation of the term 'Being' from its ancient Greek origin, physis, to the Latin 
interpretation, esse, to the English, essence. 'Wesen'avoids the Latin corruption into 
essence which has become a static and fixed kernel. Wesen is the verb forin of Being, 
better understood in English as 'are. ' 315 Through a complicated series of philosophical 
arguments (that I explain below in chapter eight) Heidegger incorporates 'becoming' into 
Being, so that from its traditional interpretation as a static and all encompassing term, it 
engages with change and process, becoming an 'event ontology. ' 
It is only during the 'turn' of the 1930s that Heidegger begins to significantly 
acknowledge nature as 'self-arising' which to a significant extent he incorporates into his 
key concept of 'Being' as Physis. As I describe in detail on the section titled physis and 
aletheia (below, chapter eight) Heidegger conceptualises truth, Being and subjectivity in 
ontological terms. Truth or aletheia is the 'revealing' of aspects of Being that 
ontologically preside in relationship to the ability of Dasein to care and apprehend. 
While Heidegger sometimes interprets Being as 'earth, ' in his later philosophy he implies 
(in marginal references that are not full explained or dwelt upon in his text) that 'earth' 
rises up and erupts into the 'world' of social relations. In these fleeting glimpses 
Heidegger seems to imply that the earth as self-arising only underlies 'being and the 
'world' as a subterranean strata - but he insists - never as the stable foundation for truth, 
rather as the juxtaposition against which the dynamic relation between beings and Being 
is played out. 
For Heidegger, poetics is the ability for Dasein to bring forth nature as the self-arising, or 
the becoming of Being, physis, into language. Poetics is a process of allegory which 
touches upon the 'real' and transforms the whole 'world' with its subtle shift in 
meaningful metaphor towards the renewed uncovering or revealing of the truth of Being. 
314 Heidegger, 1962: 70 
315 Heidegger, 1982 book 11, Irwin, 2000 
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Quoting Charles Taylor, Bonnett refers us to the Romantic method of poetic elegy, the 
poet makes us aware of something in nature for which there are as yet no adequate words. 
The poems are finding the words for us. In this "subtler language" - the term is borrowed 
from Shelley - something is created and defined as well as manifested. 316 
Poetics breaches the nominalist gap - but not via rationality as is the case in Idealism. 
Heidegger's ontological approach is intended to mount criticism at the philosophical 
tradition for totalising subjectivism, as in Descartes, Berkeley and other members of the 
Idealist tradition who insist upon a harsh separation between the subject and the object, or 
thing-in-itself. Heidegger is very critical of Idealist subjectivism whose basic argument is 
that the object can only become known through rational deduction and categorisation that 
vouches to be universal. To put it another way, Idealist subjectivist Truth has a 'capital' T 
of the absolute. Truth aims at universal categorisation and rational calculation when the 
subjects' interpretation generates all truth. This combination of rational calculation, 
universal categorisation and an over-emphasis on the solipsist nature of the subject's 
mind exhibits subjectivist 'mastery' over nature rather than the poetic ontological relation 
of Dasein with Being. 
In contrast to the onto-theo-logical account sketched above, Bonnett challenges 
'postmodern' authors because he believes they exhibit subjectivist mastery. The problem 
with postmodern subjectivism is, Bonnett assumes, technological and rational mastery 
4over5 nature. 
Bonnett has misunderstood post modernism for Derrida's post- structuralism and Rorty's 
neo-pragmatism. The confusion is to some extent understandable. All three reject (in a 
variety of importantly different ways) absolute or essential Truth. 
Bonnett wishes to defend his concept of Nature as the self-arising that furnishes 
"fundamental aspects or our metaphysical space" against, what he perceives as 
postmodern objections, I accepted that our concepts of nature are socially produced, but 
not necessarily that they are all thereby rendered optional, arbitrary or function 
316 Taylor, 1991: 85 cited in Bonnett, 2003: 595 
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politically. , 317 His objection is that post-modernism renders all interpretations, including 
the 'self-arising Nature' as a human construction and therefore a matter of conscious, if 
social, choices and decisions. Rorty in particular is a good example of the problematic 
postmodern desire for conscious 'choice. ' 
One particularly influential articulation of the social constructivist thesis is given by 
Richard Rorty, who develops the notion that man invents (that is, constantly re-invents) 
nature through descriptions whose point of reference is other descriptions rather than 
some externally existing world. Thus, in Philosophy and the Mirror offature, he refutes 
the idea that language in some way represents reality and that truth is therefore a matter 
of correspondence with that reality. Rather, we just have descriptions that reflect the 
norms of the day. Truth about reality is always truth about 'real ity-under-a-certain- 
description' and these descriptions are optional -- we could always choose others. "' 
For Bonnett 'Nature' needs to constitute the foundational 'ground' of truth. When he is 
less careful, Bonnett rhetorically enquires that nature has "everything to do with 
objectivity, accurate representation and correspondence. 019 
Heidegger overtly argues against nature (or Being) as a 'ground' of truth, although 
whether Nature as foundational is still present in his concept of Being is a moot point (see 
chapter 9). Heidegger was the student of Husserl and is very familiar with the linguistic 
critique of the correspondence theory between signifiers and the signified. In his critique 
of Descartes he rejected the 'correctitude' of representation as the Idealist recourse to 
logic to create the only legitimate bridge between the subjectivist mind and the intrinsic 
reality of the object. While Bonnett accepts the critique of the object and rationality, he 
does not refer to the long philosophical tradition from whence the arguments emerge. 
Heidegger's concept of Being relies upon Aristotle's metaphysics of the One and the 
many. The relationship between the totality of beings over time, and the particular event 
or article at any given time is the ontological relation, and this is the focus of all 
articulations of Being and beings. 320 
Unlike Heidegger who avoids recourse to terms like 'value' and 'ethics' because they 
resonate with the Idealist mastery of modernity and metaphysics of which he is so 
317 Bonnett, 2003: 692 
318 Rorty, 1994: 379 referred to by Bonnett, 2003: 598 
3 19 Bonnett, 2003: 598 
320 
Heidegger, 1969b and 1973a 
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suspicious (see chapter 10). Bonnett argues that there is a 'right relation' to Nature, which 
exhibits "such a thing as proper authority. , 
321 
Bonnett's difficulty arises from two sources: the metaphysical 'ground' he attributes to 
nature and his misunderstanding of the critique of philosophical 'subjectivism. ' A 
metaphysical ground embedded in nature is which is clearly not what Heidegger 
intended, although I argue an essentially inert onto -theo-logical ground is still 
4concealed' in Heidegger's concept of Being (see chapter 9). 
Bonnett argues for a genuine, authentic knowledge: truth with a purchase on Nature. Yet 
somehow this is not 'objective' truth, instead it is poetic truth. The poetic approach to the 
truth of nature contrasts with what he regards as a postmodern fickleness for truth as 
something to control and play with: "finding 'more interesting, ' 'more fruitful' ways of 
speaking. " He quotes Rorty's disregard for authoritative truth, which "is a way of 
allowing a description of reality to be imposed on us, rather than taking responsibility for 
choice among competing ideas and words, theories and vocabularies. " Language has 
become the primary structure (rather than Descartes' epistemology of rational deduction). 
So, as with de Saussure's linguistic structuralism, sentences are "connected with other 
sentences rather than the world. 5322 
Bonnett is very startled by the totalising epistemology advocated by Rorty, who says, 
44we are shoved around by physical reality. Yet what does being shoved around have to 
do with objectivity, accurate representation, or correspondence? Nothing, I think, unless 
we confuse contact with reality with dealing with reality. , 323 Bonnett challenges Rorty's 
dualism between contact with reality and dealing with reality. Both dealing and contact 
are significant; "Is it significant contact, that is, part of conscious experience in which 
case does it not have to be linguistically mediated on this view. , 324 
Cannot this be interpreted as the world's resistance and correction to our linguistically 
structured (and other) intentions, a resistance and correction that provide us with a sense 
32 ' Bonnett, 2003: 692 
322 Rorty, 1994: 372 quoted by Bonnett, 2003: 597 323 Rorty, 1994: 375 quoted by Bonnett, 2003,598 324 Bonnett, 2003: 598 
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of what is 'other' and its properties - and thus define such intentional activity in 'real' 
tenns?... 
Rorty seems to argue that truth is not out there: it is sentences that are true or false and 
these are human constructions. 
Truth cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - because 
sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the 
world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own - 
unaided by the describing abilities of human beings - cannot. "' 
Rorty's 'postmodemism' emerges from American pragmatism rather than Continental 
structuralism: Pierce and Dewey rather than Nietzsche. Though both traditions made the 
same amendments to truth in relation to 'reality' that Bonnett advocates. That is to say, 
when a 'truth' that has been 'working' adequately for a long period of time begins to 
'fail' to explain events often and an ongoing way, then the 'anomalies' become a much 
more far-reaching challenge to the maintenance of what has hitherto been taken as given. 
For example, capitalist growth has (arguably) provided a satisfactory motif for structuring 
modem societies, providing modes of 'excellence, ' differentiating rank via 
entrepreneurial initiative rather than hand to hand combat. The differentials in wealth 
have been on the one hand criticised on the grounds of inequitable distribution and the 
deprivations of poverty, yet the countervailing discourse of meritocracy has at the same 
time been present in the liberal democratic general will. The struggle between rich and 
poor has been essential to democracy and there is no way to isolate and remove capitalist 
growth from the liberal democratic mode of organising society. However, the devastation 
of resource depletion and pollution - which were described in economic terms as 
'externalities' - or outside the rational calculation of cost-benefit analyses - are now so 
pressing that they threaten the 'truth' of capitalist growth altogether. There are some 
attempts to modify the truth of capitalism by incorporating externalities of pollution and 
the finitude of resources into the financial equation and making corporations, individuals 
and nation states accountable for them (see final section of the thesis) but ultimately the 
pressure of these 'anomalies' will collapse the 'truth' of capitalism as the Ideal mode of 
325 Bonnett, 2003: 598 
326 Rorty, 1989: 4-5 cited in Bonnett, 2003: 599 
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constructing modem societies and it will be replaced with another paradigm that 
acknowledges the integration of human society and nature in altogether different ways. 
I suspect that Rorty is making a more traditionally Idealist and subjectivist move than 
Derrida. The similarities that inform Bonnett to group together Rorty, Derrida and 
Giddens fall flat when one understands their conflicting approaches to epistemology. 
There is no likeness between the Neopragmatist and the Post-structuralist approaches to 
nature, epistemology, ontology or metaphysics. 
Post-modernisin formulates a change in modes of capitalist production, such that instead 
of the Fordist structured production lines, constant change, flexibility, efficiency and life- 
long learning characterise social and capitalist organisation. I agree with Bonnett that 
postmodernity coheres with Heidegger's critique of nature and humanity as a 'resource' 
susceptible to rational mastery. Post-structuralism mounts an enlightened, or post- 
enlightened critique of all metanarratives. No mode of social organisation is sacred, 
including the grand narrative of 'economic growth' which governs, increasingly, all 
modes of human-nature interaction. Neo-pragmatism has modified the critique of Truth 
mounted by Pierce, Dewey and Jameson at the turn of the 20th century, and tends to 
modify rather than completely deconstruct liberal democracy, justice, empiricism, empire 
and economics. 
Poststructuralists advocate regarding the tradition of metaphysics, including the 'ground' 
of truth in nature, as a structuring metanarrative, that has legitimised many concepts and 
proffers the standard for truth. Metanarratives are not a matter of 'choice. ' We are born 
into cultures that already operate in a given paradigm. The 'suspicion of metanarratives' 
is a call for critical thought about orthodoxy reminiscent of Kant's short essay "Was ist 
Aujklarung? " -What is Enlightenment? Critical thinking is not a rejection of the 
significance of matter, objects, environment or context in the same way that Bonnett 
describes postmodernism. 
While grappling with the status of truth and the nominalist separation of languages from 
nature, Bonnett fails to distinguish (as Heidegger does) between nature, earth and world. 
For Heidegger, 'world' is cultural, emanating from an important 'work of art' a 
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signifying and symbolic artefact (such as the Greek Temple) which symbolises the 
327 
epistemological norms of that epoch . The world relates to Nature by bringing to light 
(aletheia) an aspect of Being that hitherto may have been concealed. 'Things' 'world' 
according to Heidegger - they have meaning which reinforces a paradigm of meanings 
within a socio-historical and cultural epoch. 
Bonnett does refer to the way things 'world, ' in contrast to the Idealist tradition that 
separates out natural 'objects, ' at once alienating them from subjectivist interpretation 
and yet remaining essential as juxtaposition against which we evaluate ourselves. Objects 
are only understandable through rational deduction, overcoming the nominalist barrier 
via measurement, calculation and categorisation. A reasoned reckoning that Heidegger 
calls 'correctitude. ' 
Bonnett raises a very interesting point in relation to the anthropocentricism embedded in 
some po st- structuralism and post-modemism. Although Bonnett does not frame the 
problem in this way, it appears to be a contest between epistemology and ontology: 
between Derrida's totalising epistemology and Heidegger's totalising onto-theo-logy. As 
Derrida puts it, "il n' a pas de hors-texte, " there is nothing outside the text. This is an Y 
important issue. Epistemology seems to have 'won' in the argument that philosophers 
have been tossing around for over two and a half thousand years. 
Bonnett makes no reference to de Saussure, the important realms of langue and parole, 
the structure of language or the community in which it circulates, or the distinction 
between the signifier and the signified. De Saussure comes out of a long tradition of 
distinguishing between the subject, the fallacy of nominalism, and the object so named. I 
do not claim to know Rorty and possibly he has rested on structural linguistics, but if, as 
Bonnett suggests, Rorty has "clear resonances" with Derrida, then a 'post' structuralism 
is at play. The circulation of signs does not rely on rational deduction, but rather on 
culturally consistent assumptions about metaphysics, or the metanarrative of 
metaphysics. Bonnett writes, the 
view that what appears to be given and self-evident is generated by and dependent upon 
language and other sign systems. For Derrida, signs have meaning only through their 
327 Heidegger, 1977f and 1977d 
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relations with other absent signs -- the play of difference. Nothing refers only to itself -- 
and certainly not to some extratextual reality. Meaning is achieved only through the 
interweaving of significances that is the text, and everything is constituted on the basis of 328 a trace within it of other elements of the 'chain', this 'textile' that is the text. There is 
nothing before the text; there is no pretext that is not already text. 1329 
In 1995 Willy Maley argues that this interpretation of Derrida overlooks Derrida's 'true 
intentions. ' 
In Of Grammatology (1967), Derrida first formulated the phrase that has haunted him 
ever since: 'There is no extra-text', or there is no frame, often interpreted as: 'There is 
nothing outside - or beyond - the text'. This is the impression of deconstruction that sees 
it as a form of close reading that is blind to larger questions of history and politics, a sort 
of ultra-formalism. But when Derrida used the phrase he had something else in mind, 
specifically a desire to undo the opposition between close readings and contextual ones. 
Thus in a recent essay in Critical Inquiry he writes : 330 
'there is no outside-the-text' signifies that one never accedes to a text without some 
relation to its contextual opening and that a context is not made up only of what is so 
trivially called a text, that is, the words of a book or the more or less biodegradable paper 
document in a library. "' 
Elsewhere Derrida writes about the way any text exceeds its own boundaries, both in 
terms of the concrete conditions of the writer's surroundings and the moment of textual 
exegesis, whenever it is read. 
(A)II those boundaries that form the running border of what used to be called a text, of 
what we once thought this word could identify, i. e. the supposed end and beginning of a 
work, the unity of a corpus, the title, the margins, the signatures, the referential realm 
outside the frame, and so forth. What has happened ... is a sort of overrun that spoils all 
these boundaries and divisions and forces us to extend the accredited concept, the 
dominant notion of a 'text' ... that is no longer a 
finished corpus of writing, some content 
enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, a fabric of traces referring 
endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential traces. 332 
In fact Derrida turns out to be arguing almost exclusively for context, for what Bonnett 
(and others) have assumed was the 'outside' but which Derrida insists is not a question if 
intrinsic or extrinsic because the over-run of boundaries is unavoidable. The subject can 
never be completely divided from the object -whether it be a text or a tree - and neither 
328 Demda, 198 1 b: 26 paraphrased by Bonnett, 2003: 598 
329 DeMda, 198 1 a: 328 cited by Bonnett, 2003: 597 330 Maley, 1995: §1 
33 1 Derrida, 1989 vol 15,4: 841 quoted in Maley, 1995: §1 
332 Derrida, 1979: 81; 83-84 quoted in Maley, 1995: §I 
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can the parole, the circulation of signs, be separate from the socio-historical situatlon of 
either reader or author. In the essay "Biodegradables; seven diary fragments" he writes, 
An 'Internal' reading will always be insufficient. And moreover impossible. Question of 
context, as everyone knows, there is nothing but context, and therefore: there is no 333 
outside-the-text . 
Maley goes on to explain, "So, for deconstruction the distinction between text and 
context is bogus. A con-text, because this text is not impervious to politics, culture, 
history and so on, and this context is not something non-textual. " Instead of 
deconstruction or po st- structural ism adhering to the rules of subjectivism as Bonnett 
implies, it challenges subjectivism by permeating all aspects of nature with coding and 
overcoding and any text defers to these other elements, without necessarily consciously 
recognising them at all. 
There is still solipsism as the subject encounters some aspect of nature that has not yet 
made it into terminology, and this recalls the elegy in Heidegger and Bonnett's 
methodology of poetics. Yet this enunciation or 'iterability' does not directly define one 
element or item of nature. In an interview titled "This strange institution called literature" 
Derrida argues that iterability, "both puts down roots in the unity of a context and 
immediately opens this non-saturable context onto a recontextualisation. , 334 Effectively 
any introduction into langue is also an introduction into the historical layers of parole. 
The iteration is not so much a recourse to a more authentic truth about Being or Nature, 
but the destabilisation of such concepts because all parole shakes up the concrete by 
deferring to the contextual politics, the shifts and movements of power, and the 
overlaying of meaning through translation and mistranslation of terms, however 
technical. Maley describes the power, historical and political impositions on the text; 
"Deconstruction can also be seen as an allegorics, or analogics of power. A politics of 
linkage. Because there is nothing outside the text - everything is included in 'reading', 
everything counts - connections are constantly made with the so-called 'real' or 'outside' 
world. 035 Or as Derrida describes it in "Limited Inc" in the journal Glyph 2, 
333 Derrida, 1989: 873 quoted in Maley, 1995: §1 
334 Derrida in Attridge 1992: 63 quoted by Maley: 1995: §1 
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Either the contextual difference changes everything, because it determinesftom within: in 
this case, it can hardly be bracketed, even provisionally. Or it leaves certain aspects 
intact, and this signifies that these aspects can always separate themselves from the 
allegedly 'original' context in order to export or to graft themselves elsewhere while 
continuing to function in one way or another ... In order that this either/or not be an 
alternative or an insurmountable logical contradiction, the value of context must be 
reelaborated according to a new logic... Every sign ... can ... 
break with every given 
context, is absolutely illimitable. This does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a 
context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any centre or absolute 
anchoring. 336 
So not only does Derrida resist getting captured by the text/ context dualism, he 
destabilises the authentic ground of truth in Being or Nature, constituting a very 
important critique of Heidegger (and subsequently Bonnett's) project. 
Certainly Derrida was very aware of Bakhtin's argument for an expansive play in the 
meaning of words in relation to objects. This contrasts with Heidegger's hermeneutics 
which is designed to narrow down interpretive breadth and consign precision as much as 
possible on the meaning of the text, not simply of the author's intention, but the historical 
emergence of the truth of Being. 
337 
Bakhtin pre-empts post-structuralism with a clearly enunciated antagonism towards 
Idealism, in this case Kant's thing-in-itself 
The direct word, as traditional stylistics understands it, encounters in Its orientation 
toward the object only the resistance of the object itself (the impossibility of its being 
exhausted by a word, the impossibility of saying it all). But no living word relates to its 
object in a singular way: between the word and its object, between the word and the 
speaking subject, there exists an elastic environment of other, alien words about the same 
object, the same theme, and this is an environment that it is often difficult to penetrate. 338 
The 'richness' in interpretation in the circulation of language is supposed to extricate the 
interpretation from poetic realism which Bakhtin describes as narrow homoglossia and 
instead valorises narrative play, humour, and multivarious wordiness of heteroglossia. 
Any concrete discourse (utterance) finds the object at which it was directed already as it 
were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with value, already enveloped 
in an obscuring nust - or, on the contrary, by the 'light' of alien words that have already 
been spoken about it. It is entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, 
alien value judgements and accents. The word, directed toward its object, enters a 
dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgements and 
336 Derrida, 1977: 220 quoted in Maley: 1995: §1 337 
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accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils from 
others, intersects with yet a third group: and all this may crucially shape discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers, may complicate its expression and influence its 
entire stylistic profile. "9 
Compare this to Derrida's discussion of the text and the historical assemblages of power. 
One of the most necessary gestures of a deconstructive understanding of history consists 
... in transforming things by exhibiting writings, genres, textual strata (which is also to 
say - since there is no outs i de-the-text, right - exhibiting institutional, economic, political, 
pulsive [and so on] 'realities') that have been repulsed, repressed, devalorized, 
minoritized, deligitimated, occulted by hegemonic canons, in short, all that which certain 
forces have attempted to melt down into the anonymous mass of an unrecognisable 
culture, to '(bio)degrade' in the common compost of a memory said to be living and 
organic. 340 
Bakhtin goes on to explain how the word designated to a particular object or event defers 
to the whole system of language and articulation, never able to attach itself in isolation as 
signifier to signified. Nor is the word able to extricate itself from the layers of history 
incumbent in the object itself, the sedimented change, the upheavals and power struggles, 
the entangled interwoven affects and counter affects. 
In the poetic image narrowly conceived (in the image-as-trope), all activity - the dynamics of the image-as-word - is completely exhausted by the play between the word 
(with all its aspects) and the object (in all its aspects). The word plunges into the 
inexhaustible wealth and contradictory multiplicity of the object itself, with its 'virginal, 
still unuttered' nature; therefore it presumes nothing beyond the borders of its own 
context (except, of course, what can be found in the treasure-house of language itself). 
The word forgets that its object has its own history of contradictory acts of verbal 
recognition, as well as that heteroglossia that is always present in such acts of 
i1 341 recognition. 
Bakhtin - in direct contrast to Descartes' fear of dreaming, and madness, plays up the 
'Carnival' as the anti-rational moment, a time when the Narren, Joker's wild, sexual, 
mad, masked, playful, - can arouse new meanings from the layers and layers of historical 
associations that spring up in deferance to the Other. 
The object reveals first of all precisely the socially heteroglot multiplicity of its names, 
definitions and value judgements. Instead of the virginal fullness and inexhaustibility of 
the object itself, the prose writer confronts a multitude of routes, roads and paths that 
have been laid down in the object by social consciousness. Along with the internal 
contradictions inside the object itself, the prose writer witnesses as well the unfolding of 
social heteroglossia surrounding the object, the Tower-of-Babel mixing of languages 
that goes on around any object; the dialectics of the object are interwoven with the social 
339 Bakhtin, 1994: 276 
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dialogue surrounding it. For the prose writer, the object is a focal point for heteroglot 
voices among which his own voice must also sound; these voices create the background 
necessary for his own voice, outside of which his artistic prose nuances cannot be 
perceived, and without which they "do not sound. 15342 
When Derrida claims "il n'a pas de hors-texte, " there is no extra-text he is taking Y5 
human reflection, knowledge and language out of a separated and privileged realm and 
reintegrating us into the ecology of the natural world. Derrida has rarely (if ever) been 
interpreted as doing this. The confusion of subjectivism tends to remain because, like 
Heidegger, philosophers and literary critics have remained caught in the modernist and 
Idealist paradigm. Our very grammar, as Nietzsche notes, tends to separate and privilege 
the subject from the verb, the individual from their own physical actions, the interpreter 
from the interpreted. Heidegger too, remains caught up in this paradigm and it requires 
careful critique that goes beyond the scope of his philosophical rubric to recognise the 
limitations of the conceptualisation of Dasein, Being and his reliance on the poetic to 
introduce new correspondence 'from' nature (Being) into language. Bonnet writes that 
Derrida finds, "even Heidegger... guilty of striving for a foundation in what is 
immediately and self-evidently present. , 343 De Saussure himself, the master of 
structuralism, writes that language is one system that is comparable to other systems that 
may enunciate themselves in completely different ways. The codes and langue, 
permeates social systems, "Language is a system of signs that express ideas and is thus 
comparable to the system of writing, to the alphabet of deaf-mutes, to symbolic rituals, to 
forms of etiquette, to military signals, etc. It is but the most important of these 
systems. , 
344 
Bateson, Deleuze and Guattari, as different examples of the post-structuralist approach to 
the environment, extend the coda of langue and apply it to assemblages in the natural 
world. So the system of signs permeates everything. Nature is not separated from culture, 
or from humanity. It is not concealed, not extra-textual. Deleuze and Guattari, along with 
Bateson explain this much better than Derrida ever has. The 'language' of repetition, 
predictability, form, growth and atavistic procreation operate as much as natural events 
342 Bakhtin, 1994: 278 
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and objects in the unfolding of species and genera, in the gradual sedimentation and 
stratafication of rocks, in the consistency of oceans and atmospheres, as they do in the 
peculiar shared phenomena of reproduction of the system, the code, the grammar, and the 
vocabulary of any given language. The signs and grammatical structures that are shared 
amongst language communities - the langue- has the same internal qualities of 
consistency as the genetic code that is shared by any particular species of shellfish. They 
are both 'text'; that is, coda, form and sign, sequence, pattern, repetition and difference. 
Bonnett describes Anthony Giddens work as an amalgam of Rorty and Derrida all of 
whom mount "ontological attacks on our intuitive sense of nature as some innocent non- 
,, 345 human realm. Giddens (whom, unlike the other two, really is a postmodemist) claims 
"Nature no longer exists" making the end of history argument that everything is 
ultimately managed as a calculable, potential resource (see 'Giddens and the Third Way' 
in section three of my thesis). Bonnett's rejection of the End of Nature thesis is 
important. However his assumption that Derrida makes the same case is erroneous. 
Dwelling, Authenticity, Aletheia, Being, 
To tie together his thesis, Bonnett's last chapter focuses on Heidegger's concept of 
dwelling. A potential problem is the nationalist, conservative, sedimentation of 
preserving, conserving, safeguarding in the local dwelling place. One of the ways of 
avoiding (rather than ignoring) nationalist politics embedded in Heidegger's philosophy 
is nomadology. A nomadic approach is also in tune with the natural tempo of the seasons, 
the flows, growth and decay of the passing events in the environment. Yet the nomad 
safeguards without being possessive, and it is the social organisation of privatised 
ownership and rights that is much a part of technological enframing as any other principle 
of Liberal modernity. In fact Bonnett's simply rejects the political problematic associated 
with Heidegger 'blut und boden, ' blood and soil, that resides in his concept of 
'dwelling. ' 346 
34' Bonnett, 2003: 601 
346 Bonnett, 2003: 655 
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Bonnett argues that an educational focus brings the question of authenticity to the fore. 
'Intrinsic nature produces particular kinds of knowledge and 'right' relationship that 
should be the "prime goal of environmental education. " Authenticity brings up questions 
about legitimacy, lies, mimicry, and degrees of value. These worries emerge from the 
concept of a stable foundation for truth that hides in the essential 'mystery' of nature. 
The subjectivist discernment of nature as the self-arising is always vulnerable to 
misperception "it can be faked, that what is essentially a matter of optional convention 
can be presented as a matter of irrefutable nature. 047 Bonnett argues that there are 
degrees of naturalness; a harebell is "clearly natural in not bearing the imprint of human 
intention" whereas a plastic cup or an automobile is nature's opposite. However it is the 
simulacra of nature - perhaps regenerated forests - that present "cause for suspicion. " 
These problems (which crop up often in the environmental ethics literature) stem from 
the desire for nature to serve as foundational truth. Heidegger dropped his discussion of 
'authenticity, ' which he always meant in terms of care, having seen the way Sartre tried 
to make it the existential standard in Being and Nothingness (). Bonnett avoids any 
discussion of Heidegger's concept of Being. Yet avoiding Heidegger's key term, the 
conceptual centre of all Heidegger's mature work since 1927 is a failure to engage with 
Heidegger's own rejection of Nature (or biology) as either ontological or epistemological 
'ground' or foundation for truth. That is why Heidegger resorts to the Greek concept of 
aletheia or on-going revealing of Being - which Bonnett has interpreted, in a form that 
slides rather easily into the essential realm, as the mystery of nature. Tied up with the 
problem of authenticity, is that Bonnett, again following the tradition of environmental 
literature over the last 20 years, reverts to the 'intrinsic' nature argument - which 
Heidegger's concept of Being avoids. Heidegger's subject, Dasein cares about Being, 
Being is not mere existence because Dasein cares. Through emotional and intellectual 
comportment Heidegger ties together nature (in the guise of Being) and human society. 
For Heidegger and Bonnett poetry is an ideal means for 'evoking' truth. For Heidegger, 
34' Bonnett, 2003: 692-693 
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the truth is held in the concealment of Being, whereas for Bonnett, truth is 'out there' 348 
in the otherness, the 'inherent mystery and fluid integTity of intrinsic nature. 349 
By recalling the 'intrinsic nature' argument, Bonnett is forced to regard nature as alien or 
'other' from human beings. Otherness implies the Idealist alienation and the nominal 
fallacy that evokes an irreducible chasm between one subjectivity and another, between 
the subject and the object, between humanity and nature. The poststructuralist concept of 
'difference' on the other hand holds within it a greater sense of repetition, that many 
elements are similar, yet what is noticeable is minute aspects of change. Bonnett tries to 
bring 'intrinsic nature' back to Heidegger's philosophical framework by ranking what is 
authentically natural from what is inauthentic, the artificial human artefact. "Ultimately 
in such cases, " Bonnett claims, "we may need to contemplate how a thing sits within our 
form of sensibility in its many modes and nuances, which range from direct sensuous 
contact to science, art and poetry. , 350 
So we can see that although his question is a good one, Bonnett's thesis, to a greater 
extent even than Heidegger, is still constrained by an epistemology that resorts to an 
ultimate foundation for truth; the key characteristic of the Enlightenment. Dwelling 
entails, 
the Heideggerian sense of arisings that gather a neighbourhood; through their inscrutable 
presencing a world of significances is opened up. It follows that if we are to know nature 
so characterised, we must learn to develop the receptive/responsive-that is to say, 
poetic-attitude that itself is a key characteristic of authentic dwelling, a dwelling that is 
in touch with what ultimately sustains it. Thus we were brought up against the issues of 
nature's intrinsic value and of the kinds of knowledge appropriate to the apprehension of 
nature. Both of these constitute central elements in that 'right' relationship with nature 
that I have argued to be the prime goal of environmental education. "' 
Bonnett dwells comfortably within Heidegger's philosophical rubric, not pushing at the 
internal inconsistencies or the limits of Heidegger's thought. There is an important regard 
in which Bonnett exceeds Heidegger's philosophy: the recognition of the 'other. ' Despite 
his ethos of 'care' in the authentic relation between Dasein and Being, Heidegger rarely, 
if ever, mentioned any commitment to social relations; loving they neighbour, 
34' Bonnett, 2003: 598 
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respectfulness, equality or even hierarchy. In respect to education, Heidegger focuses on 
leadership, knowledge (rather than skills) and philosophical enquiry. Bonnett develops 
his ethics of environmental education in reference to authentic respect and a critique of 
the Neoliberal colonisation of the concept of sustainability. 
ontologically, human consciousness is neither the author of things, nor a contingent 
spectator, but the 'occasioner' of things - it is the space (world) where meaning and value 
is discerned, there being no significant things without consciousness and no 
consciousness without things... It is through such a disposition that we may truly come 
home. Recognition of the respectful, other-sensitive, receptive responsive or 'poetic' 
thinking that this involves-and that is expressed as much in making as in perceiving- 
leads to interpreting sustainability as both necessary to authentic human being and as 
eschewing the overweening instrumentalism and mastery tacit in policies of sustainable 
development, such motives constituting the currently dominant metaphysics that has 
brought us to our present environmental situation of alienation and irresponsible 
dependence. "' 
Bonnett's critique of the discourse of sustainability is powerful. In derives, subtly, not from a 
suspicious of metanarratives but rather from the desire to generate a renewal of metaphysics. In many 
ways this is just a question of semantics, but as I clarified above, it does have some interesting 
philosophical implications. 
For Heidegger the core philosophical question is the ontological difference between Being and beings, 
which harks back to Aristotle's concept of the One and the many. Heidegger highlights the problem of 
Idealist subjectivism, that draws such a harsh separation between the subject and the object and the 
problem of nominal representation. This has implications of the Cartesian emphasis on rationality and 
categorisation. Bonnett makes a strong case, based on this Heidegger critique of modernity, for 
reinvigorating a concept of the 'mystery' of nature as the 'self-arising' and an eco-poetics as a 
legitimate form of knowledge that might form the basis of political, social and educational 
organisation. 
Derrida mounts a strong critique to some fundamental elements in Heidegger's philosophical 
framework. Differance defers to the not-present, the text always exceeds itself and defers to 
contextual, political struggles that impact on the meanings of words both at the point of writing and 
the point of reading. There is no extra-text; ontology is epistemological, epistemology is ontological. 
352 Bonnett, 2003: 693 
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The question of an ethics of nature, an ecology of relations, and the implications for education are 
reinvigorated by Derrida and Bakhtin by opening up the struggle of heteroglossia in a similar way to 
the way Being comes to light within the enframing 'world' of a given historical epoch. Both sets of 
philosophy: Heidegger and Poststructuralism, recognise the inevitable struggle that Heraclitus 
mentions, in drawing distinctions, in recognising the difference, or 'Otherness' of nature, as much as 
persons. 
Notwithstanding our differences in opinion about the status of truth in regards nature and the 
environment, Bonnett has announced a brave program of change by challenging the normative 
standards that prevail in a conservative and Neoliberal era. He is prepared to be 'politically 
uncongenial' in his approach and I find his advice on environmental education highly commendable. 
Environmental Education 
Bonnett makes the case that the liberal-rationalist paradigm dominates contemporary politics, 
education, and philosophy and that it needs re-examining at the metaphysical level. He says, "the 
political consequences of certain interpretations of our environmental problems are highly 
uncongenial to consumerist market orientated economies and on these views their long term resolution 
,, 353 will require a radical overhaul of such systems. 
Bonnett argues that conventional education as we know it operates in the paradigm of rationality, 
observation and categorisation. He indicates how the European Environmental School's initiative 
adheres to the liberal rational model by privileging economics, and individual production and 
consumption as the key goals that are embedded in terms like 'sustainability. ' Sustainability 
"presumes to predict and to control the self-arising', 354 He writes that the 
inherent mystery and fluid integrity of nature conceived as self-arising - the world of open, infinitely 
faceted 'things' - is not susceptible to an engagement that is preoccupied with intellectual (and other) 
possession and that is articulated exclusively through systematised conceptual schemes. 355 
Like myself, Bormett advocates learning across the curriculum, especially "geography, science, 
personal, social and health education, and citizenship. " In some respects a fairly traditional education 
system is what we each have in mind. But I agree with Bonnett completely when he argues that the 
353 Bonnett, 2003: 552 
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radical shift in philosophical premises also results in a new set of prerogatives in social organisation, 
governance, and education. 
Thus the possibility of education for sustainable development seen from this perspective involves a 
radical interpretation of the notion that retrieves non-instrumental conceptions of development and 
human flourishing and that, at the same time, recognises the special place that humankind has in the 
cosmos. While drawing on strands of thought central to the Western tradition, it clearly runs counter to 
many motives and values that are currently ascendant in Western society, and is therefore likely to be 
viewed as politically uncongenial. "' 
Bonnet has written a really exemplary account of environment, Heidegger's philosophy and 
education. Yet Bonnett remains trapped within the threshold of Heidegger's onto-theo-logical rubric, 
part of the western tradition of philosophical metaphysics. Heidegger is vitally important because he 
marks a 'beginning, ' or at least the intimations of the beginning of the scope required with his 
question "What is Being? " The metaphysical remains within the scope of the question, so put, in the 
tenninology of 'Being' and the hermeneutical tightening of language to the Greek etiological and 
grammatical origins from whence the nominalist fallacy emerged. These problems are examined more 
closely in the following section on Heidegger. 
In the next few chapters in my section on Heidegger I examine how Heidegger developed his critique, 
the complications of his politics, the inherently conservative aspects of nostalgic homeliness and, 
having begun to frame the scope of the necessary questions, how we might redefine Being in more 
ecological terms. It is to a closer examination of Heidegger that we shall now turn. 
356 Bonnett, 2003: 689 
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6 The Romantic Heidegger, Technology, Thinking and Education in 
the Nazi Era 
Heidegger's ideas are proving to be amongst the most interesting in present day 
philosophy of the environment. He describes the scope of the question that we need to 
ask - it is not just an instrumental insertion of 'sustainability' but a renegotiation, a poetic 
awakening, and a fundamental reconceptualisation of the relationship between humanity 
and the environment. Yet it is already apparent to me, that embedded in Heidegger's 
philosophy are some subtle flaws that constitute a symbiosis with the terror of Fascism 
and fail to relinquish us from the modem paradigm of technological enframing. A close, 
and critical examination of Heidegger's philosophy, historical context and influences will 
put environmental philosophers of education in a better position to understand the crucial 
elements of his philosophy, to rework the conservative, static problems that reside in the 
metaphysics, epistemology and ontology that recur throughout the centuries of theology 
and philosophy. 
The ideas and politics that imbue our times shape our expectations, the focus of our 
endeavour and actions, and the horizon of our thinking in the most thoroughgoing and 
mundane ways. It was turbulent times in the early half of the 20 th century in Germany 
when Heidegger began his career and people coped in a variety of ways. In this chapter 
we will look more directly at Heidegger's politics and ideas, and his intellectual milieu, 
particularly in the early 1930s during the interwar period. 
There is a continuity from the Romantic period when modem technology was beginning 
to emerge and, along with industrialism, the French Revolution introduced western 
Enlightenment thinking to democracy in its first fully fledged form. The Gestell, or 
enframing of modernity, industrial technology and individual rationality, have shaped 
western, and increasingly, global society, up to the terrible events that are happening in 
Iraq at present. Heidegger attempts to reconceptualise modemity, arguing that Plato is the 
'culmination of the beginning' of philosophy, and that Nietzsche is the final member of 
the long line of philosophers of modernity. He has been able to throw up some ideas that 
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exceed the philosophical emphasis on individuality, the separation of the subject from the 
object, the possibilities of and constraints of language, and the alienation of nature by 
technological enframing. But Heidegger's thought is complicated by his connection with 
the terror of the Nazis during the 1930s in Germany. To what extent he managed to think 
his way beyond the structures of modernity is highly controversial and contested. Yet 
since Romantic poets like Wordsworth and Hblderlin, Heidegger is one of the few 
philosophers to really engage with the scope of the problem of the relationship between 
humanity and nature, from early Greek thinking, to present day technology and the social 
organisation of modernity. His philosophy and his life story also throws some light on the 
politics of globalisation and the terrorism being unleashed as North American and British 
Christians and Middle East Muslims battle over correctitude and control of Oil and 
sovereignty. 
From his earliest writing, Heidegger found the historicity of thinking important. At his 
most acute, he points out the hidden conditions that determine the thinking that is 
possible within a particular epoch. Within a specific epoch the 'concealed' aspects of 
Being constrains thinking. In relation to Descartes, for example, Heidegger argues that 
his own position as an 'outsider' rather than someone imbued in the socio-historic 
context can be a better position to ascertain Descartes' 'true' meaning behind the text. 357 
In the early 193 Os, just two or three years after his spring to fame with the publication of 
his first book Being and Time, Heidegger was flying high and his confidence in his 
philosophy and ability leapt ahead of the practical conditions of Germany's attempt to 
create a Third Reich. In 'Facts and Thoughts' (1945) Heidegger wrote, "At the time I saw 
in the movement that had come to power the possibility of an inner self-collection of the 
Volk, and a path towards the discovery of its historical-westem destiny. 058 
Despite his hermeneutical claims that being on the 'outside' lends him privileged access 
to interpreting the 'truth' of earlier writing, Heidegger also privileges the German 
language as the only language capable of returning thinking to the Greek origin and 
therefore the only possibility of a new beginning and a new pathway. His experience 
357 Irwin, 2000: chapter 4 
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during and after the war shook his self assurance and revealed the risks of thinking. But 
he never abandoned the patriotism of his hermeneutics. 
During the 1930s Heidegger tried to engage German society in this holy endeavour to 
care and think about the relation of beings to Being. He never advocates the giving over 
of the destiny of Being to fate. The role of Dasein is to wrest the truth of Being from its 
concealment. This requires agency of a kind, and it was this care towards Being that 
guided his engagement with thinking, politics and the governance of education. By the 
end of the Second World War, he became acutely aware of his own provisional role in 
thinking, on which he wrote a number of books. 
For good reason, Heidegger has been described as one of the 'master thinkers' of 
contemporary theory in the humanities and social sciences. It is the depth and quality of 
his thinking that gives him such authoritative status and calls the attention of those 
writers interested in reconc eptuali sing society. However, many writers after World War 
Two obscured his influence by forgetting to reference him. There has also been a great 
deal of unease, sometimes published, about his affiliations with the Nazis before and 
during the war. In the 1980s this became a flood of publications as the status of 
Heidegger's theory vis a vis his politics and life was widely contested. Heidegger's 
theory deals with the major issues of contemporary society; technology and its impact on 
the relationship between humanity and the environment. He is one of the most exacting 
and profound writers of the 20th century. As the humanities and social sciences seek 
6answersý or paths through the complexities and decadent over-consumption of modem 
(or post-modem) life, Heidegger is clearly someone, who has we might say, prepared the 
ground for seeking alternative thinking and modes of being. As one of the best exemplars 
of western thought, his association with Fascism highlights in the simplest way, the 
failure of the west to be able to extricate itself, at least initially, from the metaphysical 
nihilism he so strongly wanted to leave behind. 
Of necessity, Heidegger uses the common philosophical language, including all its 
traditional metaphysical resonance, such as essence, Being, existence, etc. It is impossible 
to redefine all terms in detail (although he certainly invented a few! ) but his frustration at 
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the inadequacies of metaphysics is palpable at times, especially in A Letter on 
Humanism. 359 So he attempts to 'torque' the meanings of words by making them strange. 
He emphasizes the verbal, active qualities of prefixes and makes alliterations and 
linguistic connections to older meanings contained within terms. He uses etymology as a 
methodological device in such a way that it pinpoints meaning rather than loosening it. 
Language in Heidegger's hands becomes a convergent rather than divergent field. 
Questions hold within themselves the intimation of an 'answer. ' Thus, Heidegger's 
emphasis on the question (concerning technology, or thinking, or the sway of Being) 
implants, 'prethinkingly, ' the seeds from which the response must grow. The question 
stakes out the parameters of the field of enquiry. Heidegger himself was aware of this. As 
he wrote in the 1933 Rectoral address, 
Questioning will then no longer be simply the preliminary stage to the answer as 
knowledge, a stage that we can put behind us, but questioning will itself become the 
highest forin of knowledge. Questioning will then unfold its ownmost power for 
disclosing the essence of all things. Then questioning will compel us to simplify our gaze 360 
to the extreme in order to focus on what is inescapable. 
In Western democratic societies, independent 'critical thinking' is the fundamental 
justification for the necessity of enquiry and thinking. Autonomous thinking is vital in 
democratic decision making. For Heidegger, the relationship between the Volk and the 
state was not individually atomised, and so voting was not the guiding stratagem behind 
educating students to think. He perceived thinking as a spiritual pursuit that seeks the 
essence of the relationship between humanity and Being. The clearing is an aspect of 
Being within which human being dwells. It is the difference between beings and Being 
that ek-statically attends to thinking. 36 1 His thinking about political practises was vague 
and badly formed. He rejected modem Liberalism without fully formulating any viable 
alternative. In the early 1930s Heidegger's writing intimates the tendency to subtly 
Romanticise Fascism and violence as 'the Volk. ' 
And the spiritual world of a Volk is not its cultural superstructure, just as little as it is its 
arsenal of useful knowledge (Kentnisse) and values; rather It is the power that comes 
from preserving at the most profound level the forces that are rooted in the soil and blood 
359 Heidegger, 1949 
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of a Volk, the power to arouse most inwardly and to shake most extensively the Volk's 
existence. A spiritual world alone will guarantee our Volk greatness. For it will make the 
constant decision between the will to greatness and the toleration of the decline the law 
that establishes the pace for the march upon which our Volk has embarked on the way to 
its future history. 362 
The Gennan concept of the 'people' or Volk is very different from the aggregate of 
individuals necessary to democracy. The role of thinking and of knowledge is intimately 
connected to the stratagems of social organisation and coherence. The educative 
endeavour is political at its foundation. To clarify matters by seeking an educative origin 
is no easy matter. Inevitably there is a confusion of influences in historic sources. 
Widespread education emerged with industrialisation, and Enlightenment thinking came 
about during the same period. The close connection between education and the needs of 
the workforce are often assumed in the language and policy of Neoliberalism. Often too, 
education is held responsible for encouraging docile or disciplined behaviour in society. 
It occupies teenage time during this epoch of underemployment, thereby minimising the 
boredom and anomie of disillusioned vagrancy, opportunist theft and vandalism. More 
often than not, research is situated in educational institutions, although increasingly it is 
closely connected with the immediate needs of industry. These types of research are 
predominantly limited to a positivist range of enquiry and typifies what Heidegger 
(following Ringer) calls the total mobilisation of technology. Under this kind of regime 
education is no longer associated with original thinking. Heidegger's philosophy and his 
brief overt political engagement focus on these educative issues about the nature of 
knowledge. During 1933, because of Hitler's rise to power, the previous Jewish Rector 
had to resign and Heidegger was persuaded to become Rector of Freiburg University. 
During his short spell as Rector, he tried to reorganise the Faculties and disciplines in 
terms of a cohesive desire for knowledge, rather than the overproduction of information 
and skills. He tried to reconstitute the role of the university in regard to the State. 
Heidegger was badly burnt by his involvement with the Nazis, both professionally and 
personally. Many of his best students and some of his most important professors and 
oldest ffiends found it difficult to maintain good relations with him after he openly 
362 Heidegger cited in Wolin, 1993: 33-34 
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became a member of the National Socialist Party in 1933. He is still regarded with huge 
suspicion by many people, and most of these personal relationships never recovered. 
Heidegger began lecturing at the University of Freiburg in 1915. Before having published 
anything of significance, in 1923 he was given a permanent position at Marburg 
University on the strength of the lectures he was giving on modem philosophy, literature, 
poetry, Bach Beethoven, Rilke, and Thomas Mann. He published his first book, Being 
and Time in 1927. Two years later he was elected to his erstwhile mentor's job, as 
Husserl's successor as Professor back at Freiburg University. Although he never sought 
the post, as a well liked and 'fair' replacement for the existing Jewish Rector whom the 
Nazis forced to resign, Heidegger was elected Rector of Freiburg University in 1933. He 
never spoke to Husserl again. He resigned from being Rector early in 1934. 
Heidegger's active promotion of National Socialism was predominantly limited to 1933, 
although after this, he did not or could not disassociate himself from a being a part of 
their propaganda machine. L6with, his Jewish, former student recounts, for example, that 
in 1936 he wore a swastika pin while visiting him during a trip to Italy. 363 There are 
significant items of evidence countering the 'official story' he promoted after 1945. At 
the very least letters and documents indicate that on an opportunist basis during the 1920s 
and 1930s Heidegger sometimes indulged in racist comments designed to cast suspicion 
on students or colleagues in a professional capacity. But this opportunism, while making 
use of the tone of the times, was not aimed at biological eugenic purity but rather at his 
notions of intellectual rigor; Heidegger had his own philosophical motives for 
restructuring the university, that assumed that Germany was a crucial locus for changing 
the direction of the historical destiny of the West, and he put to use whatever tools were 
at his disposal. 
The 'official story' of Heidegger's Nazi involvement is that it was a brief, 10 month 
episode and after seeing his error he underwent an 'inner emigration' and increasingly 
363 L6with referred to by Zimmen-nan, 1990: 40. Although the letters Heidegger sent to L6with in 1921 and 
1927 indicate their relationship was full of tension and bitter resentftilness throughout, L6w]tb, 1995: 235- 
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opposed the evils of National Socialism, dissociating himself from 1934.364 As Rector of 
Freiburg his famous inaugural speech was titled "The Self-Assertion of the German 
University" indicating a desire for leadership rather than subjection in relation to the 
political interventions of the Nazi regime. Documents from this time also include many 
speeches and articles in student publications. He refused to fire anti-Nazi lecturers, 
forbade anti-Semitic posters on campus, and finally resigned when he felt political 
interference compromised his position to an intolerable extent. 365 As I will go on to 
outline, this period is subject to highly charged debate. 
In the ensuing years of the Nazi regime, Nazi officials treated Heidegger with increasing 
suspicion. Zimmerman explains "He was subjected to scathing criticism by party 
ideologues, who claimed that his was a kind of 'personal' National Socialism. , 366 
Journals and publishers were secretly instructed not to publish his articles and books. He 
was excluded from German visits to foreign academic conferences, even when 
specifically invited. His classes were watched by the Gestapo. He was not included on 
the list of 500 most 'treasured' scholars and artists. Quite the reverse in fact; in 1944, 
when he was 55 years old, he was designated one of the 'most expendable' professors 
and was sent off to work on the fortifications on the Rhine. When he was finished there 
he started to teach another lecture course on H61derlin but after delivering only two 
lectures he was called up to join the Volkssturm. 367 
Directly after the war, the new Germany also silenced Heidegger. His status was such 
that he was the first Professor to be called in front of the Denazification trials. He found 
the hearings very disturbing and had a nervous breakdown in 1946.368 For five years after 
the war he was given a pension so he could continue his writing but forbidden from 
teaching 'vulnerable' students. But Heidegger was not silent forever. His book What is 
Called Thinking 369 was published in Germany in 1954 but written as the first lecture 
course he was allowed to teach in 1951 and 1952. He quite directly mentions 
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contemporary German circumstances, again in reference to silence: the spirit of his times. 
"What did the Second World War really decide? (We shall not mention here its fearful 
consequences for my country, cut in two. ) This world war has decided nothing. " He goes 
on to readjust the scope of the question - to prethinkingly align the decision as "man's 
essential fate on this earth. " 
(T)he danger is growing again that those matters in this undecided area which are moving 
toward a decision, and which concern world government as a whole -that these matters, 
which now must be decided, will once again be forced into politico-social and moral 
categories that are in all respects too narrow and faint-hearted, and thus will be deprived 
of a possible befitting consideration and reflection. "0 
In 1966, apparently after a long silence and certainly with an absence of public apology 
about his Nazi involvement, he finally gave an interview with Spiegel magazine about his 
philosophy and actions before and during the war, 'Only a god can save us; ' "Nur noch 
ein Gott kann uns retten: Rudolf Augstein in Gesprdch mit Martin Heidegger', 371 to be 
published posthumously. He lived until 1976. His final word indicates the conservative 
and Romantic elements remained hand in hand with his anti-modem radicalism until the 
end. 
Heidegger's Critics 
Much, though not all, of the critique of Heidegger has the privilege of hindsight and tends 
to be astonished at how involved, yet ignorant Heidegger was of the unfolding of the 
horrors of Nazi Germany. Philosophy can speculate but cannot be asked to prophesy 
specific coming events. Philosophy, thinking, and writing is a very reflective exercise, 
usually addressing events and repetitions that have taken place historically in an effort to 
describe trends and uncover commonplace assumptions that create the conditions of 
readiness for a certain scope of future events. But speculation is always just that -a 
limited (if necessary) attempt to bring together events and ideas into themes of 
recurrence. Reflective thinking sets up change in the scope of comprehension and 
awareness but it cannot claim 'accuracy' or definitiveness. Heidegger's experience 
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indicates that philosophy is sorely placed to even posit leadership (including the 
missionary zeal that often drives the desire to teach). 
It has become a methodological common place to situate theorists in terms of their 
cultural context. Somewhat ironically, this owes something to Heidegger's theory of 
hermeneutics. In Heidegger's case, despite being well-known, many post war writers use 
his ideas but distance themselves from his political allegiances during and before World 
War 11 by rarely or never acknowledging their debt to him as an author. More recently, 
there has been a plethora of work on Heidegger and politics which both vilifies him and 
yet acknowledges the importance of his work. This acknowledgement of his importance 
has been partly overt, and partly through the maintenance of so much intense interest. 
The silence has finally broken. 
There is no doubt that the historical context and ideas circulating in Germany that 
produced National Socialism also profoundly shaped and influenced Heidegger. It may 
be an impossible task to make some sort of calculation that separates out the 'evil' Nazi 
strands from the 'good' concepts. Hence, Heidegger's work has been categorised by 
Adorno, 372 Farias, 373 Lyotard, 374 and Bourdieu 375 as inherently fascist. Post-war, Arendt 
fiercely denounced him in writing and then over the years, gradually changed her mind, 
or forgave him about his motives. 376 Derrida regards his thought, in Of Spirit; Heidegger 
and the Question (1989), as part of the history of the West, not dastardly but 
conservative. 377 Young acknowledges Heidegger's Nazism but rejects the charge that his 
theory is inherently, metaphysically fascist. 378 Foucault declared how profoundly he had 
been influenced by Heidegger in his last set of interviews, preferring before then to 
remain silent about his influence. 379 Others ignore his short association with politics and 
simply find him productive. In The Political Ontology ofMartin Heidegger (199 1), 
Bourdieu describes well the confusion his political engagement elicits - 
372 Adomo, 2004 
373 Farias, 1989 
374 Lyotard, 1990 
37' Bourdieu, 1991 
376 Arendt, cf Lang, 1996 377 Demda, 1989 
378 Young, 1997 
379Foucault, 1980 and cited in Dreyfus, 1998a 
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Measured by philosophical standards, his discourse is from beginning to end of a rare 
ambiguity, for it manages to subordinate existential and ontological categories to the 
historical "moment" so that they create the illusion that their philosophical Intentions 
have an a priori applicability to the political situation, as when he relates freedom of 
research to State coercion, and makes "labour service" and "armed service" coincide with 
"knowledge service", so that by the end of the lecture the listener does not know whether 
to turn to read Diels on the "pre-Socratics" or join the S. A. 380 
Which is why Beistegui writes, "Any confrontation with Heidegger's relation to National 
,, 381 Socialism is, at bottom, a confrontation with the thought of Being . As Beistegui puts 
it, Heidegger's political 'misadventure' had nothing to do with his role as professor or 
Rector. It was not his biography, but his thinking. His politics emerged, not "despite his 
thought, but because of it.,, 382 
In Heidegger and the 'Jews " (1990), Lyotard has mounted a sophisticated critique of 
Heidegger around the politics of the voice, and the status, in Heidegger's own theory, of 
forgetting. 383 Heidegger criticises humankind for forgetting the crucial question - the 
question of Being. His entire polemic rests on this concept of forgetting. After the Second 
World War Heidegger wrote on the risks of thinking. Thinking, speaking had become too 
political and difficult for him to fully enunciate his complex relationship with the Nazi 
party before and during the war. Much has been made of Heidegger's 'silence. ' Lyotard 
makes the association between the forgetting of Being and the 'forgetting' of the 
humanity of the Jews incarcerated and gassed in the concentration camps. On the very 
rare occasions when Heidegger did mention the atrocities of the war he related it, 
importantly in some ways, together with atomic bombs and industrialisation to 
technological enframing. For Lyotard this short paragraph just amounts to relegating the 
incredible suffering of real people to those of machines. In general, Heidegger's silence 
on the subject of war crimes is a kind of forgetting which many Germans of his 
generation actively maintained. Lyotard's point is that one of the country's leading 
academics is an exemplar through his teaching, his actions, his politics, even his 
forgetting, silence, and especially his thinking. 
380 Bourdieu, 1991: 5 
38 1 Beistegui, 1998: 5 
382 Beistegul, 1998: 3 
383 Lyotard, 1990 
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Some authors regard the problem as a deep naivety. The project of Being and Time 
(1927) is afundamental ontology which is set up to be prior to politics (and ethics, 
anthropology, physics, psychology, science). Fundamental ontology is the pre-political 
ground of Being. Philosophy prioritises over other fields of enquiry, so Heidegger's 
philosophy is radically apolitical. Heidegger's colleague Jaspers described Heidegger as 
,, 384 "unpolitical by nature. Beistegui wrote 
Because of his philosophical presuppositions, Heidegger was able to see in Nazism a 
historical mission that was never there (a histonco-political response to the essence of our 
time as dominated by planetary technology) and was never able to see, even after the war, 
what was really there (a form of terror and a power of destruction hitherto unknown). "' 
Volk 
Strangely, though Heidegger clearly underestimated the extent of the atrocities of which 
the Nazis were later capable, in the inter-war period his environmental focus on the 
relation between human beings and Being gave him a unique insight into, for want of a 
better phrase, the essence of technology as it has shown up in the modem and post- 
modem epoch. 
During the interwar period, Germany suffered humiliation and financial hardship having 
lost World War One. They owed immense debts for reparation and the economic 
hardship must have been exacerbated by the general economic depression that all the 
countries of the west suffered in the 1930s. 
Despite having lost the war, Germany saw itself as squashed between two polarised 
ideologies that were both intent on dominating the social organisation of the globe. The 
'ideas of 1914' were characterised by a suspicion of Enlightenment, of greedy 
individualism and a waryness of the explosion of industrialised technology. Germany was 
seen as trapped between the twin evils of modem, individualised democracy and 
commercialism in France and Britain and communism in Russia, both of which were 
trying to take over the world. Instead, the v51kisch writers were trying to find a 'Third 
Way' with emphasis on the roots of the Volk in the soil and villages of Germany, the 
384 Jaspers cited in Ott, 1993: 244 385 Beistegui, 1998: 10 
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people as the basic unit of society (rather than the individual-and-his-family) and the 
immanent identity of the Volk with the nation State. They respected German 'Kultul- Y as 
opposed to Enlightenment Zivilisation. The key terms of Kultur were; community, blood, 
will, self, creativity, craft, strength, race: and Zivilisation; reason, intellect, 
internationalism, materialism, finance. Communism was regarded as total technological 
order, which meant virtual slavery. Heidegger commented that communism and 
democracy involved - "the same dreary technological frenzy, the same unrestricted 
organisation of the average man. " His aversion to modernism was totally consistent with 
Nazi propaganda. 386 
Germany was trying to create a Third Way that was neither communist nor democratic. 
Individual and institutions ought to subsume themselves in the needs of the Volk. Young 
explains this very well. "In v61kisch thinking, the state, when legitimately constituted, 
exists as the vehicle and outward expression of the Volk. A v61kisch thinker would, thus, 
in Hegelian terms, expect the laws of a state to correspond to the 'ethos' of a community. 
The state is, therefore, not an artefact, not the product of human creative activity. In that 
,, 387 sense it is a natural entity. 
National Socialism was strictly hierarchical, and not at all egalitarian in its organisation. 
Young writes that the individual was expected to serve the state and re ect egotistic self- 
serving pleasure. 388 National Socialism was idealistic rather than materialistic. They 
rejected Marx's analysis of the inevitable class war and believed that under National 
Socialism, different forms of labour could harmoniously, indeed, interdependently co- 
exist. They also rejected Marxist internationalism. The root of conflict was between 
nations, not between classes. Hitler was presumably aiming to rebuild the Reich that 
would ultimately have enlarged the economy to transnational proportions but only as long 
as all these nations were directed by the Fiihrer. 
The v6lkisch aim was German co-operation not British greedy individualism: the 
unification of the nation in 'national socialism. ' Heidegger's thinking easily slid towards 
386 Zimmerman, 1990: 42 
387 Young, 1997: 20 
388 Young, 1997: 24 
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Fascism at this point. The people, he wrote, "should submerge their identity within the 
unity of the v6lkisch state, taking as their sole purpose the promotion of the interest of the 
Volk as such. ý, 389 
In its early phases, v61kisch ideas were characterised by a Romanticisation of village life 
and a rejection of the industrialised and urban ways of the city. These ideas were 
transformed unevenly by the Nazis. At first the ideas of the Volk held together a blend of 
people from a wide spectrum of political affiliations (including many Jews). Some 
authors have coined the terrn 'reactionary modernists' to describe the shift that took place 
within National Socialism from the Luddite views of 1914 to a point where technology 
was utilised to promote Kultur. There is a crucial transition from rejecting technology or 
at least seeing it as a temporary contingency utilized during wartime so that urbanisation 
could be reversed and the rural traditions of the German Volk could be returned. At some 
point this link was broken, and the Nazi's took up technology with a view to its 
permanent place in the German Reich. Hitler was later able to build immense Autobahn 
systems, promote industry, and wield together a war machine that was thoroughly 
technological. This corresponds with the 'turn' in Heidegger's work where he realizes 
that technology is the 'danger' but also 'the saving power. ' 390 
Zimmerman describes reactionary modernism and its v61kisch roots as three inter-related 
elements: 
Firstly, to restore German importance with a suitably German appropriation of modem 
technology and industry. Secondly, to find a 'third way' between the dual evils of 
boundless egoism (the spirit of Manchester) and blind collectivism (godless 
communism). Thirdly, to exchange the Enlightenment calculation of rational 
individualism with the self-sacrificing and danger loving hero. "' 
Germany was aiming to avoid the totalising impetus of communism and democracy and 
set up its own form of social organisation based on the history and identity of the German 
Reich. 
"9 Heidegger in Young, 1997: 23 
390 Young, 1997: 29 "reactionary modernism" posits an 'essence' to Nazism, according to Young. Taken up 
by commentators of Heidegger, such as Thomas Sheehan 1981: 44, and Richard Wolin 1993: 94, and 
Zimmerman, 1990: 29, who all see Heidegger in the early 1930s as a reactionary modernist rather than an 
anti-modemist. 
391 Zimmerman, 1990: 47 
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The roots of Heidegger's anti-modernism reach back to his Catholic education. Martin 
Heidegger was born in a small village in Bavaria called Messkirch in 1889. He was 
brought up Roman Catholic and attended a Catholic Seminary with the view to becoming 
a priest. In 19 10 the Catholic hierarchy declared that every cleric must take an 'oath 
against modernism. ' 
If the Church wants to remain faithful to the treasure of eternal truth it will rightly work 
against the destructive influence of modernism which is not aware of the sharpest of 
oppositions in which the modem view of life stands to the ancient wisdom of the 
Christian tradition. 392 
These anti-modem tendencies first emerge in his earliest published articles in Catholic 
journals while he was a theology student. In 1910 he wrote a review of F. W Foerster's 
Autoritdt und Freiheit (Authority and Freedom) in which he warns Foerster had not 
defended the traditional sufficiently from the 'treacherous appearance' (trfigerischer 
Schein) of the modem spirit. ' 393 Clearly the Catholic antagonism to modernity (evolution, 
freedom and secularism) had a lasting influence on Heidegger's thinking. 
Heidegger maintained a close relationship to his family and the Bavarian Alps where he 
had grown up, throughout his life. His brother fanned in the district, and Heidegger had a 
simple hut near a village high in the mountains where he and his wife spent a great deal 
of time. Stefan Schiminski wrote of meeting him in this hut after the War. "When he 
emerged from the small skiing hut, high up in the mountains, to greet me, he was dressed 
in the costume of a Schwabian peasant, a dress he often also used to wear when he was 
Rector of Freiburg University. His heavy, squarish skiing boots (it was summer) 
emphasized still more strongly his relationship to the Soil. 5. )394 He rarely travelled. On 
several occasions he was offered a Chair at the University of Berlin but he refused to 
leave Freiburg. 
According to Zimmerman, Heidegger commended comments made by Novalis about the 
profound implications of homesickness. in Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, The 
392 Catholic Church quoted by Ott, 1993 393 Ott, 1993 
394 Schimanski, cited in Heidegger, 1949: 9. 
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Groundwork ofMetaphysics, (1929/30) he wrote, "philosophy is authentic homesickness 
(Heimweh), a drive at all times to be at home... " going on to say, 
A remarkable definition, naturally Romantic. Homesickness - is there still something like 
this in general today? Has it not become an incomprehensible word, even in everyday 
life? For has not the contemporary urban man and ape of civilisation long since abolished 
homesickness? And (to think of) homesickness as the absolute determination of 
philosophy! '9' 
He had already analysed 'boredom' as the basic mood (Stimmung) of modernity in Being 
and Time (1927). He associated boredom with nihilism because it obscures the enquiry 
into the nature of Being. It is a turning away from thinking. In The Groundwork of 
Metaphysics, he made the association between boredom and homesickness. 
This deep boredom is the basic mood ... If (time) becomes long for us, we drive it and this boring-character (Langwerden) away! We want to have no long time and yet also 
have it. Boredom, long time (Langeweile, lange Zeit) - in Alemannian linguistic usage 
especially - 'to have a long time' means, not accidentally, much the same as "to have 
homesickness. "' 
Boredom is not incidental or of passing relevance. It changes the essential characteristics 
of subjectivity: "Es ist einem langweilig - it is for one, boring. " Compete indifference 
transforms Dasein into some(one) impersonal. 
Have we become for ourselves so devoid of meaning (unbedeutend) that we need a role? 
Why do we find for ourselves no meaning, i. e., no more essential possibility of being? ... But who want us to speak thus, where world-commerce, technology, the economy seizes 
man and keeps him moving? ... Is it in the end with us thus, that a 
deep boredom draws 
tfi in and out in the abysses ofDasein like a silen og? 
397 
Living dangerously is to escape the boredom of the technological economics of 
calculation and control. Through danger the subject surrenders to the higher power 
working through them; it is the self-abandonment of the disclosure; freedom as the 
affirmation of necessity; the Blick of destiny; authenticity. 
The philosophical notion of danger and struggle met with support in Ringer's writings 
about the soldier and the sublime nature of war. In the volatile days of the 1930s macho 
talk was on many people's lips. Heidegger's rhetoric supported discourses of war. He 
395 Heidegger, GA, 29/30: 7 cited in Zimmerman, 1990: 23 396 Heidegger, GA, 29/30: 120 cited in Zimmennan, 1990: 31 
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believed in making a decision and had a high regard for his own role in promoting the 
course of the leaders and the people. His anti-urban tendencies concurred with Nazi 
rhetoric and justified the expansion of German boundaries in order to resettle the city 
dwellers back on the land. 
The Influence of Spengler and Ainger 
Two of Heidegger's contemporaries were important influences on both his philosophy 
and his politics. All three of them were in turn influenced by a similar intellectual 
mixture, including Darwin, Fiche, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. I owe my analysis of the 
importance of Spengler and Ringer to the detailed examination of their works in 
Zimmerman. 398 Heidegger was in an interesting position in regards to Nazi propaganda 
and theory. He does not appear to be racist and consistently criticised theorists such as 
Spengler and Ringer for reducing their analysis of humanity to questions of biology. He 
was anxious about the impact of technology, the disintegration of traditional German 
culture and he was anti the individualism inherent in modernity, at the expense of the 
Volk. 
In The Decline of the West (1918,1922) and Man and Technics (193 1), Oswald Spengler 
wrote that Europeans are degenerate and thus enslaved to technology that has sprung out 
of control. He considered that biologically produced 'morphological types' struggle to 
impose their will and control the world through technology. 
Heidegger was interested in the analysis of technology and nihilism, but rejected 
Spengler's metaphysics. Heidegger argued that the biological or racial analysis of 
mankind is based on a misguided metaphysical conception of man as the rational animal. 
Heidegger's concept of subjectivity is the antithesis of a biological or racial subject. He 
had put forth his concept of Dasein in his first book Being and Time as early as 1927. 
Heidegger regarded biological notions of humanity as quasi-scientific theory that is based 
on misguided Darwinism. He argued that the biology of the subject is tied to reductionist 
assumptions based on the Enlightenment belief in the rationality of all knowledge and is 
therefore bound by a narrow focus on calculus that can never ascertain the truth of Being. 
398 Zimmen-nan, 1990: 18-65 
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The Enlightenment of Britain and France portrayed themselves as the new self-assertion 
of human reason and freedom. Heidegger was critical of modernity for its idealism and 
nihilism. He regarded it not as free but mathematical. The calculus of rational science 
imposes and fixes universal value judgements over every thing. 
Spengler argued that man turns nature into a stockpile of raw materials. With remarkable 
foresight, he noticed that climate warming would result from things like the 
transformation of great forests into newsprint. In Man and Technics Spengler wrote, 
All things organic are dying in the grip of the vice of organisation. An artificial world is 
permeating and poisoning the natural. The civilisation itself has become a machine that 
does, or tries to do, everything in mechanical fashion. We think only in horsepower now; 
we cannot look at a waterfall without mentally turning it into electric power. "9 
Spengler made an important reversal that was also followed by Heidegger - that 
humanity was not the locus of control in the invention and utilisation of technology. 
Spengler wrote, "the master of the world becomes the slave of machine. It compels him, 
us, and indeed all without exception, in the direction of its course, whether we know and 
want it, or not. 
400 
Zimmerman draws attention to the direct parallel with the example in Heidegger's 
important essay "On the Question Concerning Technology. " 
The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine ... 
In the context of the 
interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the 
Rhine itself appears as something at our command... What the river is now, namely, a 
water power supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power station... But, it will 
be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is it not? Perhaps. But how? In no 
other way than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the 
vacation industry. 401 
Heidegger developed his theory of the enframing of technology on precisely the same 
examples of the hydro-electric dam on the Rhine. The important change from the water- 
wheel to the hydro dam is that the earlier activates power with the rhythm of the river, 
grinding wheat into flour when the crop and the force of the water are both optimum. The 
399 Spengler, 1931: 94 cited in Bourdieu, 1991: 16 and paraphrased in Zimmen-nan, 1990: 28 
400 Spengler, 1932: 75 cited in Zimmerman, 1990: 28 
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latter stores the potential force of the river and expends it when it is consumable. This 
creates the illusion that humanity has increased its control in the war against nature. 
This technological change from the natural rhythm to a challenge and storage of 
everything as potential resource also profoundly alters the human mode of existing: to 
ourselves, to one another, and in relation to the environment. During the gradual rise of 
modernity there has developed an emphasis on the individual subject as the centre of 
interpretation and the source of truth. But Heidegger contends that 'subjective' 
interpretation is illusory within the overarching context or Gestell that everything is 
calculated in terms of present or future use-value - 'standing reserve. ' Technology not 
only characterises all beings as resource but both reaffirms the traditional notion of 
humanity as the solipsist master and yet inverts that solipsism from a free and creative 
nominalist relation to a proud, if anonymous calculating machine. 
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does so, 
rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing 
but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous 
fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing- 
reserve. Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so threatened exalts himself to the posture 
of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man 
encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. 402 
At the point where humanity is an object amongst objects, having forgotten the art of 
self-reflection in the enthusiasm and commitment to calculus and rationality, the 
technological Gestell is at its peak. At this point of sheer objectification, humanity 
exacerbates the illusion that we are the locus of control. The enframing of technology 
exposes the loss of status of humankind as a meaning-maker and then, in the same 
moment, obscures the truth of nihilism by an immodest 'posture' of mastery. This very 
significant understanding of the combined affects of Idealist solipsism and technology on 
modem culture is crucial to my reading of environmental philosophy, education, and the 
processes of global capitalism. 
The other important influence on Heidegger's work in the 1920s and 30s was Ernst 
Ringer. They remained correspondents throughout their lives. Unlike Spengler's 
402 Heidegger, 1977: 26-27 
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despondent determinism, Ringer was more inclined to refract technology "though the 
prism of literary- aesthetic categories. " Ringer was a veteran of World War One5 had 
spent a great deal of time on the front and personally fitted the 'heroic' model. He took 
the Nietzschean stance that, as there is no going back, all events in life must be 
6 swallowed' and affirmed. He willed war as a way of coping with it. 
Wolin makes clear that Ringer played a vital role in the shift between the 'idealized, pre- 
capitalist' ideas that were circulating before World War One, and the 'conservative 
revolutionary' ideas of the 1930s that promoted a Kultur community that restored 
German values whilst meeting the demands of industrialisation. Janger saw the 
4masculine warrior virtues' as a counter force to the "effete, decadent, and materialistic 
bourgeois Zivilisation , 403 
Heidegger read both the article "Total Mobilisation" published in an edited collection 
titled Krieg und Krieger (War and Warrior) in 1930 and the book Der Arbeiter (The 
Worker) published in 1932. The pair carried on an intellectual conversation 'Over the 
line' for many decades. 404 Zimmerman describes eloquently the thesis of The Worker; 
"Ringer portrayed the titanic process of modem technology as aesthetic phenomenon, as 
a terrifying but sublime spectacle that was 'beyond good and evil. ,, 405 Ringer interprets 
war as a technological form of the sublime that profoundly alters the soldiers' attitude 
towards death. 
One begins to acquire a disposition for higher temperatures, the icy geometry of light, 
and the white glare of superheated metals. The environment becomes more constructive 
and more dangerous, colder and more luminous; there disappear from it the last remains 
of Gemfitlichkeit (comfort)... One avoids secondary goals such as taste; one elevates the 
formulation of technical questions to the decisive position; and one does well thereby, 
since more than the technological is concealed behind these questions. 406 
Walter Benjamin criticised Ringer for imposing wholesale the Romantic 'art for art's 
sake' argument on the business of war. Benjamin's contemporaneous review is explicitly 
403 Wolin, 1993: 119 
404 Heidegger, Ringer correspondence, cf Heidegger, 1999. 405 Zimmerman, 1990: 46 
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titled "Theories of German Fascism. 53407 In "Total Mobilisation" Ringer argues that there 
was no longer a difference between war and peace. 
In feudal times, armies were expensive enterprises that were called up occasionally. In 
the shift towards industrialisation, standing armies are waiting in constant reserve. All 
sectors of society would be 'integrated' into the mobilisation when the call was made. 
Ringer described total mobilisation "where no fixed budget is enough; taxation on every 
transaction, where every effort of each member of the populace is focused on the war 
effort be it sewing, sowing or shooting. 408 In other words, in the technological era, every 
thing and every one is potential resource including the circulation of effort, service, 
goods and currency. The shift to total mobilisation is integral to the modem war machine. 
He wrote, 
In this unlimited marshalling of potential energies, which transforms the warring 
industrial countries into volcanic forges, we perhaps find the most striking sign of the 
dawn of the age of labor (Arbeitszeitalter). 409 
Ringer regarded Nietzsche's theory of the will to power in these very determining warlike 
terms. The realisation of the task of total mobilisation "an act which, as if through a 
single grasp of the control panel, conveys the extensively branched and densely veined 
power supply of modem life towards the great current of martial energy. , 410 
Heidegger's reading was not unreservedly affirmative. He agreed with Ringer's analysis 
of total mobilisation as the 'destiny of the west, ' but was scathing of some of Ringer's 
other ideas, including his reliance on Nietzsche's concept of Will, as a metaphysical 
construct. Heidegger wrote about the biological misinterpretation of the Will extensively 
in his lectures on Nietzsche in the late 1930s. He regarded both technology and art as 
ways of disclosing the Being of entities. Neither can be merely pragmatic or purposive. 
Disclosure of Being is driven by the Will to Will, ever expanding as a network of energy 
and knock on effects. 411 
407 Wolin, 1993: 122 
408 Ringer cited in Zimmerman, 1990: 125 409 Ringer cited in Zimmerman, 1990: 126 410 Ringer cited in Zimmen-nan, 1990: 126 - 127 411 Irwin, 2000 
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Heidegger understood total mobilisation as the Volk being gripped by the technological 
Gestalt. Humanity overlooks the originary event, (Anfang), the ontological movement' of 
"jointing and fateful dispensing" (Ffigung und Schickung) of the destiny of Being. 412 He 
disagreed with Ringer's Nietzschean interpretation of Gestalt. Jilnger assumed it is 
humanity that 'stamps' meaning on an unformed existence, in other words, that humanity 
has the agency to 'decide' and shape the environment's meaning in terms of 'work. ' 
Heidegger wrote a letter to Ringer in 1955 saying "You also think of the relationship of 
Gestalt to that which it 'forms' as the relationship of stamp and impression (Stempel und 
Prdgung). To be sure, you understand the stamping in the modem sense as bestowing 
, 413 4meaning' on the meaning-less. Gestalt is the 'source of meaning bestowing... 
Heidegger understood Gestalt in a more deterministic manner as the final phase of the 
historical trajectory of western metaphysics that produces technological humanity as 
orientated by continuous production as standing reserve. For Heidegger, the ontological 
foundation is in the fluid coming-to-presence of Being, and thus shapes the parameters 
(or foundation) of human subjectivity. Human agency is not in control of social 
conventions or the manner in which work shows up. Heidegger's speeches to the students 
reflect the impact of Gestalt on work. 
Zimmerman notes that Ringer's conception of the Will to Power and Gestalten is not so 
easily usurped by Heidegger's schematisation. Heidegger attempted to slot Nietzsche into 
his history of Being unsuccessfully. Ringer's theory rests explicitly on Nietzsche's on 
these points. The Will to Power is not a 'cause' and Ringer's Gestalt is the way in which 
both work and humanity shows up in the modem period. Nietzsche's Will to Power is 
influential on Heidegger's theory of physis, or the dynamism of Being, although he 
would never acknowledge this, and indeed attempts to subsume and finally make 
unrecognisable, Nietzsche's insights. 414 
Facing up to the fact that entities are involves risk because it calls into question the 
Idealist basis of the previous way of understanding and constructing the world. 
Acknowledging and letting things simply 'be' risks a new way of comprehending, and 
412 Zimmerman, 1990: 80 
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generates a new path, or series in an altogether alternative direction. The dynamic of 
physis is a movement that tends to reverberate with the individual actions of each agent, 
and reinforces and enlarges the tendency that was already emerging. Like a frequency, or 
a wave physis resonates in a series. The ocean has waves, swells and tides that might all 
be heading in different directions, echoing at different rates and crossing over and under 
one another all the time. There is no one telos to the becoming of Being. Wind, 
evaporation, stillness, rain, gravity, the moon; all these things, along with the 
reinforcement or dissipation of underlying swells impact on the pattern of the waves, 
wiping them off the ocean's surface, or turning them into greater and more energetic 
breakers. Paradoxically, the exuberance of things simply being reminds us that there is no 
fundamental ground. 
Most men avert their gaze from the overpowering presencing of things, which reminds 
them of their own ultimate groundlessness, and which also threatens constantly to 
overturn every historical project of community. Preferring security to the courageous 
venture with truth, most people focus on how to gain some control over entities that 
appear within the given historical world. "' 
Whereas Heidegger brings forth the optimistic dispensation of Providence, of 'Rigung, 
and destiny in relation to the Gestalt, or shape of things, Janger has a more fatalist view 
of the enframing of technology. He regards total mobilisation of the technological war 
machine as beyond good and evil, as a totalising force that we must 'swallow' in order to 
preserve the illusion of our own potent agency and meaning. 
It goes against the grain of the heroic spirit to seek out the image of war in a source that 
can be detennined by human action. Still the multitudinous transformations and disguises 
which the pure form (Gestalt) of war endures amid the vicissitudes of human time and 
space offers this spirit a gripping spectacle to behold. 416 
War is like a volcano; Ringer writes "at the point where authentic passion breaks through 
- above all, in the naked and immediate struggle for life and death - 
it becomes a matter 
of secondary importance in which century, for what ideas, and with what weapons the 
battle is being fought. 417 
415 Zimmerrnan, 1990: 83 
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Leadership and a 'New Beginning-' 
Heidegger believed Germany was the 'centre, ' from which the 'decision' would emanate, 
to wrest a new spiritual epoch from the threat of annihilation. "We are certain of this 
vocation, but our people will be able to wrest a destiny from it only if within itseýf it 
creates a resonance (Widerhalo, a possibility of response for this vocation, and grasps its 
tradition creatively. " The destiny wrenching of the people required a leader. An authentic 
Gemeinschaft, or society, 
stands in the rooted unity of an essential deed. All and everyone, we are those assigned 
by a slogan, followers of a program, but no one is the manager (Verwalter) of the inner 
greatness of Dasein and its necessities. This leaving-empty in the end vibrates in our 
Dasein, its emptiness is the staying away of an essential affliction. The mystery is lacking 
in our Dasein, and thereby stays away the inner terror which every mystery bears within 
itself and which gives to Dasein its greatness. 418 
Much earlier, shortly after the First World War in 1921-22, Heidegger had argued that 
people had to learn to see philosophically "without prophets and Fahrer illusions. " By 
1930 he was calling for a powerful leader, "who would restore the inner greatness of 
Dasein" by renewing the sublime mystery and terror of existence. During his role as 
Rector, he supported Hitler in his speeches to the students, "Not doctrinal propositions 
and 'ideas' are the rule of your being. The Ffihrer himself and only he is the 
contemporary and future German reality and your law. , 419 
After reading Spengler, Ringer, and the famous novelist and poet H61derlin, Heidegger 
began to see technology as the 'danger' and the 'saving power. ' Danger was also 
reinforced by his knowledge of the ancient Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, who saw 
struggle as the dynamic of life, that sets things apart from one another; Aus-ein-ander- 
setzung. Struggle that differentiates elements from the general chaos of existence and 
introduces rank . 
420 According to Heidegger's reading of Heraclitus, hierarchical 
differentiation is part of the dynamic of becoming. Struggle is the dynamo of Being. 
Struggle, Heidegger wrote, "brings about the complete transformation of our German 
Dasein. " In one of his speeches to the students, Heidegger advised, 
418 Zimmerman, 1990: 244. 
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Whoever does not endure the struggle, remains left behind. The new courage must 
accustom itself to steadiness, because the struggle for the educational places of the 
leaders will last a long time. It gets fought ftom the forces of the New Reich, which the 
Volk-Chancellor Hitler will bring to reality. A hard stock (Geschlecht) without the 
thought for itself must be equal to it; this stock lives from constant testing and for the 
goal which it assigns for itself . 
421 
At this point Germany was not at war. Heidegger was advocating an intellectual and 
educational struggle for the "places of the leaders" albeit in militaristic terms. 
In the critical period of 1933-4 when, for the only time, Heidegger had political functions 
and responsibilities, he regarded the reconstitution and protection of authentic thinking 
and knowledge to be in the service of the people (Volk) and destiny. Knowledge is the 
vital leadership role of the university. Heidegger wrote that Wissenschaft, academic 
knowledge "must become the fundamental event of our spiritual existence as a Volk 422 
As Rector, he was concerned with responsibility for the university, the role of 'education' 
and 'leadership. ' Consistent with his theory, he wished to use his role to remodel the 
University so that knowledge would constructively problematise technology and the 
western relationship between Being and humanity. With this concept of authentic 
knowledge firmly in mind the universities could educate future leaders and begin a new 
destiny for Germany and eventually the west. 
Interestingly, it is during Heidegger's shortlived office as Rector of Freiburg University 
that is the only time he became political engaged and consciously applied his ideas to the 
political contingencies of education. This was a time of great upheaval in education (as in 
other aspects of society), and there was a real possibility that the ancient institution of 
4university' as it had been understood might be abolished and replaced, along lines 
similar to today's rhetoric about life-long learning, with skills based educational camps. 
In fact the similarity in ideas between elements of National Socialism and Neoliberalism, 
such as the narrow association of education with vocational skills or the constraint of 
knowledge to the accumulation of facts and skills, are fascinating. In his Rector's 
address, Heidegger focuses on knowledge as the central calling of education; "That 
421 In Schneeberger, 1962 
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knowledge should exist at all has never been unconditionally necessary. But if knowledge 
should exist, and should existfor us and through us, then under what conditions can it 
truly exi St? i423 
Heidegger was very specific about what constitutes knowledge, and what is derivative 
and of lesser importance. He differentiated between Wissenschaft and Kenntnisse. 
Wissenschaft is a broad concept, too quickly translated as 'science' but actually more 
attuned with awareness as in Heidegger's demand for a reconfigurement of Dasein in 
terms of Being than the positivist endeavour. It is academic knowledge rather than 
information. He writes that Wissenschaft "needs reclaiming in the face of knowledge 
being understood as the mere accumulation of commonplaces and facts (Kenntnisse). " 
Although he actively took up the National Socialist cause, Heidegger contested the 
reduction of academic knowledge to skills at every turn. He supported the Nazi 
programme of Gleichschaltung (bringing into line). However, he did not situate the 
university in subordination to the state but the reverse. Young argues that he inverted the 
role that the Party intended for education by interpreting the Gleichschaltung as 
positioning the university as the source which offers and shapes (in other words, 
educates) students who would shortly become the leaders of the Volk. Heidegger wanted 
the university to be the prime site for constituting the (re)orientation of the people of the 
State in terms of their socio-political and spiritual relation to the earth. In his inaugural 
speech "The Self-Assertion of the University, " Heidegger regarded the university as "the 
locus of spiritual legislation. " 
The self-assertion of the German university is the original, common will to its essence. 
We regard the German university as the 'high' school which from knowledge 
(Wissenschaft) and through knowledge, educates and disciplines the leaders and 
guardians of the fate of the German Volk. The will to the essence of the German 
university is the will to knowledge as the will to the historical spiritual mission of the 
Gen-nan Volk as a Volk that knows itself in its state. Knowledge and German fate must 
come to power at the same time in the will to essence. And they will do this then and only 
then when we - the teachers and students - expose knowledge to its innermost necessity, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, when we stand firm in the face of German fate 
extreme in its extreme necessity (Not). 424 
423 Heidegger cited in Wolin, 1993: 30-31 
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Universities ideally strike a balance between research and teaching, but Heidegger 
believed that research was disintegrating into an obsession with an economy of 
knowledge production and teaching was becoming increasingly irrelevant. This 
irrelevance was masked by the maintenance and justification of teaching through the 
system of examinations. Teaching and research was becoming an inauthentic production 
line. In "The University in the New Reich" he announced, "Research got out of hand and 
concealed its uncertainty behind the idea of international scientific and scholarly 
progress. Teaching that had become aimless hidden behind examination requirements. 425 
There are two versions of Heidegger's support of Gleichschaltung (that are not entirely 
incommensurate with one another): fascist Nazi or enlightened influencer of National 
Socialism. The former is that for the period 1933-34, Heidegger was unequivocally pro- 
Nazi. Zimmerman writes that 
Heidegger allowed himself to be called Ffihrer of the university, and eagerly co-operated 
with the Gleichschaltung; the coordination of the university into the totalitarian 
Nationalist state. Shortly before resigning as Rector he spoke of his 'initial principle and 
the authentic aim' of his leadership was to 'reside in the radical transformation of 
intellectual education into a function of the forces and demands of the Nationalist 
Socialist state. 426 
To this end, Heidegger envisaged reforming the organisation of the university faculties 
by looking freshly at the distinctions between discipline areas and at Freiburg University 
assigning new and younger people to the heads of each Faculty. "The departments are 
only departments if they are deployed in a power of spiritual legislation that is rooted in a 
capacity consistent with their essence, in order that they might transform the force of 
Dasein which besieges them into a single spiritual world of the Volk. , 
427 He 
(unsuccessfully) advocated national reform with the Reich Minister for Education. 
Heidegger wanted to halt the prevailing assumption that theory is separate from practice. 
It is not that he was attempting to bring them both into line with one another. The wish is 
not "to bring practice into line with theory, but the other way around: to understand 
425 Heidegger, June 30,1933, edited by Wolin, 1993: 43 
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theory as the supreme realisation of genuine practice. " Zimmerman explains Heidegger's 
views on the 'fit' of the university with the Volk. 
The university is not a cultural institution superficially imposed on top of society like a 
product of surplus value. Heidegger saw the university as the venue for sheltering and re- 
awakening the Volk's spiritual knowledge about Being. 428 
In effect, Young suggests that Heidegger had in mind the Philosopher King in Plato's 
Republic when he supported Gleichschaltung. 429 Indeed, Young notes, Heidegger rarely 
mentions the term 'State' or 'government. ' In his speeches he refers to the Volk: 
Volksgemeinschaft; community of the people: Volksgenossenschaft; people's co- 
operative: Volksk5rper; body of the people. Heidegger did not see the state or leadership 
as superimposed on the masses but as the embodiment of the people. If it were properly 
attuned to the reawakening and preservation of Being, the people's thought, including 
critique of existing structures would emanate freely within Heidegger's conception. 
Knowledge should not be a 'cultural treasure, ' "but the innermost determining center of 
their entire existence as a Volk and a state. Knowledge is also not merely the means of 
making the unconscious conscious, but the force that keeps all of existence in focus and 
embraces it.,, 430 His project was in many ways more enlightened than democracy. At the 
same time, the reality was that the Fascism inherent in Nazi doctrines warped his ability 
to think and constrained his freedom to express his thought. It was ultimately the 
antithesis of Volkgemeinschaft. 
The very basis of Heidegger's aims for reform conflicted with the outright Fascism of 
key Nazi bureaucrats, but at this stage Heidegger had not become disillusioned with 
National Socialism to the point of calling it a lost cause. Even after resigning, in 1935 his 
faith remained in the 'inner truth and greatness' of National Socialism to reformulate the 
Volk into the authenticity of Dasein in relation to Being. Later he wrote that he meant 
during his term as Rector to - 
express my opposition to (Alfred) Rosenberg's conception, according to which, 
conversely, spirit and the world of spirit are merely an 'expression' and emanation of 
428 Zimmerman, 1990: 105 
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racial facts and of the physical constitution of man. According to the dogma of 
'politicized science, ' which was then propagated by the National Socialist student 
organisations, the sciences should serve as a model for vocational goals, and the value or 
the lack of value of knowledge should be measured according to the needs of ' life. '431 
He specifically rejected the biological and eugenic interpretation of 'will' and 'life' that 
derive from Nietzsche and Darwin. He also emphasizes in this later address a line 
delivered in his inaugural speech as epitomising his attempted project as Rector "clearly 
and unambiguously. " He wrote, "Knowledge does not stand in the service of the 
professions, but the reverse: the professions effectuate and administer this highest, 
, 432 essential knowledge of the Volk concerning its entire Dasein . 
Postwar Remarks 
In his interview with the Spiegel magazine, "Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten" (Only a 
god can redeem us), Heidegger justified, for the first time publicly, his involvement with 
the Nazi regime. 433 In this interview he is remarkably tentative about the role of 
philosophy having an 'effect' in discerning the essence of technology and thereby 
transforming the relation humanity has with the earth. "Philosophy is at an end, " he says. 
Philosophy is tied inexonerably to metaphysics, and as he states in Letter on Humanism 
the stagnation of metaphysical philosophy has put all thinking at risk. 
Bearing in mind that after reading Spengler and Ringer, Heidegger was awake to the 
enframing of technology as the 'destiny' of the west. He regarded technology as totally 
mobilising human society in the objectification of everything as potential resource. In the 
Spiegel interview with Augstein, he continued to believe that National Socialism moved 
in the direction of helping humankind "think" an "adequate relationship to the essence of 
technology. " He then argued, "those people were far too limited in their thinking to 
acquire an explicit relationship to what is happening today and what has been underway 
for three centuries. , 434 
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His complete loss of hope about the possibility of philosophy or even thinking to have 
any role, let alone a 'causal' effect is a long remove from his belief in 1933 that the 
University, and in particular his ideas of a refonned university knitted together by 
philosophy, could lead the leadership and provide a Rihrer or Philosopher King, to 
initiate a 'new beginning' that would abandon the nihilistic path followed by the 
technological enframing of modernity. 
There is, however, a deeply conservative element in Heidegger's theory. Despite the far- 
reaching influence of Nietzsche and also Dilthey on Heidegger's concepts, 435 he stuck to 
his description of an inevitable spirit or teleology to western philosophy. Terms such as 
Schicksal, or destiny and Wesen, essence along with Sein, Being play an enormous role in 
his philosophy. Knowledge, for example, is included with the military and work as three 
essentially human spheres in the Rectoral address, paraphrasing the traditional Catholic 
triptich. The only element that is superior to knowledge is Fate; "Knowledge is the 
questioning standing firm in the midst of the totality of being as it continually conceals 
itself This active perseverance knows of its impotence in the face of Fate. , 436 The 
internal dynamics of Heidegger's technical terms are exquisitely examined in fine works 
of philosophy but the 'essential' 'inner' 'geistig, ' or 'spiritual' association of Being, for 
example, converges with his antimodem, anti-urban, German nationalism. The 
convergence demands a conservative revolution in similar ways to those of National 
Socialism. Under these circumstances, Adomo can write that Heidegger's thought is 
"fascist in its most intimate components. 19437 
A theme that does have some continuity from early to late Heidegger, albeit in a variety 
of forms, is a certain assertion of spirituality or faith. The Geist and god rise late in his 
writing and overtake thinking and philosophy as the potent force affecting destiny. 
Although he abandoned Christianity in the form advocated by the Catholic Seminary, the 
notions of the Geist (spirit) remained very important during the war years, often in 
association with v61kisch ideas. Destiny also retains great importance despite its 
435 Zimmerman, 1990: 11 mentions the influence of Wilhelm Dilthey on Heidegger, who argued that there 
is no plan, nor purpose, nor transcendence to history 436 Heidegger cited in Wolin, 1993: 32 
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somewhat uneasy segregation from progressive telos. Finally, in his later writings, the 
notion of a god (with a small 'g') reappears, further retiring the agency of philosophy. At 
the beginning of From Enowning Heidegger comments on the articulation of thinking 
from Being in terms of the godly, 
the enquivering of Be-ing's essential sway will determine the jointure of the work of 
thinking. This enquivering then grows stronger, becoming the power of a gentle release 
into the intimacy to the godding of the god of gods, from out of which Dasein's allotment 
to Be-ing comes into its own, as grounding truth for Be-ing. 1438 
In the Letter on Humanism he refutes the indifference of atheism towards the holy. And at 
the end of "The Question Concerning Technology" he concludes with a quest, 
description, and something of a plea for a mode of thinking quite different from the 
traditional status and logic of philosophy, but containing a referral to the theological 
traditions; "Questioning is the piety of thought" (my italics). In the Spiegel interview, 
Heidegger explains, "philosophy will not be able to effect an immediate transformation 
of the present condition of the world. " Famously, he claims, "Only a god can save US.,, 439 
This religious motif permeates his theory, including the 'transcendent' concept of Being. 
Schicksal, destiny or fatalism often stands in for a god. The teleology and structuralism of 
destiny is 'unknowable' but not random. He avoids all reference to chance, and limits the 
range of options for change to the return to a beginning. The topic of god is concordant 
with Heidegger's realisation this late in his career that "this is connected with the fact that 
what I name with the word Being, a word which is of long standing, traditional, 
multifaceted, and worn out, needs man for its revelation, preservation, and formation. " 440 
There is present in his thought, a significant element of Christian conservatism, or might 
one say, cultural chauvinism that wishes to preserve a certain status quo that might have 
approximated the norm of society in Heidegger's childhood and teenage years in Baden 
during the late 1800s. His viewpoint is by no means irrelevant because of its specificity. 
The cultural chauvinism might limit his ability to find a new beginning but not the clarity 
and bravery of speaking about the danger. We have to take seriously a crucial insight of 
this undoubtedly industrious and often profoundly thoughtful person, especially when he 
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writes (with a humility unfamiliar in a lot of his other writing) about the Ge-stell, or 
enframing of technology. 
Heidegger writes "The frame holding sway means: the essence of man is framed, 
claimed, and challenged by a power which manifests itself in the essence of technology, a 
power which man himself does not control. To help with this realisation is all that one 
can expect of thought. 441 Thus the Ge-stell is modified subtly and importantly, from 
Spengler's inescapable totalisation. Limited agency does not emerge from philosophy or 
thought let alone speech but what is possible is the preparation or a readiness for thinking 
and change to take place in the future. 
Apparently resting on his theory of hermeneutics and the limitations of translation, 
Heidegger continues to elevate the status of Germany to the locus and centre of western 
thought, from whence any (even if its possibility is extremely curtailed) thinking which 
will have an effect on transforming, or opening, or preparing a readiness - will emerge. "I 
have in mind especially the inner relationship of the German language with the language 
of the Greeks and with their thought. This has been confirmed for me today 442 again by 
the French. When they begin to think, they speak German, being sure that they could not 
make it with their own language. , 
443 He goes on, 
It is my conviction that a reversal can be prepared only in the same place in the world 
where the modem technological world originated, and that it cannot happen because of 
any takeover by Zen Buddhism or any other Eastern experiences of the world. There is 
need for a rethinking which is to be carried out with the help of the European tradition 
and of a new appropriation of that tradition. Thinking itself can by transformed only by a 
thinking which has the same origin and calling. 444 
Does this cultural chauvinism that directly concurs with the mess he found himself 
entangled during the war relegate his entire theoretical edifice to politically incorrect, or 
worse, immoral Nazi propaganda which ought to be actively countered? Certainly this 
national chauvinism overpowers his ability to think in some ways. It confines and limits 
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some key features of his theory, such as the inherent conservatism embedded in the 
concept of Being, that even association with the dynamic ofphysis does not entirely 
dislodge (cf. Nietzsche's disparaging remarks on the static rigidity of 'Being' in The Will 
to Power). These elements inhibit his ability to think 'beyond' western traditions. Indeed, 
his cultural chauvinism virtually forbids any culture beyond western traditions to enter 
and dislodge the technological Gestell, despite his long held conviction that modernity 
and Enlightenment democracy is a nihilistic enterprise. Ironically this nationalism about 
the German language contradicts his own philosophy of Hermeneutics, that suggests that 
the outsider's viewpoint brings to light aspects of Being that are concealed in the 
commonplace assumptions of another time and place. Unfortunately cultural chauvinism 
has obscured not only Heidegger's ability to think, but many of the thinkers that have 
taken up his important ideas since then too. Thus, though Heidegger does not claim to 
have the 'answer' to the question concerning technology, where he hints to look has not 
always or ultimately proved most productive. Thinking has not been transformed from 
the same origin. Heidegger claims that the technological world needs to be "transcended 
(aufgehoben) in the Hegelian sense, not pushed aside, but transcended, but not through 
man alone. , 445 
In no way can anybody claim that the technological world is overcome, or even that the 
beginnings of the end of the technological frame has opened up. But post- structurali st 
thinkers (writing in French and coming in extraordinary large proportion from the 
outskirts of the French colonial empire; Algeria) have begun to think to a certain extent, 
beyond the west, beyond man, and beyond the Hegelian dialectic of transcendence. 
Instead of a homely dwelling place, it is the nomads who are opening new pathways and 
preparing the ground for a new set of strategies and attitudes to the earth. 
Ultimately, Heidegger did not face up to the manner in which National Socialism was 
actually bringing things, such as the death-camps, to pass. Turning a blind eye, like so 
many Germans during and after the war, avoided asking questions about his assumptions 
that Germany was the privileged Ursprung, 446 or springing-place for the new, better 
445 Heidegger cited in Wolin, 1993: 113 446 
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beginning. Something new had occurred, but it was almost a direct inversion of 
Heidegger's intimations for the 'beginning' of a new destiny. Technology was showing 
up in Germany at its most ignoble, dare one say, evil, form. 
Nevertheless, Heidegger's theory in regards to Being, technology and the human relation 
to the Earth is an important jumping off point for encouraging an ecological ethics for 
humanity. His historical context was both a prompt and a distortion of his crucial 
engagement with modernity and technology, which is not to say that as a one-time Nazi, 
his theory ought to be disregarded. But his nationalist convictions do need to be taken 
into consideration when trying to consider the ramifications of the past and the present in 
tenns of the future. 
Ramifications ofNazism 
The status of Heidegger's philosophy in regards to his role as a leading philosopher on 
modernity, technology and the environment, yet unavoidably associated with Nazi 
ideology, has caused some highly charged academic discussions. What is at stake is the 
designation of responsibility for the horrors of the holocaust. Many writers wish to align 
German society and German ideas as the only place such devastation could occur. But 
Heidegger's theory is closely tied to the history of ideas in the West, from Greek times, 
through Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche to the contemporary 
engagement with the technological enframing of western society. Themes that emerge 
from all these sources go into the make up of his philosophy. Picking out the peculiarly 
German aspects of his theory may satisfy the argument that the holocaust was a German 
responsibility. Certainly it occurred under an extremely nationalist Gennan regime. On 
the other hand, anti-Semitism and anxiety about nomadic Gypsies was rife in Britain, 
Russia, France Czechoslovakia, Romania, Italy, and many other countries at the time, and 
had been for many, many centuries. Furthermore, the Gestell, or enframing of technology 
has successfully perineated nearly every facet of the globe, and in what I regard as a 
compelling argument this is, according to Heidegger, the source of Nazi death camps and 
nuclear bomb proliferation as much as it is alienating factory conditions and hydro dams 
on the river Rhine. The dangers of patriotic empire building would not be lost on any 
European, but this mindset, in the context of a global deepening of the technological 
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Gestell, is alive and well at the moment in the United States. Heidegger, like many 
people, presumed that his philosophy was radically prepolitical. Events in Germany 
during the 1930s and 1940s proved that politics and the environment challenge, shape, 
and cut short philosophy as much, if not more than philosophical thought can provide the 
grounding motifs for the world-view that motivates politics, education, consumerism, and 
the relationship between humanity and the environment. 
A major aspect of Heidegger's theory is that the history of western metaphysics began its 
decline with the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, and culminated in Nietzsche's assertion of 
the death of God. It is in the context of nihilism that the reduction of all things, including 
humanity gets reduced to a potential 'resource' in the machine of consumerist culture. 
Heidegger hoped that philosophy could initiate a 'new beginning' on a par with thinking 
such as Parmenides and Heraclitus in Ancient Greece, that would re-engage humanity by 
thinking in refreshing and authentic ways about Being itself His careful and detailed 
expositions on this subject examined and avoided reducing Being to Life because 
Nietzsche had closely associated the 'Will to Will' with life and Heidegger regarded 
Nietzsche's philosophy as an expedient culmination of the history of western 
metaphysics rather than the essence of organic and anorganic existence. His engagement 
with Nietzsche in particular (often through or in response to Nietzsche's interpretation by 
various contemporary writers influenced by Nietzsche, such as Bdumler, Ringer, 
Spengler and Jaspers), attempts to position Heidegger himself as the beginning of post- 
metaphysical philosophy. It is his commitment to a new beginning that leads Heidegger 
to believe in National Socialism as a force for providing Germany and the west with a 
new historical trajectory. 
But despite all this, possibly because of the fascist limitations on Heidegger's thinking, 
he has developed the critique of technology further than anyone else since and found the 
limits to thinking within the extremes of modernity. Thus, he is in many ways a very 
productive path to follow, and in other ways a warning against the revolutionary impulse 
to impose radical new beginnings in an abrupt, urgent and fascist manner. Thinking is a 
critical occupation in that it is often a negative critique of the status quo and therefore 
politically threatening and of positive, vital, 'critical' importance. Thinking needs a safe 
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public space in which to occur. Tyranny constrains thinking, and this is the primary 
reason for the emergence of democracy. The role of education, as Heidegger saw in the 
1930s, is to safeguard this safe space and promote a culture ready to take intellectual 
risks: to think in far reaching ways, about the inter-relationship between humanity and 
environment. 
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7 Heidegger's Nihilism: Life, Being, Dasein 
Heidegger made a definition of metaphysics which owes to Aristotle, as the inquiry into 
the relation between the many and the One, the plurality and the universal, or as 
Heidegger put it, beings and Being. 447 Rather than the unknown tangents essential to 
evolutionary emergence, or Nietzsche's concept of life, necessity and chaos, Heidegger 
clearly defines the legitimate field of inquiry of Being into the ontological, 
epistemological parameters that can be ascertained by Dasein. The reciprocal 'sameness' 
referred to by Parmenides of thinking and being, or Being and Dasein, is carefully 
outlined in opposition to extraneous 'busy' alien existence, which he defines as 
nothingness. Heidegger is wary of nothingness as a way leading to loss, annihilation, or 
the nihilist forgetting of Being. Heidegger argues that instead of overcoming nihilism 
through the transvaluation of values, Nietzsche brings about the culmination of 
metaphysics. Nietzsche inverts the Platonic and Christian 'beyond' in a dualistic 
opposition that does not transform the problem that humanity is forgetting to 
authentically inquire into the profound nature of Being. 448 
Michael Peters suggests that Heidegger's thesis sets forth "a deepening of humanism, but 
a deepening that, at the same time, recognises forces somehow beyond 'Man. ,, 449 
Beyond Man is Heidegger's concept of the unique quality of Dasein as the ability to 
ascertain the nature of Being without relying on a rationalist or positivist position of 
control 'over' nature. Heidegger puts emphasis on the hubris of Humanism, which he 
argues, in the busy pursuit of rational positivism, 'forgets' the unique ability of Dasein to 
apprehend Being. He writes, "Humanism is opposed because it does not set the 
humanitas of man high enough. , 
450 
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Heidegger's critique of Humanism and his construction of a new ontological philosophy 
aims to provide a guiding paradigm for social organisation, in counter distinction to the 
prevailing norms or rational individualism, market consumerism, and economic growth. 
The most important relationship that Heidegger challenges is the mastery over 'nature. ' 
He conceived of an ontological conceptualisation of Being, rather than the universal 
categorisation that breaches the inaccessibility of truly understanding the thing-in-itself. 
Being 
The crucial, guiding question that Heidegger finds in the crucible of western metaphysics 
in surviving fragments of Greek thinking is "What is Being? " The style, approach, and 
forrn to the questioning is what creates vitality and ignites the 'answer. ' Yet style does 
not simply reside in the etymology and grammar of the question. Words alone will not 
release the factor of most importance. To prepare for this question - "What is Being? " 
initially, the most fertile mode of inquiry has to be discovered. Many iterations of this 
task engrossed Heidegger's thought throughout his career. The term 'Being' is so huge 
and all-encompassing that Nietzsche argues that it's meaning has become 'empty' and 
'vaporous. ' Logically, the more comprehensive a term, "the more indeterminate and 
empty is its content. 451 Thus, Heidegger says it is easy for the question 'What is called 
Being? ' to become "merely a mechanical repetition of the question about the Being as 
such. " What is required is an engagement with Being which allows its "appropriate 
unfolding. 452 Heidegger emphasises many elements in this seemingly simple question, 
sometimes the 'origin' of the term, sometimes concentrating on who is capable of asking 
and being receptive to what unfolds. He advocates poetry as making the term Being 
'strange' and thereby enabling a discerning and fresh revealing of the Being of beings. 
Plato assumed that the Ideal nature of Being was a priori and inaccessible to the 
temporality of a human. But this is not a limitation that Heidegger takes seriously 
because although humans may never have an all-encompassing view, the questioning is 
only viable through a peculiarly human ability to apprehend the ground from which 
45 1 Heidegger, 1973a: 40 
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Being springs. As Peters argues, in this way Heidegger is advocating a deepening of 
Humanism, not a rejection of it. 
453 
Heidegger looks to the poetry of the early Greeks; Parmenides, Heraclitus and Sophocles 
in his book An Introduction to Metaphysics, as an originating experience of Being. 454 He 
shows how these 'originary' poetic authors have their fresh, vital concept of Being 
'degraded' to a fixed metaphysical Truth of Being by Plato and, to a lesser extent, 
Aristotle. The consequence of the rigid 'otherworldly' designation is a stale turning away 
from the original poetic attention to the light of Being, which has been exacerbated by 
western metaphysics down the years up until, and including, Nietzsche. Heidegger posits 
himself as the beginning of the 'post' metaphysical era, although as investigated in the 
previous chapter, his philosophy has remained caught up in the modem terrors of his 
time. As Charles Guignon puts it, in the foreground of the book is "the dawn of 
metaphysics in ancient Greece, its decline and calcification up to the present, and the 
prospects for rejuvenation today', 455 which to some extent, turned out to become 
synonymous with National Socialism. 
Nothingness 
The Ancient Greeks, those 'originary' authors, had initially set up the dualism between 
Being and Nothingness. Heidegger rarely mentions nothingness, yet it is fundamental to 
his concept of Being. Nothingness is indescribable and, Heidegger suggests, best 
approximated through poetry rather than philosophy: "Authentic speaking about nothing 
always remains extraordinary. It cannot be vulgarised. It dissolves if it is placed in the 
cheap acid of a merely logical intelligence. 
456 Nothingness is not based upon 'the void, ' 
or 'madness, ' 'chaos, ' or even the abstraction of infinite space, which might be 
juxtaposed with Being, but rather on the Buddhist notion of not-being, or Being, which is 
the removal of the once-being such as the absence of the cup from the bench or death. 
Heidegger asks - "Why are there beings rather than nothing? 
, 457 Nothingness frames 
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Being. Or to put it another way, Being elicits the possibility of nothing - and in that 
possibility reveals itself. 458He argues that Being and Nothingness combine with one 
another, because Being "is nothing. " Nothingness marks the boundaries to finitude. It is 
integral to Being. What is surprising is the way Heidegger distinguishes between 
'existence' and Being: 
Nonbeing means accordingly to depart fi7om such generated permanence: existasthai, 
cexistence, ' 'to exist, ' meant for the Greeks nonbeing. The thoughtless habit of using the 
words 'existence' and 'exist' as designations for Being is one more indication of our 
estrangement both from Being and from radical, forceful, and definite exegesis of 
Being. 459 
Comprehension by other animals does not qualify for entry into the peculiarly reflective 
human language of Being. Anything truly gone from the purposive, solipsist centre of 
knowing as an object of understanding is mere 'existence. ' Mundane 'existence' is 
oblivion; it 'exits' from Dasein's co-representation of Being. If something is taken for 
granted, or hidden or obscured then it still contributes towards Being. But something lost 
or forgotten holds a precarious place, on the threshold between Being and existence. 
Heidegger will find great danger in 'forgetting. ' This distinction between existence and 
Being illustrates how anthropocentric Heidegger's version of Being really is, when it 
only 'shows' itself apprehendable to human thought (and possibly to gods). The notion 
that existence as nonbeing exits from the immanent emerging of Being makes the 
subtleties of the 'substance' of Heidegger's concept of Being clearer. Nonbeing or Being 
is subtly, but profoundly, different from lethe, or 'concealment' because where Being is 
hidden it is remains there, simply obscured from view. 460 Nonbeing or Being is partly 
not-present, but primarily not-present to human apprehension. For example, a corpse 
might be literally present, but there is no glimmer of Being in its being. The fear of death 
reappears in the authentic relation to Being on many occasions. Just to add to the 
confusion, Being does not, however, mean life, in either a biological or Nietzschean 
sense. There are always aspects of Being which are 'concealed' to the present cultural 
and linguistic potential for apprehension, but that is different from 'nonBeing. ' Many 
aspects of life also abound in a manner that humans are physically, emotionally and 
458 Heidegger, 1973a: 29 
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intellectually incapable of ever becoming aware, and this is existence, not Being. Indeed, 
Heidegger argues that the technological expansion of the boundaries of human 
comprehension in regard to the natural environment via magnification, frequencies, 
chemical engineering, and so forth, simply results in 'busyness' rather than increased 
access to the truth of Being. 
Nietzsche talks about 'life' rather than Being or existence. His theory of the Will to 
Power attributes perspectives to other forms of existence that are outside the parameters 
of human comprehension. The concept is anorganic, including the strata of magma, rock, 
ocean, atmosphere, solar systems and so forth, rather than being limited to breathing, 
'living' things. He regards each mode of being as having its own perspective and thus its 
own (world. 
461 
Event Ontology 
For Heidegger, there are two related ways of understanding das Seiende, Being: the 
boundaries of Being with nothingness (as outlined above), and the manner in which 
Being is discernible through beings. The relationship of 'Being' to 'beings' is 
fundamentally immanent, (and Aristotelian) because "thinking Being in abstraction from 
-))462 being is artificial . Human apprehension 
in relation to Being, and through beings, is 
vital because Being presents to a view. Oblivion (or existence) is a poverty of viewing. 
The human apprehension of Being is limited to its appearance in examples of being. The 
traditional view of Being as the static ground and the Idealist separation of subjects from 
objects tends to itemise 'things' rather than the more Aristotelian concept of individuals 
as examples of the emerging species. Heidegger describes the changing becoming of 
things, as the exemplars of Being in action. It is an event ontology. Because of his 
philosophical aversion to 'existence' as part of the definition for Being, Heidegger 
has 
completely altered the meaning of the tradition German term for existence, Dasein. 
Dasein is a very specific technical term which Heidegger uses to refer to humans (and 
conceivably other beings) which care about 'being as a whole. ' Without the enquiry, the 
care, the apprehension, and the shared language community of Dasein, the 
Being in 
46 1 Nietzsche, 1909, Heidegger, 1982, vol 11 and Imn, 2000, chapter 7 
462 Heidegger, 1973a: 32 
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beings could not enlighten or 'shine forth, ' and all would be mere existence, or nothing. 
Dasein are the subjects (so to speak) who make the call, we are the callers, our enquiry 
and thinking is capable of asking, "What is called Being? " 
The mode of enquiry into Being shapes the parameters of apprehension. It is the 
f4 ocus 
63 difference between beings and Being that needs bringing into I Heidegger regards 
this relation in what he describes as Aristotelian philosophy, as beings ascending towards 
Being. 464 Dasein moves from ascertaining a particular and transient being to 
comprehending what endures throughout Being. Time then, is essential to the enquiry into 
Being. 
Nietzsche complains that according to the philosophical tradition, 'Being' has a static feel 
to it, as in 'ground. ' Being is usually associated with 'substance ontology'; it 'is' a thing 
that endures, rests, and has weight and importance. Guignon best puts Heidegger's 
conceptual shift from the static to the dynamic; "Heidegger conceives of human existence 
not as a thing or object, but rather as an event, the unfolding realisation of a life story as a 
whole. , 465 In Aristotle's dualism between Being and beings, the specific entities were 
assumed to change because of accidents in the environment that meant deviations from 
the essence of the entity. 'Becoming' was associated with entities or beings, not overall 
Being. Heidegger incorporates the dynamism of 'becoming' into beings as a whole. 
Being itself is immanent in the unfolding of events. Heidegger takes the Greek term 
physis as Being, that is the power of emerging and holding sway, 
In this power rest and motion are opened out of original unity. This power is the 
overpowering presence that is not yet mastered (bewdltigt) in thought, wherein that which 
is present manifests itself as a (being). But this power first issues from concealment i. e. in 
Greek aletheia (unconcealment) when the power accomplishes itself as a world. 
466 
Guignon argues that this 'retrieval' of an early Greek 'pre-metaphysical' experience of 
Being that Heidegger makes, rescues Being from substance ontology and replaces it with 
event ontology. 
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What this retrieval is supposed to provide is a way of replacing the dominant substance 
ontology in the Western world with an alternative understanding of Being, an 
understanding that emphasizes the way beings show up in (and as) an unfolding 
happening or event. 467 
By focusing on the philosophical tradition, Heidegger manages to avoid the evolutionary 
implications of physis as emerging, becoming, changing, evolving. An evolutionary 
perspective of physis challenges his anthropocentric emphasis and the distinction between 
Being and existence. 
Das Dasein 
Aristotle's notion of essence bears a strong relation to the 'potential' and 'fruition' 
encompassed in Being. The essence 'causes' the substance to be formed in a way that 
shows what it is although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish what is essential and 
what is accidental to the particular configuration of an entity. Guignon argues that neither 
Being nor Dasein has Aristotle's inevitable telos. Neither does Heidegger bother with 
analysing biological genera, species, or individuals, which lend themselves to a 
philosophy of evolution. Instead, as with most other modem philosophers, Heidegger 
concentrates on the anticipated finitude of an individual's lifespan. Heidegger's Dasein 
'styles' her/himself by projecting towards the future, and recouping the past within the 
finite parameters of birth to death. Dasein makes decisions and promises in the context of 
one's life as a whole. Life-as-a-whole has clear boundaries and a process of unfolding, 
yet the future is not linear, as it is, arguably, for Aristotle. The finitude of the individual's 
life-as-a-whole does not lend itself to the Ideal of the 'good' or heaven, nor to a precise 
goal or meaning. Each of us is bom into a larger pre-existent collection of beings as a 
whole. Heidegger presumes that unlike any other entity (except perhaps, gods) what 
makes humanity meaningful is that we are open to comprehending the appearance of 
Being which 'shines forth' from beings. The crucial distinguishing characteristics of 
Dasein are the capacity for enquiring into our unique relation to Being. 
(A) privileged, unique relation arises between (beings as a whole) and the act of 
questioning. For through this questioning beings as a whole are for the first time opened 
467 Guignon, 2001: 38 
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up as such with a view to its possible ground, and in the act of questioning it is kept 
open. 468 
Yet Heidegger's emphasis on the unique capacity of Dasein in relation to Being does not 
remain entirely ignorant of the eons of life on the planet before humanity. He is not a 
creationist. Though rarely enunciated, Heidegger recognises that humans are insignificant 
in the scale of the history of the earth, let alone the universe. "What is the temporal 
extension of a human life amid all the millions of years? , 469 Yet Heidegger cleverly 
repositions human history as the centre of the only interesting epoch of the planets 
evolution by developing Kant's theory of time, such that time is not simply a priori to 
individual subjectivity but emerges commensurately with Dasein. 
There is the pure possibility that man might not be at all. After all there was a time when 
man was not. But strictly speaking we cannot say: There was a time when man was not. 
At all times man was and is and will be, because time produces itself only insofar as man 
is. There is no time when man was not, not because man was from all eternity and will be 
for all eternity but because time is not eternity and time fashions itself into a time only as 
a human, historical being-there (Dasein). 470 
Heidegger has shifted the meaning of the German term Dasein from broad 'existence' 
into a technical designation for someone capable of an authentic enquiring relation with 
the Being. Das Dasein is a play on words. Dasein translates as Vas, ' gender neutral 'the' 
and 'ein' or 'one'; 'the one' or 'any one. ' In a certain sense Dasein remains within the 
solipsist, nominalist tradition and 'any one' universalises the capacity for enquiry to all 
humanity (and gods). Heidegger enlarges his concept of Dasein from an individual 
consciousness to include a group consciousness in his later writing. 
Another examination of the etymology of the term shows that 'Da' means 'there' and 
4sein' is 'being; ' 4being-there. ' Anyone being there projects the existence of Dasein from 
static being to dynamic becoming, away from 'here' towards a future. Being-there is the 
movement of potentiality that both remains collected as a knowing centre, and also 
moves beyond the already understood towards the unknown future. The Da gives Sein a 
space to come forth. Manheim explains that, "he means man's conscious, historical 
468 Heidegger, 1973a: 4 
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existence in the world, which is always projected into a there beyond its here. , 471 Being 
emerges in relationship to Dasein; the future directed being-there, of becoming in 
relation to the finite, enquiring, and caring capacity of Dasein. 
In A Letter on Humanism (1949) Heidegger shifts existence again, towards the 'ex- 
sisting, ex-static' that thoroughly incorporates the emotional being of what we once 
separated out as 'subject' with the broad existence of Beings in the entirety of being. 
There is no separation in Da-Sein, it indicates 
that 'essence' is now being defined neither ftorn esse essentiae nor from esse existentiae 
but rather from the ex-static character of Dasein. As ex-sisting, the human being sustains 
Da-sein in that he takes the Da, the clearing of being, into 'care. 9472 
He goes on to say that Dasein "unfolds essentially in the throw of being as a destinal 
sending. " This later work, after the 'turn' in the mid 1930s contrasts, I think, with the 
earlier characterisation of Dasein from Being and Time, although Heidegger never 
overtly states that he has left behind the subjective elements that characterise his earlier 
work. 
In his first major publication, Being and Time (1927), Heidegger developed the concept 
of subjectivity as Dasein who must face the anxiety of her/his own 'finitude, ' in what 
Heidegger calls being-toward-death. He accepts the commonplace discourse that each 
individual faces their own death alone - whereas death might be regarded as the 
uncoupling of an entity from individuality and its return to the swirling motions of 
existence (or environment). Heidegger regards finitude as offering the chance for Dasein 
to comprehend their life, past, present and future, as a whole. While constrained by the 
historical conditions and possibilities into which they are 'thrown, ' Dasein can take a 
stand and, from the perspective of finitude, style an authentic life. 473 Heidegger places an 
enormous amount of weight on the finitude of being-toward-death because it is the 
condition in which thinking happens as an openness and receptivity which projects 
'there' and apprehends Being. The projection allows Dasein to put perspective on the 
471 Manheim's note in Heidegger, 1973a: 9 47' Heidegger, 1949a: 249 
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immediate surroundings, which Heidegger argues conceals the present state of affairs 
through over- familiarity with the local socio-historical environment. 
Heidegger's concept of Dasein is situated in a public environment that predates and 
postdates any given individual. Dasein is 'thrown' into an 'always already' socio-historic 
context. Having been brought up in an always-already 'world' of equipment, the 
complete familiarity with the social surroundings 'world' as undifferentiated from the 
self. Guignon explains, "Heidegger's 'phenomenological' approach to understanding the 
human starts by describing our lives as they unfold in familiar, everyday contexts of 
action, prior to theorizing and reflection. 9,474 For Heidegger this integration, the 
'worlding' of equipment, or 'equipmentality' has the characteristic that it is too non-nal 
and everyday to be overtly noticeable. Conscious reflective thought is a tiny element of 
the predominantly unconscious submersion in our surrounding world. For the most part, 
we are 'objects amongst objects, ' and are indistinguishable from our environment. 
In its early form, Dasein was not very different from many other configurations of the 
Idealist solipsist subject. Yet Heidegger had criticised Descartes for his stark separation 
of the subject from the object, and continued to vilify 'subjectivism' throughout his life. 
So in the 1930s when the Volk movement was at its peak, Heidegger expanded the 
concept of Dasein to encompass the people: "Even to speak of our capacity for seUhood 
'does not mean that man (insofar as he is Dasein) is primarily an 'I' and an 
, 475 individual ... any more than he is a We and a community'. This effectively diffused the 
problem inherent to stark solipsism that when the subject constitutes 'the world', it 
expires with the death of the subject. Guignon explains that Heidegger's concept Dasein, 
refers to the fact that there is a (finite) understanding of Being. On the assumption that 
humans are the only beings with an understanding of Being, Dasein appears in, or at least 
arises only where there are humans. Having an understanding of Being (i. e. being the 
opening in which beings can show up) is humanity's most essential trait. 476 
Being and Dasein emerge reciprocally, both the same and yet set apart, they are co- 
dependent on each other for meaning, language and thought. Being is not conditioned by 
474 Guignon, 2000: 67 
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individual subjects as in Idealist solipsism nor is it intrinsically independent as in 
'Nature' or 'existence, ' but it retains a certain Idealist mega-solipsism on the part of 
human language communities (das Volk) who share a meaningful world and enable 
enlightened enquiring into the question of Being. 
Struggle; Being and Becoming 
Heidegger specifically rejects the historical presumption that Being is a static foundation 
to existence. He finds evidence of the dynamism involved in Being in three ways; 
through the coming to presence of Being through beings, the growth and fulfilment of 
potential, or 'form, ' and finally through the active grammar of language. Although the 
significance of Being emerges into the care of Dasein, the dynamism of Being is not 
achieved strictly through human apprehension and language. Change is the precondition, 
the 'nature' of Being and it is only when our expectations stagnate and ossify into 
'statements' rather than an attitude of enquiry, respect and awe that we fail to find it. 
Perhaps one of the most important, and the most underworked aspects of Heidegger's 
theory is this precondition of change. It shows up in his exploration of Heraclitus and the 
concept of strife. Heidegger cites Heraclitus as the first to 'think' Being as conflict and 
the 'becoming' of flux: "In the conflict (Aus-einandersetzung, setting-apart) a world 
comes into being. (Conflict does not split, much less destroy unity. It constitutes unity, it 
is a binding-together, logoS. ),, 477 
The particular relation of Being to Dasein, and the difference between Being and beings 
do not bring us to its origin. Heidegger looks to the 'originary' poets and philosophers in 
Ancient Greece and finds in fragment 53 of Heraclitus a description of Being as struggle. 
The English translation of Heidegger's translation of ancient Greek reads, 
Conflict is for all (that is present) the creator that causes to emerge, but (also) for all the 
dominant preserver. For it makes some to appear as gods, others as men; it creates 
(shows) some as slaves, others as freemen. 478 
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Struggle initiates rank through difference - by setting (gods, men, slaves) apart from one 
another. Struggle "sets forth their Being. , 479 The traditional view of the concept of 
struggle is to conflate it with violence. Violence in the Judeo-Christian-Muslim tradition 
is a form of evil that causes suffering and must be righted through retribution. The 
struggles and conflict over comparative rank and the competition for resources is a 
significant component of the field of ethics. Hence, while reading Heidegger's (and 
Nietzsche's) description of struggle, it is important to be wary of the ethical domain. 
Likewise the Cornucopian revolution destabilized God and Man from the Centre of the 
Universe, and Heidegger's persistent attempts to re-issue the concept of Being that is 
anthropocentrically ranked (like Darwin's Great Chain of Being for example) is 
problematic. The ordering of chaotic existence into hierarchical rank inevitably brings 
with it conflicts of interest. Ethics will continue to grapple with these problems while 
abandoning the utopian ideal of absolute Truth and a world without struggle. The subtle 
shift is, as Guignon explains, that gods or men do not initiate (an ordered) 'world'; 
struggle itself does. Heidegger clarifies the manner in which struggle 'works' to order 
chaos, 
Against the overwhelming chaos they set the barrier of their work, and in their work they 
capture the world thus opened up. It is with these works that the elemental power, the 
physis first comes to stand. Only now does the being become being as such. This world- 
building is history in the authentic sense... Where struggle ceases, the being does not 
vanish, but the world turns away. The being is no longer asserted (i. e. preserved as such). 
Now it is merely found ready-made, it is datUM. 480 
This insight from Heraclitus along with Nietzsche's concept of the Will to Power as the 
driving force of life initiates the rethinking of strife and power in post- structurali st 
thought. Deleuze and Guattari have generated a theory that strife produces a positive 
distribution of difference rather than an oppressive negation of the 'other' and similarly, 
Foucault has developed a more positive evaluation of the effects of power that is in the 
process of shifting the ground of ethics and educational issues. 
At first glance the root of Greek thought seems to contrast Being against becoming. 
Parmenides' exposition on Being as all that is ultimate and enduring appears to oppose 
479 Guignon, 2001: 43, quoting Heidegger, 1973a: 157 
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Heraclitus saying "panta rhei"; everything is in flux. The philosophical tradition has set 
up a dualism, opposing Parmenides' static foundational Being to Heraclitus' chaotic 
changing Becoming: everything 'is' becoming. 481 Heidegger marks the emphasis on 'is, ' 
thereby bringing the flux of becoming into the same realm as the endurance of Being. 
Heidegger brings Parmenides' Being together with Heraclitus' flux for the first time, 
arguing that they are both essentially talking about the same thing. Becoming is the 
engagement of Being with the existence of beings. At the centre of this engagement is 
dynamic struggle. 
Parmenides also wrote a fragment that is often translated as "thinking and Being are the 
same. " The fragment could be understood from Descartes' perspective that thinking is 
subjective and, therefore, Being is subjectively fashioned. But Heidegger argues against 
the subjectivist interpretation which creates an oppositional dualism between subjective 
thinking and the objective characteristics of Being. He argues that 'the same' has 
reciprocity. Yet the two are 'the same' in relation to each other, inferring Heraclitus 
auseinandersetzung is also at work; 'the same' is also 'set apart' allowing both the being 
of thinking humans and, reciprocally, the apprehending (vernehmen) of Being to shine 
forth. For Heidegger, "Thinking and Being are the same" translates into "There is a 
reciprocal bond between apprehension and Being. , 482 Being is a shining or emerging for 
thinking. Heidegger explains it as "the particularity of being-human will grow from the 
particularity of its belonging to Being as dominant appearing. , 483 
Being and Appearance 
In the same way that he had conflated Being and becoming, Heidegger conflates Being 
and appearance. Plato designated Being to the Universal, outside of time and space, with 
our own phenomenological perceptions limited to ascertaining the mere 'appearance' of 
beings, themselves a shadowy copy of the original Being. Heidegger manages to bring 
Being and appearance together in the same reciprocal relation, while acknowledging a 
remnant of the nominal fallacy enabled by Plato's dualism that divides Being from 
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appearance. He draws attention to three aspects of appearance that are based on the 
'shining' forth of Being into the clearing of human perception and thought. The 
4appearance' projects from an object and has to be interpreted by a subject; It is the 
nominalist divide between subject and object in its very early phase. Heidegger argues 
that there is an interpretive scale for appearance (Schein): firstly as 'radiance' or glow, 
secondly as 'appearing' or coming to light, and thirdly, as 'mere appearance' or 
semblance. 484 At one end of the scale, appearance reveals Being by letting it emanate 
from beings. Along the other end, individual experience of the appearance of the being is 
subject to so many variations, and interpretations, it has to be, in Platonic terms, a 
deviation, a copy, or even an illusion of Being. Heidegger takes a very different position 
that the shining forth of Being has to be 'wrested' from the being. 485 Taking Nietzsche's 
critique of Absolute Truth and the' otherworldly' nature of Being in Plato, Heidegger 
refuses to accept a particular version of the appearance as correctitude. Arguing that the 
traditional philosophical categories of 'subjective, ' 'objective, ' 'realistic, ' or 'idealistic' 
are irrelevant to the mode of questioning Being. 'Schein'in its full spectrum as coming to 
light, as the appearance of Being, the radiance of Being, or the semblance of Being, still 
facilitates Being to be apprehended by Dasein through beings. Appearing is crucial as a 
means by which Being emerges from unconcealment. Heidegger argues, "Appealing is 
the very essence of Being. 486 Becoming and appearance both contribute to Dasein's 
relationship to the truth of Being, through manifest appearance and the enduring sway. 
Far from being alienated from Being, through 'being-there, ' Dasein can evoke the 
unconcealed radiance of the Being as it is manifested in beings. 
Heidegger summarises that Being as Physis was divided at this early point in Greek 
thought into three facets; firstly as emerging; secondly, becoming to presence; and 
finally, manifesting as the appearance. Plato and the Sophists congealed the distinction 
between appearance and Being by making a distinct separation between concealment and 
distortion - appearance. Heidegger counters the rigid Platonist desecration of appearance 
as distortion by regarding the Schein as the unconcealment that reveals Being towards 
484 Heidegger, 1973a: 100 
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Dasein. Yet for Heidegger, Plato marks on origin, the 'culmination of the beginning of 
philosophy' 487 Parmenides more poetic and original conceptualisation of the question of 
Being 'falls away' with Plato, into a hardened, otherworldly quest for 'values' rather than 
ontology. Plato emphasized the mimesis of the appearance, which implies that being is a 
replica and Being the original. The appearance is the shadow and insufficient copy of the 
Absolute Being, implying that the appearances of beings are mere replica: re-present 
themselves as appearance, or simulacra of the original Being. This set up representation 
as the only means that human subjects can apprehend any thing, a philosophy of 
nominalism that recurs through Thomas Aquinas, Peter Abelard, Dun Scottus, William of 
Ockham, David Hume and permeates philosophy today. 
The third aspect of Being also resides in the Platonic schema of metaphysics. Heidegger 
makes an etymological argument that eidos, or Idea is derived from ousia, or enduring 
manifestation. The enduring manifestation is not simply a slowing down of physis or 
emerging into a static or stagnant tempo. The falling away from physis to ousia is 
actually a divorce in terms. As ousia, the permanence of Being is juxtaposed against the 
temporal limits of beings. As eidos, the Idea is opposed to the illusory deficiency of 
appearance. Being is removed from the immanent ground, to a transcendental position 
that lights up the mere apprehension of transient objects. New constraints on 
epistemology result from this extraction of Being from beings, and it is much more 
querulous to apprehend things. According to the new ontology truth "becomes a 
correctness of vision, of apprehension as representation. 488 
Heidegger argues that Plato's conception of Being as indiscernible except as the 
simulacra, the enduring manifestation of Ideal truth, 'correctness of representation' falls 
into a stale understanding of logos as statement. The logical statement has an obvious, 
positivist reference in relation to appearance that Heidegger argues is 'always already' 
unconcealed in relation to appearance. The appearance no longer has the ability to inquire 
into the truth of the ground of Being because logos is always limited to a nominal 
representation that cannot 'wrest' Being from unconcealment. The dynamics of physis 
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has congealed with logos so that Schein as emerging radiance, and not distinguished 
radically from subjectivity, can now only be perceived as an apparent, surface 
appearance. The appearance of the entity is bound by time and space and only interpreted 
through the representation of the subject. The dialectical method of deduction gives rise 
to a language that privileges calculating logic. Logos describes an entity's quidity - its 
whatness - and appearance designates its quodity - or thatness. The appearance can be 
measured in size, volume, weight and so forth, it can be positioned in terms of place and 
history. Being can be represented as having different properties, such as magnitude and 
extension. Heidegger argues that Aristotle too, derives his philosophy of language from 
logos. 
Being as emerging unconcealment has been shifted to the statements of logos, to 
representations of correctness. While the logos lends itself to rational calculation, the idea 
and statement have taken over, and now ground the possibility of finding the truth of 
Being. 489 Christianity and modernity, Heidegger admonishes, adheres to the metaphysical 
traditions' "paralysis of all passion for questioning. A90 
Clearly, it is here that the role of education is most vital. According to a Heideggerian 
reading, the ethical task of education is to inspire a psychology of awe: to care about 
Being as such. As teachers know, in the moments when we do achieve this, as opposed to 
the long hours where students are struggling not to fall asleep, 'the penny drops' and real 
learning and thinking occurs. 
To summarize, Heidegger's argument of the 'degradation' of the inquiry into Being by 
Plato, then Aristotle and the tradition of Western metaphysics, several key shifts take 
place. Through Plato's shift from physis, Being to eidos, Idea, Being is no longer 
immanent and welling up through all beings, it is reserved as the model of beings. 
Modem languages have evolved from Plato and Aristotle's philosophical assumptions. 
We are bom into communities with a language that pre-exists any individual, and in 
European languages the terminology and grammatical structures reinforce the separation 
of subject from the environment because appearance and 'representation' is always 
489 Heidegger, 1973a: 186-188 
490 Heidegger, 1973a: 142 
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inserted in the meanings that we attach to names. The appearance is the semblance or 
simulacra of Being which thinking can 'correctly' ascertain. 
Because Being has lost its 'ground' in beings, and is now held fast by the verifiable 
logos, it is susceptible to Plato's transcending it with 'the good. ' Values impose a 
transcendental 'ought' upon Being, and so there is no longer an intrinsically radiant, 
immanent unconcealment through beings. Value judgements are posed in the language of 
calculation and rationality, imposing a technological measurement on Being. 
Representation and calculations of value hierarchically supersede Being. Logical 
deduction is assumed to produce universal moral values, imprinting the subjectivist 
construction of truth above Being and thus annihilating any possibility of Being to 'shine 
forth. ' Because Being is removed from the daily existence of time and place, the 
reciprocal relationship where thinking both 'is' and at the same time apprehends Being 
can no longer coalesce. What Heidegger calls the 'staleness' of the logos mediates 
between the replica or representation and the human. Since the culmination of the 
beginning of philosophy, thought remains captured by the logos of values and statements. 
For Heidegger, language as representation is the essence of metaphysics. 
Being as emerging, or becoming, also changes from the viewpoint of the metaphysical 
logos. Being is no longer the immanent, enduring presence that belongs, but is instead the 
calculable magnitude and movement of space and time. Becoming shifts its emphasis to 
movement and away from permanent presence, its velocity being calculable as distance 
divided by time. This emphasis that Heidegger places on permanent presence explains his 
continual reference to the homely place of dwelling. His resistance to movement, whether 
nomadic peoples or the technological development of engines, transport, globalised 
consumerism all find justification in the rather static conceptualisation ofphysis as 
emerging from enduring presence. 
Where Plato was characterised as the 'culmination of the beginning, ' Heidegger positions 
Nietzsche as the culmination of metaphysics. He argues that Nietzsche's thought is 
merely the inversion of the Platonic Idea. 491 Nietzsche rejects the 'otherworldly' but 
491 Heidegger, 1982, vol. 11: 95 
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elevates nature, or 'life' to take its place. A generation before Heidegger, Nietzsche wrote 
that Plato initiated the degeneration in philosophical metaphysics by creating an 
'otherworldly' alienation of the Idea. He wrote in his notes for The Will to Power, 
The great concepts "good" and "just" are divorced from the first principles of which they 
form a part, and, as "ideas" becomefree, degenerate into subjects for discussion. A 
certain truth is sought behind them; they are regarded as entities or as symbols of entities: 
a world is invented where they are "at home, " and from which they are supposed to hall. 
In short: the scandal reaches its apotheosis in Plato. 492 
In regards to the history of western metaphysics, Heidegger does not acknowledge his 
debt to Nietzsche's thinking. Instead he disposes of Nietzsche's awesome analysis of the 
history of western metaphysics by arguing, in effect, that Nietzsche's concept of the 
transvaluation of values is a reimposition of the hierarchy between the World of 
Appearance and the World of Ideas. 493 Nietzsche proposes a series of metamorphoses, 
that overcome the dichotomy created by metaphysics, but Heidegger argues that 
Nietzsche wishes to 'naturalise' humanity and 'deify' the appearance rather than the 
'otherworldly' value of the 'good. ' According to Heidegger's careful explication of the 
ancient dichotomy between appearance and Idea, Nietzsche succeeds only in inverting 
the two, and thus the dichotomy is not transcended, it is preserved. 494 The tussle between 
them amounts to vastly different approaches to the concepts they use in regards to the 
environment. Heidegger claims the ancient philosophical term Being, and Nietzsche 
relies on Life. 
ietzsche 
Nietzsche's critique of the theological and philosophical is highlighted in his declaration 
"God is dead. " With this flash of insight he proposes that the entire edifice of Western 
metaphysics with its faith in universal truth will collapse. Nietzsche talks instead in terms 
of the 'Will to Power' which generates a particular constellation of perspective(s), a flow 
of forces, and constitutes a relatively stable 'ground' from which a person or group will 
understand their world. 
492 Nietzsche, 1909a, vol. 1, # 430: 351 493 Heidegger, 1982, vol. 1: 171, and vol 11: 95 494 Heidegger, 1982: vol. 1: 171 
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Nietzsche's philosophy of values is a complex and apparently contradictory set of ideas, 
made harder to coherently apprehend because of his style of short, oblique aphorisms that 
do not directly associate with one another. He presents a variety of perspectives that 
together amount to both a critique and an acknowledgement of the contribution of 
different points of view. The moral perspectives of various groups in society can be 
judged according to their contribution to the overall health of the planet. The active 
'noble, ' the reactive, plebeian ressentiment - they are sometimes poisonous to the health 
of society, but poison can also in some circumstances be the unlikely and dangerous 
medicine required to save us from disease and death. 
In Towards a Genealogy ofMorals, Nietzsche defines the 'Will to Nothingness' as 
nihilism. 495 In that text he makes a comprehensive argument that monotheistic belief 
systems tend towards idealising the 'otherworldly; ' Judeo-Christian-Muslim religions 
with heaven, Buddhists with nirvana, and so forth. Aiming the attention, will, and 
purpose at something 'beyond' the immanent, daily reality of this life is, by his 
definition, the will to nothingness. By insisting on universal purpose and teleology, whole 
societies deny the meaning of living in the often incomprehensible, mundane, daily world 
of the living environment. Nietzsche's argument is that we need to rejuvenate the Tlick' 
of existing in the here and now by making the decision to will the inevitable in our own 
lives. 
Nietzsche himself has often been accused of being a nihilist. And in a restricted sense this 
has some validity. In Ae Will to Power Nietzsche notes that disillusiom-nent with the 
belief in God has resulted in a loss of meaningfulness; "And thus the belief in the utter 
immorality of nature, and in the absence of all purpose and sense ... as though there were 
no meaning in existence at all, as though everything were in vain. " 496 But he does not 
abandon thinking or decision making in this void. Nietzsche argues that the significance 
of human life is the ability to be creative and enquire about our environment and 
ourselves. He calls this the transvaluation of values. These enquiries have no recourse to 
the authority of God, or Being, or the legitimacy of the State, or less still the Pragmatic 
495 Nietzsche, 1989 
496 Nietzsche, 1909a, vol 1, # 55: 47-48 
244 
paramount importance of the 'good of the greatest number. ' Knowledge is contestable at 
every level. It is constantly in a state of flux. It is the differentiation, as Deleuze and 
Guattari put it, that produces a dynamic democratic 'rhizome' of links, overlays, missed 
connections, and multiplications of meaning. 497 The will to power of different 
perspectives generates institutions, communities and modes of social organisation, rather 
than assuming that societal structures are rigid, pennarient and serve as a source of 
legitimation. 
Heidegger has a subtly different concept of nihilism to Nietzsche. Heidegger describes 
nihilism as thefOrgetting of Being. 'Nothingness' is simply existence for Heidegger, 
which is outside the scope of Dasein's openness to Being. While nothingness subtly 
coalesces with Being, it is also a false or unavailable path of enquiry. He follows 
Nietzsche's lead and associates metaphysics with nihilism, for fixing truth into rigid 
'correctitude' and 'forgetting' Being. 
Heidegger's case is that the Platonic Idea is a corruption of the earlier dynamic, emerging 
physis into the representation of the highest value of the 'good' which imposes a 
transcendental logic for universal morals above the truth of Being. The enduring presence 
of Being has also been affected by ousia and 'becoming' or 'emerging' has shifted to the 
magnitude and movement through space and time. Instead of the appearance shining 
forth towards thinking, the appearance degenerates into a representation or copy of 
universal Being. Plato's 'Idea' consolidates appearance into the simulacra, so that the 
entity is a finite and limited copy of Being. Aristotle developed logos into logical 
discourse, or statement, constraining the space for the unexpected to emerge from 
concealment, and instead designating the appearance into an always-already developed 
language with a well -established system of names and categories. The idea can only be 
represented by logos. It is repeatable, and communicable, as correctness, but logos loses 
the capability of freshly allowing Being to stand and exude its own full glory. 
Being retreats into an Ideal that is inaccessible to humanity, bound as we are by time and 
space. So Being becomes a heavenly model which earthly beings simulate. But the model 
497 Deleuze and Guattari, 1999 
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of Being has increasingly become artificial because it has lost validity through the 
removal of groundedness in actual things and events. To compensate, Plato added gravity 
to the Idea of Being by attributing an 'Ought' which transcends Being as an a priori 
supreme model of the 'good. ' The 'Ought' of values overtakes Being as the highest 
purpose that directs human endeavour. Aristotle brought Being back to beings by 
focussing on the 'essence' of entities. Yet he did not make the same revision of values, 
which, like essence, he attributes with a universality that transcends the finitude of the 
individual and instead resides in the entire species, over time. The categories were 
designed to transcend individual whim. Categories and universal values can be deduced 
by the logos. Heidegger argues that values and categories have fixed philosophy into an 
increasingly technological specificity, where the minute details of species, genera, and so 
forth, are busily logged and theorised, and at the same time, the genuine relationship with 
Being is lost to view. Having forgotten to enquire into Being, the logos which has 
become modem, positivist science is trapped in nihilism according to Heidegger, and he 
believed that Nietzsche was also caught up in the same rubric of reducing Being to 
values, or in Nietzsche's terminology the Will to Power as a 're-evaluating' force for 're- 
evaluating values. ' 498 
In contrast to Heidegger's analysis of nihilism, which is the forgetting to care, the failing 
to enquire into the nature of Being, Nietzsche regards nihilism as a psychological 
phenomenon. Nietzsche's nihilism is a phase of disillusionment which humanity must 
pass through when we face up to the problem that are integral to our previous sources of 
meaning. Nihilism derives from an ethos of purpose that has lost its significance, or 
ground. Instead of being the ultimate end in disillusionment, nihilism is a crucial part of a 
cycle of decision making as we rid ourselves of outdated moral truth concepts that have 
become life degenerating rather than life enhancing. The 'otherworldly' values that have 
lost their meaning can be overcome through a transvaluation of all values. Nihilism 
is 
something to be overcome as we find a deeper regard for life. Willing permeates 
life, and 
willing provides the impetus for choosing values to motivate our own actions, 
in the 
Heidegger, 1973a, last chapter 
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knowledge however, that these motivations will also be subject to question and the 
disorientation of disillusionment. 
The dominant form of political and social organisation in most modem democratic (and 
many non-democratic) states is Neoliberalism. It uses the market as a metaphor for all 
aspects of society, including education. The marketisation of everything, including 
'human resources' has exacerbated the danger and the disillusionment of the self-serving 
degeneration of a civil society because we have no regard for other living beings, the 
biosphere, the world's poor or even our own future generations. This fall into depravation 
and selfish greed has generated unease in all caring and thinking people. That 
disillusionment with contemporary values creates the nihilism that is for Nietzsche, a 
necessary pre-condition for the creation of new values that will reshape society into an 
entirely new, ethical configuration. Not that we should imagine all problems will be 
solved, for struggle and change will show up in new arrangements of rank, new 
distributions of difference. Education has potentially a central role to play in this 
metamorphosis of the relationship between human society and the environment we live 
with. 
The tone of redemption is not absent from either Nietzsche or Heidegger's accounts of 
nihilism or its nemesis. But present at the core of their work is a recognition that strife 
generates life itself In the form of suffering, strife is not something we can eliminate or 
return in kind, explain or redeem. Strife is how differentiation occurs. No two items are 
ever identical. Differences generate the flux of positions that create identifiable 
perspectives and meaning. But neither is strife of differentiation the Terror of 
governmentality that is embedded in the modem state. Strife is not why life is unbearable 
or meaningless, it is simply the powerful, chaotic, generation of movement and change. 
There is considerably more that could be said about Nietzsche's concept of nihilism, the 
will to nothingness and the will to power, life and the eternal recurrence. I disagree with 
Heidegger about Nietzsche's position as the culmination of western metaphysics, but in 
terms of bringing Heidegger's philosophy into focus, the comparison with the two 
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different versions of nihilism, life and Being is important. Heidegger continued to engage 
with Nietzsche's thought throughout his life. 
By focusing on the significance of the relationship between Dasein and Being, Heidegger 
has avoided the technological minimalisation of site specific scientific 'fixits' to 
problems such as pollution and human caused extinction. Nietzsche was taken up by the 
Nazis in precisely this manner; the Nazi will to power sought to technologically 'solve' 
the 'Jew problem. ' Attention to language, a refusal to fall into the 'stale representation' of 
the logos, and an awareness of the creative possibilities of all knowledge as means to a 
vital, life enhancing culture is the massive task of humanity in general, and education in 
particular. 
Education teaches values in a variety of curriculum areas, for example Citizenship, 
Environment, Religious Education, and Modem Studies, and the values will have to deal 
with these issues of scope and the relationship between humanity and the environment at 
the same time as we analyse our modes of social organisation and struggles over equity 
and difference, war and peace. Heidegger's analysis of the nihilism embedded in the 
language, logos, and universal transcendence of 'values' initiates a new critical turn in 
our approach to education and ethics. He advocates that a new framework for ethics 
might emerge from the focus on the relationship between beings and Being. 
The tensions that are brought to light between the philosophy of Heidegger and Nietzsche 
indicate that the concept of Being needs closer investigation. I think the scope of a new 
focus for educational ethics might also look at the relationship between beings and 
environment, or as Nietzsche calls it, Life. It is not a return to Liberal justifications for 
vocationalism or critical democratic participation, nor is it exactly a mode of redemption. 
The debate over educational values needs to engage with the shift in relationship between 
humanity and life such that consumerism gives way to an ethic of attention, care and co- 
existence. 
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8 Heidegger's version of Environment: Equipmentality and Being 
Encrusted in the ancient term Being, ' there seems to remain a conservative eschatology 
that's tends to the transcendental. To some extent this derives from the historico-political 
circumstances of 20th century Germany and to some extent is a relic of Heidegger's onto- 
theo-logical genealogy of the term 'Being. ' In this chapter we will look closely at 
Heidegger's conceptualisation of 'foundations, '' equipment, ' 'physis, ' 'aletheia, ' 
'worlds' and 'epochs. ' Heidegger's philosophy is hugely influential for rethinking the 
scope, the purposes, and the grounding for epistemology in an era which is beginning to 
recognise the failings of modernity. Yet some of these failings creep in and reside in 
Heidegger's thought. I attempt here to critically examine some fundamental aspects of 
Heidegger's concepts, while recognising that his ideas are crucially important for 
reconfiguring economic transactions, global consumerism, international relations, 
politics, policy, social structures and institutions, and the educational project. 
Foundations 
The Earth has been traditionally associated in philosophy with the physiological source or 
substructure of the human animal. Biology has been the 'ground, ' the 'substance, ' or the 
'substratum' upon which human animals build on a 'superstructure' of social relations, 
knowledges, politics and technology. Heidegger completely rejects biology as the ground 
of thinking. 499 While he made use of Marx's materialist methodology, he rejected the 
notion of an intellectual superstructure. For Heidegger, thinking is grounded in the home 
of Being. Thinking is fundamentally ontological. There is no civilised hierarchy that 
offers a 'wealth' of opportunity for the privilege of education and thought. Rather than 
biology, Heidegger offers an alternative 'ground' to thinking and ontology: Being. Being 
could arguably be a physical, environmental, and immanent ontology. Heidegger insists 
on leaving Being enigmatic. "Whenever a being is, Be-ing must sway. But how does Be- 
499 Heidegger, 1973a 
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ing sway? But is a being? "'500 The continual refraining of the question "What is Being? " 
draws different elements of the Be-ing to light. There is no definitive answer, but the 
questioning intimates a genealogy of meanings which contribute to contemporary and 
future understandings. If in that genealogy is the problem of anthropocentric nominalist 
Idealism, or technological enframing, then the questioning, the terminology somehow 
needs transforming or disrupting, to allow a new set of relations and a new pathway to 
emerge for human beings and the planet. 
Equipment 
In Heidegger's 1927 text Being and Time, the substrata of Nature is not exactly inverted 
but his concept of being in-the-world places primary emphasis on equipment rather than 
physiology. The 'ground' is shifted from 'earth' and biology to the 'world' of normalised 
social relations. Heidegger's early writing ontologically prioritises equipment as an 
integral part of human subjectivity. The majority of the time equipment is 
indistinguishable from the self. 'I' stoop over desk and paper and squiggle with a pen but 
am consciously engaged with the communication of ideas rather than the manipulation of 
tools. Unless, that is, some item 'fails, ' for example my elbow twinges with repetitive 
stress syndrome or the pen runs out of ink. Then 'the problem' is isolated out as object of 
enquiry but the rest of the time, unreflective absorption in equipment constitutes the 
501 
world . 
Nature is rarely brought up in Heidegger's early work. But after the 'turn' of the 1930s he 
began to approach nature, modernity, and equipment in a subtly different way. Feenberg 
argues that he has two distinct classes of equipment; premodern 'craftwork' that is 
ontologically privileged, and then modem enframing where everything is reduced to a 
resource. 502 There certainly is a significant shift, I would argue of disillusionment during 
and after the National Socialist period. In some moments this presents as a dualism; the 
skill and comfort of Luddite premodern 'craft' being contrasted with a degraded, 
dangerous and alienating modem industrialism. However there are many ways in which 
500 Heidegger, 2000: 5 
'0' Cf. Charles Guignon, 2000: 67 and Hubert Dreyfus 2003 for examples of the way equipmentallty 
functions together with subjectivity. 
502 Feenberg, 1999: 184,208 
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Heidegger's earlier analysis of the ontological basis of tools holds in the later discussion 
of enframing. The Cartesian model of individuated subjectivity is negated in both, firstly 
by ontological absorption in tools which 'world' and secondly, and similarly, in 
enframing which also creates a world that encompasses human subjects as much as it 
does earth and particular technological items. 
According to the second more cynical approach to technology as enframing, the initial 
challenging forth by humanity and environment is of utility, potential resource and 
capacity to store. Nature and humanity are instrumentalised. The forest is a place to 
exercise and a reserve of building materials and paper, rather than an autonomous 
sublime landscape. In fact, Heidegger argues that the presence of 'pure nature' is derived 
as an abstraction from the ready-at-hand (Zuhandenheit) of the relational field of 
equipment. Present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) is a secondary concept rather than a 
metaphysical 'ground. ' Both of these relationships with nature are oblivious to its raw 
power or autonomous force. The (Romantic) nature "which overwhelms us and enthrals 
us as landscape"503 is not derivative nor reducible to Zuhandenheit or Vorhandenheit. 
This hidden aspect of nature is present but unexplored in early Heidegger. 
Heidegger is interested in where the nominalist separation of subjectivity from nature is 
imposed and if, where, and how it is transgressed. The 'world' is a network of 
interdependent relations at a variety of levels; equipment, politics, morality, and so forth. 
The 'world' of relations conceptualised in human terms limits our ability to comprehend 
natural earthliness. Or put in Heidegger's words, "All that we will ever be able to say, or 
think or experience of supposedly 'natural' phenomena is necessarily situated within the 
world. 95504 Somehow, despite his notion of humans 'being-in-the-world, ' dissolving the 
separation between subject and object that was posed by Descartes, Heidegger retains a 
sense of the Idealist separation between nature and humanity. The 'world' is a nominally 
different conceptual space to the 'earth. ' 
503 Heidegger, 1962: 70 
504 Heidegger, 1962: 70 
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Physis and aletheia 
During the 1930s Heidegger's thought took an acclaimed 'turn' during which he 
developed another approach to nature. In An Introduction to Metaphysics 0 93 5) and The 
Origin of the Work ofArt (1936), he rejuvenated two related Greek terms, physis and 
aletheia. This new conceptualisation reinstates the independence of nature, he wrote in 
Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, "(What does ' hysis'mean? It means that which arises on P 
its owny, 505 but it also struggles to transgress the rupture posed by Idealism. In Holzwege, 
"The world is founded on the Earth and the Earth thrusts up in the world. , 
506 
Physis began to stand in sometimes for 'Earth, ' sometimes for 'Nature, ' and sometimes 
for 'Being. ' In a variety of texts, Heidegger wrote, "This appearing and arising itself and 
on the whole was early on called physis by the Greeks. In a single stroke this name 
clarifies that upon which and in which man grounds his abode. We name it Earth , 507 
"Physis is Being itself -)508 and also in the works on H61derlin, "The inaugural arising of 
what is present in all being, but also falls askew, even falls into oblivion: Nature 
(physis) -)1509 
There arises a complex set of relations and important distinctions between Being, 
aletheia, physis, and Earth and Nature. While at times Physis takes the title of Earth or 
Nature or Being, each of these is different. Michael Haar expounds in his book, Song of 
the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds ofHistory ofBeing (1993), "if the Earth appears, 
manifests itself in the world, it must enter into being. But it does not stem from Being; it 
does not identify with Being. If the Earth is neither the appearance of Being nor, as 
Heidegger will make clear, the name of its withdrawal, then does not its proper, 
autonomous power remain unthought? 95510 
Crucially physis does not rely on the materiality of the planet, but rather on its dynamic 
of obscurity and emergence into the light of truth, aletheia. Physis is at once, aspects of 
505 Heidegger, 1953: 11 cited in Haar, 1993: 11 
506 Heidegger, 1979: 37 cited in Haar, 1993: 13 
507 Heidegger, 1979: 31 cited in Haar, 1993: 13 
508 Heidegger, II cited in Haar, 1993: 13 
509 Heidegger, 1951: 64-65 cited in Haar, 1993: 12 
5'0 Haar, 1993: 12 
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the earth coming forth and at the same time, necessarily, retaining a hidden element. 
"More precisely" Haar explains, "Earth belongs to the dimension of withdrawal, of 
concealing (lethe) which holds sway in un-concealment, in a-letheia .,, 
511 Earth is not 
exclusively a secret, or a hiddenness or even the 'unthought. ' It is always both 
impenetrable, hiding elements of itself and allowing aspects of its being to show forth. 
Dissecting the flower and mapping its veins, cells and photo-chemical processes in 
minute detail cannot ascertain the texture, delicacy, smell, imperfections of its 
flowerness. The flower is. Heidegger explains, "Earth is the spontaneous arising of what 
is continually self-secluding. " To comprehend the Being of the flower we are better 
served by poetry than rationality. Aletheia is the process ofphysis. The concealing or 
revealing is directed towards an audience - those who care, Dasein. 
It would be overstating the case to say that aletheia and physis seals the rupture of 
Idealism, Earth is arising into the world, and this projection constitutes an upheaval that 
is never satisfactory. Movement is not quite the right word, but Haar is on to something 
when he writes that because the Earth keeps its own depths hidden, "Being essentially 
this movement of again taking up and going back into itself, it makes this covering rise 
up and visibly appear in the very midst of the world. ý9512 The Earth exudes with 
fundamental familiarity, something that is undiscoverable and incalculable in rational, or 
even worldly terms. But Heidegger wants to say something further, and in Erlduterungen 
zu H61derfins Dichtung he wrote that the "Earth cannot renounce the Open of the world if 
it is itself to appear as Earth. 9513 Aletheia has many facets. It is concealment that becomes 
manifest in the 'clearing, ' the rising or unconcealment of elements of Being into the 
open, and it is the forgetting or obscurement of Being in the guiding paradigms of the 
world. Truth is fundamental to the relations that extend between beings and Being, or 
Earth, or Nature. 
According to Heidegger, it is not scientific positivism but poetry that is one of the best 
ways that people have to bring the Earthly into language. This does not occur through an 
capparent' representation but through a truth factor that is irreducible to the calculus of 
51 1 Haar, 1993: 57. 
5" Haar, 1993: 57 
513 Heidegger, 1951: 38, cited in Haar, 1993: 57 
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science or governmentality. In his book The Song of the Earth (2000), Bate draws 
attention to the way Heidegger associates poiesis and physis in The Question Concerning 
Technology (original lecture 1953 ). 514 From Plato, Heidegger argues that poiesis brings 
something into the world that was not previously there, bringing it forth into the clearing, 
aletheia. This is the same process as the emerging, revealing, or 'coming into presence' 
of physis in aletheia. 
Physis, also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. 
Physis is indeed poiesis in the highest sense. For what presences by means of physis has 
the irruption belonging to bringing-forth, e. g. the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in 
itself. "' 
Heidegger distinguishes between the poiesis arising from itself, and the technological 
arising of instrumental activity in the craftsman, for example. The bringing forth gets 
transferred to the craftsman, rather than the instrument that 'causes' the production of an 
artefact. The truth (aletheia) gets attached to the person rather than the being. Heidegger 
reverts to Idealism again. 
Harking back to the Romantics, particularly Wordsworth, ecologically aware poetry, or 
Ecopoesis is not a-political but is a poetic principle of politics. This means ecological 
poetry might be held and contested by a variety of political spectrums. The blossoming 
tree reveals itself in an always-already political landscape. Many political forins claim to 
mimic nature, Burke justified inheritory land ownership through natural evolution, 
516 
Capitalist economics is associated with natural competition, and 'survival of the fittest. ' 
Heidegger tried to regulate an 'authentic' relationship; Dasein and Being, as a kind of 
authentic eco-politics and ultimately true ecopoesis. Yet Heidegger too, places so great an 
emphasis on the local; home, hearth, and dwelling, that he confuses eco-politics with 
nationalism. 
World 
Heidegger puts together nature, truth and human agency in an integral whole, that is 
shaped by an aesthetic 'decision. ' The decision is the principle of action. The 
decision - 
5" Heidegger, 1977 
5 15 Heidegger, 1977, c1ted in Bate, 2000: 253 
516 Bate, 2000: 278-279 
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this is the point of interest to educators! It is the guide and reference point to all our 
interactions, both with each other and in relation to nature. The aesthetic decision is what 
political activism is motivated by, and works to change. It is what teaching is aimed at. It 
is the 'reason' that the Scots will vocally object to queue jumping but casually ignore 
littering. Green consciousness is a decision that has far reaching consequences on 
institutional policy making, on personal effort, on lifestyle choices, on ethics, on 
physically and metaphorically creating a 'world. ' 
Heidegger's concepts ofphysis and aletheia radically challenge metaphysics and the 
guiding principles of modernity and the Enlightenment. Truth and knowledge are not a 
superlative add-on to the fundamental structure of material physiology but essential to 
nature itself. The foundations have changed. Understanding Nature via a first premise 
such as equipment or instrumentality is no longer adequate as an initial focus. 
Unlike traditional Idealism which accentuates the sceptical gap between subjective mind 
and nature as the object of knowledge, Physis and aletheia integrate the human need to 
seek truth in the ground of Being. Heidegger's concept of poetry is a potent force for 
sunnounting the subjectivism of Idealist principles that have separated human society 
from Nature. Nominalism is still at work, but instead of believing it emerges only from 
the individual's subjective mind, aletheia is firmly anchored to the erupting forces of 
Earth as it pushes forth into unconcealment in relation to human beings. 
Animals 
Bate (2000) and Haar's (1993) commentary on Heidegger and the poetry of 'earthsongs' 
dissolve modem and Enlightenment distinctions between subject and object and should 
democratise the Great Chain of Being. But when it comes to the status of humanity in 
relation to other forms of life, Heidegger retains the prejudice of his times. Although no 
theorists want to associate with Heidegger's politics because of its Nazi associations, his 
prejudice based on the Christian hierarchy is accepted by most Heideggerians, including 
Guignon and Haar. Humans are superior because they are capable of poetic insights. 
Animals on the other hand, are restricted to unreflective absorption in their environment. 
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In Heidegger's schema, there are three important distinctions between humanity and 
animals, remembering that he wants to abandon biology as the substratum of human 
being. Firstly, animals are so engrossed in the environment that they have little or no 
agency. Secondly their 'world' is an impoverished one. Thirdly, he thinks that animals 
have no anxiety about death -a concept crucial to Heidegger's notion of authentic 
subj ectivity. 
Animals are unable to discern beings as beings. They are totally engrossed in their form 
of environment. 517 One might say - although Heidegger would extend them the capability 
of wielding tools - that animals are completely engrossed in their world of equipment 
"only as non-isolable elements of its environment. 518 
Heidegger tries to avoid being arrogant about the status of animals, in Die Grundbegriffe 
der Metaphysik, he says it "does not mean that life is of less value or of an inferior degree 
compared to human existence. Rather, life is a domain which possesses a rich openness 
(Offensein) the likes of which the human world perhaps knows nothing. , 519 However, for 
the most part, animals are not seen in honourable terms of alternative worlds to which we 
have little access, but in terms of an impoverished world . 
520 Furthermore, to envisage a 
'rich' animal-world is attributing human values to animal realities. Haar agrees with 
Heidegger's stance "We much too quickly shift animals into a genuine world, forgetting 
that an animal lives in the limited space of an environment. , 521 Animals are firstly 
organisms, from which the root word, 'organ' describes the physiological means of 
carrying out the will of the faculties, i. e. an 'organ' is a tool. 
Heidegger also makes a distinction between animal behaviour and human conduct. 
Behaviour is limited to operating in an environment in an absorbed and self-referential 
manner. The utter absorption in the lived envirom-nent (often called 'instinct') is a 
517 Heidegger makes a distinction between 'environment' and 'world. ' The 19'hcentury German term for 
environment is dasein; the term he co-opts as the being who is open to Being. 'Environment' Is degraded to 
mere existence, little removed from nothingness. See chapter 8 518 Haar, 1993: 25 
5 '9 Heidegger, GA 29/30: 371-2 cited in Haar, 1993: 25 
520 Heidegger, GA 29/30,274,275 referred to by Haar, 1993: 12 
52 1 Haar 1993: 26, Furthermore, Heidegger believes that there is an abyss between humans and animals 
deeper than that between us and the divine. CE Heidegger, 1949: 313 
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compulsion that excludes awareness and agency. Heidegger regards behaviour as closed 
and captured by existence. Conduct on the other hand, is the openness to the manifest 
experience of things in the 'open of the world. ' Although elsewhere Heidegger is happy 
to acknowledge that humanity has little insight into the 'essence of life' itself. On a larger 
scale Heidegger's notion of the epoch and the Enframing of technology is just such a 
finite and totalising system as the all-engrossing environment he attributes to animals, 
and subsumes agency in a similar manner. 
The third vital difference that Heidegger wants to posit between humans and animals is 
their differing attitudes towards death. Anxiety towards death is a crucial part of 
Heidegger's philosophy in Being and Time. It forms the framework for his concept of 
time and history. Humans always conceive of their lives as finite and thus it is possible 
for the blick of the present moment to contain the entirety of the past and a projection in 
the knowledge of this inevitable future endpoint. Holding this entirety together lends a 
perspective on the life we lead that is, he would argue, unavailable to animals. He writes, 
And thus, just as it remains questionable to speak of an organism as a historical 
(geschlichtlich) or even historiological being, it is questionable whether death for man 
and death for an animal are the same, even though physio-chemical, physiological 
correlations can be ascertained. "' 
Many mammals pine for their dead loved ones and obviously understand that death is 
profound non-being. For all Heidegger's exposition on allowing Being to shine forth, he 
seems oddly unsympathetic and closed off from many aspects of the world he lived in. 
I"-- 
Epoch 
Again harking back to the tradition of philosophy which assumes that a teleological 
process guides history, Heidegger seems undecided about the telos of change. On the one 
hand he is influenced by Dilthey and Nietzsche who both reject any teleological 
direction, on the other hand he often posits an unfolding, a telos, or destiny to history. 
Haar regards Heidegger's theory as an inversion of the telos of Hegelianism, although 
Haar is not arguing that the destiny of Being is in any way a dialectical process. Destiny 
(Geschick) holds within it all the potential possibilities of history. This does not resonate 
522 Heidegger, GA 29/30: 388 in Haar, 1993: 8 
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with Hegel, I would argue, but with Aristotle's notion of the essence as a 'seed' that 
defines the potential pattern of growth. This is why the 4 commencement' is so important 
to Heidegger. The sending of destiny (Geschick) is held in its commencement. Humanity 
is merely in the position to note aspects of the essence that have already unfolded. The 
4essence' however, is the totality of possibility held within the commencement. Owing 
considerably to Aristotle's teacher Plato, the essence of Being supersedes the historical 
contingencies of time and space. 
Heidegger's teleology does not reach towards a heavenly otherworldliness, or a 
technological and social utopia because the beginning (Anfang) was corrupted. He 
pessimistically characterises the evolution of the world in Sein und Zeit as an escalating 
'fall' from grace. "The History of Being is the history of the increasing oblivion of 
Being. , 523 This process is not a logical inevitability, nor does it follow a law of causality 
that, to some extent following Nietzsche, Heidegger rejects. He explains that, 
Between the epochal metamorphoses of being and the withdrawal one can perceive a 
relation which nevertheless has nothing to do with a relation of causality. One can say 
that the further away one is from the dawn of western thinking and from aletheia, the 
greater is the oblivion into which it falls, the clearer is the manner in which knowledge 
and consciousness break into the open, and the manner in which Being thus 
withdraws. 
524 
Heidegger believes each epochal manifestation of Being has a finitude that excludes it 
from being able to comprehend dimensions other than its own disclosure. The destiny of 
Being has reached its closure with the technological apprehension of everything as 
resource. But Haar says 
Final totalisation does not mean that History is a total unveiling. What could the term 
Geschick mean if not that being gives itself, "sends itself' (schicken), gathers itself at 
each moment into a domain of unity (Ge-)? This unity is that of an epoch. But each epoch 
is completely closed and blind to what does not enter into it. There is a radical finitude to 
an epoch and to all epochs. Every epoch of History is epocU, which means a "holding 
itself back, " "self-suspension, " or "withdrawal, " of being which goes hand in hand with 
its manifestation. The epochal or historical as such is deployed on the basis of a free 
emergence closed in itself... 
523 Heidegger, 1977: 56 in Haar, 1993: 72 524 Heidegger, 1977: 56 in Haar, 1993: 73 
525 Haar, 1993: 2 
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The (unlooked for) defining principles make an enclosed, finite epochal period, and the 
inhabitants of any epoch are not in the position to be able to activate pathways or even 
'see' outside it. The enclosure or enframing; in our case of technology, generates the field 
of possibility. 
Openness to beings as Being, the role of agency, creative conscience and responsibility 
seem to form the critical differences between animals and humans, between existence and 
Dasein. Our world of equipment is more encompassing, and has with it a greater 
responsibility for damage control. The epoch though, is a peculiarly human example of 
6worldliness' and while we imagine that it is superior to the worlds of other animals or 
beings we will be incapable of calling forth, in poetry or otherwise, a decision to care 
(which is the very motif of Dasein) in a manner which will guide politics and science 
from mere calculative rationality to a honouring and revealing of Being in its primary 
form. 
Unless we genuinely approach the animal world with an attitude of equity it is impossible 
to advocate an authentically ethical relation between humanity and environment. In this 
regard I think Heidegger began a process of thinking outside of the Christian ethos of 
rank and the Heavenly Will to Nothingness, as Nietzsche described it, but does not 
sufficiently leave behind these ideas to avoid the pitfalls of denying life on this planet in 
this moment, including the finitude of life itself and not simply the finitude of the 
individual. 
Earth as 'substratum' has been disinterred by a combination of the global flows of 
finance capital and the new information technologies where cyberspace has become the 
'place' where relationships between people, organisations and production occur. 
In contrast, Heidegger recognized that the 'home' is significant because it is physis, the 
abode of the enduring presence of Being. Home involves safeguarding the ground as 
something that matters in every place, frontier or not. The decoupling of responsibility 
from the planet is the latest example of other-worldly nihilism and its associated 
devastation and degeneration of 'earth' and 'world. ' Education is an important site for 
rethinking and promulgating a more hopeful, caring and constructive relationship 
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between humanity and the environment that recognizes our absorption both in terms of 
biology and thought, as a part of a delicate ecological sphere that must be approached 
almost with tendemess. 
There are some important internal contradictions in Heidegger' theory, particularly his 
changing attitude towards tools and technology. In Being and Time (1927) he developed 
the theory that tools are ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) and present-at-hand 
(Vohandenheit) which he approves of as a counterargument to the separation of subject 
from object initiated by Descartes. However his later work is engrossed with how to 
escape the enframing of technology that reduces everything and everyone as a resource. 
His earlier reduction of the environment to sets of tools obviously fits in to the 
technological enframing he later argued against. This is not to say that he is wrong on 
either of these points, but that humanity as the tool-wielding animal by definition is 
equally as problematic as humanity as animal rationalis. 
An associated problem is the space generated by solipsism between Dasein, world, and 
nature. In some instances Heidegger rails against 'representation' as an artificial mimicry 
or dissembling objectification that intervenes between subject and object. He 'solves' this 
Idealist dilemma with his theory of Aletheia and Physis, the revealing and enduring 
presence of Being that integrates thinking into the ontology of beingness. At other times 
though, he holds open this solipsistic space between subject and object as vitally 
important in distinguishing, for example, between the non-reflective existence of animals 
and the superior analysis of (human) Dasein. But a difficulty remains in how we can hold 
open the distance of sceptical nominalism while integrating the human being with the 
world. 
Heidegger's critical re-examination of Descartes is valuable to questions about 
sustainability and public attitudes. Descartes famously tried to describe a division 
between the mind and body via the concept of sceptical doubt and the subjective source 
of representation. This is a crucial philosophical element of the Enlightenment privileging 
human individuals as the centre of the knowing universe. Heidegger's refusal to accept 
this division between mind and body and his consequential rejection of the role of 
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representation signals a beginning, although not the fulfilment of a new, unorthodox, dare 
we say, original or originating Anfang or commencement, which will develop into a 
poetics, a politics and a consciousness that obviates the necessity for distinctions such as 
nature/culture. Heidegger begins to show the path where dismantling the anthropocentric 
hierarchy that has traditionally separated and superimposed Man upon Nature might 
possibly be thrown away. His association with Nazi politics and the Nationalist 
Romanticisation of 'home and hearth' and the 'craftsman' are not necessarily easy to 
accept nowadays, but nevertheless Heidegger makes some important points and his 
theory is both leading the way and illustrating some dead end paths for reimagining new 
sets of social and ecological relationships. 
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9 Heidegger's Turn: Unconcealment and Forgetting 
Technology has driven the industrial revolution that has made mass consumerism 
possible. Heidegger's insight into the profound importance of technology on the 
relationship between humanity and society is incredibly important. Heidegger places 
technology as central to the relationship between the subject and the Umwelt or 
surrounding environment. Later, he borrowed Ringer's concept of 'total mobilisation' 
where technological production has enframed the modem epoch. 
The public's most prevailing assumption about technology is that it is a set of neutral 
tools, which the ingenuity of humankind has both invented and controls. There are two 
versions of opposition to the neutral tool. The 'technophobe' is someone who fears or 
fails to understand how to use the technological tool. Someone who fiddles, but can never 
get the video tuned in, but is still the operator of the technology. Or, further than mere 
inadequacy, some people are technophobic because they fear the side effects of 
technology; the magnetic field generated by high voltage overhead power lines for 
example, as a health hazard. This Luddite view is characterized both as 'green' and often 
as a Romanticizing of the past when life was simple and the horse and cart prevailed. 
Heidegger's view is that technological tools define our understanding of the world we 
live in. Far from being neutral, the tools shape our sensory perception, our expectations, 
and our relation to both other people and Being in general. Technology is enframing. 
As Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith and Paul Standish put it in their book 
Education in an Age ofNihilism (2000); 
Technological instruments, it might be argued, refine or extend our sensory 
perceptions... the dentist's probe enables the dentist to register fine differences in the 
surface of the tooth of a kind that would not be evident to the fingers directly. It amplifies 
the sense of touch. The microscope and telescope enables us to see with clarity objects 
which otherwise would be invisible because of either their small size or their distance 
from us. But just as this amplification occurs, so too is there a reduction in other aspects 
of our normal perception of the world such that what might otherwise be available is 
concealed. The probe does not register the wetness of the tooth; the microscope and 
telescope alike present things to a view in a kind of flat, homogenized, and framed near- 
distance that is strangely insulated from us, both limiting in curiously identical ways the 
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visual field. The amplification that, undoubtedly fruitftil in so many ways, brings with it a 
reduction or concealment of certain aspects of our ordinary experience of the world. "' 
Technology increasingly mediates our experiences and relationships with our 
environment (and with each other). Most obviously, education is a means to extend our 
ability to utilise technology - teachers can explain how the signal is sent, what tuning is 
for, the limitations of the screen, pixels versus digital images. More subtly, these 
practices shape our subjectivity. Students are offered the vocational opportunity to 
become a Video Sales Representative. They slot into a pre-existing set of economic 
relations, a play of consumption, with the resources obscured behind a plethora of 
technological devices. Being thus obscured and forgotten is the centre of what Heidegger 
defines as the modem problematic of 'technological enframing. ' 
Heidegger's project is to highlight the relationship between humanity and Being. On the 
way, he sets up a strong critique of modernity for "forgetting the question of Being. " His 
argument is that there has been a shift in our ability to ascertain Being from the early 
Greek thinkers, pivoting on Plato and later, Descartes. The 'revealing' of the Being of 
beings through poiesis has been displaced by the enframing of technology which 
'challenges forth' and 'demands' entities to conform to the ordering of consumerism. 
This reading makes Heidegger one of the most important philosophers of the 20th 
century. He requires educators to question their own practices in terms of the human 
relationship to the environment. His philosophy challenges environmentalists to set upon 
their task with the appropriate scope and care, without falling back into endless 
arguments about the relative merits of 'values. ' 
Heidegger stakes out the territory for questioning the limits of solipsist scepticism and the 
extent to which we are still engulfed in the paradigm of modernity. These questions over 
subjectivity and knowledge are too easily relegated to austere and elitist philosophy. The 
ideas are written in a language that is hard to access, deeply sexist, and subject to the 
difficulties of translation. I have endeavoured to touch upon the important issues brought 
up by Heidegger with the intention of engaging with his ideas, while being aware of their 
limitations. Education happens in the context of modernity, the technological frame, and 
526 Blake, Smeyers, Smith and Standish, 2000: 6-7 
263 
the relationship between humanity and existence. These sets of references govern the way 
we make decisions and maintain our assumptions. By bringing these modes of operation 
to the fore and asking questions and thinking about our taken for granted relationships we 
can begin to at least open an avenue for discussing options. Having a resolve to approach 
these questions in the classroom, both as a part of critical learning in the subject 
'technology' and also as awareness of the technological enframing of all aspects of 
schooling, educators can open up the possibility of disrupting the unhesitating 
reproduction of students as participants in an economy of consumption. 
Heidegger's ontological philosophy places central concern to the 'question of Being. ' In 
his early work from the 1920s he spells out in detail his coherences and differences with 
the philosophical tradition, particularly thinkers such as Descartes and Kant. He argues 
that Descartes is the representational thinker who sets subjectivity against objectivity. Not 
only does this result in the subject becoming the foundational prmciple for the world, but 
it sets thinking along an abstracted and mathematical path which arrests the human ability 
to discern Being in its originary aspect. This is the core of his criticism of modernity and 
it grounds my critical reading of contemporary globalisation and (Neo)liberalism. 
Heidegger explicates his alternative theory. Also ontological, and to a significant extent 
remaining within the modem project which he suggests is formulated by Descartes and 
then later Kant. He has strong criticism of the individualism inherent in the modem 
project. However his characterisation of the subject as 'Dasein'with its public and 
personal relation to Being does not create a significant gulf from the paradigm of 
modemity. Furthermore, his phenomenological method revolves around a concept of the 
work-world which assumes a technological use value to the environment. Heidegger's 
later work critiques the assumption that humanity is 'in control' of technology. He argues 
that technology is the frame which permeates all human relations with the world. His 
criticism is extremely important in the context of the dominant scientific assumption that 
humanity is capable of compensating for irreversible global damage by developing new 
technology. He also suggests that the whole concept of 'nature' which the green 
movement relies upon is a construct of modernity, and inherently part of the problem 
itself. 
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Heidegger sets us on the right path, but many of his hints towards a solution remain 
essentially conservative and not particularly helpful for extracting us from our dilemma. 
The ontological basis of Being, the calling forth of new gods and the ultimately passive 
approach to destiny all remains within the rubric of Catholic theology. 527 Yet Heidegger 
is one of the most forceful writers to collect together insights into the 'Geist, 'or spirit of 
our times and shine a light on them. His theory of forgetting, Vergessenheit takes an 
abrupt 'turn' in the 1930s when he argues that there is a passive obliviousness to Being 
hidden within the technological frame. Ironically, forgetting 'saves' because Being is not 
registered by Dasein. 
By interrogating his earlier assumptions about everyday environing and the parameters of 
Dasein, hopefully, we may discover fissures and excesses by which to decompose the 
technological frame. While I agree broadly with Heidegger's argument about the 
'descent' of the human relationship to Being - or I would want to take more of an 
evolutionary and less of a theological position and say ecological environment -I want to 
investigate Heidegger's own loyalty to modernity, his resolute Idealism and particularly 
his concepts of Being, the work-world and science as it relates to what in traditional 
terms has been called the human relationship with 'nature. ' 
This chapter examines Heidegger's central concepts of Being and Dasein with an eye to 
the major problematic in western metaphysics which is the sceptical rupture between the 
knowing subject and the object of knowledge. Heidegger's concept of equipmentality 
operates in an always-already work world. He anguishes that the modem lifestyle is 
nihilistic because it encourages us to forget to ask the most crucial and authentic 
question; what is Being? The enframing of technology has shifted the language, self- 
concept, and relationship with the earth from one of contemplative releasement of Being 
from the daily encounters with beings to a challenging of storage and power from beings 
for potential consumption. Finally, during the midst of the terrible upheaval of Nazi 
Germany in the 1930s, Heidegger underwent an epiphany. He realised that the notion of 
forgetting Being was not entirely nihilistic. Forgetting actually sheltered Being as well, 
527 Heidegger, 1916 
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and he 'turned' his ideas in relation to the enframing of technology, of oblivion, which he 
goes on to argue 'saves' us from the danger of the progressive telos of modernity. 
Being and Dasein 
Being shows up, in Heidegger's terms, in beings, entities, or things. Being does not have 
an abstract existence, independent of the material world. It is not floating outside of time 
and space, as Plato would have it. Being is the lasting, enduring, presence that pertains in 
entities. Each entity is different from anything else to a certain extent, but Heidegger is 
interested in the continuity that 'shows up' and can be ascertained and safeguarded by 
humanity. There are several precedents to this idea. Although he does not claim to be 
expounding a new interpretation of Aristotle, Heidegger's concept of Being coincides 
closely with Aristotle's concept of enteleichia. The concept of Being enduring and 
'showing up' in the interstice between entities and Being is strongly reminiscent of 
Aristotle's theory of substance and accident. Aristotle too, refutes Plato's notion of the 
Idea of Being, outside of time and space. The essence or substance is based in the 
material world, although for both Aristotle and Heidegger it is not limited to particular 
objects or items. Schopenhauer too has a metaphysics based on the will which is the 
connecting force between the One and the many. Heidegger tempers the philosophical 
tradition of Being with the 'originary' ideas of Heraclitus and Parmenides. 
Charles Darwin's ideas had been extremely influential for 50 years when Heidegger 
began to write, and Erasmus Darwin's more Romantic and poetic texts were closer again 
to Heidegger's thinking. But early in his career when he developed the concept of 
'Being' Heidegger was steeped in Catholic theology so evolution was regarded as 
heathen. His concept of 'Being' is influenced by the theological ontology of Duns Scottus 
528 
which Heidegger wrote on in his Master's thesis (1916) . The theological ontology was 
later tempered by his intense engagement with Husserl's phenomenological 
existentialism. Heidegger decided to forego traditional Catholicism but never entirely 
abandoned his theological approach to Being. 
52' Heidegger, 1916 
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Heidegger did not describe Being as universal. As I explained in chapter seven, there are 
limits. Being is not existence. Whereas existence can also be understood as 'ecology' or 
4 environment' in Darwinian terms, Heidegger defined it very metaphysically. Heidegger 
regards 'existence' as an etymological corruption through translation of the Greek 
through Latin and then into modem European languages. The distinction between mere 
existence and Being hinges upon the ability of Dasein to apprehend. Thus Heidegger 
remains faithful to the eschatological gist of German Idealism. The human subject (in the 
guise of Dasein) is the channel through which apprehension and understanding must pass 
for the world of Being to come forth. Anything that does not show up in relation to 
Dasein is abstract 'existence' rather than the 'generated pennanence' of Being. Such 
abstractions are 'nothing. ' Dasein takes on a peculiar significance in relation to Being, as 
everything that shows up for a horse, for example, does not count. That is nothing. 
Heidegger argues that Being shows up in relation to the ability of Dasein to apprehend. 
That is to say, that while Being is present throughout, it is only apprehendable by beings 
who can think and reflect. Dasein is not, strictly speaking, limited to humanity, however, 
as it happens, Heidegger does not believe that there are any other beings who are capable 
of gathering up, saving and preserving Being, except perhaps, gods. 
Ironically, the term Dasein in German is a 19th century designation for what we call in 
English 'existence. ' However, Heidegger has narrowed and defined Dasein into a 
specialised and specific knowing subject which has the ability to ask questions about the 
relationship between beings and Being. He plays on the components within the term da 
sein; 'being there. ' This both grounds and projects a subject into the future, a 'there' 
beyond the 'here. ' This resonates with Being as an event or happening - not a fixed 
position or truth but a generated permanence. The ontological ground of Dasein is being 
and time coupled with the ability to think. Far from the broad concept of 'existence' 
Dasein corresponds to a particular type of human who is aware both of their own finitude 
(as being-towards-death) and Being (which extends beyond the individual life-span). 
The concept of Dasein differs from the canon of German Idealism in several important 
ways. One of the major differences between Heidegger's concept of Dasein and the 
sceptical subject of Idealism is that Dasein is not limited to the individual. It is the public 
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-1 - aas-ein; 'any-one. ' Although to be meticulous, in his work on the German Romantic 
H61derlins Hymnen 'Germanien'und 'Der RheinHeidegger writes extensive material on 
the individual's acknowledgement of their own approaching death, which is an existential 
account of the vulnerability and pathos of each subjective life. 
The nearness of death as a sacrifice stood before each one in the same nullity, so that this 
could become the source of unconditioned belonging-together. Precisely death, which 
each individual man must die for himself, which individualizes each individual in the 
uttennost way, precisely death and the readiness for its sacrifice creates first the space of 
community, from which comradeship anses. "9 
It is this projection that forms the basis of the 'authentic' Dasein and reinforces the 
element of time in relation to Being. Every human being is constrained, as Kant pointed 
out, by space and time, every human is capable of authentic Dasein. 
Scepticism 
Heidegger has a complex resistance to the anthropocentric hubris of sceptical modernity. 
Scepticism has set up a series of questions about the relationship (or lack of) between the 
subject and his or her access to the reality of the external world. Heidegger asserts that 
the separation of the subject from the object, most famously proposed by Descartes, sets 
up the incapacity for someone to be sure of the thing-in-itself is a phenomenon essential 
to modernity. Inevitably every name the subject gives an object emerges from a human 
interpretation. Berkeley's old joke about the whether or not the tree truly fell down in the 
middle of the Amazon if someone did not see it depends on this anthropocentric 
conditioning of 'reality' by the subject. Heidegger both challenges and remains within 
this problematic. 
The very important content of Heidegger's work is his critical account of modernity and 
the hubris of man in relation to the environment. The separation of subject from object 
occurs with a series of almost unassailable divisions between reason, sense perception, 
the affect of the object, the appearance of the object, and the Being of the object. The 
stark separation of the subject's reason from sense perception and then object both 
separates and extemalises the object by exclusion, but paradoxically brings the object 
5'9 Heidegger, 1934/35, cited in Zimmen-nan, 1990: 73. 
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against which the subject is posed into close proximity. The juxtaposition of the object 
operates to reinforce the subject's conditioning of the world-as-object through 
representation. 
Descartes wrote that we represent the object to ourselves in an unavoidable nominalism. 
The truth of the representation cannot pass through the Idealist rupture between subject 
and object, so the representation has to be a product of the subjective mind. Heidegger 
notes that the rupture is not as great as Descartes assumed. The subject only comes across 
sense if s/he is juxtaposed against an object. 
Re-present (vor-stellen) means to bring what is present at hand (das Vorhandene) before 
oneself as something standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing 
it, and to force it back into this relationship to oneself as the normative realm. "O 
Heidegger's extensive critique of Descartes extends to the problematic of modernity in 
general. The subject has become, for the first time, the ground from which all ordering of 
the world is generated. The notion that there is a distinct separation of subject from object 
brings the object into a normative relation with the subject through representation. This is 
a form of solipsism that Heidegger largely rejects. The subject of modernity becomes the 
ground from which the ordering of the world emerges. Man, 
puts himself into the scene, i. e., into the open sphere of that which is generally and 
publicly represented. Therewith man sets himself up as the setting which whatever is 
must henceforth set itself forth, must present itself (sich... prdsentieren), i. e., be picture. 
Man becomes the representative (der Reprdsentant) of that which is, in the sense of that 
which has the character of object. "' 
Medieval and ancient Man were also in 'the centre' of what is. What is new is that 
modernity sets the subject as ground, rather than the gods, the Good, god, fate, Being or 
ecological environment. "What is decisive" Heidegger writes, "is that man himself 
expressly takes up this position as one constituted by himself, that he intentionally 
maintains it as that taken up by himself, and that he makes it secure as the solid footing 
for a possible development of humanity. "532 Nietzsche's famous quote "God is dead. 11533 
530 Heidegger, 1977d: 131 
... Heidegger, 1977d: 131-2 
532 Heidegger, 1977d: 132 
Nietzsche, 1979, see also Nietzsche, 1982a: 370-379 and Heidegger, 1977e 
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encapsulates this anthropocentric movement perfectly. If God is dead then humanity 
takes over the role of the creating meaning. Heidegger draws out the implications - 
There begins that way of being human which mans the realm of human capability as a 
domain given over to measuring and executing, for the purpose of gaining mastery over 
that which is as a whole. 534 
Technologies which aim to 'improve' our ability to measure, concepts such as metrics, 
numerics, logic and so forth, tend to rationalise items and events into categories. The 
rationality of calculating and measuring encloses items into what Heidegger calls a 
familiar world picture. The hubris of modernity in relation to the whole of existence is the 
problem of the centralisation of the subject-as-ground (child-centred learning springs to 
mind). The modus operandi of anthropocentric modernity is a selfishness exacerbated by 
Liberal and Neoliberal individualism which contributes to a greedy and instantaneous 
consumerism at the expense of the environment and future generations. 
Man contends for the position in which he can be that particular being who gives the 
measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is. Because this position secures, 
organizes, and articulates itself as a world view, the modem relationship to that which is, 
is one that becomes, in its decisive unfolding, a conftontation of world views; and indeed 
not of random world views, but only of those that have already taken up the fundamental 
position of man that is most extreme, and have done so with the utmost resoluteness. 535 
This world view is what Heidegger calls "The Age of the World Picture. , 536 Heidegger 
argues that it is not simply Descartes' shifting of the ground of metaphysics away from 
the medieval faith in God towards a new essential subjectivity which spells out the 
characterisation of modernity. It is the notion of the modem 'world picture' which places 
Man as central to cosmology in its entirety. "What is, in its entirety, is now taken in such 
a way that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent that it is set up by man, 
537 
who represents and sets forth . He argues that this 
is a profound rupture from earlier 
medieval and Greek concepts of nature and of humanity. They had no picture or 
representation of the world, no Weltanshauung at all. 
534 Heidegger, 1977d: 132 
535 Heidegger, 1977d: 134 
536 Heidegger, 1977d 
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The Work-World 
The 'clearing' of the work-world is Heidegger's description of the fundamental 
integration of people within their environment. Charles Guignon (1983) draws attention 
to the familiarity of objects such as the pen, or the keyboard which is completely integral 
to writing. Although the tool is essential, it is not where the writer's attention is focused, 
unless it ceases to function effectively. For Heidegger the object, such as pen, is 
'worlding. ' The pen, and other equipment operate in a system of items in relation to one 
another as an always-already world within which writing is a part. The person writing 
then, is not a subject specifically divided from the external reality of the pen. The writer 
and the pen and all the other objects present in the room and the locality are the all 
familiar, unconsciously taken-for-granted work-world. The exercise of writing is a good 
example of the non-differentiation between subject and objects. Heidegger calls this 
unconscious familiarity with the work-world 'the clearing. ' 
Dasein as being-in-the-world in the sense of concern is absorbed in its world in which it 
is preoccupied, is so to speak exhausted by that world, so that precisely in the most 
natural and the most immediate being-in-the-world the world in its worldhood is not 
experienced thematically at all. 538 
The work-world assumes a technological familiarity which dissolves the harsh separation 
between subject and object, thus eliminating the unassailable externality of 'reality' and 
with it, the necessity of all knowledge of the 'world' to be subjectively interpreted. 
In his lecture series from 1924, published as The History of the Concept of Time, 
Heidegger explains that "world is the wherein ofDasein'S being. , 53 9 The 'world' is a far 
cry from an independent external existence, or even Being. World is characteristic. 
However, this reintroduces a certain element of solipsism into Heidegger's theory. He 
argues that there is the need to "circumvent the obscurity of knowing 'worldhood' 
understood not as a character of the Being of the entity but rather as the character of the 
Being ofDasein, and only through it and along with it that of the entity! , 
540 The world is 
not an epistemological function of the knowing subject (an interpretation) but an 
538 Heidegger, 1985: 185 
539Heidegger, 1985: 168 
540 Heidegger, 1985: 169 
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ontological function. The world is subjectively experienced and the discourses about the 
meaning and function of things are collectively maintained. 
It is not an individualised solipsism but a public understanding of the items of reference 
as a whole. The public is appresent with the personal work-world. The room I am writing 
in for example, 'belongs' to the University rather than myself. My position in this locality 
is part of a greater set of relations. "We always think of the world-thing in advance as a 
world-thing. , 541 
The environing world is the aroundness - it is the in-being of place and space, or the 
locale wherein Dasein dwells. However, the familiarity of in-being an environing world 
is an openness to the encounter with things rather than a narrative about an external 
object. It is "not a narrative report of world-occurrences but an interpretation of 
worldhood, which characterizes everything that does occur as worldly. " It is not just a 
question of the "reality of the external world"542 but the surroundings of everyday 
worldliness. That is to say, being-in-the-world is not originally an abstracted notion of 
geometry, or the metric measurement of space. It is not a representation of the world, but 
rather an absorption as world. For Heidegger, "care as the constitution of the being of 
Dasein uncovers the world. , 543 
The difference between sceptical solipsism and Heidegger's solipsism is that Dasein is 
communal as much as it is individual, and the interpretation of the world is built on the 
functional familiarity of dwelling-in rather than the abstracted narrative of scientific 
ordering which is always somewhat sceptically attached to external 'reality. ' 
Heidegger rejects the tradition which considers the Being of the world as nature 544 
because he regards this as an extemalised thing-in-itself which emerges from research, 
itself based on a narrative of abstract ordering. Patrick Fitzsimons explains this very well 
in his chapter "Enframed Education: Heidegger and the Question of Technology" which 
contributes to the book Heidegger, Education and Modernity (2002). 
54 1 Heidegger, 1985: 169 
542 Heidegger, 1985: 170 
54' Heidegger, 1985: 170 
544 Heidegger, 1985: 171 
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Scientific research operates by setting up a total view of some region of reality and then 
attempts to show that the anomalies that emerge can be fitted into the total picture. It 
takes for granted that its plan is correct, and that the anomalies have no truth to tell; they 
must merely be brought under the projected total order. "' 
The scientific projection of the system is defined beforehand in terms of "spatiotemporal 
magnitudes of motion. " Positivist science has a new attitude towards the functioning 
locale, that is a significant shift from the being-at-hand earlier described. 'Nature' is a 
representation. Heidegger writes, 
that stipulating has to do with nothing less than the plan or projection of that which must 
henceforth, for the knowing of nature that is sought after, be nature: the self-contained 
system of motion of units of mass related spatiotemporally. 546 
Science as technological research constructs everything as an ordered entity including 
people themselves, "everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at 
hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering 547 This 
notion of the 'standing reserve' in his essay "The Question Concerning Technology" 
(1954) is the central tenet of enframing. 548 
Forgetting Being 
Heidegger regards Kant as following up and helping to expound the insights of Descartes. 
In The History of the Concept of Time (1924) he quotes Kant; "being is not a real 
predicate. " This follows the solipsist conditioning of the world by the subject which rests 
on Descartes separation of the subject from the object. The subject is only able to sense 
the affects of the appearance of the object, not its Beingness. That is, Heidegger writes, 
Being is not a datum which can be apprehended by way of any kind of receptivity and 
affection. Precisely because we are not capable of apprehending the Being of entities 
primarily and in isolation, but always first apprehend what an entity is, in Greek the 
E: t6oq, its outward appearance, we must therefore, even in the apprehension of the Being 
of the authentic entity, start with the attributes, through which the nature of the entity and 
its Being are then presented. This peculiar principle, that Being for itself cannot be 
experienced by us in the entity because if does not affect us, is perhaps, without 
545Fitzsimons, 2002: 6, see also Dreyfus, 1993: 293 
S46 Heidegger, 1977d: 119 
547 Heidegger: 1977a: 17 cited in Fitzsimons, 2002: 6 548 Heidegger, 1977a 
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Descartes knowing it and also perhaps without Kant ultimately understanding it in his 
thesis, the most clear-cut formulation of the Being of the entity which we call world. 549 
This aspect of incomprehensibility of Being is what Heidegger terms concealment. 
Yv'hilst necessarily obscure, this notlon of concealment is crucial to Heidegger's theory. 
Concealment replaces the nominal scepticism of traditional Idealism. Its presence is not 
representable but neither is it separate, it endures without phenomenologically affecting 
our senses or arising to our conscious attention. 
It also presents a difficulty in Heidegger's argument, where he wants to dissociate 
himself from the traditional harsh segregation of solipsist subject from independent 
object. The connection is forged in nonphysiological terms as the concealment of Being. 
Yet later we will find that just as absolute subjectivism is problematic, so is uniform 
objectification of humanity and things as 'potential resource. ' At that point Heidegger 
will reintroduce the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. 
What becomes concealed by the modem formulation of the solipsist subject, or 
subiectum, and his calculation of world is the Romantic ability to simply let nature be, 
and allowing things to reveal themselves without any function in the calculability of 
technological enframing. Thus, concealment of the truth of Being rests upon the 
separation of subject from object. 
Heidegger goes on to argue that the technological enframing of nature as 'standing 
reserve' obscures its Beingness from view. The calculation of everything as a component 
or potential component in the economics of consumerism obliterates the possibility of its 
Being showing up in any other way. The theoretical imprint of measurement in science 
pre-empts any other possibility for existence other than that which the subject first greets 
it with. This means the worldly understanding of magnitude, or res extensa maps out a 
framework within which items can be inserted. Sensory data then confirms or disproves 
according to a pre-existing schema of truth how an item ought to slot into the scientific 
world. Heidegger's point is that because of the methodology of scientific research, the 
results in the philosophical 'gap' between sensory perception and interpretation have 
549 Heidegger, 1985: 175 
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been inverted, so that interpretatIon (taken as truth) proclaims what the senses will 
perceive according to criteria of validity. 
But it is also already evident that the Being of the world, which on the basis of certain 
judgements is first conceived as nature, cannot even be obtained by a theoretical 
reconstruction which goes from the res extensa back to the sensory thing and then to the 
value-laden thing, but that by doing so the specific theoretical objectification is retained 
and the analysis is led astray even further. The world would be deprived of its worldliood, 
since the primary exhibition of the authentic reality of the world should be referred to the 
original task of an analysis of reality itself, which would first have to disregard every 
specifically theoretical objectification. The course of the scientific inquiry into reality 
shows, however, that the original mode of encounter of the environing world is always 
already given up in favor of the established view of the world as the reality of nature, so 
that we may interpret the specific phenomena of the world in terins of its theoretical 
knowledge of the objectivity of nature. 550 
The 'natural' asserts an untouched externality of which Heidegger is justifiably very 
suspicious. 
Enframing 
The enframing of technology has taken its toll on modem ethics. It seems that the 
universal categorical imperative is no longer maintaining its grip on the social order. The 
potential of technology is so magical, so diverse, so unheard of, that scientists end up 
inventing bizarre and controversial things without much reflection on the ethical 
consequences. 
The debates in the scientific community and society at large have hardly begun to touch 
some of the major issues brought up by genetic technology. An example is the 
experiment where a Rhesus monkey has had a fluorescent gene from a jellyfish 
introduced at the cellular zygote stage via a 'harmless' virus. The purpose of this 
experiment appears to simply be that 'we can' -a proof that humanity is able to creatively 
change and control the parameters of species diversity. Other experiments are more 
functional and closely aligned with medicine. At the government genetic engineering 
farm at Ruakura in New Zealand approval has just been granted (during a moratorium on 
genetic engineering experiments) for a flock of sheep to be manufactured without the 
gene which inhibits muscle growth. This is of interest to those researching muscular 
550 Heidegger, 1985: 183 
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dystrophy although clearly farmers will be keen on animals which potentially are more 
efficient meat producers. Nanotechnology enables interventions so minute that the 
pervasiveness can barely be imagined. 
As those supporting genetic engineering technology point out, humanity has bred for 
efficient production for thousands of years. Genetic engineering is simply the latest, more 
technologically sophisticated mechanism in a long history of the teleological drive for 
efficiency. Technology has alleviated the saturation point of human population growth, 
allowing exponential increases in the last one or two hundred years. 
As explored in chapter five, Heidegger's theories on technology emerged in the prewar 
years and became even more urgent with the realisation that the nuclear bomb makes 
total annihilation of humanity and the planet possible for the first time. Clearly the 
benevolence of technology had irrefutably shifted. The claims that humanity was 'in 
control' of the instrumentality of technology was largely unbelievable in the face of the 
volatility and expansionism of the cold war. 
Nietzsche positions science and rationality as another ascetic attempt to find an absolute 
external truth, which he regards as stultifying. Heidegger's argument holds similar 
connotations in regards to science. But his own concept of Being is also susceptible to 
Nietzsche's critique. 'Being' holds an ontological function which constitutes an 
underlying foundation, as with Aristotle's substance. Aristotle categorises and Heidegger 
retains a certain Idealist anthropocentrism in his concept of the relationship between 
Dasein and Being. A genealogy of ideas through Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Heidegger all 
allude to a necessary relation, unknowable, enduring over time, but each philosopher has 
a different idea of the metaphysics that 'grounds' or binds everything into connection. 
For Nietzsche, science and Substance and Being are already loaded interpretations. 
Science is based on a rationality that we might call ontological to the human condition. 
Science-as-interpretation is inadequate because it focuses on rational measurement 
instead of an originary and poetic 'wresting open' of the truth of Being. But Nietzsche's 
argument destabilizes Being, Substance and science equally as systems of thought that 
are generated by a historically situated society rather than a-historic and universal truths. 
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The Turning 
Because of the very familiarity of the 'world, ' Heidegger suggests that much of Being 
operates in concealedness. It is present but hidden. The event that occurs between Dasein 
and Being through thinking and questioning, is a coming to light from concealedness. 
That is why in his work from the 1920s he opens with the complaint that the gravest error 
of humanity is that we haveforgotten to ask the question of Being. 
According to Heidegger, the crucial 'turn' (Kehre) in his work is the realisation that the 
forgetting (Vergessenheit) of Being in the case of the enframing of technology is not such 
a bad thing. Forgetting means failing to notice, or remaining unconscious of the 
concealment of Being. It owes something to the Greek term lethe which has connotations 
of oblivion, as well as the carelessness or culpability of the 'hidden' or overlooked. 
However forgetting is NOT oblivion (into mere existence) until the process of forgetting 
is itself forgotten. 
When forgetting is doubled, when the forgetting of Being is forgotten then, Heidegger 
proposes, Vergessenheit turns in on itself He calls this turn the danger. The forgetting of 
forgetting Being is the most dangerous event for it deprives humanity of the possibility of 
being Dasein but at the same time it offers the possibility of saving Being. The turn of 
forgetting hides and preserves Being. 
This risk of losing DaseinS relationship with Being, the dangerous lack of regard for 
Being is the result of technological enframing, "that setting-upon which challenges forth" 
nature as standing reserve. As can be seen in his earlier work on the phenomenology of 
Dasein and his rejection of solipsism, Heidegger argues that handiness is what generates 
the worldliness of our familiar localities. We operate in an always-already extant, public 
work-world. This system of references, equipment, and relationships is largely so familiar 
that there is no separating Dasein from world. 
Heidegger argues that technology encompasses the Being of humanity. Some people hold 
the idea that humanity is 'in control' of technology, but on the contrary, Heidegger states, 
"in truth, it is the coming to presence of man that is now being ordered forth to lend a 
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hand to the coming to presence of technology. , 551 Humanity is necessary for the 
technological frame to unfold. But is no longer possible for humanity to operate in a 
world outside of the ordering belonging to enframing. 
The argument is that through an inventory of all things into charts and graphs that order 
all aspects of life into a rational calculation, humanity has become unable to appraise 
nature, or as Heidegger defines it, Being, as anything other than potential resource for the 
consumption of capitalism. This rational calculation pervades our common usage 
language, our metaphysics and ontology, our subjectivity and the sceptical removal of 
objects, and our understanding of 'truth' and knowledge. Rational calculus characterises 
modernity. 
Technological enframing is part of this all-pervasive calculation of all things, people, 
oceans, deserts, stars, atoms, chemical bonds, DNA codes, and so on. Humanity has 
entered the service of the technological Gestell by putting all our effort, our self- 
understanding and ideas about the environment towards the 'progress, ' the reproduction, 
and the development of more and more technology. 
Zizek points out that for Heidegger, 
The true problem is not ecological crisis in its ontic dimension, Including a possible 
global catastrophe (hole in the ozone, layer, melting of the ice caps, etc. ), but the 
technological mode of relating to entities around us - this true crisis will confront us even 
more radically if the expected catastrophe does not occur; that is, if humankind does 
succeed in technologically 'mastering' the critical situation 552 
Economic consumerism is simply an example of the rational calculus of all things as 
standing reserve. The question then, in view of Heidegger's faith in destiny is whether the 
enframing of technology, or the system of consumerism has to arrive at its ultimate 
conclusion, fulfil its cataclysmic destiny. Keynesian and Neoliberal solutions simply 
serve to prolong the nightmare. As Zizek puts it, 
Heidegger devalues the effort to constrain the system - to maintain its 'human face'... as 
an escape from the inner truth of the system that becomes perceptible in such excesses: 
551 Heidegger, 1977b: 37 
552 Zizek, 1999: 12 
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such half-hearted efforts to keep the system in check are the worst way to remain within 
its horizon. "' 
Heidegger might be susceptible to a faith in systems and the logic of a telos of 
repetitions. The consistency of the technological frame may be affected by events 
4concealed' from human awareness; like global warming. It is these concepts of 
concealment and forgetfulness that allow the incursion of some unforeseen force to affect 
the enframing of technology in a manner beyond our wildest dreams. Unlike Bateson 
(1979), Heidegger does not leave it to chance. But nor does he confine the field of 
possibility to human agency and endeavour. 
As, for humanity, there is no 'outside' of the technological frame, there is not much 
possibility that humanity can think our way to wresting open a new destiny for Being. 
This is why Heidegger is so intrigued with the 'danger' and the 'saving power' of 
forgetting. When Being abides in forgetfulness it is thus preserved in a fashion without 
showing up as enframed. 
In the coming to presence of the danger there comes to presence and dwells a favor, 
namely, the favor of the turning about of the oblivion of Being into the truth of Being. In 
the coming to presence of the danger, where it is as the danger, is the turning about into 
the safekeeping, is this safekeeping itself, is the saving power of Being. 554 
Nothing however, is saved, if Being can no longer come-to-presence in the awareness, 
thought and language of Dasein. The preserving of Being only has validity if its truth is 
once more released, so to speak. The next stage in the turning is a lightning flash of 
insight. 
Insight into that which is -- this designation now names the disclosing that brings 
into its 
own that is the coming-to-pass of the turning within Being, of the turning of the denial of 
Being's coming to presence into the disclosing cornIng-to-pass of Being's safekeeping. 
555 
This necessity for Being to disclose itself to Dasein is a concrete example of Heidegger's 
affinity to a type of Idealism. Being and time make no sense without the attention and 
appraisal of 'man. ' "When insight comes disclosingly to pass, then men are the ones who 
553 Zizek, 1999: 12 
554 Heidegger, 1977b: 44 
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are struck in their essence by the flashing of Being. In insight, men are the ones who are 
caught sight of . 
iý556 
Enframing is 'that setting upon which challenges forth' the environment as 'standing 
reserve. ' This serves to promote one 'destining' of Being at the expense of all others. The 
calculation and measurement involved in enframing results in a stale forgetfulness of 
Being. This is the problematic of modernity which has caused us to forget the question of 
Being. The enframing is so all pervasive that it is itself impossible for humanity to escape 
from. Whenever we think or use language like 'value, ' 'evaluate, ' account, ' 'price, ' 
4merit, ' 'goods' 'estimate, ' 'worth, ' 'importance' we are enframed. Therefore the answer 
to this dilemma lies not with humanity but with Being. 
Enframing itself is a coming-to-presence of Being even if it does tend to inhibit the 
ability of Dasein to apprehend Being with any original force. The forgetfulness turns in 
on itself and becomes oblivion. 
When this entrapping-with-oblivion does come expressly to pass, then oblivion as such 
turns in and abides. Thus rescued through this abiding from falling away out of 
remembrance, it is no longer oblivion. With such in-turning, the oblivion relating to 
Being's safekeeping is no longer the oblivion of Being; but rather, turning in thus, it turns 
about into the safekeeping of Being. When the danger is as the danger, with the turning 
about of oblivion, the safekeeping of Being comes to pass; world comes to pass. 557 
This turn is the critical point that is outside of human agency. "When and how it will 
,, 558 come to pass after the manner of a destining no one knows. Being is preserved in the 
oblivion and it continues to world. The disclosure of Being through the 'blick' of insight 
is the conscientisation of worlding. Both oblivion and disclosure sustains and conserves 
the nominalist obscurity or 'primal corresponding' between Dasein and Being. 
Over many books, and decades of thinking, a multiple series of moves has occurred in 
Heidegger's theory. Firstly, Being forms the epistemological ground as a 'meaning of 
existence' for humanity in the form of Dasein. Otherwise the fact that man remains 
556 Heidegger, 1977b: 47 
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558 Heidegger, 1977b: 41 
280 
oblivious to Being would not be a problem, as it is not presumably, for that-which-is-not- 
Dasein. 
As a result, the forgetting of the question of Being is, in the first instance, the failure of 
modemity. Modernity has been subsumed by the essence of technology to the point of 
enclosure, or enframing. 
Humanity is incapable of extracting itself from the technological frame because we are 
not in control of it, and it permeates our very language and thought. We cannot think our 
way out of the calculation and measurement of everything as resource or potential 
resource. Tinkering with technological 'fixes' will not solve the essential dilemma. 
The answer emanates from the Being implicit in technology itself The coming to 
presence of technology both relies on humanity as a tool for its arising, and encourages us 
to forget the question of Being. Once we have forgotten that we forgot to question Being, 
the oblivion turns and protects and safeguards Being. At the same time Being continues 
to 'world. ' Which is to say, it continues to hold relevance in a set of references which 
form an entirety within which Dasein operates. 
The work-world generates the familiarity which makes Dasein cohesive with entities. 
This familiarity is the clearing. The clearing dissolves the distinction between subject and 
object, which is the foundation of modernity. The work-world also relies on a 
technological understanding of the surrounding environment as equipment. Heidegger 
tries to draw a distinction between a positive association with tools which are at hand 
(Vorhanden) and technological enframing. He makes this distinction by connecting the 
work-world to the pre-Socratic 'essence' of technology which 'shows up' Being or 
allows it to be 'disclosed, ' while enframing is a 'challenging forth' of Being which 
demands that everything (even in its wild state) is storage of a potential resource. 
The obscurity of Being is released by insight. On Dasein's part, it is the contemplation of 
the sublime that allows us to be open to insight. It might have taken on a new 'vista' from 
the traditional Romantic landscapes, if the sublime is to be found in the enframing of 
technology itself 
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Assuming not that we have control over the future, but that we make some contribution to 
its character is, I think, implicit in the project of education, and in Heidegger's body of 
work too. Schools operate within the technological enframing of the modem paradigm. 
Passive openness to insight seems a rather passive and conservative approach to take to 
the realisation that technology is not neutral or merely instrumental but penneates every 
interaction between Dasein and Being. At the same time, Heidegger tried a more active 
approach when he attempted to lead the leaders of the national socialist party in 1933 and 
1934. He assumed at that stage, that the philosophical question of Being could bring 
society 'into line. ' Consciously attempting to change the paradigm that is worlding 
559 
proved catastrophic. Heidegger concluded that philosophy was at an end . 
More constructively, questioning the separation of object from subject seems to me a 
very good place to start education. Heidegger's work clearly discards the individualism 
inherent in Liberalism and Neoliberalism. Selfish individualism, or the 'rational 
individual utility maximiser' tends to maximise resource consumption within one life 
time. This emphasis on instant satisfaction is transformed by the communal, 
intergenerational time-frame of Dasein. In the context of schooling this is an important 
insight. Heidegger's theory might be seen to position aesthetics, and the arts in general to 
a much more important standing than the sciences. It is the arts that seek sublime insight 
whereas the rationality of the sciences dissects 'nature' into categories. However if the 
Being of the technological frame itself is to re-emerge in a profound way this historical 
separation of art from science may be disrupted. Technology is the saving power. 
Expanding the concepts of Dasein and Being to encompass a far wider idea of existence 
and life is another possible path for extracting ourselves from the enframing of 
technology. Once the anthropocentric mega-solipsism of Heidegger's theory is dropped 
but the notion of the vitality of poetic openness to existence outside of the human realm is 
invigorated then I think technology would diminish in significance. Opportunities for 
exceeding the technological frame might emerge from energizing respect for existence, 
life, in an expanded concept of Being. 
559 Heidegger, 1973b 
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Associated with the 'turn, ' (Kehre) of the 1930s, Heidegger began to think that 
technology was both the 'danger' in terms of human obliviousness to Being and also the 
4 saving power. ' The destiny of Being has metamorphosed into an epoch inescapably 
enframed by technology. The spark of life that is humanity is beginning to envisage itself 
more positively than as the polluter of the Earth. In Kim Stanley Robinson's Mars trilogy 
(1996), terraforming other planets was both the possibility and the result of the political 
and ecological mess produced by consumer capitalism and technology. But going off 
planet did not solve any of our human problems - we take our alienation with us. 
Technological creativity might make it possible to take all life elsewhere in a fast forward 
version of evolution. But the conditions for life quite possibly only exist on this planet, as 
the only suitable abode in the billions of stars and solar systems of the universe. 
Safeguarding, nurturing and regenerating Earth is the potential, the responsibility, and the 
future of technology and humanity. 
283 
10 Heidegger and Bowers; Technology and Pedagogy 
Technology clearly plays an important role in the speed and growth of consumerism 
across the globe. 'Globalisation' has in many respects been a result of colonialism, but it 
has reached its present crescendo with the emergence of the Internet and widespread 
availability of computer ports. Aeroplanes and automobiles, fossil fuel consumption and 
increasing sophisticated methods of resource depletion all contribute, or arguably 
constitute a view of the planet as a global resource ready for human consumption. 
Understanding technology as a neutral tool in the hands of human agents is to 
misapprehend the way technology shapes our reality. The prior question to the question 
of 'neutrality' is how, in Heidegger's terms, does the technological Ge-stell narrow the 
frame of human awareness. 
Heidegger's critique of technology has important implications for education. This chapter 
attempts to discern what elements of information communication technologies 'enframe' 
our subjective experiences of the world as distinct from the interpolation of students into 
the Liberal capitalist paradigm. Liberal capitalist concepts of subjectivity, society and the 
environment dominate contemporary computer programmes, teaching materials, 
curriculum, and pedagogy. Technology also intervenes phenomenologically in our 
subjective experience of our environment. Separating out the two elements could give us 
a starting point for developing social and environmental interaction with a deeper 
commitment to ecological, equitable and ethical living arrangements, that moves forward 
carrying with it technological innovation rather than harking back to a Luddite utopian 
past. I do not intend to prescribe future curriculum in this thesis. My intentions are to 
open up the possibilities for future directions from the postmodern paradigm that 
presently dominates education and society. 
It is often argued that humanity is unique amongst living beings because we are capable 
of self reflection and reflection on the world that we live in. It is very difficult to abandon 
the active agency that believes that reflective thinking might influence predominant 
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world views and instigate change. The environment has been in sore need of reflection 
and in sore need of a change in the attitudes and life style that dominates western culture 
and that is increasingly becoming a global phenomenon. Consumerism has become the 
'right' of people everywhere, to the detriment of the entire planet. The ability to think our 
way out of the enframing of technology has some potential, although such thinking is 
often sidelined as impossible dreaming, or it is co-opted into the increasing science of 
governmentality. 560 This chapter looks closely at the way technology constructs 
subjectivity in education. 
C. A. Bowers is one of the earliest and important Heideggerian educators writing in the 
field of environmental education and technology. He argues in the Canadian Journal of 
Environmental Education (1998) that it is "mainstream consumer orientated, 
technologically dependent culture that has such an adverse impact on natural systems" 
and that this is being globalised. As an educationalist, he attributes a "widespread failure 
of teachers and students to recognize the deep symbolic roots of the ecological crisis - 
which are visible in curriculum materials and in classroom discourse. , 561 
The way in which computers are presented in schools sheds some light on the nature of 
technology itself, and the contemporary approaches to teaching, learning, language, 
meaning and the question of thinking. According to discourse analysis, a constellation of 
ideas 'produces' a particular type of subjectivity. In the case of computers and computer 
language, Bowers argues that the subjectivity produced is based on aI 9th century, 
positivist, rational individual. Bowers develops a case that the computer amplifies a 
rationalist, technicist framework of understanding the world which assumes that language 
is a conduit, that reduces the emotional, corporeal, historically contextualised aspects of 
culture. 
While I agree with Bowers' Heideggerian argument about the calculating, rational 
emphasis in computer programming, he has believed too readily in the self-image of 
4 cyberspace' where the body is extracted and the mind is abstracted into a new, clean 
dimension, sexy but unsullied. He associates the individualised alienation of cyberspace 
560 Foucault, 1979 
S6 1 Bowers, 1998: 60 
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with abstract thought and the historical specificity of the body with practice, falling into 
the crude and cliched separation of theory from practice. I will argue that there is a 
complex interaction between the 'world, disclosed in language and the 'world' shaped by 
material conditions. 
Technology is a specifically human artefact but has an impact far larger than any 
individual, any community, or any generation. Some anthropologists have characterised 
humanity as the 'tool wielding animal' which suggests that humanity controls and 
manipulates the environment through tools. It might be more helpful to understand 
humanity as being wielded by technology as a means of reproduction, or coming into 
being. Technology shapes the discursive and political reality as much as it does our 
material interaction with the environment. Bowers' treatment of computers in the 
classroom tends to focus on discourse analysis without distinguishing the material impact 
and parameters of technical devices on human corporeality, or the intrusion, except in 
terms of sociology, of the body's excessive and unavoidable invasions of the dominant 
discourses of 'cyber-space. ' 
Notwithstanding this objection to the easy separation of practise from theory, Bowers 
soundly argues that many of the assumptions made by computer programmers and the 
teaching of technology shroud a hidden curriculum that reinforces a world governed by a 
technicist framework. His elaboration about the impact of this on programming, language 
and pedagogy are clear and insightful. 
Bowers' book The Cultural Dimensions ofEducational Computing; Understanding the 
Non-Neutrality of Technology (1988) is an outstanding, close examination of the 
assumptions made about computer use in the classroom. He takes seriously Heidegger's 
concept of technological enframing. Since then, Bowers has written extensively on 
technology in educational practice and environmental education. 
During the last 20 years, 'computer literacy' has been held up as a key ingredient of 
education. It is regarded as far more than a 'skill, ' such as typing. Computers are touted 
as an essential means to access copious quantities of information and furthermore a 
means of developing or processing knowledge. Once a non-compulsory subject, 
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technology is increasingly entering the core curriculum. This shift in status in the 
curriculum is associated with a raft of other policy initiatives, such as 'life-long-leaming' 
that are an attempt to re-orientate the workforce to be more flexible and encourage people 
to be able to continually retrain as redundancies and short term contracts become the 
norm in the labour market. Computer literacy is both a marketable skill in itself (adding 
value), and a valuable 'search engine' for finding new employment niches. Computer 
literacy contributes 'added value' to life-long learners who are employable resources on 
the labour market. 
Technology is thus closely associated with the educational emphasis on vocationalism. 
While an emphasis on vocationalism should not necessarily be at the expense of critical 
thinking or creativity, Bowers points out that the binary language of computing amplifies 
a technicist view of the world and reduces the historical contexts of concepts and 
metaphor. The technicist view presents itself as a-political but it perpetuates the 
consumer view of the planet as a resource to be efficiently exploited. 
The Heideggerian argument is that technology shifts our phenomenological sensibility, 
radically changing our relationship with the Earth from a sublime awareness of nature to 
a framework that incorporates everything as a resource. All technology makes tangible 
changes to the way in which we apprehend the world we live in. 
Artificial In telligen ce 
Influenced by Heidegger, Don lhde explains that examining an item with a magnifying 
glass or telescope, for example, results in a loss of smell and tactile impressions while it 
accentuates the 'view' of that which is usually unseen. Sensation is amplified or reduced 
by technology. 562 Computers reduce the activity of the physical body and enhance a 
remote and decontextualised self in cyberspace. Some aspects of personality can be 
accentuated and played with in this space but the physical body and the cultural context 
the body inhabits is largely untranslatable through such a medium. 
562 ldhe, cited in Bowers, 1988: 32 
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However, while technology enframes our relationships with each other and our 
environment, it also presents us with a4 saving power' from the total mobilisation of 
capitalist consumerism. I think it is important to remember that the clean abstraction of 
cyberspace is a myth. In an online commentary on cyber-reality, the Krokers illustrate - 
The ruling illusion of digital reality is its antiseptic cleanliness. A virtual hygiene 
movement that launches a global tech style that is so clean, so cool, so cold that it shifts 
the myth of virtuality from the conceptual realm to material experience. Not alienation, 
reification or simulation, but virtualisation as about the digital scrubbing of the world. "' 
The absence of the body is itself a myth. The cyber-self still relies on fingers to punch the 
keyboard, stooping shoulders to weather the tiny incessant movements combined with a 
badly positioned desk and chair, an aching bottom, slumping back and jutting chin. The 
guiding metaphor of cyberspace is of a floating personality decoupled from a physical 
body. This is reinforced by the nature of the technology and in turn the obscurity of the 
body reinforced by the Liberal paradigm of the rational individual. 
Culture and politics also invade cyberspace. The technological frame has altered our 
emphasis, but older discourses are also perpetuated online. Sexism, including 'cyber- 
rape, ' 564 ethnic and class relations, and other unnameable cultural assumptions that have 
shaped the personality of the real-time person continue to show up in cyber-personalities, 
webpages, academic texts, and all cultural artefacts. Political assumptions about access, 
authority, whose cultural norms are universal, include but are not entirely limited to the 
prevailing Neoliberal paradigm of rational calculation and selfish individualism. The 
debate over 'shareware' for example, have emerged as contradicting Neoliberal 
assumptions about rational self-interest because sophisticated programs have been made 
freely available on the web without participating in capitalist profit making. 
Virtual people and artificial intelligence form the stereotypical, science fiction basis of 
associating people and computers. The debate tends to fit in neatly with the traditional 
dualism of the mind versus body, so that the intelligent, learning machine is the most 
reified mind possible. Mary Midgley is scathing that computer intelligence can be 
analogous to human thought. The debate assumes a telos where computers will become 
563 Kroker, 2001 
564 Dibbell, 1993 
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conscious, and humans "are already, in some fairly literal sense, themselves programines 
run on computers made of meat. 95565 This critique is fairly understandable in the light of 
how much the literature on artificial intelligence make use of age old philosophical 
presumptions that separate the mind from the body, making it plausible to posit 
4programs' (mind) that could run on any given 'hardware' (body). The cosmologists John 
Barrow and Frank Tipler write "The essence of a human being is not the body but the 
program which controls the body; we might even identify the program which controls the 
body with the religious notion of a soul, for both are defined to be non-material entities 
which are the essence of human personality. ,, 566 The impetus behind Barrow and Tipler's 
push to recognise people as machines seems to make us immortal: "An intelligent 
program can in principle be run on many types of hardware, and, even in the far future of 
a flat Friedman universe, matter in the form of electrons, positrons and radiation will 
continue to exist. ,, 567 Although, as Midgley points out, this immortality prolonged into an 
epoch where there is no organised matter at all, hardly provides circumstances for much 
conversation, except perhaps abstract mathematics. 
With close attention to various teaching programmes, Bowers outlines how he thinks that 
the technologies of print and computing have constructed language in a manner that 
accentuates I 9th century positivist views of knowledge and subjectivity. The body tends 
to be separated from the mind, some forms of information are readily transmitted while 
the subtleties of spoken communication are often lost. A technicist framework produces 
certain metaphors and ignores others. 
The technology also reduces the recognition that language, and thus the foundations of 
thought itself, is metaphorical in nature. The binary logic that so strongly amplifies the 
sense of objective facts and data-based thinking serves, at the same time, to reduce the 
importance of meaning, ambiguity, and perspective. 568 
The language of computer programmes rests on the yes or no logic of binary code. 
Bowers argues that this limits the capacity for allegory, metaphor and metonym, paradox, 
alliteration and countless other subtle examples of communication that must be missing 
565 Midgley, 1994: 9 
566 Barrow and Tipler cited in Midgley, 1994: 9 567 Barrow and Tipler cited in Midgley, 1994: 9 568 Bowers, 1988: 33 
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from the territory that computer technology occupies. According to Gregory Bateson 
(1979) though, the human brain works on a similar combination of algorithm and 
stochastic change. In brief, Bateson's argument is that synapses in the brain are like a 
binary system. They respond to stimulus and fire - yes - or do not - no. Hundreds of 
nerves are stimulated at any given time and the binary yes/ no of each synapse combines 
statistically to form a resulting analogue; 'maybe. ' The combination of binary and 
analogue enables the brain to interpret complex phenomena into sophisticated ideas in 
black and white and shades of grey. 569 The distaste for relating the subtleties of human 
personality to a machine may just be technophobia. It is debatable. 
For Bowers, the assumption that technology is neutral is a major problem for education. 
He is particularly critical of software packages. He makes the important point that 
interactive educational materials available on computer tend to decontextualise the 
cultural and environmental parameters of social existence and instead promote a rational, 
universal model based on efficiency, maximum utilisation and individualism. 
Software packages tend to assume a Liberal model based on the basic tenets of 
modernity, but this may be a historical interpretation of the possibilities presented by the 
technology rather than parameters defined by the machine itself. Indeed, the network 
possibilities of computers have hardly begun to be tapped. At present, the most common 
examples of interactive networking are often found mostly in Internet war simulation 
games but these popular past-times barely scratch the surface of potential networking 
possibilities. The social limitations seem to me, to be about access; access to end use 
interface and more crucially perhaps, the resources and confidence for marginalised 
peoples to write interesting and constructive programmes. 
For Bowers, the significant limitation to binary code is the cultural bias of software 
programming, and the general assumption that the computer is an excellent and neutral 
conduit through which information can pass. But furthermore he argues, binary code 
inevitably results in the logical reduction of all language to a true - false dichotomy. This 
is why, despite the phenomenal capabilities of computers to accumulate, 'remember' and 
569 Bateson, 1979: 18-19 
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calculate information, they will never have 'real' intelligence. They are too black and 
white. Human consciousness is 'hardwired' to accommodate paradox, humour, play, and 
contradiction, as well as emotion, sexuality, irrationality, madness, mood, self-reflection, 
and creative inspiration and countless unnameable sources of comprehension and 
communication. As Bowers puts it: 
Since computers function on an algorithmic system, it is impossible to program forms of 
knowledge that cannot be made explicit and organized into discrete components or whose 
operational rules cannot be formally represented. "O 
Nothing is neutral, and like Nietzsche and Heidegger's argument about grammar, the 
machinery itself does set up certain parameters for the software. These limitations are 
about the social orientation of readable print language, and furthermore, on the mediating 
languages of Basic, Pascal or Fortran operations that computers use to convert binary 
code into language. Computers operate essentially on a logic of yes or not-yes, one or 
zero. A key difference between Bowers' assumptions about the binary code and my own 
is that he believes the binary - yes/no, one/zero sets up a finite range of capabilities. I 
think that Gregory Bateson's theory of stochastic change illustrates how there are infinite 
possibilities for combining zero, one in multitudinous and often ambiguous ways. 
Different varieties of computers, Acorn, Apple and IBM for example, set up their binary 
code in different configurations. For those that know the problems of sending and 
decoding files through the Internet, you will have met up with some of the 
incompatibilities between these different configurations of code, language, and systems. 
The software programmes completely vary from company to company for the same 
reason. IBM has developed remarkably similar word processing programmes to Apple, 
but the languages between binary code and 'natural' programming languages are 
different and not easily translatable between one system and another. IBM is clurnsier 
and more difficult to programme, their software requires longer to operate, takes up more 
memory, and introduces a multitude of faults. 
The Krokers' suggest that the sterile image of computer interaction is not 'clean' and 
indeed requires 'dirt' to generate new pathways, new 'thought. ' 
570 Bowers, 1988: 33 
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The will to virtual hygiene is so powerful because the really existent animating force of digital life is dirt. Noise in the machine, liquid in the wires, waste in the system, accidents 
in the codes, distortions in the gifs, mutations in design: it's the absence of dirt that 
haunts the virtual hygiene machine and without which the system as a whole loses 
energy, and runs towards digital entropy. "' 
Conduit model 
Bowers argues that the algorithmic nodes of cyberspace displace bodies and their cultural 
contexts. Alongside invisible bodies, the cultural relativism of student and software 
writer's interpretative frameworks are out of focus. What gets cut out of the mix in 
computer interaction is cultured and gendered conceptual categories, 'tacit-heuristic 
forms of knowledge. ' Bowers argues that computer literacy ought to shift from a 
technicist emphasis on manipulating the machine to a sociological awareness of the 
political and historical context that the machine reinforces: "from technical questions of 
how to input and output data to a concern with how the symbol-manipulation processes 
of computers alter consciousness and reinforce certain cultural orientations. , 572 He wants 
to institute a shift from the dominant paradigm of Cartesian individualist rationality, such 
that "individuals are assumed to have the autonomous rationality and agency to control 
,, 573 the throughput of information/knowledge. 
Bowers cites Seymour Papert (1980) as a typical example of the individualist and 
Neoliberal assumptions about classroom computer use. Papert argues that computers in 
every classroom would make education "more of a private act" free of school 
bureaucracy. 574 Eventually schools themselves might be made redundant if the teacher 
shortage and the privatisation of education encourages students to work from home, each 
individually networked. Cyberspace certainly challenges conventional methods of 
pedagogy. It generates networks of isolated and lonely individuals where crucial physical 
components of communication and touch are unavailable. 
Bowers argues convincingly that on the whole computers in classrooms tend to reinforce 
the conduit model of language and information. The argument is that the paradigm 
57 1 Kroker, 2001 
572 Bowers, 1988: 27 
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dominating the technology curriculum and policy documents encouraging technology and 
education is one where computers are seen as an instrumental conduit of language that 
originates with one individual and is delivered via a neutral delivery system. The 
computer is perceived as a neutral tool made up of metal, plastic and glass which 
facilitates the input, output, storage, memory, and retrieval of data or information to the 
individual end-user; the student. This "assumes (computer) language is an efficient 
transmission system of transferring ideas that originate in the first speaker, inputted into 
code, transferred, stored, manipulated, and then retrieved and decoded by the listener or 
receiver. , 575 
The sender-receiver model assumes "that information is contained in a transmitted 
message. , 576 If all that is needed were to simply uplift the contents of the message then 
"learning would be effortless and accurate. , 577 The computer is utilised as a neutral 
storehouse that various people load with information and as end-users, students can 
access and absorb this information. This minimalises the need for teacher intervention 
except on the level of offering the student technical assistance to operate the keyboard 
and find the programme pathways. The 'student centred' leaming rhetoric coincides with 
the notion that knowledge (or information) can be reduced to data entry, storage and data 
retrieval. The ideal self-motivated student learns to independently sift and uplift data in 
order to become knowledgeable. The teacher 'facilitates' this retrieval of information. 
The age old trap of unquestioned acceptance of the authority of the printed word comes 
into play here. But because the computer is an interactive tool, the notion of 'blind 
acceptance' of the selective basis of the information is further obscured. It appears as 
though agency by the end-user is operating. However while students can 'play the game' 
they cannot rewrite the programme. Therefore, they cannot alter the dominant 
assumptions of the software unless they engage critically in discussions within their 
immediate vicinity; in the traditional, physical, and immediate interaction of classroom 
teaching in order to develop an enlightened attitude to the material they encounter on the 
Web. "If language is viewed as non-neutral - that is, as a dynamic process that shapes our 
"5 Bowers, 1988: 39 
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thoughts as we use it to communicate with others - we would be forced to rethink our 
view of the autonomous individual and the rational process as free of cultural 
influence. , 578 
The conduit theory ignores the often haphazard nature of the way the data was collected. 
Taking ideas from Heidegger about how 'language speaks us' 579 Bowers notes that the 
conduit model has a series of implicit assumptions: 
Far from being a neutral vessel that can transport and transmit meaning to others, 
language metaphorically constructs and translates, in other words, it 'names and frames' 
conceptual boundaries and delimits or constrains the scope of thinking. "O 
The conduit view of objective knowledge and its transmission misrepresents how 
knowledge is humanly constructed over time in culturally specific ways and continually 
reconstructed as it is communicated to others. 581 
In the conduit model, the dynamic interplay between language and thought also gets lost. 
Master narratives and metaphor condition the social organisations we live in and form the 
relationship between humanity and the planet. This function of language still operates in 
the conduit model of language. The rational packaging of individualism and consumerism 
is the governing metaphor promoting an approach to the environment based on use value. 
The educational use of the microcomputer reinforces the more Cartesian view of the 
individual as the detached observer who is empowered through the acquisition of 
objective knowledge. This Cartesian view of knowledge is based on a mind-body dualism 
that not only established the primacy of procedural thinking and a mechanistic view of 
the external world but also a sense of detachment ftom the rhythms of culture and 
nature. 
582 
The networked society has alleviated the need for local communities to fit in with the 
seasonal cycles and tempo of local production. The storage capacity generated by a wide 
variety of technologies combined with cheap transport and immediate communication 
technologies have generated a consumer culture that is 'virtually' 'decoupled' from the 
restraints of the natural cycles and limitations of particular areas. It is only in the last 
578 Bowers, 1988: 41 
579Heidegger, 1982: 124 
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decade that the globalised effect of pollution and resource depletion has begun to impact 
on this phenomenon of ever increasing consumerism. 
The point Bowers makes about the primacy of procedural and mechanistic worldview is 
important. However, although the dominant discourses surrounding technology tend 
towards the Cartesian mind/body dualism, we need to draw attention to the fact that when 
closely analysed this separation fails on a number of levels. The body exists somewhere, 
it is fingers that punch keys on the keyboard, electrical impulses are transmitted on 
physical wires. Cyberspace is not merely ethereal; it is physically located - often in 
government sponsored computer banks. 
The networked society does not simply alienate and individualise people through the 
technological reinforcing of Descartes' dualism between the mind and the body. It 
increases the domestication and docility of students by tying technological networks to 
government surveillance. 583 This is classically the case with the Internet which is mostly 
physically located in two enormous storage centres; one run by the CIA and the other by 
the government in France. Store cards and mobile telephones are more examples of the 
increasing flexibility of communication technology and its enhancement of surveillance. 
Each mobile telephone can be located via satellite tracking its owner's movements and 
conversations (and not just their telephone conversations). Information technologies are 
transforming pedagogy, subjectivity, consumerism, and the science of governance. 
Alienation and Individualism 
Bowers finds evidence of Cartesian individualism in the technological enframing of 
computing software and also in older forms of print technology. Following Walter Ong 
and the Scollons, Bowers argues that the early technological shift from oral traditions of 
disseminating knowledge to the written tradition introduces an alienating and 
individualising abstraction to the field of social relations. 
584 Quoting Ong, he writes that 
64 writing, print, and electronic verbalisation ... have restructured consciousness, affecting 
583 
cf Foucault, 1979 584 Bowers, 1988: 80-81 
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men's and women's presence to the world and to themselves and creating new interior 
distances within the psyche. , 585 
Literacy contributes to two basic forms of modem alienation - what the Scollons (1985) 
refer to as the separation of the word from the body (the reification of the printed word) 
and separation in our personal relationships ... 
This reordering of our psychic space, where 
the abstraction of the printed word becomes more real than experience itself is 
complemented by the alienation that literacy fosters between persons. Writing - whether it takes the form of an article, novel, or instructional program - separates the sender from 
the receiver, turning communication ... 
into an asymmetrical power relationship. The 
writer and reader do not stand in an immediate relationship that allows for reciprocal 
communication. Instead, the writer and reader must enter into a highly privatized world 
wherein the writer transmits and the reader receives and reflects on the message. 586 
Ironically this assumes a conduit type of interaction between writer and reader. It 
obliterates the idiosyncratic history and degree of attention and agency that any given 
reader brings to the text. Moments of quiet aloneness do not necessarily constitute lonely 
isolation. Furthen-nore, distributions of power do not adhere so simply to the model 
writer-has-power, reader-is-passive. Although I think there is some merit in Bowers' 
argument that the Liberal individual is often the underlying metaphorical figure to whom 
various software 'speaks, ' the analysis of all print media to an individualistic framework 
underestimates the specifics of mass publishing and the networked nature of computers. 
It could be argued that a speech to an audience of hundreds is a communal and physically 
immediate form of communication, but in Bowers' analysis, this form of communication 
is also uni-directional in that, short of a mass walk-out or some other mass response, 
there is no means for the audience to reciprocally dialogue with the Speaker. He thinks 
the printed book operates in a similar manner. It is mass-produced and seeks a large 
audience. I would argue that there is an important response factor, carefully orchestrated 
via journals in the academic world, but practised informally by all readers through the 
personal and selective interpretation of the ideas presented n the text. It is an activity of 
reading, and individual only to the extent of all acts of interpretation. 
587 Reading is 
individual but it is also in the context of a shared speech community and often the ideas 
are discussed informally or formally amongst acquaintances. The network capacity of 
computers adds a further dimension of sharing where both immediate interaction with the 
585 Ong, 1977: 1 cited in Bowers, 1988: 80 586 Bowers, 1988: 80-81 
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text and forwarding it (sometimes altered) to other people interested in the content, 
forecloses individualism as too narrow an understanding of computer generated 
communication. Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the rhizome is more apt to describe 
computer interaction. 588 Having said all that, the technology may not ensure an 
individualist framework but the content posted often does. 
Unfortunately, at some level, Bowers confuses and conflates the invisibility of the body 
in cyberspace with the sceptical separation of the body from the mind set up by 
Descartes. Following Heidegger's critique of Cartesian modernity, he disapproves of the 
dualist approach to bodies and minds as the governing motif of male dominated cultural 
imperialism, Bowers develops a tendency towards anti-intellectualism. There are some 
fundamental problems with Bowers' interpretation of the activity of reading. "As a 
technology print amplifies an autonomous sense of individualism (the isolating nature of 
,, 589 writing and reading) and analytical thought . He is trying to find evidence of the 
problematic Liberal individual which as the base metaphor of modem society. But, while 
his thesis has merit, his examples are not always helpful. This emphasis on the isolation 
of the activity of writing and reading confines it to a forin of alienation and abstraction. 
The elements of engagement and communication are obscured, just as the body is 
obscured in his understanding of cyberspace. This emphasis on alienation and abstraction 
produces a crude theory versus practice distinction that tries to disparage abstract 
thought: 
Analytical thought involves this mental distancing, which is facilitated through print. 
Ironically, the fixed nature of the text, which provides the needed reference points for 
analysis, also means that the content is no longer part of lived experience. "O 
Clearly, these ideas are influenced in unfortunate ways by Ong, who Bowers quotes in 
relation to the alienation and individuation of writing and reading: "... to assume that the 
printed word is the real word, and the spoken word is inconsequential. Permanent 
unreality is more plausible and comforting than reality that is transient. , 591 This 
'unreality' of the text seems to be a result of its permanence (a relative concept at the best 
... Deleuze and Guattari, 1994 
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of times). 'Permanent unreality' misses the point that any statement, oral or textual, 
confines the chaos of the moment into a fixed position or ordering as confinement and 
delimitation is the premise of making sense. If we do not impose some limits then there is 
nothing to say. Or, impossibly, all to say. 
It seems a little ironic to read a book that clearly articulates complex ideas that are not 
reducible to measurement or objectivity, but that complains that printed texts are 
inevitably tantamount to Cartesian dualism and the reduction of all knowledge to 
objectivity. This muddling of anti-intellectual suspicion of abstract thought is combined 
with high levels of anxiety about Liberal individualism at the expense of community 
cohesion. 
The possibility of viable communities may be further weakened by internal processes, 
including a fon-n of education that strengthens a form of rootless individualism by 
socializing students to a decontextualizing forms of thinking, by ignoring the forms of 
knowledge and values essential to the authority of community life, and by reinforcing the 
liberal ideology that represent the person as an autonomous, self-directing individual. In 
effect, the educational process carried on in schools may equip the individual to operate 
within the larger society by undermining the symbolic foundations of the community. 592 
The contrast between individual freedom and community law has worried Liberals for 
many generations. Deleuze and Guattari point out that the networked society is no longer 
particularly interested in free individuals, but rather itemised, numbered, coded masses. 593 
The surveillance techniques made available by infon-nation technologies is enhancing the 
governmentality of the masses, offering them autonomous consumer choices and 
advocating a 'calculus of consent' without developing the subject capable of critique, 
independence, or genuine creativity. 
Bowers also makes the important point that anomie is a significant concern in our modem 
individualistic society. Although it is hard to know whether today's high levels of youth 
suicide and the oft spoken of breakdown of the nuclear family is actually worse than our 
Romanticised versions of a pre-technological past. However, the valorisation of 
community at the expense of abstract enlightened thinking (by subgroups or individuals) 
592 Bowers, 1988: 13 
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could easily degenerate into the sort of fascist tyranny which Heidegger found himself 
supporting, a result which I am sure is not what Bowers had in mind. 
Bowers' critique of individualism emerges from a similar source to my own; he is highly 
critical of our modem consumer society for its detrimental impact on ecosystems and the 
way in which it elevates some areas of expertise to exorbitant levels and devalues other 
(usually feminised) forms of labour to below the survival line. Individualism is the basis 
of Liberal democracy, the most successful fonn of modem society, and combined with 
capitalism, responsible for the exponential escalation of resource depletion and pollution 
on the planet. Individualism has been critiqued by feminist theory for postulating that the 
lone male is the core unit of society, rather than the more communally orientated unit of 
mother-and- children. The emergence of individualism is usually attributed to Descartes' 
Discourse on Method 594 which transformed the nominal tradition of philosophy by 
sceptically separating the mind from the body (of the individual) and postulated that 
nothing was certain except that which could be reasonably deduced. Descartes has had an 
enon-nous and by now often unacknowledged influence on modem thought. The premises 
of individualism, positivist objectivity, and a male orientation permeate our language and 
are thus conceptually almost unavoidable. From this critical perspective, and somewhat 
ironically for a man clearly competent as an intellectual himself, Bowers falls into an 
anti-intellectual disparagement of "abstract-decontextualized knowledge. , 595 There is a 
well placed anxiety about the tendency of computers, software programmers, technicians 
and teachers to adhere to the dominant paradigm of individualism, separating the mind 
from the body and regulating the sphere of knowledge through the sceptical metaphor of 
positivist objectivity. The questions raised by such insights into the premises of 
modemity are important to raise in the classroom. 
Heidegger's insights about technology and the phenomenological implications of 
highlighting one form of sensory experience (often sight) at the expense of occluding 
other sensory apprehension is important and Bowers has shown how computers reinforce 
the activity of the mind and obscures the cultural practises, the movements and the very 
594 Descartes, 1980. An interpretation of Descartes influenced by Berkeley and possibly not what Descartes 
intended. 
595 Bowers, 1988: 11 
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existence of the body. The dominant understanding of technology as 'neutral' feeds into 
Cartesian theories of dualist scepticism that separates the individual's mind from the 
body via rational objectivity. Holding this critical attitude towards technology and 
computing in particular, Bowers shows how teaching the technology curriculum often 
utilises these discourses without evaluation or any attempt to ascertain the relevance or 
detrimental impact to the cultural context of the particular classroom. While computers 
are assumed to be 'neutral' tools, the technological sphere can expand without 
limitations. His book with David Flinders Responsive Teaching; An Ecological Approach 
to Classroom Patterns ofLanguage, Culture, and Thought (1990) expands on these 
issues. In it he attempts to redress these absences from the curriculum and to reinvent the 
teacher as an active participant rather than a technological assistant to the computer 
facilitated conduit of student access to colossal quantities of information. 
My reservations about his work is its rather unsophisticated association of abstract 
thought with alienated individualism through a faulty understanding of the processes of 
print technology; writing, reading and dissemination. He highlights the limitations of the 
dominant discourse surrounding computers that obscures the historico-political context of 
the body at the computer. The body or the cultural context impacts on cyberspace 
anyway, the network fails to live up to its clean and sober image by crashing, failing to 
load, accepting spam mail, succumbing to a virus, und so weiter. 
Technology is not neutral. But neither is it evil. As Heidegger put it, rather famously 
quoting H61derlin 'technology is the danger, but also the saving power. ' 596 Where could 
that take us? The question prior to technologies' supposed neutrality is how does it frame 
human understanding? Bowers has in large part begun to process this question. He has 
recharged the educational task, so it hums with questions about meaning, context and 
power dynamics, so the environment and our relationship to it is brought to the forefront 
instead of hiding behind the rhetoric and practises of consumerism. The classroom 
according to Bowers ought to ask critical questions about what is obscured, and what is 
emphasised instead of dryly reducing infori-nation to a consumable product available in 
the technological marketplace. 
596 Heidegger, 1977b: 34 
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What I have attempted to do in this chapter is begin to distinguish between the dominant 
narratives about technology which tend towards individualism and an abstract domain 
called 'cyberspace' and begin to see where the parameters are set up by the machinery 
and where the parameters are set up by the narratives of modernity. The chances are that 
the technological Gestell is capable of a new poetics of apprehension. Stretching to the 
outer limits of the known Universe, the telescope reintroduces us to the sublime. This 
time, it does not taste or smell. In fact at this point of realisation it presents a boring and 
monotonous buzz of 'background' X-rays emitted, it is thought, by the Big Bang. But this 
is an example of how technology can reinvigorate our association with our environment, 
and recontextualise our place in it. For the last 200 years technology has enhanced the 
regime of consumerism to the point of annihilating many species and habitats, and more 
recently destablilizing the global climate so that it is endangering humanity too. It may be 
the case that technology can 'make right' some of these catastrophes but many events, 
extinctions for example, are already irreversible. Nature, however, is not dead. And the 
phenomenological affects of technology, including the computer and the Internet, may 
open up and awaken our understanding of our relative importance (or lack thereof) and 
the unique significance of the planet we inhabit. 
Technology in the classroom has the chance to address these powerful and vital issues. 
Through a 'turn' towards a new set of metaphors and a the potential for a new 
grammatology that does not enhance the separation of the subject from the object, 
education can enlighten and constructively engage with the way we produce technology 
and technology produces us. Heidegger's idea of technological enframing was taken up 
by Bowers and applied to classroom Internet Technology. He also tried to show how 
technological enframing produces the modem individual. Without throwing either of 
these important concepts out, I have tried to show where they have significance, and 
where they are a result of other, contingent processes. Showing up the limitations, the 
parameters and the constructive associations of teacher, students and computer 
technology can help us to begin to think in new ways, with new stories, new metaphors, 
new languages and the possibility of a new 'world. ' 
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II Global Policy: 'Sustainability' and 'Risk' 
Heidegger analysed many of the problems that face us in a world dominated by 
technological change: fon-nidable alteration in capitalist production, patterns of economic 
exchange, and the changing priorities of knowledge. Nowadays economy is characterised 
by massive global financial transactions that bear little or no relation to the locale of 
production or local profitability. The deterritorialisation of global finance and production 
has decoupled responsibility for care of people, places, species, and ecosystems. 
Heidegger called this 'technological enframing, ' the 'forgetting of Being. ' One of his 
attempts to resist the 'total mobilisation' of technology was a reviving of 'home and 
hearth' in an effort to reconnect people with the immediate parameters of our 
environment, rather than the 'decoupled' iiber-consumption of globalised production and 
evermore potential standing reserve. He connects 'poetic dwelling upon the earth' with 
regenerating the authentic relationship between humanity and environment, 597 or Being, 
as the pause that will bring us back from the threshold of devastating meaninglessness. 
His philosophy is tinged with a sense of desperation that humankind is trapped in the 
momentum of the history of western metaphysics and this is mired in the depths of 
nihilism. 
At the time that Heidegger was writing, the industrialism had been underway for over 
200 years and Marx's analysis of the modes of capitalist production coupled with 
Darwin's ideas about 'survival of the fittest' seemed to offer an adequate explanation for 
the various examples of species extinctions that were occurring across the globe. 
Marx tends to cast capitalism as the inescapable structure which crushes the possibility 
for authentic and unalienated work to take place. Heidegger's structuralism is the similar 
alienation caused by a technological enframing and he argues that technology is what 
inhibits authentic work to bring a person (Dasein) into close proximity with earth. Marx's 
determinism is marked by the hope of dialectical reason gradually taking us to a utopian 
597 Heidegger, 1977b: 34 
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era of small, close knit communities with a direct relation to resources and production. 
Heidegger's determinism does not have the same faith in an inevitable telos, and while 
the utopian ideal is very similar to Marx's, he looks to the unknowable disruptions of the 
enframing of technology that could be made ready if Dasein remembers to remain open 
to the unconcealment of Being. As I outlined in the previous section on Heidegger, 
bearing in mind the reservations I have about the concept of Being and Dasein, I would 
like to take a Heideggerian position when examining the processes of modemity, 
contemporary globalisation, and Modem Liberalism. 
At the present time, technology has deepened its characterisation of humanity's 
relationship with the earth, and yet there is a diffuse politicisation of environmental 
concerns in a wide range of regions, ecological spheres, and discipline areas. These 
revolve around many technological resource issues from fossil fuel consumption, 
emerging evidence of global warming, the health concerns of pesticides and fertilizer on 
humans, animals and water reservoirs, soil erosion, non-replaceable virgin forest-felling, 
and so on, and so on. The reservations about technological interference and over- 
consumption are the site for a significant change in the eco-social sphere. 
During the 1970s the relationship between humanity and environment shifted from the 
periphery of human concern into a crisis with which humanity must deal. The 'answers' 
have been a growing interest in the threshold of 'sustainability. ' At one end of the 
spectrum sustainability is interpreted as either a rejection of capitalism because of the 
inequitable social divide between 'developed' and 'non-developed' nations and at the 
other end of the spectrum is the intensification of capitalism that measures and 
standardises acceptable levels of pollution combined with a call for efficient industry as 
an outcome of 'green initiatives. ' Global warming, the transference of inert 'sinks' of 
carbon-fossil deposits (coal, oil, gas) into activeC02 emissions released into the 
atmosphere, atmospheric ozone depletion, large scale forest felling at a non-replaceable 
rate, soil erosion and desertification, water pollution, acid rain, population growth, 
rubbish disposal and so on, have in a variety of ways required an ecological frame of 
mind. These concerns have encouraged environmental efforts that 'tread lightly on the 
earth. ' For policy makers at national and international levels technology itself is where 
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relief might occur from the environmentally devastating practices of the industrial 
revolution, the production of poisons, and the long terin over- consumption of massive 
quantities of fossil fuels. 
Heidegger's critique of technological enframing has not yet infiltrated the top echelon of 
the global community. They have become aware of the thresholds of sustainability, 
finally commissioning interdisciplinary scientific studies to ascertain as closely as 
possible the 'natural' fluctuation of global climate change, and model the potential 
changes initiated by humanC02 emissions. 598 But these models are advanced to pan- 
global organisations with the view to developing the economic policy and the new 
technology required for alleviating the situation. The full impact of the teetering 
threshold is onlyjust coming into view. The continuation of the same mechanisms, the 
same strategies, and the same philosophical and social paradigms that have gotten us into 
this mess still pervade the policy makers, the bankers, the world trade organisations. They 
peer over the brink, trying to hold onto what they now recognise as a stable set of 
conditions for mammalian life, but do not know how to pause and reflect, how to stop the 
juggernaut of exponential economic 'growth, ' how to make dwell authentically and ready 
the possibility for eco-poiesis. They do not understand that what is required is a 
fundamental change in the expectations, assumptions, and interrelationship between 
human beings and the environment, a new coda of respect and releasement, rather than 
the challenging forth into standing reserve. 
During the last 30 years grassroots concerns from politically active individuals and non- 
governmental organisations forced their way into mainstream media and government 
organisations. By the 1990s the governing mantra of environmental concern has become 
'sustainable development. ' For example these high profile, international organisations all 
adhere to some form of sustainability; The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) promotes 'Sustainable human development'; The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) promote 'Sustainable 
economic growth'; The World Bank is committed to 'sustainable development and 
equitable development'; The European Union (EU), since Maastricht, examines the 
598 Wigley 2002 and Wigley, 2004 
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notion of 'sustainable economic and social development'; and at the local level, British 
Local Authorities and institutions such as Universities, adopt the 'criteria Of 
sustainability and sustainable development. ' 
There have been five main international conventions on the global impact of human 
society on the environment. The first was the World Conservation Union (WCU) In 1980 
that struggled to make these issues significant, the second was the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987 that began to establish international 
protocol, and the third was the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in 1992, Rio De Janeiro. The Kyoto Conference agreed on 
Agenda 21 in 1997. UNCED was recently followed up in Johannesburg in 2002. 
The World Conservation Union came up with a document published in 1980 titled 
'World Conservation Strategy. ' The strategy is a motif for explaining the relationship 
between human kind and the ecosystems we live in by tying together the disparate themes 
of 'conservation' and 'development, ' "The integration of conservation and development 
to ensure that modifications to the planet do indeed secure the survival and well-being of 
all people. , 599 There is an important (and largely unrecognised) difference between 
sustainable resource use and sustainable ecology. Conservation is to retain an existing 
form, in this case, of ecosystems. Development on the other hand illustrates Heidegger's 
argument with frightening accuracy; it is to shift our understanding of an ecosystem 
towards a socially and economically viable potential resource suitable for transformation. 
The incompatibility of these two concepts has been increasingly ignored by capitalist, 
pan-global organisations. 
The first acknowledgement of the ecological problem at a global policy level was the 
World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. They produced a 
publication 'Our Common Future, ' often known as the Brundtland Report after the 
chairman of the Commission. In the Brundtland Report, it is noted that seeing the world 
from space offered a new perspective on the fragility and finitude of the small planet, 
covered in clouds, oceans, vegetation and soils and that human activity was so remote, it 
599 WCS, section 1.2, cited in Brundtland, 1987: preface 
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was unseen. This shift in perspective has fired the imagination of science fiction, 
astronomy, art, poetry, and changed the configuration of human consciousness towards 
the singular planet in the universe that is known to support life. 
The Brundtland Report is most well known for its focus and definition on 'sustainability' 
or its tangent, 'sustainable development. ' There are three distinct categories of 
4sustainability' each with vastly different approaches to the relationship between 
humanity and the environment: sustainable resources, sustainable ecosystems, and 
sustainable development. 
A sustainable resource is the replacement, maintenance, re-use, or at worst, slow 
consumption of non-renewable resources. Energy is a good example: solar heating, wind 
turbines and hydro energy are continually renewable sources of energy. Large scale 
however, they each have various detrimental impact on locations; the damming of rivers, 
the water levels of lakes, extensive wind farms disrupting bird habitats and so forth. 
Nuclear energy is also 'renewable' but the radioactivity of exhausted uranium is so 
excessively dangerous that there are no methods of safe disposal. Sustainability includes 
continuity of the initial resource and a commitment to little or no pollution in the 
production, consumption, and disposal of the resource. In contrast, fossil sources of 
energy have massive pollutant problems and they are non-renewable. 
Sustainable ecosystems bear no relation to 'resource use' at all. Ecological sustainability 
is the protection of the dynamics of ecological niches and emerges from the ethics of 
4conservation. ' It does have static overtones because there is an implied assumption that 
an 'original wilderness' can be resuscitated. But ecological sustainability can adjust and 
adapt to many of the global introductions of new species that occur either via vectors of 
human transmission or other means of expansion. It is the global effects of pollutants, 
deforestation, and climate change that are threatening ecosystems all over the world, 
regardless of direct human intervention. 
The WCED define the third category of 'sustainable development' in anthropocentric 
terms of maintaining resources and lifestyles across generations, "developments which 
meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the chances of future 
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,, 600 generations to meet their own needs. Elsewhere they state, "Sustainable development 
seeks to meet the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising the ability to 
meet those of the future. , 
601 
The remit of the Brundtland Report is clearly attempting to politically activate the will of 
governments around the world to produce policy initiatives and regulations which at least 
begin to become environmentally sound. Key points are: 
to propose long-term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable development by 
the year 2000 and beyond; 
to recommend ways that concern for the environment may translate into greater co- 
operation among developing countries and between countries at different stages of 
economic and social development and lead to the achievement of common and mutually 
supportive objectives that take account of the interrelationships between people, 
resources, environment and development; 
to consider ways and means by which the international community can deal more 
effectively with environmental concerns; 
to help define shared perceptions of long-term environmental issues and the appropriate 
efforts needed to deal successfully with the problems of protecting and enhancing the 
environment, a long-term agenda for action during the coming decades, and aspirational 
goals for the world communityI02 
Right from the beginning the Brundtland Report addresses the long term relationship 
between people, resources, environment and development -a set of relationships that had 
hitherto been virtually neglected. The Brundtland Report directly addresses economic 
inequity between nation states and the need to conceive of a constructive environmental 
policy that will equitably address these huge differences. This should be compared with 
the World Trade Organisation that consigns these differences to a shadowy silence and 
uses market metaphors to shroud issues of inequity and 'development' to maintain and 
enhance the 'G8' wealthiest nations at the expense of resource depletion and living 
standards of poorer nations. However, the inclusion of 'development' and 'resource' in 
the WCED's Brundtland report clearly indicates that the relationship between humanity 
and environment is anthropocentric and illustrate Heidegger's point that everything, 
600 Brundtland, 
60 1 Brundtland, 
6" Brundtland, 
1987: preface 
1987: 40 
1987, ix 
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including humanity is regarded as a potential 6resource' in 'standing reserve' for capitalist 
consumption. The combination of 'development' with environment compacts this 
problem. It assumes that the environment can be managed or 'gardened. ' This makes 
humankind the manager of a technological enterprise named 'earth. ' These reservations 
though, at this point in time, are unavoidable dimensions of the technological enframing 
of the relationship between humanity and earth particularly in view of the inequities in 
the distribution of wealth, money, and products, globally. 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) met for the 
first time in 1992 at Rio de Janeiro. Again, even the title of the conference shows the 
close links and assumptions that bind a management relation to the environment and to 
humans around the notion of development. Despite the inauspicious framing of the 
environment in such Utilitarian terms, Rio was the beginning of very important debates. 
The scale of environmental issues cannot produce instant answers. At the same time, it 
was an unsatisfactory convention in many regards. Huge discussions ensued about the 
relationship between industrialised and 'developing' countries about the limits of 
resources. However they did manage to concur on 5 'Earth Summit' agreements and an 
action plan for sustainable development titled Agenda 21 was produced. The United 
Nations congratulated itself on producing "an elaborate tool that could set the planet on a 
new course towards global sustainable development. " Agenda 21 is divided into four 
main sections; 
Social and economic development; 
The conservation and management of resources for development; 
Strengthening the role of major groups involve in achieving sustainable development; 
means of implementation 
It includes financial and technology 'transfers' to implement ecological initiatives. The 
UNCED is explicitly anthropocentric in outlook and the technological enframing is more 
visible than in the Brundtland Report. 
It is impossible to separate policies and financial initiatives aimed at environmental 
protection from social and economic issues in the locality. In other words, the attitudes 
and understanding that we have towards the environment are closely connected to our 
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attitudes to one another (interpersonally and across continents). The economic divides 
that have resulted from post-colonial international economic and political relations are 
deeply implicated in the environmental problems that have become so startlingly obvious 
in the last 30 years. 
The recognition that colonialism extends its influence today, and detrimentally impacts 
not only on peoples but also on the environment is extremely important and refreshingly 
honest. In Agenda 21, they noted that "methods for assessing interactions between 
different sectoral environmental, demographic, social and developmental parameters are 
not sufficiently developed or applied. " Nevertheless, they urged countries to "develop the 
concept of indicators of sustainable development" in a way that would "contribute to a 
,, 603 self-regulating sustainability of integrated environment and development systems . 
In 1997,38 developed nations met in Japan to assemble another version of Agenda 21 
called the Kyoto Agreement. This time they began to firmly fix figures and goals f6rC02 
emissions. They used 1990 levels of emissions as a base line and bickered with one 
another over fair and realistic goals for 'safe' levels of national emission. The United 
States insisted, with good reason, that India and China ought to be included in the 
Agreement. Controversially, no levels were set for 'developing' nations. It was during the 
Kyoto Summit that the United States introduced the idea of emission vouchers that is 
being advocated by OECD spokesman for the environment, Simon Upton (see below). 
The United States' proposal is to permit a trade in emission quotas, which would allow 
richer countries to 'buy in' the right to pollute the environment from countries which do 
not use up their full emission quota. This proposal is very undeveloped but has a great 
deal of political commitment. Questions of measurement about value, population quota, 
and environmental impact will arise. But as with fish quota, this solution is likely to 
eventually be put in place. 604 
603 Upton, 2001 
604 Fish quota are also a classic example as to why vouchers are deeply problematic. Fish have to be over a 
certain size to be legally viable. However the fertility of fish increases exponentially with size, making very 
large fish much more important for reproduction than juveniles. The codes defeat the original purpose of 
regenerating fish numbers. 
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In 1997, critics complained that only 38 industrial nations offered to join the treaty, 
promising to cut their emissions of greenhouse gases by 5.2% by 2008-12. Under the 
Presidency of Clinton the United States as the world's biggest polluter offered to cut by 
7%, the European Union by 8%, Canada and Japan by 6%, from 1990 emission levels in 
the next 15 years. Other countries, according to the beginning of quota estimates, were 
allowed to increase theirC02 emissions. Australia was allowed to increase emissions by 
8%, Norway to increase by I% and Iceland to rise by 10%. Russia is allowed no change 
under the draft. 
In Johannesburg 2002, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
met again. At the beginning of 2004 178 nations had signed the agreement. However, 
after the elections in the U. S. A., President George W. Bush refuses to acknowledge that 
the U. S. A is by far the world's most prolific consumer and polluter or sign the Kyoto 
Agreement. Despite this major setback, the UNCED conferences are informing a 
paradigm shift in the aims and objectives of many key international organisations, 
governments at national and local levels and the media and popular culture. If anything, 
educational policy and curriculum is lagging behind in these changes. 
OECD 
The OECD is an excellent example of an important international organisation that has 
substantially altered its mission since Rio. In 1960 the first article of the OECD 
Convention read; 
to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising 
standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and 
thus to contribute to the development of the world economy; 
to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member 
countries in the process of economic development; and 
to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory 
basis in accordance with international obligations. "' 
In contrast to its earlier economic and exclusively human orientation, the OECD adopted 
an Environmental Strategy in 2001 that has four central policy objectives that 
605 OECD, 1960 
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increasingly recognise the interdependence of one region's social and environmental 
situation with another's. The mechanisms of measurement and governmentality are 
emphasised. There is also a growing acceptance at this stage of a climate of global 
environmental crisis. They state, "We must place the health of ecosystems and their 
carrying capacity at the centre of our preoccupations. , 606 
Maintaining the integrity of ecosystems through the efficient management of natural 
resources. 
De-coupling environmental pressures from economic growth. 
Improving information for decision-making by using indicators to measure progress. 
Enhancing the quality of life: The social and environmental interface. 
Improving governance and co-operation: Global environmental interdependence. 'O' 
These key points have been so influential we will spend some time unpicking them. The 
initial aspect to notice, through a reading informed by Heidegger, is the emphasis on 
managing the environment as 'natural resources. ' Secondly, the economic belief that it is 
possible to 'decouple' continuous exponential economic growth divorced from the 
existent parameters of the ecosystem. And finally, the perceived need for better quality 
information and 'indicators' or attributes of value that enhance economic management of 
the 'social and environmental. ' This includes 'risk' assessment. They go on to place 
environmental concerns at the centre of OECD policy, and take a decisively Neoliberal 
attitude to addressing these problems; 
Unsustainable production and consumption patterns are increasingly threatening the 
health of global ecosystems and biological diversity, climate patterns and the global 
environment. Human pressures on the environment are not expected to ease unless strong 
policy actions are taken to protect ecosystems and maintain the essential services they 
provide. OECD countries will need to remove or reform subsidies and other policies that 
encourage unsustainable use of natural resources and ensure the full costs of natural 
resource use are taken into account through market and other policy instruments, 
reflecting the User Pays Principle and the Polluter Pays Principle. 'O' 
The OECD have put out a series of publications aimed at environmental education. The 
environment has taken an increasingly central role. In their 1995 publication 
Environmental Learningfor the 21" Century, the remit is merely to "promote the active 
606 OECD Environmental Strategy, 2001 
607 OECD Environmental Strategy, 2001 
608 OECD Environmental Strategy, 2001 
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engagement of teachers and their students in identifying, developing knowledge on, and 
acting to resolve local environmental problems. , 609 
The OECD methodology was via action research to compare local environmental 
education in five countries; Australia, Austria, Finland, Germany and Norway. A network 
was set up in 12 participating countries where schools were interested in environmental 
education initiatives. They state, 
Given the growing 'environmental imperative' the following criteria were seen to 
constitute a 'new' responsibility of the education system - that is, the promotion of 
environmental awareness and of 'dynamic' qualities in students, such as initiative, 
independence, commitment, and readiness to accept responsibility. " 0 
In environmental education, 'responsibility' requires that "the concept of environment to 
be broadly defined, not limiting school initiatives to the natural environment but 
including social, economic, cultural, and technological dimensions. The OECD 
encourages a broad scope and personal initiative for environmental education. They have 
gone on to do some even more intensive and vital research that encompasses the 
controversial issue of climate change and global warming. 
The Brundtland Report (1987) has provided guiding principles for the proliferation of 
policy initiatives, environmental theory, and environmental education in most nations 
throughout the world. The phrase "meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" must be one of the most often 
quoted sentences in literary history. 612 As the Deep Ecologists and the contemporary 
Pragmatists advocate, this 'platform' is providing a marriage of convenience between 
humanity, environment, and management of the future that is proving an inclusive bridge 
across many types of environmental theory. The notion of Environmental Futures does 
emerge from Neoliberal principles, as OECD spokesman on the environment, Simon 
Upton 'less cautiously' and 'more provocatively' acknowledges. 613 Upton writes that the 
Brundtland formula "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
609 OECD, 1995, my emphasis 
6 '0 Kelley-Lain&, 1993: 414 cited in OECD 1995: 7 
611 OECD 1995: 11 
612 Brundtland, 1987: preface 
613 Upton, 200 1b 
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future generations to meet their own needs" is a definition that does not require basic 
philosophical principles or "metaphysical leaps. " The antagonism to philosophy resounds 
with Neopragmatism and Deep Ecology. 
Indeed, one of the founding motifs of modernity is the emphasis on the present day. 
Humanist self-help guides and maxims advise us that genuine appreciation of life is to 
'live in the moment. ' In Neoliberalism, the ultra-modem emphasis on the present lends 
itself to maximising consumption, with a faith in the market's ability to meliorate 
decisions, including political decisions. But this concentration on the immediate (live for 
today, tomorrow may never come) has been importantly modified by the notion of 
sustainable futures and the increasingly evident impact of human consumption on the 
environment. Upton explains this shift in emphasis from the immediate to the future in 
economic terms. There are "numerous environmental variables where the externalities are 
simply not linear. Thus, continual pressure on a resource (or species) can be applied with 
no apparent effect for a considerable time until suddenly a threshold is crossed and the 
negative effects begin to rise sharp Y.,, 
614 
The first UNCED conference at Rio, very sensibly according to Upton, affirms the 
"anthropocentric nature of our interest in sustainability. 'Human beings, ' it states, ' are at 
the centre of concerns for sustainable development. "' The 'ingenuity' and 'efficiency' 
that humanity creatively apply to the transformation of nature is unending. But Upton is 
careful to distinguish the social and economic aspects (such as distribution) of 
sustainability from the finitude of natural resources. As Upton states "there are boundary 
conditions for the stability of the linked biological, chemical and physical systems that 
form the global life-support system on which human life ultimately depends. " Not only 
can we intuit and sometimes find scientific evidence for the limitations of nature, in terms 
of resources, but there is no sure way of discerning what the threshold to over-use, or 
over pollution might be until it is too late. Upton asks, 
614 Upton, 2002a 
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can 
i 
we identify which human claims on some key elements of the blo-physical 
environment place us at risk of crossing thresholds beyond which lie very significant 
environmental perturbations with high economic, social and environmental CoStS? 
615 
This 'uncertainty' is taken more seriously by Upton than many of the other policy 
initiatives on environmentally sustainability. Upton's paper "Measuring What? " explores 
the problems of generating environmental indicators. 616 
Upton understands the threshold argument put forward by ecologists in the 1970s in 
terms of the economic paradigm of 'risk' and costs/benefit analysis. He takes seriously 
the Climate Change Report published by his organisation in 2001. After extensive 
analysis of all known data, a team of scientists put together all the information into a 
range of models projecting global climate temperatures over the next century (and 
beyond). The models suggest a rise in temperature from at best 1.4 degree to 5.8 degrees 
depending on a range of variables, including the extent of carbon absorption by oceans 
and forests, and the rate of continuing release of greenhouse gases by humankind across 
the globe. 617 Upton readily acknowledges that climate change is directly attributable to 
complex by-products of human technological industrialisation, consumerism and 
globalised transport. For at least the last half a million years, atmospheric C02emissions 
have remained within stable and specific limits of 180 and 280/290 ppm. Upton faces the 
brutal facts of fossil fuel pollution; 
We also know that human activities have broken these bounds, with current carbon 
dioxide concentration approaching 370 ppm and that these have risen to that level at a 
rate at least 10 and possibly 100 times faster than at any other time during the last half- 
million years. But we do not yet know the full implications of this change for the stability 
of the climate. Nor do we actually know whether we have crossed or are poised to cross a 
threshold that will lead to rapid climate change. 618 
In response to the evidence collated and presented by science, Simon Upton, and the 
OECD in general are trying to tie together economic costibenefit calculations with nsk 
analysis that estimates the threshold when climate viability swings to catastrophic 
escalation. 61 9 This is similar to the estimations that insurance companies use to calculate 
615 Upton, 2002a 
616 Upton, 2002a 
617 Wigley and Raper, 2001: 79 c1ted n Upton, 2002a, and Wigley, 2004 
618 Upton, 2002a 
619 Upton, 2002c 
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the probable risks of earthquakes, volcanoes or accident rates for males between the ages 
of 15 and 25. The costs associated with dramatic global warming are on a vastly different 
scale from the relatively contained results of tectonic plate movement. 
Any significant warming will entail costs in fields as diverse as agricultural and public 
health. What are not fully understood are the thresholds at which catastrophic or 
irreversible changes could be triggered. To manage the risk, precautionary action would 
seem prudent. But concluding a binding treaty to take the first steps is proving extremely 
d ff CUlt. 620 i1 
From the Neoliberal standpoint of minimal government intervention and economic 
assessment of the risks and costs of global warming, Upton is advocating global 
regulation of environmental hazards. He specifically outlines greenhouse gas emissions, 
clean water, coastal marine environments and fish stocks, terrestrial biodiversity and soil 
erosion and important sites of global environmental risk. 
The trajectories of resource use indicate severe disruption to bio-physical systems, in 
many cases at the regional level and in some cases (pre-eminently climate change) at the 
global level. While the thresholds at which the need for adaptation changes to crisis 
response are not precisely known, most trends indicate accumulating rather than 
decreasing risk, even allowing for technological change. 621 
It is interesting that these outcomes of anthropocentric behaviour have not been framed 
(unlike the WTO) in terms of economic 'externalities. ' And very reassuring that someone 
of Upton's stature is not wholly relying on technology to miraculously fix the problem of 
environmental damage. Indeed like the WCED and the UNCED, Upton recognises, early 
in his OECD role, that sustainability is entangled with the massive economic disparity 
between the 'developing world' and the rich nations. In 2001 Upton notes that non- 
renewable resource use in rich nations is careless, but "there is nothing environmentally 
sustainable about poverty. , 622 Although later he extricates himself and the OECD from so 
much responsibility for equitable redistribution across the globe. 623 
Simon Upton believes that positivist epistemology ought to enable us to roughly calculate 
the complex processes of pollutant reactions on the biosphere, such as the hole in the 
620 Upton, 2001b 
621 Upton, 2001b 
622 Upton, 2001b 
623 Upton, 2002b 
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ozone layer as a result of fluorocarbon use since the 1950s, or the amountsOf C02 
releases etc. that are disturbing the 'balance' of delicate ecological systems. According to 
Heidegger, even if these calculations could occur (which they have not), measurement 
will not fundamentally redress the failure of humanity to apprehend the profoundness of 
Being, but constitutes part of the problem, which is that calculation and measurement 
obscures our relation to the planet, instead of enhancing it. Upton acknowledges that 
accuracy can never be achieved, Oust as he avoids metaphysical leaps, it is unclear 
whether this is a Pragmatic, Empiricist or Post-structuralist acknowledgement that 
absolutes are impossible). However he argues with a great degree of reasonableness, that 
some form of environmental indicators are important for international policy directives, 
and national accountability towards those policy agreements. 
Upton's attempt to place measurements and scales on pollution has a sophisticated 
disclaimer that acknowledges that all such measurements are artificial and inaccurate. His 
rough guides are to insert aspects of ecology such as atmosphere and water pollution into 
metaphors and meters capable of entering the commodity market of economic 
transaction. He soundly surmises that vouchers that can be tradable are more likely to be 
respected and acted upon; in other words, economically accounted for, by countries such 
as the United States of America which are the major sources of planetary pollution. The 
idea is that rich polluter nations should pay poorer nations that, the argument goes, are 
less developed and therefore have untapped resources such as forests that are working as 
the 'lungs' of the planet. Not felling those forests will to some extent offset the pollution 
released elsewhere. Presumably the voucher system could be privatised - providing 
another set of commodities on the stock exchange. A good example of environmental 
vouchers is the NZ government's attempt to introduce the 'fart tax' in 2003 which 
charged farmers a sum for each head of stock, on the grounds that cattle, sheep and pigs 
release so many kilograms Of C02 per year. Thus far (and completely irrationally) C02 
tax has not been attached to motor vehicle use, but it could quite easily be added to petrol 
prices or based on vehicle mileage. Rich nations can buy clean air vouchers off poorer 
(forested) nations, shifting money to 'developing' nations, and alleviating the urgency of 
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richer ones to pollute less. 624 Unfortunately, economic disparities between rich and poor 
nations are unlikely to be solved by ecologically driven economic initiatives and it seems 
to me to be more likely that vouchers will appease (for a while anyway) the populations 
in wealthier countries while environmental devastation continues with little real 
improvement throughout the world. 
Ever since the Rio conference in 1992, the United Nation's Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs has had a firm commitment to environmental development. The United 
Nations has been calling for more specific modes of measuring environmental indicators; 
"simple, elegant and effective measures that do not compromise the underlying 
complexity" of sustainable development. 625 Clear measurement guidelines make policy 
initiative easier, and national comparisons possible. Simon Upton is very interested in 
encouraging this type of environmental measurement. The United Nations, the European 
Union and the OECD are all working on environmental indicators. The European Union 
too, wants to "simplify complex information so that is it quantifiable (and) can be 
understood and communicated. " Upton is in a central position in regards to the issue of 
environmental indicators and he warris that to be useful, there must be an environmental 
premise from which they emerge. He says "In the absence of agreement on a more 
specific and tractable list of goals, assessing progress on sustainable development risks 
degenerating into lists of measures, arbitrarily chosen to suit the interests of the 
measuring entity. , 626 
In Strategyfor Sustainable Development, the European Commission proposed 36 
structural indicators to assess the internal conditions of nations in a comparable way. The 
indicators were very general, along the themes of. economic background; employment; 
innovation and research; economic reform; social cohesion and the environment. A few 
examples from the list are; 
9 Unemployment rate (economic background) 
9 Life-long leaming (employment) 
624 
see above in this chapter for UNCED estimates of 'allowable' nationalC02 emissions and subsequent 
room for C02 trade 
625 
quoted in Upton, 2002a 626 Upton, 2002a 
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" Level of Internet access (innovation and research) 
" Prices in the network industries (economic reform) 
" Early school leavers not in further education or training (social cohesion) 
" Energy intensity of the economy (environment)"' 
Upton describes the efforts by the European Commission and other organisations as 
having come up with ad hoe lists of things to measure that coincide with their own 
political interests. "They're the priorities of the particular members" he complains. The 
OECD have developed their own list of 'critical indicators' that do seem to be more 
cohesive and less erratic. But clearly the Neoliberal interest in 'human capital' and 
ýresources' is highly prominent. The categories that include production are set in 
financial terms that occlude many aspects of global corporations whereas the consumer 
end is more visible and susceptible to policy initiatives and responsibility. The OECD's 
Sustainable Development - Critical Issues list sustainable development indicators: 
Environmental assets 
Air quality GHG emission index andC02 emissions 
NOx emissions 
Water resources Intensity of water use (abstractions / renewable resources) 
Energy resources Consumption of energy resources 
Biodiversity Size of protected areas as a share of total area 
Economic assets 
Produced assets Volume of net capital stock 
Technological change Multi-factor productivity growth rate 
Financial assets Net foreign assets and current account balance 
Human capital 
Stock of human capital Proportion of the population with upper secondary/tertiary 
qualifications 
Investment in human capital Education expenditure 
Depreciation of human capital Rate and level of unemployment 
Outcome indicators: Are we satisfying current needs? 
Consumption Household final consumption expenditure 
Municipal waste generation intensities 
Income distribution Gini coefficients 
627 European Commission, cited in Upton, 2002a 
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Health Life expectancy at birth, Urban air quality 
Work status/Employment Employment to population ratio 
Education Participation rateS628 
Because of difficulties reconciling adequate categories for standardising sustainability, in 
2002 OECD membership countries decided not to attempt definitive, comparable 
measurements. Having read the critique of sustainability put forward by Daniel Esty - 
that the term 'sustainability' is 'empty of content, ' Upton asks "does sustainable 
development evaporate or become, at most, a bland agenda for policy integration without 
any real content? ). )629 
Perhaps it is this indeterminacy at the heart of the concept of sustainable development 
that led OECD countries this year to decide that it is better not to attempt to establish a 
definitive - if arbitrary - set of issues to measure as proposed in the Polic Report. Y 
Rather, they have decided to generate a 'menu' ofpolicy issues which involve trade-offs 
between the different dimensions of sustainable development. 630 
Global poverty is certainly intricately bound up with environmental concerns. At the 
international conventions it has been an important task to educate wealthier countries - 
who have often already largely consumed their irreplaceable natural resources - that 
environmental conservation in poorer nations might limit their potential for economic 
'development. ' But although the problems of international redistribution and poverty 
impact on the environment, 'development' is not the same as the impact of technological 
human occupation on ecosystems, oceans and atmosphere. Shifting from his earlier 
acceptance of the inescapable interaction between environment and the massive 
disparities in wealth between 'northern' and 'southern' hemispheres, in 2002 Upton had 
become increasingly aware of the politicisation of sustainability. Under the influence of 
Daniel Esty, Upton shifts to defending the concept of sustainability in terms that sound 
less concerned with the social sphere, and much more profoundly concerned with the 
devastating potential of pollution on global warming. Esty makes the point that 
development issues are drowning out environmental concerns. He argues that they are 
separable, in direct contradiction to the Brundtland Report. In his article with the rather 
long winded title, "Poverty, Demography, Economics and Sustainable Development: 
628 OECD, 2001: 72 
629 Upton, 2002a 
630 Upton, 2002a 
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perspectives from the developing worlds; What are the realistic prospects for Sustainable 
Development in the first decade of the new millennium? , 631 Upton writes about the 'three 
pillars that constitute eco-society. Upton is also in the process of realising that the 'three 
pillars; ' economic, social, and environmental, that have been tied inextricably together in 
European commission literature are laying too heavy an emphasis on anthropocentric 
concerns. 
The European Commission has artfully described the relationship between the pillars as 
'economic growth (that) supports social progress and respects the environment, social 
policy (that) underpins economic performance, and environmental policy (that) is cost- 
effective. ' The notion is of a virtuous triangle of reinforcing policies that advance 'a 
society that is more prosperous and more just, and which promises a cleaner, safer, 
healthier environment' not just in the near term but the long tenn. 632 
This mutually supporting arrangement occludes inevitable tradeoffs - environmental 
sustainability is not just about 'efficiency. ' The three pillars imply that everything is 
tradable, and, as Upton criticises, there are "no environmental bottom lines. " 
Upton is worried that the three pillars of social, economic and environmental 
sustainability, along with the loosely organised, issue by issue approach of the OECD, 
threatens to 'empty' the concept of sustainability by enlarging it beyond any 
meaningfulness. Upton wants to return to the analysis of scientifically based 
environmental indicators, no matter how rough they may be as guides, because it is only 
with positivist measurement that nations can be held accountable. He seems at first 
glance to be avoiding the simplistic market metaphor of Neoliberal theory: that once firm 
measurements can be counted upon, economic transactions can be created, presumably 
(for the idealistic) with some transparency, and the market can magically adjust the 
political dimensions of redistribution. Instead the real complexities of the disparities 
between north and south mean that sustainable indicators, especially social ones, tend to 
reflect the normative values of the host nation. Because the physical conditions of north 
and south are so disparate it is impossible to make any universal claims for 'fair' 
indicators. Upton's example is based on the first OECD social indicator of retirement 
funds; a matter of primary concern to the babyboomers about to retire in western nations, 
631 Upton, 2002b 
632 Upton, 2002b 
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but of absolutely no relevance to Sub Saharan Africa where the average life expectancy is 
49, there is no pension or welfare scheme, and the elderly and the very young rely on 
family bonds of gathering and sharing to survive. Upton makes an intelligent case that the 
concept of 'sustainability' ought to be applied to the solid boundaries of absolute poverty 
and morbidity, as thresholds in the same way that rates of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere presents a real toxic boundary, the limits of which are the limits of life. This 
still takes an anthropocentric 'bottomline' as Upton asks "are there thresholds beyond 
which natural systems, on which everyone relies, will cease to deliver the so-called 
4ecological services' needed to sustain life? , 633 
According to Upton, because of these irreducible variations in cultural norms over 
generally acceptable levels of wealth (such as clean running water, electricity, housing, 
and clean clothes) inequities between north and south are likely to be 'insoluble. ' Equity 
is a more general issue than sustainability that, Upton argues, should not be ignored but 
treated politically and morally, but elsewhere. He writes "But there are also good 
instrumental reasons of an economic and environmental nature and they will command 
support where more ambitious, all embracing notions about 'equity' will founder. " This 
is the most overt admission I have ever come across that equality is not one of the 
Humanist principles that underpins Neoliberalism. Usually the extensive Neoliberal 
jargon about equity enshrouds the tangible facts that the extremes of wealth and poverty 
are exacerbated under Neoliberal regimes. Upton's argument is a much more 
sophisticated version of Ehrlich's population argument and subject to the same critique 
put forward by Commoner and Feenberg. Similarly to Ehrlich's estimates of population, 
and food crop 'carrying capacity' Upton searches for "scientifically demonstrable 
thresholds" in an "analytically tractable world. 5,634 Upton is able to avoid looking 
politically incorrect by the use of already acceptable categorisations that are current in a 
wide variety of organisations that look as though they include most aspects of economic, 
social and environmental life, without falling into the obvious disparities of specific 
conditions, policies, and issues of concern between countries. 
633 Upton, 2002a 
634 Upton, 2002b 
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Some of these social indicators that are already in use are the 'health, wealth and 
wisdom' of UN's Human Development Index that relies on data about health, education 
and income indices (such as GDP). The regulations of global organisations like the UN 
and the OECD have to begin by scientifically "establishing whether there are global 
thresholds within which humanity must stay if it is to avoid significant disruption to the 
planet's life support systems. " 
Furthermore, Upton makes use of trade - the magical market - to illuminate how 
environmental indicators can help negotiate the minefield of political anxieties that cause 
friction at the UNCED conferences. Wealthy nations might present a healthier version of 
pollutants or resource consumption than is fair, if accurate indicators do not show how 
globalised trade impacts on carbon release, for example. Carbon is embedded in plastics, 
steel, aluminium and many other goods that are consumed in the north but produced in 
the south. Taking the mobility of trade into account would more accurately reflect how 
the north is more responsible for the carbon release in poorer nations. This is a classic 
Neoliberal argument that the market will account for and 'balance' all the significant 
factors without resorting to political interests. 
Upton's desire for more trans-boundary information to fill the scientific gaps are shared 
by many in the environmental community. Institutions are opening several new discipline 
areas, especially 'earth monitoring. ' A good example is the International Geosphere- 
Biosphere Programme which seeks to establish; 
A more comprehensive model of atmospheric chemistry to identify any other weak links 
such as were discovered in relate to ozone depleting substances. 
A more comprehensive, data-rich understanding of ocean circulation and the extent to 
which anthropogenic forcing could trigger major changes. 
An understanding of the relationship between biological diversity and ecosystem 
resilience (this appears to be a particularly under-defined area . 
635 
Furthermore Upton advocates better surveillance and assessment of development money 
flowing from OECD nations, and estimates of the "the market destroying and distorting 
consequences of trade barriers and subsidies" By 'weighting and bundling' these 
interventions, a 'synthetic indicator' of the 'aggregated impact' of trade subsidies versus 
635 International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme quoted in Upton, 2002a 
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charity could be included in the normal flow of market factors, that consumer cho'ce will 
struggle with scarcity of supply due to biophysical limits, until a market value is set and 
'balanced. 9636 
At this point he is returning to the initial goals outlined by the OECD (above) which state 
that one of the primary objectives is to 'decouple' economic growth from environmental 
limitations. The idea is that continued exponential economic growth can be achieved in 
environmentally sound ways by increasing 'efficiency' in production and distribution, 
and presumably increasing price while diminishing costs. The service and information 
sector, specifically the 'Knowledge Economy, also offer opportunities for economic 
growth that has been 'decoupled' from environment constraints. Uniquely, this sector has 
relatively few problems with end-of-line disposal of consumable products (except for the 
increasing mountain of outdated computers), paper and ink consumption and so on. Costs 
of electricity, storage, and surveillance remain hidden in the expenditure accounts of the 
general population's living standard. The increased capacity and abundance of 
information technologies expands the opportunities for making capitalist profit through 
both the distribution and the with-holding of knowledge and services. Life-long learning 
plays an important role in promoting this sector of the economy, and shrouding problems 
of domestic unemployment. 
Dramatic alterations to the 'self-regulating' machine of the environment poses unknown, 
but potentially calamitous 'risk' to the maintenance of conditions that can maintain the 
possibility of life on earth. Upton's position is a complex and sophisticated amalgamation 
of environmental scientific 'realism' and faith in the Neoliberal market to iron out 
problems as long as environmental problems can be included in the accounting of cost/ 
benefit and risk analysis. His acceptance of the threshold of conditions suitable to life that 
are threatened by global climate change and is traceable to the technological lifestyle of 
humanity in many countries in the world is refreshingly straight forward. The 
technological enframing of the theoretical methodology that permeates all pan-global 
institutions is absolutely uncritically received. Admittedly it is improbable that any other 
636 Upton, 2002b 
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means of changing the technological and economic approach to environment problems 
could have such immediate short term effect. 
Giddens and the Third Way 
Anthony Giddens makes a comparison between Socialism and Neoliberalism in his book 
The Third Way; The Renewal of Social Democracy, (1998). It is an important text 
because Giddens has been very influential on Tony Blair's ideas of developing a 'Third 
Way' that is 'economics with a social conscience' to guide public policy. As Giddens 
puts it, "market economy but not market society. " Giddens is apt to take a more nuanced 
account of economics than straight Neoliberal policy allows, but still falls back on the 
familiar rubric of the market metaphor accommodating all spheres of life. 
Giddens optimistically believes that economics and environmental protection can be 
amalgamated. He sets out this utopian ecological modernisation in the context of 
increasing globalisation where "domestic strategies of national economic management 
are increasingly irrelevant. , 637 Giddens echoes the European Commissions' 'three pillars' 
approach that the social, the economic, and the environment, mutually support one 
another as environmental protection is met by increasing the efficiency of resource use 
rather than increasing the extraction of consumption of the resource. 
In classical social democratic thinking, it had been assumed that there was a trade-off 
between economic development and protection of the environment. According to the new 
theme of ecological modernisation, environmental protection is seen as a source of 
economic growth rather than its opposite. 638 
There is no doubt that the massive expansion of the financial markets since the 1970s has 
profoundly influenced late modernity. There has been a huge increase in money 
circulation and a massive increase in 'middle men' who manipulate the exchange of 
goods, as opposed to the simple model of the cornmarket used by early economists like 
Adam Smith. In 1998 Giddens notes with awe "A trillion dollars a day is turned over in 
currency exchange transactions. The proportion of financial exchanges in relation to trade 
has grown by a factor of five over the fifteen years. 'Disconnected capital' - 
637 Giddens, 1998: 19 
63' Giddens, 1998: 19 
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institutionally managed money - has increased by 1,100 per cent on a world scale since 
1970 in proportion to other f6im-is of capital. 15639 
During the same period, ecological issues emerged as the defining problem facing people 
and planet. Giddens has written an extraordinary number of books over the last 30 years, 
that are sociological accounts of various 'issues' including class relations, civil rights, 
feminism, and poverty, and I suspect that the environment remains for this experienced 
and perhaps jaded campaigner, just another 'issue. ' He contextualises the outpouring of 
grass-root organisations, political activism, technical and popular books as a 1960s crisis 
discourse. 640 According to Neoliberal theory, scarcity will increase prices whereas 
oversupply will reduce prices. So the endangerment of resources such as trees, oil, and 
soil run-off should result in higher prices for commodities such as wood, petrol, and 
crops, resulting in more careful consumption. But in actual fact, as Giddens notes, prices 
have dropped in real terms. This could be taken as an indicator that there is abundance 
rather than scarcity affecting the market. Or, alternatively, it could mean that the market 
is not a reliable indicator of all the empirical factors. 
In the past, faith in the market ignored 'externalities' such as pollution, which do not 
enter the producer/consumer equation in the short term. Simon Upton is a good example 
of how increasingly sophisticated measurement of environmental indicators might 
include these previously ignored factors into the market equation. However Neoliberal 
theorists continue to remain oblivious, as noted earlier, that the market has changed from 
a simple and direct trade of goods between suppliers and customers to now include a 
fantastic proportion of middlemen. Production (and externalities) are now dispersed and 
globalised, and ownership is indirect through stocks and shares. The disassociation of 
ownership from place or persons through shares, the massive increases in corporate 
middlemen and organisation are enabled by the shift from the technological enclosing of 
production from the family to the factory, into the assembly lines of early industrialism, 
to the globalised networked era of transnational production. Globalised ownership and 
production along with a concurrent lack of global regulation or taxation contribute to 
639 Giddens, 1998: 30 
640 Giddens, 1998: 54 
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unsustainably extreme low prices for irreplaceable resources. The globalisation of the 
market transgresses national boundaries. Perhaps this helps source commodities from 
resource rich areas, thereby fulfilling the market requirement of cheap prices for 
abundant goods. Or it can be understood as a corporate mechanism for avoiding the local 
national laws that attempt to regulate the unsustainable extraction of raw resources from 
particular areas, and to pay a reasonable wage to local workers. 
Another reason for the decrease in prices in real terms in developed nations is because of 
the 'free trade' agreements. These agreements are proselytised and enforced by 
irreversible, ratcheted agreements set up by the World Trade Organisation and have 
resulted in lower and lower income flowing into poorer nations. Free trade agreements 
have effectively ensured that poor nations are only allowed to export raw materials, rather 
than selling more valuable finished products, while large rich blocs of consumers - such 
as the U. S. A. and E. U. have benefited by domestically adding value to foreign raw 
resources by protecting local production and manufacturing. One set of rules applying to 
developing nations and altogether different rules applying to the wealthy. These uneven 
trade treaties are reinforced by World Bank loans which are only given to nations 
prepared to privatise more and more of State owned assets and infrastructure, releasing 
significant assets to multinational corporations with no responsibility for local 
environments and populations. But freeing all markets of tariffs would also not produce a 
miraculous redistribution of wealth from one part of the world to the other. 
Part of the Neoliberal annoury for improving development is using free trade agreements 
to attempt to lever the EU and USA into reducing or abandoning their agricultural and 
manufacturing protections. 641 In Britain, for example, the agricultural subsidies have been 
in place since after the Second World War when, having been terrified by their 
dependency on vulnerable supply ships from overseas, Britain initiated the self-sufficient 
food policy. This has resulted in a vast 'improvement' of efficiency of land utilisation 
because land which is capable of bearing stock is eligible for subsidies whereas land that 
'lies fallow' is not. This has resulted in the demise of hedgerows and stone walls (habitat 
641 Johan Norberg (2003). Interestingly, Neoliberal members of pan-global organisations such as the OECD 
and WTO recognize that this is so unlikely to occur that they do not even bring it up for debate eg. Simon 
Upton (OECD) and Michael Moore (WTO). 
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for many birds and small animals), and the shift to an industrialised scale of small fields 
into massive ones and small farms into factory fan-ning. As a result of the massive 
subsidies involved, Britain's farms are over supplied with breeding stock. The spread of 
BSE disease in 2001 was exacerbated by the centralised large scale slaughter factories 
which require trucking of live beasts across very long distances. But the large scale 
destruction of Britain's live stock, though distressing, was from the government's 
viewpoint beneficial for meeting British commitment to reduce live stock and subsidies 
to farming. 
Giddens addresses the 'very malleable concept' of sustainable development put forward 
by the Brundtland report and endorsed by Agenda 2 1. He is critical of Margaret 
Thatcher's 1970s declaration that Britain is sustainable. He makes the point that in 
Holland, sustainable development is avoidance of 'end of pipeline' technologies that 
attempt to 'clean up' environmental disasters after the fact, in favour of avoidance of 
pollution at the stage of initial production. He refers to Maarten Hajer, who advocates the 
concept of 'ecological modernisation'; there is a preference for anticipation rather than 
cure; and the equating of pollution with inefficiency provide the defining principles of 
642 economic growth. Environmental regulation and economic growth are seen as 
mutually beneficial. But in a thorough reading of these vast tracts of global policy, 
Giddens puts a similar argument to Simon Upton - that 'development' and 'environment' 
are two distinct problems. 
It isn't really convincing to suppose that environmental protection and economic 
development fit together comfortably - the one is bound sometime to come into conflict 
with the other. Moreover, ecological modemisation is largely a matter of national policy, 
but environmental hazards mostly cut across the borders of nations and some are global 
in scope. 643 
This very important acknowledgment of the difference between protection and economic 
expansion, or development is a good starting point for all serious environmental theory to 
begin - although my reasons are not the same as 
Giddons and Uptons. ' From this 
beginning it is possible to argue that economics is not the only explanatory and 
642 Hajer, referred to by Giddens, 1998: 56 
643 Giddens, 1998: 58 
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theoretical principle capable of advancing arguments and solutions to the vast interrelated 
cosmos of environmental problems. 
Giddens is British, and like most people brought up in this heavily populated island, 
extrapolates and universalises that everywhere was also once famously forested and now 
is farmed to the point that accounts for every inch. There are layers upon layers of human 
history visible from every vantage point in the British Isles. It is hard to imagine from 
there, the wide and wild Steppes of Siberia, or the wandering dunes of the Sinai desert, or 
the teeming, plunging damp, and rotten swamps of the Amazon. As Heidegger noted 
before the Second World War, it is easy, in Europe, to imagine human management 
pervades everywhere. 
We might think of 'the environment' as the natural world, but of course it isn't that any 
longer. Much of what used to be natural is now either the product of, or influenced by, 
human activity - not just the external world, including possibly the earth's climate, but 
the 'Internal environment' of the body. For better or for worse, science and technology 
have invaded the human body, and have redrawn the boundary between what can be 
humanly achieved and what we simply have to 'accept' from nature. 144 
Globalisation is characterised for Giddens by permeable boundaries. The Cyborg 
becomes the metaphor for human intervention in all ecosystems, and all ecosystems are 
increasingly understood as human artefacts. A rhizome of sorts, Giddens' version of the 
relationship between humanity and the environment elevates solipsism at the expense of 
the 'wild card. ' The human relation to everything means the measurement and calculation 
of it all on a human scale. It is the hubris of ultimate administration and management. 
From this position of total faith in the measurement of all-important environmental 
indicators, Giddens asserts that it is possible to assess and insure against 'natural 
disaster. ' Instead of being pessimistic, Giddens is positively entrepreneurial; "A positive 
engagement with risk is a necessary component of social and economic mobilisation. " 
645 
He is nowhere near as aware of the gravity of environmental pollutants and their affects 
on climate change, (writing 4 years before the release of the OECD Climate Change 2001 
644 Giddens, 1998: 58 
645 Giddens, 1998: 63 
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report). 646 In the intervening years a very important shift in the general acceptance of 
these pollutant problems has taken place in global institutions and in the wider 
population. The Risk Matrix has no analysis to the ongoing detrimental impact of 
capitalism and consumerism on local ecosystems or social relations. Environmentally 
friendly institutions are linked to increased efficiency rather than any substantial shift in 
the relative importance of humans in relation to the rest of life. 
Giddens has a list of Third Way values that tries to resurrect older Liberal notions 
alongside Neoliberal ones. Third Way values include: equality, protection of the 
vulnerable, freedom as autonomy, no rights without responsibilities, no authority without 
democracy, cosmopolitan pluralism, and philosophic conservatism. 647 To conjoin the 
traditional social principles of the left with the market metaphors, and emphasis on 
individual autonomy of the right, Giddens argues "The cosmopolitan nation helps 
promote social inclusion but also has a key role in fostering transnational systems of 
governance. , 648 To some degree he is countering the Neoliberal call for a minimal state. 
Vaguely put, this allows the State to play some part in the tax provided, welfare provision 
that is crucial to the Keynesian Settlement, ensuring that a safety net of welfare, 
education and health provisions are provided for workers so that the stable conditions 
necessary for capitalism are in place. The role of the State can be understood in terms of 
Human Capital theory where everything, as Heidegger puts it, is understood as potential 
resource which can have 'value added. ' "Government has an essential role to play in 
investing in the human resources and infrastructure needed to develop an entrepreneurial 
culture. , 649At the same time Giddens argues, like many left wing Liberals, that State 
mechanisms for these provisions have room for improvement. With dubious 
understanding of ecology (which he has confused with efficiency) Giddens writes "The 
restructuring of government should follow the ecological principle of 'getting more from 
,, 650 less, ' understood not as downsizing but as improving delivered value. Although he 
acknowledged the 'uncomfortable' relationship between ecology and capitalism due to 
646 IPCC, 2001 
647 Giddens, 1998: 66 
648 Giddens, 1998: 69 
649Giddens, 1998: 99 
650 Giddens, 1998: 74 
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the increasing transparency of wealth discrepancies between the northern and southern 
hemispheres, Giddens is relying heavily on the tying together of efficiency and ecology. 
The cosmopolitan state needs to remain large enough to efficiently promote social 
inclusion and stability. It should also promote a democratically responsible forrn of 
global government to regulate global business. 
The State's obligations to provide universally accessible welfare, education, and health 
services are expanded further to the calculation and regulation of pollution. In the past 
both the owners of capital and the labourers ignored the pollution consequences of 
production as an 'external cost. ' Labourers were as culpable for passing on pollution to 
future generations to redress as factory owners. The failure to insist on environmentally 
friendly production practices have been put down to the increasing accessibility of 
consumable items from low cost, mass production that meant the workers had an 
increasing investment in industrialisation too. The Brundtland Report specifically aims to 
make the present generation responsible for its own pollution and consumption practices. 
Thus the State settlement must now also include the limitation and regulation of 
pollution. Giddens supports this role, stating, "The reduction of environmental pollution, 
for example, is a general benefit. Indeed ecological strategies are a core element of 
,, 651 lifestyle bargains, since most ecological benefits cut across classes. 
But in fact, in the face of increasingly globalised production, Keynes' pragmatic 
socialism falls down. The basis of Lord Keynes' settlement was creating the stable 
conditions necessary for capitalism, and requiring capitalism to meet social 
responsibilities through taxation. Increasingly, corporations are deciding to work in tax- 
free enclaves in traditionally poverty stricken nations such as Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Polynesia, where indentured labour returns wages into the national economy even if the 
corporations are almost tax-free. Existing welfare societies in 'developed nations' can no 
longer contain negotiated worker settlements, for example, less hours for a moderate full 
time wage because of the global nature of production and consumption. Even where 
governments settle agreements with each other over the location and levels of taxation 
from transnational production, the scale of global corporations are so immense that their 
65 ' Giddens, 1998: 109 
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legal and political weight overpowers the attempts by national governments to institute 
revenue gathering and environment regulation over resource extraction and pollutant 
externalities. Rather famously, the largest economies in the world are not countries but 
corporations. 
Giddens response to the crisis in national infrastructure is a Neoliberal one, "The 
guideline is investment in human capital wherever possible, rather than the direct 
provision of economic maintenance. In place of the welfare state we should put the social 
investment state, operating in the context of a positive welfare society. , 652 From here it is 
easy to understand Tony Blair's faith in Private-Public Partnerships for education and 
health provision. Human capital theory is the guiding paradigm that assumes that 
individual's desire, and are responsible for their own 'added value. ' This goes hand in 
hand with policies such as Life-long learning and the Knowledge economy where 
individuals continuously upgrade their skills and marketability in the workforce by 
investing in education. The 'social good' of an educated population is privatised, 
individualised and predominantly vocational. 
In a world of globalisation, the role of the smaller nation state has become a residual one; 
advocating human resources and infrastructure, and passing over regulation and policing 
to pan-global organisations like the United Nations, the OECD, WTO, and the World 
Bank The nation state remains a stabilizing force that is helpful for capitalism but it also 
fosters nationalist identity and is potentially divisive. National boundaries are becoming 
frontiers; not from inadequate control but rather the processes of globalisation. 653 
In response to the globalisation of capital, and the expansion of the stock market, Giddens 
appears to want to take many of the responsibilities that used to belong to the nation state 
and create global infrastructure or global government. Global agencies and legal systems 
are pushing into the regulation of the markets, which includes making many market 
externalities like the pollution of environment more possible to police. His emphasis on 
social responsibility fades away in practical terms. Certainly the Keynesian Settlement 
does rely on nation states in a tradeoff of minimal universal conditions of education, 
health, welfare (and now environmental regulation) in return for provision of optimal 
stable conditions for capitalist production and consumption. At the moment, production is 
652 Giddens, 1998: 117 
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being dislocated from these hard fought legislative ideals and responsibilities. But global 
governing bodies are not being asked to regulate against indentured labour, or ensure 
health, education and welfare provision in sweatshops in Indonesia, Malaysia, Polynesia, 
and elsewhere. 
Modes of Governance 
From a far more traditionally 'Labour' Liberal viewpoint than Giddens' Third Way, 
Paehike and Turgeson have a different argument for democratic questions about the 
processes of governmental and legislative control arise from the promotion of global 
centralisation. The same issues come up in the questions that have dogged nation states 
about the extent of centralisation, responsibility and decision making. In Managing 
Leviathan: Environmental Politics and the Administrative State, Paehike and Turgerson 
make a distinction between a left wing type of participatory democracy which sweeps 
aside bureaucratic and corporate self interest and focus on the well-being of environment 
and people as opposed to the right wing assumptions that governance ought to exclude 
narrow 'interest groups' because political lobbies limit objectivity and threaten the 
existing hierarchical government structure. "Conventional approaches to administration 
presuppose a central position of planning and control, a unified will privileged by 
,, 654 superior knowledge . For a decade, people had been arguing against the tyranny of 
central control because the strong hand of the Prime Minister would not respond to the 
messages of advisors or citizens. Shifts in organisational process that possibly undermine 
the existing interests of 'stakeholders' can be "regarded and portrayed as the advent of 
chaos" rather than as the legitimate and often productive insertion of new ideas that best 
solve environmental problems. 
Paehike & Turgerson are writing in the context of a newly established Neoliberalism in 
New Zealand and are advocating a type of classical 'left wing' Liberal decentralised 
democracy that, as the Neoliberals did, also underestimates the amount of work that 
institutional memory and structures shortcut. Nevertheless the argument for intensified 
participation and agency in real political debate rather than the relegation of devolved 
654 Paehike & Turgerson, 1990: 9 
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responsibility to endpoint consumer demands in a society where all decisions are 
marketised is an important distinction. Neoliberal devolution has succeeded in placing 
responsibility (and blame) with local agencies and institutions while retaining control of 
funding and policy in central hands. Unsurprisingly then, Third Way Prime Ministers like 
Helen Clark and Tony Blair are reproducing the tyrannical conservatism of historical 
figures such as Muldoon, Churchill, and Thatcher. If regulation, and policing for finance 
markets and environmental pollution (along with international relations) are centralised to 
global bodies, democratic or otherwise, but taxation, infrastructure, welfare, health, and 
education remains at the level of nation states then inevitably the power of transnational 
corporations will remain intact, and many of the related problems of capitalist 
consumerism will continue to detrimentally impact particularly vulnerable places and 
people. 
In the end, Giddens' Third Way account at least acknowledges that the market has 
undergone massive changes since James Ferguson and Adam Smith wrote their early 
analyses of the cornmarket and the implications of export on local prices and 
communities. Now there is over one trillion US dollars' worth of currencies exchanged 
every day, only 5 per cent of which relate to trade and other substantive economic 
transactions. The other 95 per cent is made up of speculations and arbitrages, as traders 
wielding huge sums look for rapid profits on exchange fluctuations and interest rate 
differentials. The huge proportion of 'middlemen' between the producer and the 
consumer completely interferes with any fiction that the market will 'balance' according 
to the Invisible Hand. 
Giddens wants to regulate what he calls 'market fundamentalism, ' "The needs are: to 
calm excessive movements in currencies and control overshoot; separate short-term 
currency speculation from investment; and create greater accountability within the 
transnational organisations involved in world economic management, as well as 
restructure them. , 655 He hopes that regulating the Stock Market will reintroduce these 
miraculous balancing effects. Certainly regulation is desperately needed, to weed out the 
corruption of people like Richard Grasso, the Chair of the New York Stock Exchange for 
655 Giddens, 1998: 148 
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the last eight years. Grasso signed himself hundreds of millions extra to his excessive 
salary for years on end for which court proceedings may finally be in place. Regulation 
may constrain the chances of corporations such as Enron from 'cooking the books' so 
effectively for so long. But enhanced regulation will not alter the fact that markets never 
achieve that mythological 'balance. ' Neither does owning stock in recommended shares 
simply 'grow' in economic value in a slightly more variable pattern than bank interest or 
inflation rates. A vast proportion of consumer products no longer bear any relation to 
Malthus' 18 th century hierarchy of needs. Most production of consumer items, services, 
and the 'knowledge industry, ' are results of the technologically possible combined with 
our collectively imagined craving for fashion, novelty and the 'good life. ' The technology 
of consumerism has sold us into our own enslavement. Heidegger's analysis is that the 
'total mobilisation' of people and resources into the enframing of technology has 
permeated cultures across the globe so thoroughly that the most intelligent people cannot 
think their way out of the conundrum. 
335 
12 Limits of Liberalism 
The enframing of technology has reached global proportions in combination with the 
colonial spread of modem Liberalism. It is not unlikely that technological enframing 
could have sheltered under other forms of governance, such as communism which after 
all, emerges from the same Enlightenment ideas. Gen-nany tried a 'Third Way' during the 
1930s and 1940s between the godless communists in the east and the greedy capitalists in 
the west. Spengler and Ringer both wrote about the characteristics of modemity; the 
massive storage that has changed technology from 'equipment at hand' to the enframing 
of technology, and capitalist efficiency as the 'total mobilisation' of all aspects of life to 
the war machine. To the Oil Baron President, 'nature' is a resource to be exploited. 
George W. Bush has refused to sign the Kyoto agreement, or acknowledge the 
environmental difficulties in large part produced by his nation. 
Part of Heidegger's critique of modem Liberalism is the machine like, 'total 
mobilisation' of technological enframing which challenges forth human beings and 
natural entities to become 'standing reserve. ' There is not much room for 'freedom' in 
total mobilisation, although individuals are not necessarily aware that their choices are 
shaped to cohere with modernity's objectives. Nesta Devine and I have argued that the 
'free' and 'autonomous' individual is a necessary fiction for enabling modem cultures to 
function. 656 Ringer argues that total mobilisation has collapsed the distinction between 
peacetime and war. At all times governments function to enhance the aggressive 
surveillance and coordination required to mobilise all people, production and raw 
material into the cohesive machinery required for exponential technological expansion. 
From the relatively simple organisation of traditional societies, technological 
'civilisation' has increasingly enhanced the calculation, measurement and 
conceptualisation of things has probed the veins, muscles, bones, the brains, and genes of 
various species, including humans. Technological civilisation has probed the skies, 
learning to fly across vast areas of the globe, pushing satellites beyond the atmosphere 
656 Irwin and Devine, 2005 forthcoming 
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into orbit, tapped into frequencies of sound, light, microwaves and more. Technology has 
pushed through the depths of the oceans and charted sea floors and mineral deposits, 
peeled back the surface of the planet to unearth seams of coal, gold, crystals, oil, clay and 
rock. All these things have been redistributed, creating pathways for further modes of 
communication and travel. Civilisation is the gradual colonisation of every aspect of 
planetary Being into the totalising conduits of technological functioning. 
Modern Liberalism 
Bliffidom. emphasizes security and freedom as the two key principles guiding modem 
Liberal democracies. In the special edition of The Trumpeter, Journal ofEcosophy edited 
by Andrew Stables, Bliffidorn argues that the quality of security and freedom has changed 
over time. 657 In the post war period, the emphasis was on the security of the entire 
community and the freedom to buy commodities. The Neoliberal trope makes use of the 
same Enlightenment principles of freedom, equality, individuality, and justice but reads 
all of these concepts through the metaphor of the market. The selfish individual becomes 
homo economicus, a 'rational utility maximiser' who makes choices in the market place 
that will enhance their own 'well-being. ' Like the general will of Rousseau and the 
Utilitarians, the pragmatic choices of individuals in the market place is supposed to 
balance out the relationship between demand and supply 'as though by an invisible hand. ' 
The shift to the 'Neo'Liberal paradigm has coincided with the saturation of commodities 
on the market. Security and freedom have become increasingly individualised. 
Consumable goods and services are also individuated rather than community orientated. 
Neoliberalism has taken over key concepts, emptied them of their previous meaning and 
used them as a political framework for uniting groups that had once polarised over 'left' 
and 'right, ' community or individual, religious or atheist, conservative or broad-minded. 
Bliffidorn notes that "The concept of sustainable development has united previously 
intransigent enemies and forged unexpected strategic alliances. , 
658 Neoliberalism has 
managed to move us into a post-ecological era "in the sense that the ecologist patterns of 
657 BlOhdom, 2002 
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thought (diagnoses, values, strategies) have become outdated and have been 
abandoned. "659There is no genuine attempt to achieve environmental goals of socIal 
justice or ecologically friendly behaviours. Rather, he argues, Neoliberalism has a 
discursive strategy of disguise that serves to maintain consumer culture. 
Clearly there has been a lot of struggle over the emergence of ecological thinking. The 
technological changes of the industrial revolution severely impacted on culture and 
environment at the same time. New ideas emerged as a reaction to these change in 
circumstances. Some had echoes of earlier notions such as Christian stewardship, 
Romanticism, or Volk thinking, but some were direct products of the rapid change of 
urbanisation, new technologies, new pollutants and dramatic collapse in previously stable 
eco-systems. It has become fashionable to attribute the emergence of ideas and attitudes 
as a function of the purely cultural, of rhetoric, discourse, linguistics and thinking. 
Clearly discourse formulates a conceptual lens for understanding given environmental 
conditions. And in the terms of Nietzsche and later, Foucault, the socio-historical 
conditions impose regulations, schedules, dietary conditions and so forth that 
concurrently shapes the morphology of our bodies, our surroundings, and our 
understandings. There is no discernible separation between discursive regime and 
environmental conditions. Bltihdorn teases out the discursive normativity that shapes our 
judgements on contemporary events and conditions. 
In examining the ecologist or post-ecologist frames of mind, we are implicitly 
acknowledging the important fact that climatic change, decline in bio-diversity, 
contamination-induced epidemics, or any other phenomena or conditions in the social and 
natural environment are not in themselves problematic but are charged with normative 
content by being conflonted with a pre-established value system. "' 
Generating a discourse happens in many ways. Neoliberalism incorporates existing 
terminology into the economic paradigm. 'Sustainability' for example, as discussed 
earlier has shifted from its ecological roots towards efficient production. 'Threshold' is 
also becoming an important Neoliberal term because it chimes with risk/cost analysis of 
insurance management. Crisis discourse has long been associated with green politics. Its 
normative content is to maintain atmospheric, ocean and surface conditions within 
659 Bliffidom, 2002: 60 
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parameters that make life on earth possible. Bush has made good political use of the 
Muslim 'terror' but thus far has been unable to put the environmental crisis to political 
use - so he has ignored it. It is likely that will change. In the Neoliberal case there 
appears to be a lot of active agency in how meanings are manipulated. Bliihdorn states, 
"The politics of simulation simulates the ongoing validity of the modernist project for 
society as a whole. , 661 He argues that simulation is an unconscious project rather than a 
conscious strategy. Nesta Devine illustrates especially well the way Neoliberal thinktanks 
in the 1950s and 1960s, such as the Mount Pelerin Society, the Independent Economics 
Association, and New Zealand's Business Round Table consciously sought to influence 
public opinion along individualised, marketisation and management principles of 
efficiency and self-interest. 662 The New Zealand Finance Minister of the first Neoliberal 
Labour government, Roger Douglas was extremely specific when he publicly 
acknowledged a strategy of -rushing through Neoliberal funding and policy change 
specifically in order to minimalise democratic dissent to the new proposals in New 
Zealand in the 1980s. 
However, while the Neoliberals have been overtly strategic in shifting the meanings of 
older terms (such as 'equity') it makes no sense that the rapidly arising environmental 
changes could have been given meaning other than 'crisis. ' It is too demanding to expect 
society to be in control over its own discursive reactions. It is only some way down the 
line, once the abrupt immediacy of dawning awareness is to some extent accommodated 
and understood that self reflection can define the flashpoint as an 'early reactive phase. ' 
In fact, the normative values that served to write up, as it were, environmental change as 
problematic had to fight to be heard; as such they were not the 'norm. ' The discourse of 
environmental crisis began during the Romantic period at the beginning of the industrial 
revolution and had little earlier pre-existence of any substance. Once the battles over civil 
liberties had largely been won in the 1960s the environmental 'crisis' re-emerged with 
some urgency. The subsequent shift to the 'post-ecological' is also a battle for 
community attitude, acceptance and willingness - only this time for stasis, rather than 
substantial cultural change. 
661 Bliihdom, 2002: 67 
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According to Ronald Inglehart, there have been important conceptual shifts in cultural 
attitudes in late modernity. He argues that the general frame of mind characterising 
modem times are security and autonomy. During the post war period, Inglehart suggests 
these two concepts showed up in the pursuit of stable conditions for material production 
and distribution. Bliffidom adds that security and autonomy were characterised in the 
post-war period by community and collectivism. The combined effect of radical new 
technologies that had been developed during the war and the Cold War climate raised 
awareness of risk. Collective security and social autonomy was threatened by apocalypse; 
both nuclear and ecological. The following years were characterised by eco-pessimism. 
By the 1970s this early emphasis on material goods was in large part sated. The 'marginal 
utility of further economic growth' shifted the emphasis towards autonomy; self- 
determination, self-realisation and self-expression. The saturation of material goods also 
allowed attention to be directed towards the needs of civil rights and finally ecology. 
Hence the publication of books like Schumacher's Small is Beautifiulý 63 and the Club of 
664 Rome's Ae Limits to Growth . The change entailed a shift towards individualism 
from 
the previous focus on the security of the entire community. Many debates on Liberalism, 
democracy and the ratio of communal versus individual rights emerge during this period, 
particularly in education. "To the extent that the self and the autonomy, which shifted 
into the centre of the new frame of mind, were the individual self and individual 
autonomy, post-material politics might be described as ego-politicS.,, 665 But early on in 
this process of individuation and autonomy a high value was placed on pluralism, 
egalitarianism and the collective good. Classical Liberalism emphasised culture but this 
was replaced in the 1970s and 1980s by accountability and economics and the application 
of the market metaphor to every sphere in life. 
Bliffidorn thinks there is a third shift in late modernity, from the materialist, towards the 
post-materialist, and finally to the 'post- ecologist' frame of mind that is once again 
"rearranging the parameters that determine the way in which the social and natural 
... Schumacher, 1973 
... Meadows, 1974 
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environment are perceived. ý1666 The post-war risk society has been taken over by a 
complacent 'end of history' attitude at the fall of communism. The concept of 'risk' he 
argues, has largely been replaced by 'opportunity. ' The two defining concepts of 
modernity; security and autonomy, are being reinterpreted through a harsh individualism. 
No longer concerned with a general material security, the shift from the ecological to the 
post-ecological frame of mind is constituted by an egoistic, exclusive 'hyper- 
materialism. ' The opportunity society is primarily concerned with individual 
accumulation and consumption. Entrepreneurial opportunism is justified by the belief in 
perpetual economic growth: that the population has 'disposable' income. 
These practices of individual security rather than the earlier focus on community have 
produced a "framework of neo-materialist, neo-authoritarian, and socially exclusive 
,, 667 security politics (that is) the post-ecologist frame of mind . Bliffidorn argues that 
ecological integrity and social inclusion has been factually abandoned by late modernity 
and that it is not viable for education to expect to develop a countering ecological frame 
of mind. Indeed, environmental studies may serve to promote the 'empty' Neoliberal 
version of 'sustainability' and depoliticise any attempts by students to think their way out 
of the contemporary individual, market orientation. For this reason "environmental 
education, particularly in the shape of education for sustainability, runs the risk of serving 
purposes to which it might be expected to be fundamentally opposed. iý668 
The implications of BRIM= and Devine's critique of Neoliberalism, is a requirement 
for reclaiming language and meaning; an honest appraisal of the state of late modemity's 
economic principles and a clear espousal of the integrated and dynamic relationship 
between individual subject, ecological community and culture. Perhaps it is a losing 
battle, to ask of education that we extract ourselves from the governing policy, 
curriculum, and directives of Neoliberalism on teacher education, and become a prime 
site for the exploration, the critique, and the development of thinking our way beyond 
Neoliberalism to an ethical relation between humanity and the environment. 
666 BlOhdom, 2002: 61 
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Oil 
Bliffidorn's analysis is firmly based in existing trends. But it is possible to speculate that 
the twin Liberal drives of freedom and security in the prevailing current of 'simulation' 
masks something further than the continuation of entrepreneurial individualism. The 
technological enframing of human culture has set alight the fastest consumption of oil to 
occur in ecological history. Oil generates the mass transportation that has made the 
globalisation of capitalist production and consumption possible. However, the supplies of 
oil in virtually every field across the globe that are easily accessible to western nations 
has peaked. As George Monbiot wrote in his 2003 article in the Guardian, "The Bottom 
of the Barrel, " 
On Thursday, the government approved the development of the biggest (north sea oil) 
deposit discovered in British territory for at least 10 years.... You begin to recognise how 
serious the human predicament has become when you discover that this 'huge' new field 
will supply the world with oil for five and a quarter days. 669 
In the USA, Texas oil peaked and began to subside in the 1970s, stimulating the first 'oil 
shock. ' The possibility of the exhaustion of oil drew attention to the finitude of 
environmental resources in general. North American oil shocks also created the 
conditions which promoted the OPEC group of countries as amongst the most 
economically and, increasingly, politically important nations in the world. 
In general most oil fields, in Alaska, Australia, parts of Africa and so forth are 
diminishing at a rate of between 4 and 6% per annum. 670 The subterranean pressure of the 
oil reservoirs will push oil out of the ground until the amount of oil has diminished to the 
point that there is no longer enough pressure. At this point the fields have 'peaked' and 
the oil must be pumped to the surface; slowing production, increasing costs and exposing 
the extent of diminishment of the 'resource. ' For a while North Sea oil made Great 
Britain self sufficient, however production peaked in the 1990s. It has dropped 17% since 
1998. 
There are six or seven nations left in production (although arguably Affica is an unknown 
quantity in these figures) with major supplies of oil; Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kurdistan, and 
669 Monbiot, 2003 
670 ExxonMobil, 2003 cited in PSRAST, 2004 
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Turkmenistan, in the Middle East and Kenya, Zimbabwe and Angola in Africa. Even 
when the present war in Iraq is over and the production and distribution of oil resumes, 
its major field is estimated to supply the world's oil needs for only four or five years. 
Shell is estimating that production costs will increase to such an extent that the resource 
is exhausted world-wide by 2020 - although in March 2004 Shell admitted that it has 
over-estimated its own established oil reserves by 20%. BP estimates exhaustion will 
occur some time between 2014 and 2018. Other experts in the US say 2017 and 
independent advice in Britain estimates as early as 2010 (although these estimates may be 
hiping the 'crisis' in the hope of re-igniting the price increases of the first oil shock in the 
1970s). ExxonMobil released the following graph of oil demand and field decline. 
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Oil is the undisputed 'driving force' of local and globalised economic interaction, and is 
increasingly impacting on 'security. ' The war in Iraq has been touted as a war upon 
Terror, yet the absentee 'weapons of mass destruction' have made a mockery of the 
67 ' ExxonMobil cited in PSRAST, 2004: 4 
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motives of the U. S. A and the U. K. Oil has commonly been held up as a major factor in 
the invasion. In Britain's "Energy Review" (2002) the decline in North Sea oil has meant 
that Great Britain is about to join the rest of the E. U. in having to import oil. They write, 
The future for energy policy seems likely to be much less benign.... issues of energy 
security are likely to become more important. The UK will become increasingly dependent on imported oil and gas.... most other G7 countries already rely substantially 
on imported energy. ... (One way to maintain security is) to use international action to 
address global threats to energy security. On just about any scenario the UK will become 
more dependent on imports both for both its gas and its 011.672 
Oil has enabled large scale, cheap transport that allows a majority of individuals in 
developed nations unprecedented movement between local and far distant communities 
and places. The global distribution of multinational industry relies completely on cheap, 
large scale transport. If the price of transportation of materials increases exponentially it 
will no longer make sense to build component parts in far-flung reaches of the globe. 
Unless the technology for a viable alternative is developed, the finale of the oil crisis will 
entail the return of localised material production. The end of the post-Fordist and 
'MacDonaldised' era of production and consumption may be in sight. 673 
Empire Building 
The new empire building of the increasingly monolithic United States has to be seen in 
the context of an increasingly powerful collegiality being built in the Olde World of 
Europe. The Cold War has changed axis. No longer aimed at those 'commie bastards'; 
the Russians, the Cubans, the Chinese and the Koreans, now 'Terrorist states' comprising 
of most of the Islamic Middle East, North Korea, and various other less interesting 
regions such as Venezuela and Zimbabwe, occupy the hot-headed President George 
Bush. 'The axis of evil' is clearly held in contempt as 'them' in opposition to 'us. ' 
'Regime change' is proposed for these nations, in the name of universal democracy. 
However, other huge conglomerate nations such as the European Union (already 
democratic) and China hold an ambiguous position in global politics because they present 
real competition and a potential economic threat to America's immensely privileged 
wealth and status. 
672 U. K. Cabinet Office, 2002 
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This polarisation has been fuelled by the more recent Iraq crisis manufactured by the 
father and son oil magnate Presidents of the United States, Georges Bush, senior and 
junior that continues today. Keeping the Middle East region unstable diverts attention 
from the vastly inequitable living conditions en oyed by developed and non-developed 
nations. Simultaneously, it destabilises two potentially very important political blocs - 
OPEC and, because of Tony Blair's 'defection' to the U. S. A. rather than United Nations; 
the EU is also fragmented. Oil wars are the perfect foil for building the U. S. Empire and 
destabilising any hint of political or economic unity between other states. 
This strategy also worked to divert attention away from the recent United Nations 
Environmental conference in Johannesburg. George Bush the second has pulled the 
U. S. A. out of the Kyoto Treaty, which aims to bring consumption and pollution levels 
down to their 1990 levels. This is truly dismaying as per capita the U. S. A. consumes by 
far the bulk of world commodities and consequently is also the greatest polluter. 
There is evidence that the White House forced the Environmental Protection Agency to 
water down its environmental survey published in June 2002. A four page internal memo 
complained that due to White House intervention the section on the human impact on 
climate change does not 'accurately represent' scientific consensus on climate change. 
The changes include removing sections on the ecological and health impact of global 
warming and deleting a summary that made clear Climate change will impact 
detrimentally on global human health and the environment. A graph that showed 
temperature records over the last 1000 years was also removed so that the recent and 
limited data has no context in the long term and slowly changing fluctuations of the 
earth's temperature. Effectively this has watered down the EPA message that Climate 
change is a very serious concern. The White House also inserted numerous qualifiers 
such as 'potentially' and 'may' so that the Environmental Protection Agency complained 
that - "Uncertainty is inserted where there is essentially none. 
" In the end the agency 
completely removed the section on global warming so as to avoid discrediting its own 
scientific community with the misinformation the White House was asking to be 
published. 
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The Iraqi war was ostensibly about security. But the cynicism of America in its attitude to 
wards the United Nations peace keeping role is palpable. In January 2001 George W. 
Bush said in relation to the undermining of the United Nations role in monitoring Iraq for 
6weapons of mass destruction; ' "Redefining the role of the United States from enablers to 
keep the peace to enablers to keep the peace from peacekeepers is going to be an 
assignment. " There was a rather obvious 'hidden agenda' of oil but of more importance 
the Iraqi war made an excellent opportunity to destabilize the coherence and political 
clout of both the Middle East and Europe. Only China and Asia are undisturbed 
monoliths left to compete with Bush's American Empire. It is not really a question of 
increasing the franchise of democratic 'freedom, ' although spreading freedom is the 
4reason' to destroy the Iraqi 'd'etat. ' 
Evidence for the overt undermining of existing pan-global organisations, especially the 
United Nations, are beginning to appear. George Bush's former treasury secretary Paul 
O'Neill claims the Republicans came into power intending to 'pre-empt' 'regime change' 
in Iraq, well before the 9/11 attack on Washington's twin towers and certainly with no 
evidence of 'weapons of mass destruction. ' There is a think-tank called Project for the 
New American Century that is run by vice-President Dick Cheney, defence secretary 
Donald Rumsfield, his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, the Governor of Florida - Bush's 
younger brother Jeb, and Cheney's deputy Lewis Libby. This think-tank has put out a 
document, referred to as a blueprint for US global domination, called "Rebuilding 
America's Defences: Strategies, Forces And Resources For A New Century. " The 
document is overt in its desire for more permanent role in Gulf regional security. And 
more ambitiously, they wish to maintain US global pre-eminence. This means overt 
policies aiming to 'preclude' the rise of a great-power rival, and to control 'international 
security' for American principles and interests. 
Rather than an Internationalist European Union or world global institutions like the 
United Nations, or the domination of world finances and politics by OPEC, the U. S. A. is 
positioning itself as the only pole for world domination. This project for global 
dominance probably explains why the United States has refused to join the World Court 
346 
(they refuse to be liable for international War Crimes) and has failed to ratify the Kyoto 
Agreement on Climate Change. 
The enframing of technology has challenged forth all aspects of culture and nature as 
objects and potential consumable resources. Ringer argues that the total mobilisation of 
war is the prevailing conditions for politics in modernity. To some degree, humanity has 
some agency over our collective interpretations, our discursive norms, the spread and 
manipulation of ideas, finance, goods and services. Heidegger argues that we need to 
return to the 'origin' of westem thinking in the ancient Greek awe at the arising ofphysis 
and aletheia for a more ethical relation between humanity and the environment, for 
conditions of survival - not of the fittest - but of integrated, interconnected assemblages, 
ecology of (an)organic life. Bliffidorn is pessimistic about education providing a shelter 
for reimagining the environment outwith the disguised Neoliberal discourse of 
objectification, resource, and consumption. Whether we can think our way out of the 
predicament of totalising technology, globalised capitalism, and rampant consumerism is 
open to question. 
Maintaining the combination of politics and economics that form the status quo is reliant 
upon an epistemology of categorisation, accountancy, calculation and rationality. 
Humanity is the vector of reproduction for technology. We have thus far allowed 
technology to take over our way of understanding ourselves and every other thing 
objectively as 'standing reserve. ' As it stands, the technological frame reduces all ways 
of knowing to the consumerist ethos of the market. At the moment the two greatest 
institutions for disseminating knowledge, the media and education, are both complicit in 
this technological paucity of metaphor and thinking. 
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13 Conclusion 
Byron, Darkness 
I had a dream, which was not all a dream. 
The bright sun was extinguish'd, and the stars 
Did wander darkling in the eternal space, 
Rayless, and pathless, and the icy earth 
Swung blind and blackening in the moonless air; 
Mom came and went--and came, and brought no day, 
And men forgot their passions in the dread 
Of this their desolation; and all hearts 
Were chill'd into a selfish prayer for light... 
Unknowing who he was upon whose brow 
Famine had written Fiend. The world was void, 
The populous and the powerful was a lump, 
Seasonless, herbless, treeless, manless, lifeless-- 
A lump of death--a chaos of hard clay. 
The rivers, lakes and ocean all stood still, 
And nothing stirr'd within their silent depths; 
Ships sailorless lay rotting on the sea, 
And their masts fell down piecemeal: as they dropp'd 
They slept on the abyss Without a surge-- 
The waves were dead; the tides were in their grave, 
The moon, their mistress, had expir'd before; 
The winds were wither'd in the stagnant air, 
And the clouds perish'd; Darkness had no need 
Of aid from them--She was the Universe. 674 
Byron's poem, "Darkness" elicits a nihilistic vision of a po-st-human epoch. Its power 
evokes the terrible horror of the sublime, and prompts a willingness to transforin from a 
path heading in this desolate direction, to alternative futures, and alternative presents. 
Awareness that there is a precipice; 'being-towards-death' in the language of Heidegger's 
Dasein, draws the present out of its mundane busyness, and brings our attention to the 
conditions of the possible. Becoming aware that there is a threshold to living Being opens 
up the present in a brand new light. Nihilism draws a line between the presence of Being 
and the conditions of Being. Eco-poetics is an attempt at retreat from the threshold of the 
darkness of nihilism. Nietzsche aims to make nihilism the catalyst for a transformation or 
metamorphosis. Heidegger believed that technology could be this catalyst too. Enframing 
674 Byron, 1816 
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everything, technology is the danger because it reduces both humanity and nature to a 
stored resource in the total mobilisation of consumerism. Yet in the enigmatic power of 
technology is the potential for Being to escape the ignorance of objectification and once 
become alive once more to the safety of Dasein'S enquiry. 
In the thesis I traced a genealogy of ideas from the Romantics, through environmentalism 
and environment education to show how the milieu of ideas has shaped both Heidegger's 
philosophy and contemporary society and environmental policy. In this conclusion I am 
framing the argument from the perspective of Heidegger's philosophy of Being, 
technology and Dasein. Rather than repeating the historical teleological narrative that 
structures the thesis, I want to conclude with the premise that technological enframing 
has brought us to the precipice of a terrible ecological disaster, and how Heidegger's 
perceptive philosophy could impact on contemporary politics and the underlying 
philosophy that inform educational policy and pedagogy. This may seem unsystematic, 
but I want to show stylistically how Heidegger's philosophy mounts a thorough challenge 
to contemporary and historical modernity. A genealogical reading of history is informed 
by the present moment as much as it describes an 'objective' past. My reading of 
environmental concerns has been through a dual lens: Heidegger's critique of modernity 
and the technological Gestell, and my own critique of Heidegger that gleans ideas from 
various Poststructuralist, environmental, educational and anthropological authors. 
In the first chapter on Heidegger, chapter 6,1 show how he took up the ideas of Spengler 
and Ringer in the 1930s to develop his concept of the total mobilisation and enframing of 
675 
the technological Gestell. Once atoms had been invented , technology made use of 
them, once wind patterns could be predicted, technology has converted it into power, 
once the oceans could be plumbed or the atmosphere penetrated, technology has found a 
utility factor and has continued to widen and better define the territories and spectrums of 
the resource unleashed. The discourse of sustainability relies upon several assumptions; 
that everything is measurable, that there is an acceptable threshold of anthropocentrically 
introduced carbon-monoxide (and other pollutants), and that every aspect of the planet, 
from people to electrons are all potential resource. No local community, let alone an 
675 The concept was around for well over 2 thousand years before it was 'proved. ' 
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individual has agency enough to alter the dominant paradigm of the enframing of 
technology. Through human policy making, increasingly on a global scale (and with little 
recourse to even a nod in the direction of democracy or community involvement) the 
technological frame is expanding its scope to include more and more regions of 
existence. 
The issue of environmental damage has changed the scope of ethical concerns in general 
and educative ethics in particular. The anthropocentric relation of humanity to 'the 
manifold' cannot continue without irreversibly destroying our habitat - in the same 
fashion as a deadly virus kills its host. Unfortunately (whether we would wish it or not) 
there are no alternative host planets available for terraforming and recolonising and so the 
peril of environmental devastation looms large on the horizon of world wide social 
organisation. 676 Technological enframing and environmental nihilism offers humanity the 
unique opportunity to attend and renegotiate our relationship with the rest of the planet. 
The danger, as I explained in chapters ten and eleven, is succumbing to the temptation for 
ever-increasing technological modes of control; a govemmentality of surveillance and 
management that stabilises the ecological system through calculations of quota systems; 
exchanges of costs and benefits; the assessment and insurance of risk, to create a 
totalising technological 'farm' for a planetary home. 
In short, to reduce our humanity to an object amongst objects, (or a subject amongst 
subjects) all ensnared by the calculation of total mobilisation - the 'end of history. ' As 
Baudrillard puts it, 
After having first been matter, and then energy, nature is today becoming an interactive 
subject. It is ceasing to be an object ... For the ultimate 
danger is that, in an interactivity 
build up into a total system of communication, there is no other, there are only subjects - 
and very soon, only subjects without objects... All our problems today as civilized beings 
originate here: not in an excess of alienation, but a disappearance of alienation in favor of 
a maximum transparency between subjects. An unbearable situation, all the more so for 
the fact that, in foisting on nature the status of a subject in law, we are also foisting on it 
all the vices of subjectivity, decking it out, in our own image, with a bad conscience, with 
nostalgia (for a lost object which, in this case, can only be us), with a range of drives - in 
particular, an impulse for revenge. The 'balance' we hear so much of in ecology ('out of 
676 Robinson, 1996 
350 
balance') is not so much that of planetary resources and the'r exploltatlon as the 
metaphysical one between subject and object. "' 
There is a tendency to offer technological fixes to what are perceived as technical 
environmental problems - such as bringing the extinct Tasmanian Tiger to life through a 
combination of genetically engineering the DNA and emplanting the embryo in another 
related species. The focus on the gratifying immediate consumer desires means that 
attempts to rescue environmentally detrimental situations with technological 'fixes' kick 
in past the point of no-retum. 
As I outlined in chapter seven, Heidegger is arguing for a reconfiguring of the 
relationship between humanity and the world and he conceptualises this through the 
special significance of the ability of Dasein to apprehend Being. Heidegger relegates the 
problem of nihilism to the corrosion of the originary force of this relationship into a rigid 
representation of the language as logos. He describes nihilism as the stagnation of our 
awareness of Being to an anthropocentric table of values. Pre-empting the Neoliberal 
takeover of Liberal terminology, Heidegger argues that it is this slippage into monetarist 
terms such as 'value, ' 'importance, ' 'weight, ' rather than 'care' and 'openness, ' that 
inevitably produces a logic of consumerism between humanity and beings- as-a-whol e. 
At the moment, economics and global capitalism is a process that reaches out and engulfs 
all nation states, and most regions of the earth. The land (along with crops, humans and 
animals), the oceans (fish and carbon sink), the forests (as wood, pulp and 'planetary 
lung'), the mineral deposits, the fresh drinking water, the atmosphere and even the 
stratosphere is incorporated into a resource base for the ever-widening scope of the 
technological mode of being. Everything is increasingly gardened or managed. 
The notion of the wild is so scarce it is getting lost from the language. Off the east coast 
of New Zealand, in the deepest and most remote oceans on the planet, plankton is being 
'fed' bargeloads of iron filings to help feed the fish food chain and redress some of the 
problems of over-fishing and species extinctions. An increase in plankton production also 
enables the ocean to operate better as a carbon sink and to absorb and compensate for 
677 Baudrillard 80-81 quoted in Oerlemans, 2002: 12 
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some of the planet's temperature increase. The 'balance' of nature (if ever there was one) 
is being inextricably altered by technological use, particularly by carbon fuels. According 
to the Smithsonian Institute there has been a 30% increase0f C02 in the atmosphere over 
the last 200 years. 678 The prevailing aim of environmentalism at present is 'crisis 
management. ' It aims to avoid the ecology of the planet being altered so radically that 
most living species would be made extinct, including humanity. Technological 
innovations will have to establish thresholds for a 'normal range, ' to actively intervene 
and manufacture a regular fluctuation and normative status quo. 
There is a long held view in polemical green politics, best put by Gregory Bateson, that 
the environment will withstand a great deal of thrashing, until eventually it reaches a 
point of no-return, the threshold, which, once crossed will produce unknown and 
potentially disastrous consequences in climate, oceans, seasonal rhythms, eco-systems, 
the sustainability of species, and inevitably mass extinctions of life forms and habitats. 
Crossing the threshold will produce the conditions ripe for an avalanche effect, where 
suddenly, the build up of greenhouse gases, global climate change and so forth will 
abruptly produce results, with an unpredictable chain of effects. The result could well 
resemble Byron's apocalyptic vision. Nobody knows precisely where the threshold lies, 
or what 'point of difference' will tip off the avalanche. This is the globalisation of 
environmental risk. 
Since the industrial revolution the connections between communities and place have 
become much more tenuous. As Marx points out, the industrial revolution has alienated 
people from their connections to their place, history, local resources and environment. 
Heidegger's argument about the enframing of technology pervades more and more the 
social relations of communities, their linguistic terminology, and relation to nature. 
In chapter six I explain Heidegger's critique of technology which emerged at the time of 
the building of the autobahn system, the damming of rivers for hydro- electricity, and the 
development of atomic bombs. The modem period marks a technological shift that allows 
the forced storage of potential resource, or standing reserve, rather than making the most 
678 Smithsonian Institute, 2004 
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of the energy released by the regular rhythms and tempo of the rivers' flow, the seasonal 
abundance of fruit, or the atom's unfettered participation In molecules. The scale of the 
technological challenge and capacity for long-term, mass storage has become 
increasingly disturbing in the 30 odd years since Heidegger's death. Technological 
4control' over an increasing spectrum of the earth pushes the ability to store into wider 
and wider realms. Irradiation is another example, whereby the molecular makeup of fruit 
and vegetables is changed so that it can be kept in massive silos for months rather than 
days. Storage and transportation have released reliance on local production and 
globalised an unparalleled network of consumer relations. Our alienated relation to 
natural seasons, and the ancient cycles of growth and decay has promoted the market 
metaphor of utility and resource to permeate all facets of life. Technological enframing 
encourages excessive consumption of fossil fuels, for example, despite the increasingly 
obvious environmental devastation to which these practices contribute. 
The final chapter in the Heidegger section takes a close look at Bowers application of 
Heidegger's critique of technology in the classroom. I try to distinguish between the 
technological enframing that intervenes in the phenomenological apprehension of 
environmental stimuli, the constraints of ICT technology on communication, and the 
parameters that are not technological but rather a product of the conceptual framework of 
modernity. Heidegger himself points out that technology presents the danger but also the 
saving power and this enigmatic statement has yet to fully realised or understood. 
The key then, to the very broad topic of this thesis is how to reconceptualise the relation 
between human subjects and the environment so that it both recognises the nominal 
Idealist distinction of interpretation and also integrates people into the ecosystem. The 
pressures of global warming are proving beyond doubt that humanity is not in a 
privileged and reified position as King of the beasts but is a component of a complex and 
infinitely interrelated system that constrains, reacts and changes in multitudinous, 
necessary but unpredictable ways. 
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Environmentalism, conservation, and transformation 
The thesis tracked the challenge to the Idealist separation of subject from object and the 
associated objectification and mastery of 'nature' back to the Romantics. I then looked at 
the variety of environmentalist theories in the canon. Environmental education reflects 
the many ideas in the canon and the specific needs and roles of education as an apparatus 
of the State. The sophistication in philosophy of education is having a very positive affect 
on philosophy of the environment, as educationalists have to engage with the existing 
praxis of global, national, regional and institutional policy, the curriculum, normative 
practices of pedagogy, the institutional architecture and physical grounds of schools. 
Great familiarity with both the promise and the 'failure' of schools as transforinative 
institutions lends a level of critical engagement with contemporary Neoliberal politics not 
found often in the environmental canon. 
Romanticism proffered a remarkable challenge to classical Idealist philosophy by 
articulating solipsism in connection with nature rather than what Heidegger calls 
'subjectivism' which privileges the processes of the mind over any 'reality' of the earth. 
The Romantics put even emphasis on the body, emotions, thought, economics, politics, 
gender relations and 'nature' as opposed to the tradition of philosophical Idealism, who 
privilege rational and universal categorisation. The result is a shift away from God's 
Invisible Hand authorising hierarchical feudalism towards an ironic, pluralist and 
egalitarian body politic. The Romantics reinvented nature from the Classical rigor of a 
rational God-given order to a more allegorical receptiveness that invokes an emotional 
and poetic reciprocity that challenges the nominalist fallacy while maintaining the 
irrevocable 'otherness' between nature and human. A solipsism that does not get reduced 
to self satisfied subjectivism. A sublime materialism that transcends the closed system of 
language and reverberates with 'the real. ' 
The Romantics, like the Luddites (but without rejecting technology outright), realised 
that industrialism was changing the relationship between human society and the land. 
They raised the issue of conservation and coal pollution in the face of the enclosure of the 
commons into fenced and privatised pasture and the clearances of the Highlands for 
lucrative sheep farming. The industrialisation of farming was irrevocably changing the 
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politics, economics and beauty of the landscape. At the earliest stages of technological 
industrialism they could only predict the pressing concerns of population explosion, 
chemical pollution, waste, energy scarcity, resource depletion, desert' fication, mass 
species extinctions, greenhouse gas emissions, and climate warming. 
Despite the Romantic critique in the 18 th century, modem Idealism and associated 
rational and objective positivism has remained the dominant paradigm that informs the 
way western society is organised. In the environmental canon two conflicting genealogies 
of ideas occur, often present in a confused conglomeration in the same edited collection, 
and even the same author. Neopragmatism is a good example of this. On the one hand 
Hume and the Romantics influence the original Pragmatists, Dewey, Pierce, and 
Jameson, on the status of truth and the relationship between subject and object. Yet 
contemporary Pragmatists also subscribe to rational liberal Utilitarianism, a straight 
forward acceptance of the Idealist divide between subject and object, the constraints to 
truth posed by the nominalist fallacy and an associated 20th century antagonism towards 
theory. 
The environmentalists engage with the natural environment in a variety of ways ranging 
from the poetic; such as Leopold, Heidegger, and the Deep Ecologists, scientific; like 
Rachel Carson, the Utilitarian and Neopragmatists; Light, Katz, Buchholz and company, 
legal rights; Christopher Stone, the anthropologist; Gregory Bateson, constructivist; 
Feenberg, Critical theorist; Tim Luke, Heideggerians; Bonnett, Bowers, and 
Poststructuralists; Guattari, Deleuze. There are two major responses to environmental 
damage: firstly, inventing new technologies will fix whatever problems industrial 
technology has created; secondly, a light environmental 'footprint' and a more ecological 
relationship between humanity and environment. 
Environmental education has engaged with the gamut of ideas in the philosophy of 
environment canon. In turn, educational norms have shaped environmental education. As 
an apparatus of the Liberal Capitalist State, education tends to reproduce the prevailing 
norrns and positivist methodology that continues to dominate educational pedagogy and 
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curriculum. But education has a transformative as well as normative role. Environmental 
education struggles at the interface of these two, often conflicting, roles for education 
The promise of egalitarian transformation was seen as education's main responsibility, 
especially during the 1970s to the I 990s. The 'failure' of education to encourage more 
success and social mobility amongst working class children has been blamed largely on 
the teaching profession - hence the rhetoric that has continued since the late 1990s of 
'failing' schools. During the Keynesian period of anticipation for egalitarian 
transfonnation, environmental education emerged at its most radical and hopeful but it 
was an extremely marginalised discourse and hardly made an impact on the curriculum. 
The disillusionment with the transformative powers of education to fulfil the egalitarian 
promise of democracy combined with the overt greed of the Neoliberal subject; the 
rational individual utility maximiser, has undermined the final purpose of the sociology 
of education as all analysis gets co-opted by the capitalist economic project. 
Environmental education has followed a similar trajectory, from the transfon-native hope 
of the plethora of texts in the late 1980s such as the World Wildlife Fund sponsored texts 
by Greig, Pike and Selby to the more cynical education for sustainability proposed by 
environmental educationalists such as the Bath School. Guattari and later, Bliffidorn both 
decry the emptying of metaphors by the Neoliberal paradigm which reduces all meaning 
to a matter of economics. But radical transformation is far from dead. Environmental 
educationists who are influenced by Poststructuralism, Critical Neomarxism, and 
Heidegger are all advocating, in subtly different ways, a deepening of the egalitarianism, 
the enlightened critical thinking, and the allegorical relationship between human society 
and the environment. 
Idealism, and Societies of Control 
Part of Heidegger's thesis stems from the critique of the over-emphasis on the subject in 
philosophical western Idealism. Heidegger's precursor, Schopenhauer describes "The 
World as my Idea"679 explaining that the inevitable divide between subject and object 
means that humanity relies upon images, or representations to develop truths about an 
679 Schopenhauer, vol. 11, chapter 1, cited in Heidegger, 1968a: 40 
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object. We think representations. Our representations present us with a world. Heidegger 
is critical of representation as the mediating factor between Dasein and Being, subject 
and nature which privileges the 'Idea' of the subjectivist mind. But he agrees that 
dominant ways of knowing 'world' in particular epochs. In late modernity technology is 
'worlding. ' The enframing of technology has permeated our understanding of the world 
and ourselves, and shapes our bodies, actions, language, and thinking. The enframing of 
technology has produced globalisation as consumerism and goverrimentality. Effectively 
the enframing of technology has 'de-coupled' the integrity of communities (or nation 
states) from the constraints of the rhythms and flows of their local ecological niche. 
Education is grappling to find meaningful human interactions within the constraints of 
technological enframing. In the 1970s and 1980s environmental education attempted to 
create ethical awareness based on an understanding of the crisis of nihilism and 
environmental devastation as a catalyst for an epistemological shift. Like Heidegger, 
Leopold, Bateson and Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, environmental education is an 
attempt at a form of 'redemptive' ethics. 
A countervailing force has seen 'environmental education' being shifted away from 
politically engaged, ethical concerns, towards 'education for sustainability. ' While 
recognising the nihilist environmental threshold for the maintenance of life, the discourse 
of 'sustainability' has emptied any moral content from the environmental debate and tried 
to replace it with economic calculations of cost, benefit and risk analyses. The economic 
model owes a debt to scientific positivism, or 'objectivity' that apparently does not rely 
on subjective representations, so much as the statistically verifiable Truth of the matter. 
The representation of correctitude as truth has been held under some suspicion by 
contemporary educationalists for several decades. Contemporary education prefers to 
hold itself sceptically aloof from a finally verifiable truth, shows instead a multitudinous 
presentation of views which approaches the same subject from a variety of angles (again, 
often the 'plural' perspectives lend themselves to critical assertion of the most correct 
interpretation). 
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In his first lecture series upon being allowed to resume teaching, "at is Called 
Thinking? (1968, orig. 1954), Heidegger addressed the problem of the separation between 
subjective interpretation and the 'reality' of the object through representation . 
680 When 
we stand in front of a tree in blossom, no representation can possibly acknowledge the 
full significance of smells, sighs and rustles, the dappled light, the patter of branches, the 
multitude of leaves and petals... Nor does representation, especially in its form of the 
calculating logos of rationality, begin to approach the process of thinking. Heidegger 
wants to direct our attention to the emergence of thinking, before the categorisation of 
what presents itself to our view is named by language; the treeness of the 'tree, ' the 
poetic apprehension of perfumed blossom, mulchy soil, and oxygenated air that is lost in 
the linguistic system of representations. 
To discover "at is Called Thinking? Heidegger draws connections between language, 
meaning and empirical environment. Heidegger asks us to stand before a tree in bloom. 
To stand face to face with the tree. It is a meeting, a relation, both tree and human are. At 
this stage it is not a thinking about, or a rational calculation and picking apart of the 
elements of the tree. The meeting is a leap out of the realm of science and philosophy. 
What occurs is - "A curious, indeed unearthly thing that we must first leap onto the soil 
on which we already stand. . )68 1 Heidegger's concept of Being 'shining forth' is 
reminiscent of Wordsworth's romantic poem, to requote it again; "There is an active 
principle alive in all things ... All 
beings have their properties which spread/ Beyond 
themselves, a power by which they make/ Some other being conscious of their life. 11682 
Heidegger suggests, "The tree offers us food for thought. Somehow, the tree presents 
itself to us - and we can ask whether it be to our consciousness, our soul, our experience, 
or world? Is the tree in our head? 1683 
Like the Romantics, Heidegger assumes there is a certain ordering that underlies all 
things. It is not chaos, mayhem or disarray, but an undisclosed arrangement that produces 
the entities that shine forth. During Wordsworth's time, Edmund Burke developed a 
680 Heidegger, 1968a 
68 1 Heidegger, 1968a: 41 
682 Wordsworth, 1798: 676, cited In Nichols, 2001b: 17 
683 Heidegger, 1968a: 42 
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philosophy of the sublime and the beautiful, which permeated life beyond the merely 
human. The Copernican Revolution had shifted humanity from our central position on a 
finite and flat earth, as the image of God, at the peak of the Great Chain of Being. 
Scholars like Goethe and Erasmus Darwin took Ancient Greek ideas about the inter- 
related flow of atoms, a holistic metaphor for the universe, and posited the connections as 
passions and intellect in all aspects of Being, from the pairing of swans, to the attraction 
of magnetism. Since the 18 th century and prevailing in the Neoliberal management at 
global and national level, the integration of all things has disintegrated into minutely 
classified fields of expertise under scientific positivism. Now the prevailing 
understanding of ecological systems ignore emotion and intellect in favour of the 
economics of ecology - sustainability as technological enframing. There are objects, 
movements, power relations, but no thinking. 
Paradoxically, at the same point that the modem individual became free and exerts more 
mastery over nature than ever before, there is an absence of agency about the enframing 
of technology. Humans lose all subjectivity and become objects amongst objects. Just at 
the moment of total mobilisation, of total environmental control, humanity has lost 
something ineffable. The tree has to be understood as wood, as a resource, as a 
consumable commodity. Under the planetary horizon of total mobilisation both tree and 
person become objects amongst objects. How then, do we let the tree stand where it 
stands? How do we simply stand before it? If all nominal categorisations emerge from 
rational deduction, then 'intrinsic nature' is unspeakable. 
Adorno comments, "If thought really yielded to the object, if attention were on the object, 
,, 684 
not on its category, the objects would start talking under the lingering eye. There are 
two apparently incommensurate themes emerging; the first is the critique of subjectivism 
and the categorisation of nominal representations. The second is the physical, empirical 
entities, in holistic ecological relation, independent of language. Truth is initially 
attributed to the subject's participation in the language game. Heidegger's important 
684 Adomo 1973: 27-28 
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enquiry is about how 'the real' erupts into language in the first place. Heidegger looks to 
poetry to evoke the Being from hidden concealment and allow it to 'shine forth' into the 
light of the subject, Dasein'S apprehension. 
The second broad theme is also about the patterns and underlying structure of ecology. 
This time it is dryly scientific; the strata, networks, interlocutions within and between 
identifiable systems of integrity. It is cliaracterised, according to Heidegger, by the 
Gestell of technological enframing. Humanity is still trapped in the closed circuit of 
subjectivist representation, yet now we ourselves are included in the categorisations and 
governmentality of technology. We are objects amongst objects, and determined by the 
'worlding' of the technological frame. Deleuze and Guattari (1999) evoke 'lines of flight' 
to escape the prevailing closed circuitry of schizophrenic capitalism. Yet they too, find it 
difficult to cross from the empirical domain of tongues, cheeks, teeth, spittle, expelling 
air, volume, to the linguistic domain of meaning. The line of flight is either a thin chain 
of molecules that reaches between the subject and the object, or is recaptured by the 
nominalist fallacy, and the subjectivist reference to pre-existing categorisations of 
meaning. Gregory Bateson (1979) looks to the way birds and animals understand pattern 
rather than counting in their communication and use of tools. The patterns of repetition 
and difference reach between the two distinct domains of empiricism and meaning 
ontology and epistemology. Heidegger's reference to poetry does not closely examine 
pattern, style and meter but clearly these are important elements of poetry, music and art. 
The eco-poetic movement is a subtle epistemological shift away from accountancy, and 
the volume and measurement of mass storage, mass consumerism, and the paucity of 
Neoliberal metaphor towards an open receptiveness, a respectful aptitude for existence - 
as life, as Being, as Dasein. 
Of course education cannot abandon the norms, the policy directives, the curriculum 
requirements, the timetables, exams and endless paperwork that provide 'accountability' 
and surveillance. Heidegger accepted education as Gleichschaltung, the bringing together 
of political directives and educational aims. He did not see that this necessarily engaged 
with positivist governmentality, and tried to elevate the educational side of the 
association into a leadership position rather than locate education as necessarily 
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conservative institutions, that reproduce societies' prevailing discourses, economic 
structures and vocational possibilities. It seems to me that Heidegger accepted 
education's self understanding as operating on lines of meritocracy, producing the future 
leaders of society who would rise through the ranks, learn to become philosopher Kings 
through exposure to a vital and relevant curriculum, who could demonstrate their prowess 
both within the institutional structure and out in the political world. Sadly, Heidegger's 
experience demonstrates how flawed a belief this can be. It is easy to put this down to the 
peculiar political and economic conditions of Nazi Germany, or to the inadequacies of 
Heidegger's philosophy, or his skills as a teacher. But despite the criticism that the Volk 
movement levelled at the individualism and greed of Britain, and the totalising levelling 
of Russia, Germany's Third Way remained within the rubric of modernity. Heidegger 
took pedagogy very seriously. Most of his books after Being and Time were first written 
as lectures. He recognised that teaching requires as much, if not more, openness to 
learning by the teacher as the student. 685 Thus, we need to regard educational institutions 
in the context of their modem emergence, as part of the historical equipment of modem 
governmentality - and not expect them to operate as an apparatus for generating the 
transformation necessary to move to a post-modem world, or at least not in isolation. In 
his much more careful, even bitter, post-war works, Heidegger only requires education to 
encourage the conditions of readiness for new ways of thinking and enquiring into the 
relationship, the patterns, the differences and repetitions between human beings and 
Being. 
At the moment, education is deeply engrossed in the busy pursuit of producing docile 
bodies, increasing human capital, assessing students on curriculum aimed at vocational 
'skills. ' Yet education will never simply be subservient to political exigencies. There is 
something irreducible about pedagogy. No matter how tightly controlled curriculum 
documents and assessment procedures become, even with the intervention of computers 
and distance learning, embodied teachers will still 'stand' before their students. As I 
argued in chapter nine, both teachers and students will present each other with the 
complexities of their physical, emotional, sexual, aesthetic health, aptitude, resistance, 
685 Heidegger, 1968a, chapter 3 
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style, and comportment. They will engage and communicate with one another and with 
their politico-ecological surroundings. 
Extra to the eternal busyness demanded by Neoliberal education policy, are the demands 
of ecology. Eco-philosophy can at this stage, only begin to make its needs heard; enlarge 
the niche; people the environment with its diverse networks of inclusive and exclusive 
demands. The difficulties with new existentialities, new ways of being and thinking, are 
that they feel frightening and unspeakable. For most teachers there is a range of responses 
to globalised capitalism, from a belief in modem progress to an inability to verbalise their 
informed and overwhelming fear of cataclysmic devastation that continuing capitalism 
entails. Furthermore, in a society that accentuates economic efficiency and positivist 
accountability, whole hearted environmentalism seems wishy washy, vague, 
unfashionable and unattainable. 
George Monbiot tries to rally political action by recognising the cultural reluctance of the 
British to be uncivilised, immoderate or reckless. Political activism is somehow 
perceived as irresponsible. But Monbiot points out, taking to the streets and speaking 
aloud our dissent does have political results, although they may not be immediate. 
Political dissent disables some pathways that had been considered possible; Monbiot 
advocates getting rid of Blair for war crimes in Iraq. He writes 
British politics is still bound by the spell of Gladstone and Churchill. Every prime 
minister attempts to emulate them. To be a statesman, you need a world stage on which to 
strut, and if you don't have one, you must borrow it from someone who does. This is why 
the 'special relationship' persists. The establishment might break Blair, but it Will not 
break the spell. Only the people can do that. If we dispose the prime minister through 
direct action, he will doubtless be succeeded by someone almost as bad, but the political 
context in which that someone operates will have changed. 
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Felix Guattari wrote a book, Three Ecologies that discusses the network, or 'rhizome' of 
green politics. 687 While the overarching framework of capitalism presents itself as a 
totalising force, taking over educational policy and practice, and controlling the bulk of 
the mass media, the web of connections is always prone to disruption and drastic change. 
Capitalism has no inevitable telos, yet disrupting the unfolding of technological 
686 Monbiot, 2004 
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consumerism is demanding. The rhizome might have continuities and patterns, but it also 
produces completely new possible frameworks for existence. This 'resIngulari sing' of the 
territories of education insists that reconceptuali sing the framework of society outside of 
global capitalism and its religion of consumerism is possible and that it is our 
responsibility as educators to invigorate the lines of escape. Guattari writes of the 
difficulty of enunciating new ways of acting and being; 
At the heart of all ecological praxes there is an a-signifying rupture, in which the catalysts 
of existential change are close at hand, but lack expressive support from the assemblage 
of enunciation; they therefore remain passive and are in danger of losing their 
consistenCy. 688 
Vectors of dissent open up the possibility of real change in surprising, often frightening 
ways. The process of change is inevitable and disrupts from any systematic attempt at 
stable management: capitalist or otherwise. The chaos of the unexpected is continuously 
present and unaccounted for. A philosophy of environmental education involves anxiety, 
guilt, and pathologies associated with leaving behind the known arrangement of societies' 
relations of consumption, production and greed in regard to the surrounding planet. 
Students sometimes seem better able to enunciate these fears and hopes perhaps because, 
as yet, they have less 'invested' in the current system. 
Technological enframing has decoupled the community from integration in the local 
environment. Early industrial modernity enclosed and privatised the commons, evicting 
communities from their traditional lands in favour of more profitable pursuits. Late 
modernity incorporates the enclosure of the commons, but is characterised by the 
network. Factories have been transformed by global corporatism. Information 
technologies and cheap transport make possible globalised industrial production, and a 
global diaspora of advertising and consumerism. Taylorist methods of production still 
prevail, but the location of resourcing, manufacture, management, ownership and 
consumerism has become global in scale. Since the 1970s, the realisation that resources 
are finite, and that consumerism in the west is largely saturated has driven globalisation 
and Neoliberal govemmentality. Technology has diminished the problem of distance and 
the dialectic of industrialisation between owners of capital and their workers has 
688 Guattan, 2001: 45 
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expanded beyond the borders of the nation state. The Keynesian settlement has likewise 
been disrupted as major corporations make governments bid for their employment 
opportunities by lowering taxes and making favourable legal conditions for the 
exploitation of human capital. 
In the final chapter I describe Bldhdorn's argument that education is not able to counter 
the Neoliberal era of post-ecology. 689 Education for sustainability is likely to simply 
reinforce the market metaphor that confuses ecology with efficiency, sustainability with 
reproduction of resources and thresholds with insurable risk. 
Globalisation is spreading institutions into new locations, wide and far, as well as 
injecting international clientele into educational institutions. The deference, protection, 
funding and regulation that connects educational institutions to the particular nation state 
is transforming. Education still holds on desperately to meaningfulness by producing 
endless docile bodies that have 'skills' designed to transfer easily from one field of 
employment to another. Education has adapted admirably to its role in the era of 
transnational postmodernity, where the casualisation of labour has uprooted and made 
mobile employees on a new and enormous scale. Vocationalism is thoroughly embedded 
in schools, colleges and universities as their reason dWre. So what happens to education 
when society finally shifts the basis of meaning from economic 'growth' and conspicuous 
consumption towards a notion of environmental care? 
The superstructure of capitalist production as it was analysed by Marx will fundamentally 
shift. At the moment education is seen as the vulnerable appendage of a state apparatus, 
only existent on any national scale due to the Keynesian settlement. Neoliberal theories 
of minimalising the state tend on the one hand, to categorise education as the result of 
years of provider capture, where teachers have unethically expanded their clientele and 
their power base. On the other hand, the utility of education is fundamental and must be 
universal in order to protect property owning citizens by keeping poor and delinquent 
children off the streets and normalising children into law-abiding individuals who have 
added value to their potential utility on the market. Under Neoliberal regimes, the 
689 Bliffidom, 2002 
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'knowledge economy' is becoming one of the biggest 'growth' industries. The older 
Enlightenment expectation that education offers egalitarian opportunity is combining 
with the Neoliberal rhetoric of 'human capital, ' post-tertiary educational institutions are 
seeing an unprecedented privatisation of funding during the same period that expansion 
of student numbers peak. 
The matrix of the pedagogical enterprise at present is a combination of democratic ideals 
of citizenship, adding value to students' human capital, and vocationalism. This may shift 
emphasis profoundly when ecological philosophies define the relationship between state, 
institution, and teacher/ student interaction. The philosophy of environmental education 
offers a far more optimistic view of the ethical role and position of education nationally 
and globally. Heidegger's emphasis on the meaningfulness of the relationship between 
Dasein and Being puts an entirely different weight on education. Nietzsche, Deleuze, and 
Guattari recontextualise humanity in connection with the anorganic life of the planet. 
Both these philosophies disrupt economic growth and consumerism as the founding 
principle for organizing global society. Environmental education has the potential to 
teach out of awareness and care. It can attempt to scientifically measure the deterioration 
of planetary conditions conducive to life, and create a philosophical approach that opens 
radical new questions about the scope and role of humanity in relation to our surrounding 
universe. Education is a critically important site for these changes in attitude, for 
transforming norms, and the ensuing changes in societal structure take place. 
It remains to be seen whether pollution, exhaustion, and effects of global warming will be 
so severe that the so called 'balance' of environmental conditions will prevail, thus 
ensuring the maintenance of diverse animal species as has existed upon the planet up 
until now. But in all likelihood even a massive 'extinction' such as wiped out the 
dinosaurs will not annihilate all life from the planet (until the sun eventually bums the 
earth to a cinder). Hundreds of species of dinosaurs died out during the last mass 
extinction but many species of plants, insects, lizards, and mammals survived and from 
them a plethora of new life emerged. 
365 
Nevertheless, as far as a human friendly habitat is concerned, problems with pollution 
and global warming are forcing us to rethink philosophical assumptions of the Idealist 
separation of subject from object, human culture from nature. This thesis is an attempt to 
move beyond the frame of modernity and create an eco-philosophy. It involves an 
immanent recognition of the real, and making a decision to act upon that recognition. 
Heidegger is particularly important to this endeavour because he began to frame the right 
questions. The Utilitarians want to know "is it good for the greatest number of people? " 
the Pragmatists ask "'how can we fix it? " the Critical Theorists demand to know, "how is it 
powerful and whose purpose does it serve? " the Neoliberals only want to know "how 
much will it make us richer? " Heidegger asks, "what is the question of Being? " The 
scope of the question is of paramount importance. It sets up the beginning of an enquiry 
that is worthwhile enough to pursue. That scope invites an amplification in thinking. And 
thinking is not popular. It is political and risky. Finally we need to ask, questioningly, 
about his term 'Being. ' As Heidegger indicates, it is the questioning itself that is most 
fruitful. 
Ecology as the philosophical basis of human endeavour cannot be confined to an isolated 
subject area in the educational syllabus. It constitutes an approach to subjectivity, to 
politics, to economics, to biology and geology, to physics, chemistry, aesthetics, and to 
progress and change. A philosophy of the environment challenges the framework of 
education in the same way as it alters society itself. Resistance to this conceptual 
realignment is strong, and conformity to market and consumerist norms continues to 
dominate the policy, practise and physical locality of education throughout the globe. But 
the challenge to resituate education as a site of positive and creative change that will 
nurture future generations and the future of the planet is also strong. It is not an either/ or 
dialectical situation, but a case of reterritoriali sing the conceptual framework of our 
minds. We cannot abandon the repressive system of de-localised and alienating 
capitalism at will. Resorting to a nationalistic Romanticisation of 'home and hearth' as 
Heidegger did is not the answer. But opening up alternative nomadologies, rhizomes of 
inter-relating might encourage ethical styles of human communication and being in 
relation with global ecology - that might technologically store to a certain extent, while 
restraining from total mobilisation, remaining cognizant of the necessary rhythms and 
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cadences of anorganic life. Through education we can create the readiness, the conditions 
of possibility, for change to emerge - for a new world. 
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